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1. Introduction  
 
Children are actively present online at an increasingly young age. It is estimated, that 
two in every ten internet users in the EU are under the age of 181 and children start using diverse 
internet-enabled devices, such as tablets and smartphones, when they are still infants.2 As the 
internet has become “embedded, embodied and everyday”3, the online and the offline are now 
seamlessly intertwined for children. The digital space is “just another setting in which they 
carry out their lives”4. 
Although the online playground does not offer the nostalgia-ridden outdoor pleasures 
associated with a happy childhood, such as splashing in puddles, making daisy chains and 
climbing trees, children nevertheless enjoy exciting opportunities online. They create, learn, 
self-express, experiment with relationships and identities and thereby developing as persons in 
the own right. Online services provide unprecedented benefits. For example, first, self-
representation  through the sharing personal life details with others and the forming an 
identity(ies).5 Second, self-tracking which allows children to control their performance and 
self-improvement.6 Third, playing videogames encourages children to develop their math, 
spatial reasoning, logic and readings skills.7 And finally fourth, more generally children’s 
involvement with digital media helps them to exercise their rights to information, education 
and participation.8 Yet, there are also possible negative ramifications associated with active 
online engagement which put children’s wellbeing and rights at risk.9 Such risks can be broadly 
                                                
1   Sonia Livingstone, John Carr and Jasmina Byrne, ‘One in Three: Internet Governance and Children’s Rights’ 
Global Commission on Internet Governance Paper Series No. 22, 2015. 
2   Donell Holloway, Lelia Green and Sonia Livingstone, Zero to eight: young children and their internet use. EU 
Kids Online, LSE London, UK, 2013. See also OFCOM report on the empirical data collected in the UK, which 
shows that 16% of 3-4 year old children have their own tablet, and this number doubles for 5-7 year olds. 
OFCOM, Children and parents: media use and attitudes report 2016, 3 February 2017, available at: 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-and-data/media-literacy-research/childrens/children-parents-nov16  
3   Christine Hine, Ethnography for the Internet: Embedded, Embodied and Everyday. London: Bloomsbury, 2015. 
4   Amanda Third et al., ‘Children's Rights in the Digital Age: A Download from Children Around the World’, 
Young and Well Cooperative Research Centre, Melbourne, 2014, 8. 
5   Theresa Sauter, ‘What’s on your mind?’ Writing on Facebook as a tool for self-formation. New Media & 
Society 16(5): 823–839, 2014. Alice E. Marwick, The public domain: social surveillance in everyday life. 
Surveillance & Society 9(4): 378–393, 2012. 
6   Deborah Lupton, The Quantified Self: A Sociology of Self-tracking. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016. Deborah 
Lupton, Digital bodies. In: Andrews D, Silk M and Thorpe H (eds) Routledge Handbook of Physical Cultural 
Studies. London: Routledge, 200–208, 2017. 
7   Brecht Vandenbroucke, How Videogames Like Minecraft Actually Help Kids Learn to Read, 10 September 
2014, availabe at: https://www.wired.com/2014/10/video-game-literacy/ 
8   Sonia Livingstone, Reframing media effects in terms of children’s rights in the digital age. Journal of 
Children and Media 10(1): 4–12, 2016. 
9   There are many different clasifications of online privacy risks. For an overview see D. Haynes and L. 
Robinson, Defining User Risk in Social Networking Services. Aslib Journal of Information Management, 
67(1), 94-115, 2015. The EDPS has summarized the risks specifically for children as follows: “The growing 
use of the digital environment by children and the constant evolution of that environment pose new data 
protection and privacy risks (…). Such risks include, amongst others, misuse of their personal data, the 
unwanted dissemination of their personal profile on social networking sites, their growing use of geo-location 
services, their being increasingly directly subject to advertising campaigns and to serious crimes such as child 
abuse. These are particular risks that must be addressed in a manner appropriate to the specificity and 
vulnerability of the category of individuals at risk”. EDPS (2012), Opinion on the Communication from the 
2 
 
framed as having two distinct dimensions: the first is the intense and pervasive personal data 
processing by companies (the user to company dimension) and the second being personal data 
misuse by other users (the user to user dimension). It is important to clarify that in reality the 
picture is more complicated. There could also be a third hybrid dimension which would cater 
for grey areas such as those related the potential fallibility of security protocols and the storage 
of personal data which may have both a user (criminal) to company and user (criminal) to user 
dimensions or a combination thereof. Although commercial data collection is a predominant 
feature online, personal data is also processed by public institutions and law enforcement 
agencies. The key point is that in practice the delineation of the dimensions is complicated but 
that for the purposes of this dissertation the line can be drawn given the particular purpose of 
the study. 
As to the first dimension, the digital space is increasingly data-driven, hyper-connected 
and commercialised.10 To be fully present and to interact with friends and commercial service 
providers via wearable and mobile devices or social media platforms, children often disclose 
their personal data. Such disclosure can occur intentionally or unintentionally inter alia when 
children sign up for online services, such as games or chats, or share their pictures on social 
media. Indeed, data collection online has become ubiquitous and remains often unnoticed: 
behaviour data, such as the websites visited, the words typed or even the mouse movements, 
can be easily collected via cookies, web beacons or through the increasingly used cross-device 
tracking techniques.11 Also, the rise of Internet-connected devices, such as smart toys or 
wearable devices, allows for the continuous generation data which can be harvested for 
commercial interests and used to take decisions about individuals, including children. 
Collection of meta-data, such as the device type, usage or location data, by app providers is 
another relevant example of possible unnoticed data disclosure. Empirical research has 
demonstrated pervasive tracking occurring in the apps used by children.12 The use of data 
analytics to infer new data and correlations from collected behavioural and meta-data has 
further amplified datafication.  
As the second dimension reveals, increased data disclosures and sharing online might 
bring privacy issues not only due to the monetisation of data by companies but also due to 
potential data misuse and harms inflicted between individuals. Media outlets regularly report 
on cases related to the victimisation of internet users  through the posting of personal details or 
indeed how such posts can go viral in the online setting thereby leaving individuals helpless to 
control their negative impact.13 This can result in potential reputational loss, psychological 
                                                
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions - "European Strategy for a Better Internet for Children", 17 July 2012, para. 7. 
10  Simone van der Hof, I Agree, or Do I: A Rights-Based Analysis of the Law on Children's Consent in the 
Digital World, 34 Wis. Int'l L.J. 2016. 
11  More on the latest tracking techniques and their potential impact on consumers see FTC Staff Report, Cross-
Device Tracking, January 2017, available at: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/cross-
device-tracking-federal-trade-commission-staff-report-january-2017/ftc_cross-device_tracking_report_1-23-
17.pdf  
12  Irwin Reyes et al., Is Our Children’s Apps Learning?” Automatically Detecting COPPA Violations, 2017, 
available at: http://eprints.networks.imdea.org/1557/1/conpro.pdf (the authors discovered that “over 80% of 
the apps potentially used by children use at least one tracking service, as opposed to 65% of the apps falling 
in other app categories”. The authors showed that 19 popular and highly-ranked children games had even 
more than 10 third-party tracking and advertising domains, p. 6) 
13  See e.g. MijnkindOnline, How ONE stolen Twitter profile picture resulted in a worldwide smear campaign, 
available at: http://mijnkindonline.nl/artikelen/how-one-stolen-twitter-profile-picture-resulted-in-a-
worldwide-smear-campaign. Tiziana Cantone: Suicide following years of humiliation online stuns Italy," 
BBC News, 16 September 2016. Jorg Leijten, "ROC hoeft niet mee te werken aan onderzoek seksfilmpje," 
NRC, 21 September 2016. Paul Farrel, "Nude photos of Jennifer Lawrence and others posted online by 
alleged hacker," The Guardian, 1 September 2014. Jayme Poisson, Teen facing charges for alleged online 
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harm and other stressful experiences. Such cases range from violations of data protection law, 
e.g. publication of photos without individual’s consent, to other crimes closely related to 
personal data disclosure such as defamation, cyberharassment, cyberbullying, or online 
impersonation. Academic research confirms the occurrence of violations related to personal 
data misuse on an individual level listing the hacking of social media accounts, creation of fake 
profiles, and impersonation as actual situation that upset children online.14  
The impact of commercial datafication and dataveillance on children cannot (yet) be 
fully envisioned today.15 Equally, academics are still trying to map and understand the extent 
of harm arising from online risks posed by the interaction between individuals.16 Nontheless, 
the explosive data-intensity and online collection undoubtedly contribute to the growth of 
online privacy risks, such as commercial exploitation and misuse of personal data, profiling, 
identity theft, the loss of reputation and discrimination. Therefore, it is no surprise that this has  
intensified debates and research about the impact of the described practices on children and 
their fundamental rights, especially the rights to privacy and personal data protection, among 
the general public, scholars, and policy makers.  
The research with children suggests that children are not at ease online and feel that 
companies try to confuse them when collecting their personal data.17 In addition, empirical 
studies show that privacy risks are common on the internet18 and privacy concerns constitute 
one of the main worries among children in Europe.19 In the same vein, adults widely support 
the introduction of  special data protection measures for children. According to a 
Eurobarometer survey, 95% of Europeans believed that “under-age children should be 
specially protected from the collection and disclosure of personal data” and 96% thought that 
“minors should be warned of the consequences of collecting and disclosing personal data”.20 
Whereas at first, studies focused on gathering empirical evidence on online safety and 
online risks, with time, legal scholars became interested in the implications of these risks for 
privacy and data protection of children. Privacy and data protection as digital rights now feature 
prominently on the agenda of  scholars studying digital risks to children, with some shifting  
from framing the research problem as protection from online risks to protection of digital 
rights.21 There have emerged calls to transform children’s rights, guaranteed by the UN 
                                                
impersonation, 2 February 2012, available at: 
https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2012/02/02/teen_facing_charges_for_alleged_online_impersonation.html 
14  Giovanna Mascheroni, Kjartan Ólafsson, Net children go mobile: risks and opportunities, 2 ed Educatt, 2014. 
15  Simone van der Hof, I Agree, or Do I: A Rights-Based Analysis of the Law on Children's Consent in the 
Digital World, 34 Wis. Int'l L.J., 2016. D. Lupton and B. Williamson, The datafied child: The dataveillance 
of children and implications for their rights, 19(5) New Media & Society, 2017. 
16  Vera Slavtcheva-Petkova, Victoria Jane Nash & Monica Bulger, Evidence on the extent of harms 
experienced by children as a result of online risks: implications for policy and research, Information, 
Communication & Society Vol. 18 , Iss. 1, 2015.  
17  Coleman, S., Pothong, K., Perez, E. And Koene, A.,  Internet On Our Own Terms: How Children and Young 
People Deliberated About Their Digital Rights, 2017, available at: http://casma.wp.horizon.ac.uk/casma-
projects/5rights-youth-juries/the-internet-on-our-own-terms/ 
18  For example, according to the empirical data of the EU Kids online, 9% of children aged 11-16 in Europe 
have experienced personal data misuse online. See Sonia Livingstone et al., ‘Risks and safety on the Internet: 
The perspective of European children’ (LSE, EU Kids Online, London 2011). 
19  Giovanna Mascheroni and Kjartan Ólafsson, Net children go mobile: risks and opportunities, 2nd ed. 
Educatt, Milan 2014. 
20  European Commission, ‘Special Eurobarometer 359: Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in 
the European Union’ (June 2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_359_en.pdf> 196 and 
203. 
21  Sonia Livingstone, Reframing media effects in terms of children’s rights in the digital age, Journal of 
Children and Media, 10(1), 2016. 
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Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN CRC), to cater for the ‘digital age’.22 Among the 
rights to provision and participation, the UN CRC recognises children’s rights to protection, 
including a specific protection against arbitrary or unlawful interference with children’s 
privacy and unlawful attacks on their honour and reputation (Article 16).23 
New theoretical concepts and frameworks in relation to children and their rights online 
emerged to consider the changing relationship between children, their rights and the digital 
dimension. The “datafied child” as a concept, developed by Lupton and Williamson, draws 
attention to the amount of data collected about children during their online presence and the 
impact of this collection on children’s wellbeing and rights.24 As a response to the various 
ethical and legal issues that the ‘datafied child’ raises, scholars have developed a children’s 
digital rights research framework. This framework allows the exploration of digital media use 
by  children through a rights-based approach and especially permits to balance children’s need 
for protection with their capacity to maximize the opportunities online and, therefore, to 
“rethink (human and children’s) rights and the digital”. 25 In this context, academic efforts to 
reflect on particular child rights online through three conceptual lenses underpinning the UN 
CRC - protection, participation, and provision - started to emerge.26 They clearly diverged from 
the traditional, predominantly protective stance towards children and added a significant 
emphasis on participation in the context of media and internet policy. This emphasis is in line 
with the focus on “autonomy and participation rights as the new norm in children’s rights 
practice and policy” which, as demonstrated by Reynaert et al.,27 is one of the main general 
research themes of child rights scholars since the adoption of the UN CRC.  
Looking at the reaction of policy makers and the legislation, it becomes clear that only 
recently a child-specific perspective in the context of online privacy has been embraced.28 For 
a long time, protection of online privacy in the EU has been designed for “everyone”, conflating 
adults and children in one single group of data subjects. Since 1995, children are covered by 
                                                
22  Sonia Livingstone and Amanda Third, Children and young people’s rights in the digital age: an emerging 
agenda, New Media & Society, 19(5), 2017; Sonia Livingstone and Brian O'Neill, Children’s rights online: 
challenges, dilemmas and emerging directions in Simone van der Hof, Bibi van den Berg and Bart Schermer, 
(eds), Minding Minors Wandering the Web: Regulating Online Child Safety. Information technology and law 
series (24), Springer with T. M. C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2014. 
23  United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (UN CRC). 
24  Deborah Lupton and Ben Williamson, The datafied child: The dataveillance of children and implications for 
their rights , New Media & Society, 19(5), 2017.  
25  Sonia Livingstone, Amanda Third, Children and young people’s rights in the digital age: An emerging 
agenda, New Media & Society, 19(5), 2017, p. 657. 
26  Simone van der Hof, I Agree, or Do I: A Rights-Based Analysis of the Law on Children's Consent in the 
Digital World, 34 Wis. Int'l L.J. 409, 445 (2016). Eva Lievens, Children’s rights and media: imperfect but 
inspirational, Eva Brems, Wouter Vandenhole and Ellen Desmet (eds.), Children’s Rights Law in the Global 
Human Rights Landscape: Isolation, inspiration, integration?, Routledge, 2017. (Using the UN CRC as a 
framework, Simone van der Hof, analysed the regulation of children’s consent as a mean of exercising 
children’s rights to privacy and data protection in the EU and Eva Lievens discussed children’s rights in 
information society.) 
27  Didier Reynaert, Maria Bouverne-de-Bie, Stijn Vandevelde, A Review of Children’s Rights Literature Since 
the Adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Childhood 16(4), 2009, pp. 528-
529. 
28  Council of Europe, Strategy  for the Rights of the Child (2016-2021) (March 2016);  UN  Committee  on  the  
Rights  of  the  Child,  Report  of  the  2014  Day  of  General  Discussion  ‘Digital  media  and  children’s  
rights’,  (May 2015); UNICEF, ‘Privacy, protection of personal information and reputation rights’ (2017) 
Discussion paper; UK Children’s Commissioner, ‘Growing Up Digital: A report of the Growing Up Digital 
Taskforce’ (January 2017); UK House of Lords Committee on Communications, ‘Growing up with the 
internet’ (2nd Report of Session 2016–17) (March 2017),  2017. 
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the age-generic data protection provisions provided by Directive 95/46/EC29 with no special 
focus on the processing of children’s data. The newly adopted EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (2016/679)30 (hereinafter - ‘GDPR’ or ‘Regulation’) has significantly changed the 
status quo and rejected the “age-blind” approach to data subjects. Only recently, the GDPR 
explicitly recognizes that children need more protection than adults and generates a child-
tailored privacy protection regime, which aligns with other initiatives related to the protection 
of children’s privacy online (codes of conduct, impact assessments).  
This dissertation is an article-based research and started off several years ago in the 
midst of the developments sketched above. In a way, the articles presented in this dissertation 
testify to the rich academic debate in the domain of child-specific privacy protection and the 
impressive amount of insights that have been gained during the past few years. The articles 
written, submitted and published in the early period of this research are based on a body of 
literature that is far less rich than what is known and accepted at present. However, this also 
means that some findings of this research were published at a time when certain new academic 
insights, perspectives and protection models had not yet been presented. As a consequence, 
some of the earlier articles of this dissertation do not fully reflect all current academic 
perspectives and later articles entail some advancement in thinking on how specific legal 
provisions should be understood and interpreted (e.g. the GDPR provisions on profiling of 
children).  
Although, within the now rich body of research the original contribution of the 
dissertation remains clear: the research combines social sciences and human rights law in 
considering privacy protection for children on the internet. Despite the large amount of 
available empirical data on privacy risks online, hardly any research has tried to translate 
empirical findings into the legal domain and apply the insights in the context of child’s rights 
regimes. A key reason for the absence of such research appears to be the lack of appropriate 
expertise and methodologies or incentives from the outside world. In merging empirical 
research with legal/regulatory theories, this dissertation hopes to contribute to the academic 
debate on fundamental child rights as well as interdisciplinary research in the field of internet 
regulation. Although, some scholarly attention has been paid to the effectiveness of the 
emerging privacy protection regime,31 neither its justification, nature and extent of the 
protections afforded to children’s privacy online nor its implications to child rights, online 
behaviour and vulnerabilities have been examined in a combined effort of social sciences and 
(privacy) law. Based on desk research and empirical insights, this dissertation, therefore, hopes 
to contribute to a better understanding and justification of the necessity of specific regulatory 
privacy protection (through legal and soft-law tools) for children on the internet, to identify the 
existing gaps and unclarities, and consequently to consider how to improve the existing 
                                                
29  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281 , 
23/11/1995, 31-50. 
30  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1. 
31  A. Mantelero, Children online and the future EU data protection framework: empirical evidences and legal 
analysis. International Journal of Technology Policy and Law 2(2–4), 2016; J. Savirimuthu, Networked 
children, commercial profiling and the EU data protection reform agenda: in the child’s best interests? In: 
Iusmen I and Stalford H (eds.) The EU as a Children’s Rights Actor: Law, Policy and Structural Dimensions. 
Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2016, pp. 221–257; S. van Der Hof, No child’s play – online data 
protection for children. In: Van Der Hof S, Van Den Berg B and Schermer B (eds) Minding Minors 
Wandering the Web: Regulating Online Child Safety. Information Technology & Law Series No. 24. The 
Hague: Springer Press/TMC Asser Press, 2014, pp. 127–141; Lina Jasmontaite and Paul de Hert, The EU, 
children under 13 years, and parental consent: a human rights analysis of a new, age-based bright-line for the 
protection of children on the Internet, International Data Privacy Law, 5(1) 2015. 
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regulation. Given this, the overall aim of this dissertation is to investigate whether, and how, 
child-rights and social science perspectives can enrich the thinking about the specific 
regulatory regime adopted in the EU to protect children from privacy risks online and to 
improve the regulatory regime.  
 From a non-academic perspective, the dissertation intends to contribute to the broader 
societal, political and regulatory debate on the privacy risks for children and the role of 
regulatory measures in protecting them from these risks. Violations of privacy can result in 
long-term consequences, like stigmatisation and discrimination, and harm the social and 
emotional welfare of children. Future technological developments are likely to aggravate 
online privacy risks and harms. However, a predominantly protective perspective towards 
children taken by the regulators often fails to take into account the interests and experiences of 
children. An increased understanding of the risks and regulatory means to mitigate them, serves 





Given the aim mentioned above, the dissertation revolves around three core notions. 
The first notion is the child. The dissertation uses a holistic and multidisciplinary understanding 
of this notion. It aims to view a child through two equally important lenses – legal and social – 
and to avoid considering a child only as a minor, a pure actor in law with his/her limited rights 
and responsibilities. As Lievens argues ‘child’ is a more general term, used in different 
contexts, the notion ‘minor’ is linked to the age of majority, and more often used in a ‘legal’ 
context”.32 By not limiting the notion of a child to a minor, the dissertation adds to the legal 
characteristics (competency and responsibility limitations and partial entitlements) an 
additional social science dimension - the needs and vulnerabilities, particular behaviour and 
perceptions of children as (still developing) social actors. It is also in line with the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN CRC) terminology, which even if being a legal 
document, protects children’s and not minors’ rights. 
The legal and policy debates presented in this dissertation unavoidably require the 
discussion about the age and age limits, as age from a legal perspective is a decisive boundary 
marker of the child concept. As will be shown in Chapter 3, appropriate age threshold fuelled 
the debate of parental consent in the GDPR. Although, important for lawyers, from the 
sociological childhood perspective age does not necessarily ‘describe the lived experiences of 
children’.33 Biological age is not a precise or uniform indication of physical, psychological and 
social development. Therefore, as noted by sociologists, “the mapping of an age- and stage-
based categorisation schema onto children’s social, intellectual and psychological 
development, irrespective of social context, is now regarded as problematic”34. Age has been 
considered a contested concept as it is used to define children and restrict, protect or allow their 
activities considering them as a group despite the differences among the children composing 
the group.  
The dissertation refers to a child as an individual below the age of 18 years old, in line 
with Article 1 of the UN CRC. In this sense it uses the term ‘child’, an age-based construct, but 
acknowledges that other EU policy areas have considered ‘child’ to be a  biological construct 
                                                
32  Eva Lievens, Protecting Children in the Digital Era: the Use of Alternative Regulatory Initiatives. Martinus 
Nijhof Online, Leiden, 2010, p. 29. 
33  Allison James, Adrian James, Key Concepts in Childhood Studies. Sage Publications Ltd, London, 2012, p. 1. 
34  Ibid. 
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or a dependency-based construct.35 Despite the chosen definition, it should be clarified that 
theoretical and practical issues and the level of adequate protection are not identical for all 
children in this age spectrum.  
The second core notion is regulation. Recognising that regulation as a concept is 
contested and subject to many different definitions in various fields of research, it requires 
clarification in this specific context. In this dissertation regulation has been assigned a wide 
meaning and the definition departs from the assumption that “anything producing effects on 
behaviour can be considered regulatory”.36 More precisely, as Scott defines it, regulation in 
this context is considered “any process or set of processes by which norms are established, the 
behavior of those subject to the norms monitored or fed back into the regime, and for which 
there are mechanisms for holding the behaviour of regulated actors within the acceptable limits 
of the regime”37. Regulation therefore includes different mechanisms of social control and 
embraces not only hard law but also soft law and other forms of social norms.38 This wide view 
of regulation allows analysis of the chosen multifaceted EU regulatory model related to 
children’s online privacy which entails hard law instruments (e.g. the GDPR, the Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/EC, Unfair Commercial Practise Directive, Consumer Rights 
Directive), soft law initiatives (e.g. the Safer Social Networking Principles, the CEO Coalition's 
Statement of Purpose, the ICT Coalition's Principles, and the FEDMA code) and self-enforced 
regulatory tools, such as data protection impact assessments (DPIAs). 
As both protection of children online as a policy area and related empirical evidence 
have long been framed in terms of risks, the third core notion in this dissertation is risk. 
Notwithstanding the long-lasting academic debate on risk as a theoretical notion,39 it should be 
acknowledged that there is no single definition of risk in general and privacy risk in particular. 
In the context of this dissertation, two often diverting perspectives on risk are considered: a 
sociological and a technico-scientific. As claimed in Chapter 5, European data protection law 
from its inception does not systematically follow one of the two understandings of risk and 
partially fits both technico-scientific and sociological perspectives. Therefore, this dissertation 
draws on: 1) the understanding of risk in social sciences, in particular the risk notion present in 
media and communication studies, the field from which the most empirical evidence on online 
risks for children emerged, and 2) the legal notion of risk, present in the EU risk regulation, 
GDPR and impact assessment frameworks. According to Staksrud, a scholar who studied 
online risks for children from the perspective of media studies, the most appropriate risk 
definition in terms of online risks to children is that of “possibility of loss or injury, or 
something that creates or suggests a hazard – a source of danger”.40 In addition to this general 
meaning of risk, media scholars acknowledge that risk is a constructed rather than a universally 
fixed notion. Individual perception of something as being a hazard is strongly shaped by 
various individual and collective factors, varying from socio-economic factors, regulatory 
framework, technological infrastructure to education system, or cultural values.41 Particularly 
                                                
35  Helen Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability. Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2012. 
36  Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott, and Christopher Hood, A Reader on Regulation, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998, p. 4. 
37  Colin Scott, Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design, Public Law, 2001, 
p. 331 
38  David Levi-Faur, Regulation and Regulatory governance, in David Levi-Faur (ed.) Handbook on the Politics 
of Regulation, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, UK, 6. 
39  J. Frank Yates (ed.), Risk-taking behavior, Chichester: John Wiley, 1992. 
40  Elisabeth Staksrud, Children in the Online World. Risk, Regulation, Rights, Farnham: Ashgate, 2013. 
41  L Hasebrink, Uwe, Livingstone, Sonia and Haddon, Leslie, Comparing children’s online opportunities and 
risks across Europe: cross-national comparisons for EU Kids Online. EU Kids Online, Deliverable D3.2. EU 
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relevant factors for understanding the online risks to children are social mediation of parents, 
school and peers, an individual usage of the internet.42 Moreover, risks are often subjective 
constructs defined according to culture, ideology, norms, nationality, language or age.43  
From a legal perspective, risk can be expressed as a negative impact on a data subject’s rights 
and freedoms (the GDPR framing of risk) and as the probability that a vulnerability of an asset 
is exploited by a threat and negatively affects the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
data and the impact of that effect (the data security-related framing of risk).44  
 
 
1.2. Aim of the study and research question 
 
As mentioned earlier, the aim of this dissertation is to investigate whether and how, 
child-rights and social science perspectives, can enrich the thinking about the specific 
regulatory regime adopted in the EU to protect children from privacy risks online and improve 
the regulatory regime. Clearly, it is not possible to systematise all potentially relevant aspects 
of this aim, within the ambit of a PhD. In the light of the developments described in the previous 
paragraph, the central research question to be addressed is: 
How can EU law and self-regulatory initiatives protect children from online privacy risks while 
accounting for the particular characteristics of children? 
Each part of this PhD dissertation contributes to answering this research question by 
focusing on four key dimensions, that in turn make up the four sub-questions:  
 
- What are the characteristics that make the (online) position of children special and 
require a specific regime to protect them from privacy risks online in the EU?  
- How has the child-specific online privacy protection regime thus far been constructed, 
i.e. what are the different levels, rules and tools employed in the EU?  
- What are the dilemmas and unresolved challenges in terms of the particular 
characteristics and rights of children when implementing child-specific online privacy 
protection mechanisms in practice?  
- What are the ways to improve the child-specific online privacy protection regime? 
 
 
1. 3. Perspective of the study 
 
1.3.1. The rights-based approach   
 
The very title of this dissertation already suggests that this research should be clearly 
positioned in a ‘rights’ framework. Indeed, children are bearers of the rights to privacy and 
personal data protection under the international human rights instruments.45  Human rights 
                                                
Kids Online Network, London, UK, 2008; Elisabeth Staksrud, Children in the Online World. Risk, 
Regulation, Rights, Farnham: Ashgate, 2013, 53. 
42  Sonia Livingstone et al., Risks and safety on the Internet: The perspective of European children, LSE, EU 
Kids Online, London, 2011. 
43  Elisabeth Staksrud, Children in the Online World. Risk, Regulation, Rights, Farnham: Ashgate, 2013, 65 
44  ISO/IEC, "Information technology -- Security techniques-Information security risk management" ISO/IEC 
FIDIS 27005:2008 “the potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets 
and thereby cause harm to the organization. It is measured in terms of a combination of the probability of 
occurrence of an event and its consequence”. 
45  Art. 16 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20/11/89; Art. 12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
10/ 12/48; Art. 8 European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
04/11/50; Art. 24 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 07/12/00. 
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offer a compelling normative framework for the discussion of the child-related regulatory 
regimes in the EU.  
The rights-based approach is at the heart of the UN CRC. Four principles distinguished 
by the Committee on the Rights of the Child are considered as horizontal when implementing 
and interpreting all the provisions of the UN CRC: non-discrimination (Art. 2), the best 
interests of the child (Art. 3); survival and development (Art. 6) and respect for the views of 
the child (Art. 12).46 The UN CRC grants a comprehensive set of rights to children, which are 
commonly grouped into the rights related to protection, provision and participation.47 This is 
the so called typology of “the three Ps” aims to describe the scope of the rights rather than 
segregate them into distinct categories. Such segregation “would be in breach of the 
comprehensive and holistic spirit of the CRC”.48 Therefore, as summarised by “the three Ps 
have to be interpreted as interdependent and indivisible in the same way as the Convention 
itself: no protection without provisions and participation, no provisions without protection and 
participation, no participation without provisions and protection”.49 Although a shift in 
academic thinking – arguing against the grouping of the child rights in three categories or “three 
Ps”50 – can be seen, this research opts to follow the traditional child rights approach in 
distinguishing protective, provisory and participatory rights. This approach might be 
challenged but is still broadly recognized and solid for the purpose of this research.  
Acknowledging the interdependence and indivisibility of child rights, different 
perspectives underlying child rights law can still be employed as dominant in researching the 
position of children online and the protection they should be accorded. One can take the 
perspective of the right of a child to protection. Another perspective that could be applied is 
the child’s right to emancipation (participation) and development. These perspectives become 
even more interesting portrayed as a dichotomy in practice, given that laws and regulations 
tend to opt for one of the other, implying both perspectives by default manifest a conflict. The 
combination of both would undoubtedly allow for a balanced approach in addressing 
challenges related to children, yet practical implementation of child rights might often lack this 
balance. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, the relationship between 
empowerment and protection elements can become a dilemma for legislators and therefore the 
chapter frames it as an “empowerment v protection” conflict. Also various authors – both media 
                                                
46  Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5 (2003) General measures of implementation 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts. 4, 42 and 44, para. 6), CRC/C/5, para. 13–14. 
47  Pia-Liisa Heiliö, Erja Lauronen, Marjatta Bardy (eds.), Politics of Childhood and Children at Risk, Provision, 
Protection, Participation, Eurosocial Report 45, Vienna, European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and 
Research. 
48  See also Committee on the Rights of the Child. CRC/C/58, 1996, Para. 9. General Comment No. 5 (2003), 
General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. CRC/GC/2003/5. 
49  Eugeen Verhellen, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: reflections from a historical, social policy and 
educational perspective in Wouter Vandenhole, Ellen Desmet, Didier Reynaert, Sara Lembrechts (eds.) 
Routledge International Handbook of Children’s Rights Studies, London, UK: Routledge, 2015, 50. 
50  For example, Reynaert et al., claim that the categorization of the child rights into the three Ps conceptualy 
weakens them, especially in comparison with general human rights law: 1) “it departs from the main 
categorisation human rights actors are familiar with, i.e. that of civil and political rights on the one hand, and 
economic, social and cultural rights on the other”; 2) the term ‘provision rights’, which refers to e.g. rights to 
education, health and social security, tends to confirm the outdated misunderstanding or misrepresentation 
that economic and social rights are exclusively about provision. It has meanwhile been widely accepted that 
the obligations relating to economic, social and cultural rights (ESC rights) are to be understood as 
obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil, and that the latter obligation consists of sub- obligations to 
facilitate, to promote and to provide. Only the sub-obligation to fulfil-provide requires considerable 
mobilisation of resources.” Didier Reynaert, Ellen Desmet, Sara Lembrechts and Wouter Vandenhole 
Introduction: A critical approach to children’s rights, in Wouter Vandenhole, Ellen Desmet, Didier Reynaert, 
Sara Lembrechts (eds.) Routledge International Handbook of Children’s Rights Studies, London, UK: 
Routledge, 2015, p. 7  
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scholars and child rights scholars – have explicitly referred to the tension between the two 
perspectives51 and in their research preferred either agency or vulnerability as a paradigm.52 As 
noted by Stoilova et al, “a rights framework is holistic, concerned with the full range of 
children’s rights and, thereby, bringing into view the relation and potential conflict between 
protection and participation rights”53. Also, “a rights framework provides a normative lens 
through which to critically examine and evaluate the benefits or harms of children’s growing 
access to and provision of digital technologies”, for example avoid discussing “protection 
challenges without recognising how the resulting policy can curtail children’s freedoms to 
participate online”.54 Yet, reliance on the rights-approach involves more than compatibility 
with the standards set forth in human rights law but rather widens the debate by allowing to 
reconceptualise children’s role and questioning the responsibility of public and private actors 
in the regulatory context.  
The rights-based approach has emerged in the area of international development55 and 
only more recently this approach has also been adapted to the child-rights domain.56 The heart 
of this approach is compose of a few core principles: participation, accountability, equality and 
non-discrimination, transparency, and empowerment.57 Drawing on them, this approach 
provides the following benefits.58  
First, the rights-based approach offers a useful child-empowering normative 
framework. The rights discourse itself already leads to the empowerment of children, and shifts 
the focus from their needs to their rights as legal entitlements. This is not the case when the 
risk discourse is employed and children are framed as vulnerable to risks from which they need 
to be protected. Such an approach imposes legal obligations on those who have to respect and 
implement the rights and conditions the prioritisation of different rights.  
Second, the rights-based approach requires that both the regulatory outcome and the 
process achieved are in line with human rights.59 For example, it draws attention to the active 
and informed participation by the right-holders in the formulation, implementation and 
monitoring of relevant policies and decisions. Such participation is desirable not just as a means 
to reach other ends, but as a fundamental human right in itself. In order to guarantee such 
participation, it requires to build specific mechanisms and arrangements at different levels of 
decision-making.  
Third, the rights-based approach emphasises the responsibility of policy makers and 
other actors who have an impact on rights. It contributes to the increased accountability of 
                                                
51  Helen Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability. Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2012. J. Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009. Mariya Stoilova, Livingstone, S. and Kardefelt-Winther, Global Kids Online: Researching children′s 
rights in a global digital age, Global Studies of Childhood, 6(4) 2016. 
52  See chapters by Gertrud Lenzer, Violence against children and by Kay Tisdall, Children and young people's 
participation, in Wouter Vandenhole, Ellen Desmet, Didier Reynaert, Sara Lembrechts (eds.) Routledge 
International Handbook of Children’s Rights Studies, London, UK: Routledge, 2015. 
53  Mariya Stoilova, Livingstone, S. and Kardefelt-Winther, Global Kids Online: Researching children′s rights in 
a global digital age, Global Studies of Childhood, 6(4), 2016, p. 456. 
54  Ibid. 
55  Andrea Cornwall and Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, Putting the ‘rights-based approach’ to development into 
perspective, Third World Quarterly 25(8), 2004; Paul Gready, Rights-based approaches to development: 
what is the value-added?, Development in Practice, 18(6), 2008. 
56  Helen Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability. Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2012. 
57  Paul Gready, Rights-based approaches to development: what is the value-added?, Development in Practice, 
18(6), 2008. 
58  Adapted from HCHR Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction 
Strategies. 2004. 
59  Helen Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability. Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2012, 29. 
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states, EU institutions and other local authorities not only “in term of respecting and upholding 
human rights obligations, but also in terms of adapting or instituting processes that facilitate 
fulfilment of those rights”60 Ferguson claims that framing the debate in terms of rights is in 
itself a “vehicle for increasing the accountability of government organisations to their citizens 
and consequently increasing the likelihood that policy measures will be implemented in 
practice”.61 Even more importantly, relying on the rights-based approach extends 
accountability for rights from states to private actors who are considered as duty bearers. The 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights articulated this expanded notion of accountability 
as follows: 
 
Perhaps the most important source of added value in the human rights approach is the 
emphasis it places on the accountability of policy-makers and other actors whose 
actions have an impact on the rights of people. Rights imply duties, and duties demand 
accountability.62 
 
Therefore, this approach allows “rendering the law real in political and social processes, as 
well as within the legal mainstream and through adherence to legal obligations”, in other words, 
it makes human rights less declaratory and more operational.63  
With this in mind, the dissertation explores to which extent the EU accounts for the 
substantial child rights and adheres to the processes and obligations inherent in the rights-based 
approach in regulating children’s privacy protection online. It identifies the substantial 
provisions of the UN CRC that constitute the essence of the child rights-based approach64 and 




2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1. Social and institutional privacy  
 
In line with the interdisciplinary perspective described above, this dissertation uses the 
distinction between social and institutional privacy as part of its theoretical framework. Social 
privacy is not widely known among lawyers. As a concept it is often used by social scientists 
                                                
60  Ibid. 
61  C. Ferguson, Global Social Policy Principles: Human Rights and Social Justice, London: DFID, 1999, p. 23. 
62  Cited in Paul Gready, Rights-based approaches to development: what is the value-added?, Development in 
Practice, 18( 6), 2008, 735-747. 
63  Paul Gready, Rights-based approaches to development: what is the value-added?, Development in Practice, 
2008 18(6), 736. 
64  Article 3: In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall 
be a primary consideration. Article 13: The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either 
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child’s choice. Article 16: 
Protection of privacy. Children have the right to protection from interference with privacy, family, home and 
correspondence, and from libel or slander. Article 17: Access to appropriate information. The State shall 
ensure the accessibility to children of information and material from a diversity of sources, and it shall 
encourage the mass media to disseminate information, which is of social and cultural benefit to the child, and 
take steps to protect him or her from harmful material. Article 32: States Parties recognize the right of the 
child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous 
or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful of the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, 
moral or social development 
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to note "the ability to control the social situation by navigating complex contextual cues, 
technical affordances, and social dynamics"65 in the networked publics. Social privacy, being 
about control of social situation and context (e.g. hiding from public environments), partially 
stems from Helen Nissenbaum’s understanding of privacy through the lens of contextual 
integrity66. According to her view, privacy is defined by social context that based on its internal 
norms governs how personal information is disclosed and shared. Following this logic, privacy 
norms are “not once-and-for-all objective, but neither are they solely subjective”, but “privacy 
is specified and co-constituted by means of the nature of the relationship we have with people, 
organisations, institutions, and even technologies”.67  
Social privacy refers to the negotiation of social boundaries, in particular to the 
management of diverse audiences through privacy settings and controls, and is entangled with 
online safety. This theoretical framework therefore allows include into the study peer to peer 
privacy risks and concerns online which are the result of data flows disrespecting social 
boundaries and contexts (undesirable contacts, damaged reputation, stalking, impersonation). 
Such concerns are alternatively difficult to capture from a purely legal regulatory perspective. 
For example, EU data protection laws excludes the processing of personal data by a natural 
person in the course of a purely personal or household activity from its scope. 
Social privacy significantly differs from institutional privacy, which is more closely 
aligned with the aims of personal data protection law to safeguard individuals from illegal and 
illegitimate data collection and use by state institutions and private companies. Institutional 
privacy refers to the control of the flow of personal data. It emerges from the understanding of 
privacy proposed by Westin,68 who defined privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them 
is communicated to others.69 It does not emphasise the importance of the context in which data 
disclosure and processing takes place and its collision, but provides data controller-centric 
requirements. Although starting from different assumptions and often explored using different 
research methods, both privacy perspectives are entangled and can complement each other.70 
 
 
2.3. Sociological perspective on childhood 
 
The dissertation is grounded in the new sociological perspective of childhood, which 
became prominent after the 1990s. Social scientists following this perspective look at children 
as social actors for its own sake and not as ‘incomplete’ or ‘in process’ future adults.71  
Children are recognised as being ‘capable of making sense of and affecting their societies’72. 
Thus, this perspective provides competence to children to “interpret the social word and act on 
                                                
65  danah boyd, It's Complicated: the Social Lives of Networked Teens, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2014, p. 60. 
66  Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy and the Integrity of Social Life, Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2010. 
67  Andrew McStay, Privacy and the Media, Sage Publications Ltd, 2017, p. 162. 
68  Alan F Westin, Privacy and Freedom. New York: Athenum, 1967. 
69  Ibid., 7 
70  Seda Gürses and Claudia Diaz, Two tales of privacy in online social networks, IEEE Security & Privacy, 
Vol. 11, 2013. 
71  Allison James and Alan Prout (eds.) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in 
the Sociological Study of Childhood. London: Falmer, 1997. For an overview see S. H Matthews, A window 
on the ‘new’ sociology of childhood. Sociology Compass, 1(1), 2007. 
72  S. H Matthews, A window on the ‘new’ sociology of childhood. Sociology Compass, 1(1) 2007. 
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it”.73 Scholars following the new sociology of childhood advocate directly taking children’s 
views into account instead of listening to adults perspectives over children’s matters.  
This perspective also elucidates the fact that children are not a homogeneous group and 
various factors contribute to different childhood(s) or ‘the plurality of childhoods’ lived by 
children.74 Thus, as summarised by Matthews, “(a)ny statement that claims to describe children 
must deal with the question, ‘Which children and under what circumstances?’”75 It is 
recognised that “the everyday lives of children are experienced through social relationships 
with other children but perhaps more significantly with adults who control institutions that 
justify and support the type of dependency that children experience”.76 In the context of the 
present research, it allows to avoid falling into the trap of attaching to children generic labels 
such as ‘digital natives’ or ‘millennials’, overlook their diversity and ignore developmental 
characteristics or specific age-related needs. It also helps in advocating the age-specific data 
protection requirements in both law and self-regulatory instruments. 
According to the sociological perspective on childhood, children are viewed as beings 
rather than beings in the making, refusing both biological reductionism and age-based 
determinism. In the context of this dissertation, the sociological perspective on childhood 
provides a lens to view children as agents and right-holders whose voices and perspectives 
should be accounted in research and law. In viewing children as collaborators and actors77 
rather than research objects (by gathering research data directly from children), this research 
intends to facilitate the discovery of new insights that can inform policy and practice on 
children at national, regional and global levels. Regarding children as actors also recognizes 
their role in the dynamic interplay of multiple processes, interests and actors that ultimately 
shape the way technology is being used.78 Children can be considered to play such a role, given 
their interests are taken into account in democratic processes, among them the legislative 
provisions discussed in this dissertation that aim to protect their specific interests. 
 
 
3. Methodology  
 
 
The diverse research questions raised in this dissertation require different research 
methods to be employed in order to answer them. Descriptive questions addressed in Chapter 
2 and partially in Chapters 3, 4 (what/how is the child privacy protection regime constructed?, 
how does this regime compare with other legal regimes?) and Chapter 7 (how do self-
regulatory instruments compare among them?) to a great extent call for a doctrinal research 
method. An explanatory question (why is this legal regime needed?) raised in Chapter 3 and a 
more design-oriented question: (how can the regime be improved?) tackled in Chapters 5 and 
6 predominantly require external insights from other academic fields. As a result, the 
dissertation embraces “methodological pluralism”79 and combines traditional doctrinal 
research with interdisciplinary research through insights and data from other disciplines. 
                                                
73  Ibid. 
74  Ibid. 
75  Ibid. 
76  Ibid. 
77   An actor is something or someone who makes a difference in a relationship. B Latour, Reassembling the Social. 
An Introduction to Actor-network-theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005. 
78  W Bijker and J Law (eds.), Shaping Technology/Building Society. Studies in Sociotechnical Change, 
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1992. 
79  Christopher McCrudden, Legal Research and the Social Sciences. Law Quarterly Review. 122,  2006, 532-
650. (McCrudden refers to the methodological pluralism when doctrinal legal analysis supports or tests their 





3.1. Doctrinal research 
 
 
Doctrinal or legal-dogmatic80 research can be defined as “research that aims to give a 
systematic exposition of the principles, rules and concepts governing a particular legal field or 
institution and analyses the relationship between these principles, rules and concepts with a 
view to solving unclarities and gaps in the existing law”81. In the context of this dissertation, a 
critical conceptual analysis of the legal sources relevant to the protection of children’s online 
privacy has been performed in order to expose the current state of the law and the existing 
discrepancies, ambiguities and challenges. The protection of children’s online privacy has been 
viewed as a single, multi-layered system, in which elements of national, European and 
international law, hard and soft law form a whole. The primary sources of analysis include 
relevant international law (UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the European 
Convention on Human Rights), European law (the of Fundamental Rights of the EU, GDPR, 
Directive 95/46/EC) and national rules (e.g., national data protection laws), opinions and 
comments issued by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Article 29 Working Party 
and national data protection authorities, available case law and legal literature. Where 
appropriate, references were made to preparatory works and policy discussions of the GDPR 
to gather additional insights to those offered by the primary sources.  
 
 
3.1.1. Comparative analysis 
 
Several articles in this dissertation include comparative analysis which is both external 
and internal in its nature. External comparative legal research is used to compare legal concepts 
and provisions adopted to protect children’s privacy online among different legal jurisdictions 
and legal families.  Chapter 3 compares the rules on the consent of minors to their personal 
data processing in two different legal orders (i.e. the US (COPPA) and the EU (GDPR)) in 
order to reveal similarities and differences and provide suggestions for the improvement of the 
GDPR. The same chapter also looks into the national data protection laws of the EU Member 
States to compare existing provisions on the role and capacity of children as regards their 
personal data processing. 
An internal comparative analysis, focusing on the comparison of legal concepts and 
principles of different fields of law (consumer and data protection law) in the EU legal system, 
is carried out in Chapter 4. The method of internal comparative analysis proposed by Vranken 
looks for intersections, crosslinks and commonalities between different fields of law.82 
Although each legal field has its own principles, instruments and sanctions, the various areas 
should be treated alike in order to maintain coherence of the legal system as a whole.83 This 
method is particularly appropriate to appreciate the differentiated roots of specialised areas of 
law as well as to coherently apply the same human rights standards to different areas.84 In fact, 
                                                
80   J.B.M. Vranken, ‘Exciting Times for Legal Scholarship’, Recht & Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 2012, 
42 
81   Smits, Jan M., What is Legal Doctrine? On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Dogmatic Research, September  
1, 2015. Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz & Edward L. Rubin (eds.), Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A 
Transatlantic Dialogue, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 207-228. 
82 J. B. M. Vranken, Interne rechtsvergelijking, Tijdschrift voor privaatrecht, 1995, available at: 
https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/369319/TPR95.PDF  
83   Ibid. 
84   Ibid. 
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cross-links and mutual influence between consumer law, contract law and data protection law 
are strong and it is difficult to imagine their interpretation without their comparison and (at 
least partial) integration. Chapter 4 therefore aims to draw from consumer law notions and 
principles, such as transparency and fairness, in order to extend the less robust constructs of 
the child currently seen in the GDPR as well as to enhance the level of protection for children 




3.2. Interdisciplinary research  
 
Although doctrinal legal analysis is essential to examine and understand the law as it 
stands, it follows an internal approach and mainly focuses on textual analysis of laws and 
judicial reasoning.85  Being concerned with how to improve the current legal system in terms 
of coherence and consistency, doctrinal research does not allow for the simple integration of 
external perspectives or data outside of current positive law.86 As a result, the doctrinal 
approach alone is able “to provide only partial representations of the complicated interplay 
between law and society in the field of child online privacy”.87 Indeed, it would be impossible 
to answer the main research question (to propose the improvements for the child-specific 
regulatory regime) without knowing if this regime accounts for children’s lived experiences 
and needs. Therefore, the legal rules of the regime under study should be viewed and 
interpreted in their proper social context and with an understanding of the individuals to which 
they relate88. As a consequence, legal analysis needs to be put into dialogue not only with child 
rights scholarship but also with social science findings about children’s experiences as both 
data subjects and socio-technical agents in their own rights. In other word, insights into the 
online behaviour, privacy perceptions and special interest and vulnerabilities of children and 
adolescents are essential additional knowledge which should be taken into account if one aims 
to understand the current regulation and its possibility to achieve protection and provide 
proposals for improvement. This requires an external perspective on the law. Therefore, the 
insights from non-legal disciplines are intentionally applied to varying extents in all the 
chapters of the dissertation. Such social science findings emerge from empirical studies on how 
                                                
85   It should be recognised that doctrinal or legal-dogmatic research is not a uniform concept. As noted by 
Vranken, “(p)erspectives, approaches, or methods that might seem relevant to some, others regard as 
conflicting with legal-dogmatic research or even as non-legal. For example, the search for ‘better’ solutions to 
a problem, a common issue in legal-dogmatic research, is usually not aimed at a better legal-technical 
foundation but rather at a substantive legal contribution to better fulfil the requirements of society. However, 
such questions cannot be answered from a strictly internal dogmatic perspective. Those arguing for more open 
reasoning also use knowledge and viewpoints that others regard as falling outside the scope of legal 
dogmatism. The development that private law has seen over, say, the last thirty-five years would have been 
impossible if legal-dogmatic research had always kept to the limits of an internal perspective and ‘the’ system.” 
J.B.M. Vranken, ‘Exciting Times for Legal Scholarship’, Recht & Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs, 2012, 
42. 
86   According to Vranken, consistency and coherence of the legal system are important but not the only possible 
and desirable perspectives for legal doctrinal research. Vranken claims that more perspectives can be used by 
legal researchers conducting legal doctrinal research and questions, “why should a consistent and coherent 
system be preferable over, for example, social justice, improving the wellbeing of people, the proper 
functioning of markets, practicality, functionality, effective- ness or europeanisation and globalisation?”. 
87   Alessandro Mantelero, Children online and the future EU data protection framework. Empirical evidences and 
legal analysis. International Jour. Tech. Policy & Law, 2016 (2/3/4):  169-181 
88   Vranken states: “The law does not exist in a vacuum: it attempts to regulate and influence human behaviour 
and social developments. Therefore, it is quite obvious that creating a proper legal system requires knowledge 
of what motivates people and of the social situation in which they function.” J.B.M. Vranken, ‘Exciting Times 
for Legal Scholarship’, Recht & Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 2012, 52. 
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children use new digital, networked and mobile technologies from the EU Kids Online, Net 
Children Go Mobile, Young Canadians in a Wired World, and Global Kids Online projects. 
The latest national empirical studies conducted in several EU countries, such as by Steijn in 
the Netherlands89, by Mantelero in Italy90and by OFCOM in the UK91 are also drawn upon. 
The social sciences provide especially useful evidence for criticising the existing provisions 
and making recommendations for their improvement. 
However, the dominant perspective of the research remains legal. Indeed, although 
insights from the social sciences are necessary to answer the research question and to define 
the research problem, these do not transgress the boundaries of law but rather provides external 
input and factual knowledge for the development and improvement of the existing system 
(social sciences are used as auxiliary discipline).92 Such an extension of the boundaries into the 
social sciences is in line with the theoretical lenses of the study (the social construction of 
privacy and the sociological understanding of childhood) which contribute to a richer 
understanding of the complexities of translating regulatory frameworks into practice. It also 
mitigates against simplistic or deterministic arguments about the role of technology in 
children’s lives.  
An even broader interdisciplinary perspective is visible in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, 
incorporating the broad insights not only from social sciences but also from other external 
approaches (computer science and regulation and governance studies). When dealing with risk 
conceptualisation and assessment Chapter 5 builds explicitly on the external perspective of 
information security (i.e. computer science) and risks regulation. Chapter 6, as it was co-
authored with the computer scientists, extends reliance on external non-legal disciplines even 
further as it uses a risk assessment methodology stemming from the information security 
domain to conduct a legal assessment of the possible impact on data subjects’ rights. The 
framework proposed in Chapter 6 combines law, computer science also social sciences insights 
in order to account for a multidimentional concept of risk. This way of bringing disparate 
perspectives together allows for the discussion of risk to go beyond the typical approach to data 
protection impact assessments and thus the insertion of an understanding of risk as a socio-
cultural construction that is implicated in the everyday lives of children. At the same time this 
permits one to challenge technical understandings of risk which use measurable proxies and 
flatten the rich social experience of privacy.  
 
 
3.3. Data gathering  
 
Two main ways of data gathering have been used: desk research and a survey conducted 
by the author. In order to further acquire necessary national (often publicly unavailable) legal 
sources and data, the national practices of EU Member States in the area of children’s online 
privacy (national laws, case law and decisions of the national data protection authorities) have 
been explored based on a questionnaire submitted to the national data protection authorities 
(DPAs) in all 28 EU Member States. The questionnaire contained five open questions on: 1) 
                                                
89   Wouter Steijn, Developing a sense of privacy, Phd dissertation, Tilburg university, 2014, available at: 
https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/7737309/Steijn_Developing_05_09_2014_emb_tot_06_09_2015.pdf 
90   Alessandro Mantelero, Children online and the future EU data protection framework. Empirical evidences 
and legal analysis. International Jour. Tech. Policy & Law, (2/3/4) 2016. 
91 OFCOM, Children and parents: media use and attitudes report, November 2016, available at: 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0034/93976/Children-Parents-Media-Use-Attitudes-
Report-2016.pdf 
92   Sanne Taekema and Bart van Klink, On the Border. Limits and Possibilities of Interdisciplinary Research, 
in: B.M.J. van Klink and H.S. Taekema (eds.), Law and Method. Interdisciplinary Research into Law, 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2011.  
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specific legal provisions regulating the protection of children’s (age below 18) personal data 
online; 2) complaints related to the infringement of children’s privacy/data protection rights 
online; 3) court decisions relating to the infringement of children’s privacy/data protection 
rights online; 4)  soft law instruments (codes of conduct, guidelines, principles, etc.) adopted 
on the national level aiming to protect children’s personal data online; 5) any other relevant 
information (documents, reports, surveys, etc.) in light of the research topic. 29 DPAs from 25 
EU Member States responded to the survey. Czech Republic, Ireland and Malta did not provide 
their responses, and 4 German state DPAs (from Baden-Württemberg, Brandenburg, 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Rheinland-Pfalz) responded to the survey. A full overview of the 
questions and answers is available in Annex 1. 
The main findings of the survey can be summarised as follows. First, there is a lack of 
specific national provisions on children’s privacy and data protection. Only 5 DPAs (Hungary, 
the Netherlands, Spain, UK (for Scotland) and Italy) indicated the existence of such provisions. 
In Hungary, the Netherlands and Spain child-specific legal provisions relate to the age and 
other requirements for consent and in Scotland to the right of access to personal data. In Italy, 
specific safeguards are provided against the dissemination (including online) of information 
related to children involved in judicial proceedings and in the journalistic field (the child's right 
to privacy takes precedence over both freedom of expression and freedom of the press). The 
lack of specific provisions for children as data subjects is not compensated by DPAs 
themselves, as only the Belgian DPA has issued a formal recommendation on the subject. 
Latvian and Dutch DPAs addressed the topic in broader guidelines when discussing 
respectively the school and online data processing contexts. Other DPAs tackled the issue by 
occasionally issuing leaflets (Bulgaria, Slovenia), writing articles and opinions (France, 
Slovenia) and carrying out studies (Hungary, Poland). A number of DPAs have been involved 
in active, long-term awareness raising activities, e.g. created dedicated websites (Spain, UK, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, France, Belgium) to provide information and guidance to children, 
parents and educators and carried out trainings (Greece, Brandenburg). Although the national 
data protection laws generally cover minors to the same extent as adults, that lack of specific 
legal provisions and official guidelines from the DPAs leads to a situation where it is difficult 
to know how the data protection requirements need to be interpreted in relation to children. 
Many questions remain directly unanswered on a national level, e.g. from which age can a child 
give a valid consent, when and how can the child exercise his data subject rights and can he or 
she alone lodge a complaint with a data protection authority if his or her personal data 
processing infringes the law. Also, it is not clear if the exercise of data subject rights relates to 
the age limit from which the child can consent for his/her data processing and indeed if it should 
relate. Furthermore, the DPAs are focused on protection and are not inclined to place the 
discussion into the broader child rights or UN CRC context and note possible tensions between 
child rights and principles. Awareness raising is often framed in terms of risks rather than 
benefits and empowerment online. Only the Belgian DPA clearly underlines its aim to educate 
children and young people about the importance of privacy and responsible behaviour online 
without stressing dangers but rather possibilities, and reconciling young people's privacy with 
the positive impact of modern technologies.  
Second, despite the fact that many DPAs do not have specific statistics on complaints 
submitted by children or their representatives, such complaints in the period of 2009-2014 were 
considered rare. 7 DPAs have received no complaints at all and many DPAs mentioned just a 
few complaints that had been lodged. Often complaints related to the publishing of children’s 
data or photos online by schools, newspapers or social media users. The number of complaints 
might depend on the functions of the DPAs as not all of them are responsible for the supervision 
of data processing in media and journalistic activities. For example, the Italian DPA has such 
a function and had reported many cases of unlawful publication of children’s data in the 
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journalistic context, while Lithuania reported no complaints indicating that the supervision of 
children’s personal data processing in media falls under the responsibility of the Office of the 
Inspector of Journalist Ethics. The case also might be that children are more inclined to raise 
their concerns directly with the data controllers, e.g. report violations though the special report 
buttons or initiate erasure requests online. The low number of complaints, however, might also 
be an indication of the barriers to the availability and effectiveness of access to justice for 
children in the area of data protection across Member States. Even when a child is sufficiently 
able to identify and articulate a violation of his or her privacy and step forward to lodge a 
complaint with a data protection authority, many constraints may come into play, such as legal 
representation or legal knowledge. In fact, “(c)hildren’s special status places them in a difficult 
position for pursuing remedies when breaches of their rights occur, because of lack of 
knowledge, ability and independence”.93 Therefore, as claimed by the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, “(…) states need to give particular attention to ensuring that there are effective, 
child-sensitive procedures available to children and their representatives”, such as the provision 
of child-friendly information, advice, access to independent complaints procedures with 
necessary assistance.94  
Third, the majority of the DPAs could not provide information on relevant court 
decisions.  This does not necessarily mean that such decision do not exist, but rather probably 
shows that the DPAs have troubles in getting an overview of the relevant court work. Some 
DPAs explicitly mentioned that none of their decisions have been challenged in courts and 
could not report about the other cases which were brought by individuals directly to the courts 
on data protection matters.  
Fourth, there is a wide divergence in educational initiatives carried out by the DPAs. 
Many of the DPAs are engaged in or carry out awareness raising and educational activities 
related to children’s personal data. Some of them are particularly creative and innovative, such 
as the “youth to youth” discussion model implemented by the CNIL. However, 13 DPAs did 
not explicitly mention their involvement in awareness raising. One DPA even claimed that 
parents and children have enough information on protection online. 
It is important to note that the survey was distributed in June 2014, and since then many 
national legislators, DPAs and other authorities have been faced with questions on the age of 
consent due to the need to implement Article 8 of the GDPR. It is possible that more clarity 
and guidance has emerged on the subject than the responses document, more court decisions 
have been adopted and more new initiatives have been initiated. Also, there have been several 
important amendments in the national data protection laws, e.g. in France (on the right to 




4. Structure of the argument  
 
This dissertation is composed of six separate articles that have been published or 
accepted for publication in refereed academic journals and a concluding chapter. Together 
these chapters reveal the limitations and possible improvements of the emerging multi-layered 
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European regulatory regime aiming to protect children from online privacy risks separately 
from adults. 
Each distinct publication focuses on a selected dimension of this new regulatory regime. 
These selected dimensions present the topical issues within the child online privacy protection 
debate, including the questions of: justification of the child-specific privacy regime, online 
privacy risk conceptualisation and assessment; limitations and gaps of the EU legislation 
(especially the General Data Protection Regulation) and self-regulatory child privacy 
protection schemes. 
The first publication (Chapter 2), “From universal towards child-specific protection of 
the right to privacy online: Dilemmas in the EU General Data Protection Regulation” presents 
the new child-tailored online privacy protection provisions in the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and explores the dilemmas that the introduction of such provisions creates 
– the ‘empowerment versus protection’ and the ‘individualized versus average child’ 
dilemmas. It concludes that by favouring protection over the empowerment of children, the 
Regulation risks limiting children in their online opportunities, and by relying on the average 
child criteria, it fails to consider the some of the cornerstone elements of the UN CRC, namely 
evolving capacities and best interests of the child. 
The second publication (Chapter 3) “Consent for processing children’s personal data in 
the EU: following in US footsteps?” zooms in on the core child protection provision and the 
most controversial regulatory issue in the EU – the GDPR parental consent requirement. The 
GDPR requires parental consent before information society service providers can process the 
personal data of children under 16 years of age (unless national laws state otherwise). Being 
new this provision faces many interpretation and implementation challenges in Europe, but not 
in the US, which adopted detailed rules for the operators that collect personal information from 
children under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) almost two decades ago. 
The article critically assesses the GDPR parental consent requirement, and makes a 
comparative analysis with the rules stipulated in the COPPA in order to identify pitfalls and 
lessons to be learnt. 
The third publication (Chapter 4) “Protecting children as data subjects online: 
combining the rationale and rules of personal data and consumer protection law” reflects on 
the double role that children play online where they are not only data subjects but also 
consumers, and explores the extent to which EU consumer law, which takes account of children 
as a particularly vulnerable group of consumers for a long time, can inform the newly adopted 
General Data Protection Regulation. The analysis focuses on the reasons justifying the child-
specific protection regime, principles (fairness, transparency) in relation to children, and 
conceptual questions (definition of an average child and services directed to children). 
The fourth publication (Chapter 5) “The “riskification” of European data protection law 
through a two-fold shift” explores how risk is conceptualised and assessed in the General Data 
Protection Regulation. It claims that the role and meaning of risk can be understood through 
two distinct shifts: towards risk-based regulation and towards risk regulation of data protection 
law. The paper concludes by outlining some unresolved challenges stemming from the two 
shifts. This chapter constitutes an introductory part to the further analysis of online privacy risk 
assessments in the context of the GDPR. 
The fifth publication (Chapter 6) “Constructing Child Specific Privacy Impact 
Assessments” builds on the previous chapter and further explores how more specifically 
privacy risks for children as data subjects can be defined and assessed using the data protection 
impact assessments. It adapts the general GDPR requirements for the DPIA to cases when data 
subjects are children and illustrates how a child-specific DPIA could be carried out based on 
the PRIAM methodology.  
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The sixth publication (Chapter 7) “Protecting Children’s Privacy Online: A Critical 
Look to Four European Self-regulatory Initiatives” looks beyond data protection and consumer 
protection law and focusses on an alternative approach to regulation – self-regulation. The 
article examines the rise of self-regulatory initiatives as private governance mechanisms 
adopted by the Internet industry in the EU to protect children’s privacy online. It analyses four 
specific initiatives and performs a formal self-regulatory process analysis focusing on 
procedural (rule formulation, monitoring, enforcement) and organizational (organizational 
structures, role of public actors) aspects, in order to reflect on the strengths and shortcomings 
of the self-regulatory process. The analysis shows significant limitations of self-regulation in 
the area of online child safety, characterized by broadly formulated statements and 
unmeasurable commitments, limited monitoring mechanisms and often inexistent sanctions. It 
is argued that sector-specific, institutionalized European codes of conduct, which disentangle 
protection of online safety and privacy as policy aims, could permit achieving better 
formulation, adoption and enforcement of voluntary rules, and thus better safeguard the privacy 
of children in the dynamic multi-jurisdictional, multi-stakeholder dominated online 
environment.  
The final chapter (Chapter 8) serves as the conclusion to this PhD dissertation. It builds 
upon the joint publications and provides a final contribution to answering the central research 
question. Drawing upon the main evidence from empirical and legal perspectives it shows how 
the existing regulatory regimes relate to online behaviour, vulnerabilities and the rights and 
freedoms of children, i.e. the particular characteristics of children. The chapter provides 
suggestions on how the emerging child-tailored online privacy protection regime can be fine-
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Abstract 
The new European Union (EU) General Data Protection Regulation aims to adapt children’s 
right to privacy to the ‘digital age’. It explicitly recognizes that children deserve specific 
protection of their personal data, and introduces additional rights and safeguards for children. 
This article explores the dilemmas that the introduction of the child-tailored online privacy 
protection regime creates – the ‘empowerment versus protection’ and the ‘individualized 
versus average child’ dilemmas. It concludes that by favouring protection over the 
empowerment of children, the Regulation risks limiting children in their online opportunities, 
and by relying on the average child criteria, it fails to consider the evolving capacities and best 
interests of the child. 
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1. Introduction 
Children, who are increasingly becoming active Internet users at an ever-younger age, are 
either intentionally providing or unconsciously ‘bleeding’ increasing amounts of their personal 
data online. This growing intensity in providing personal data is seen as enhancing online 
privacy risks, such as the loss of reputation, commercial exploitation of personal data, profiling, 
identity theft, cyber harassment and discrimination. Given these risks, there have been 
increasing calls among policy makers and academics to provide exceptional treatment for 
children online, that is, to transform children’s rights to privacy (established in Article 16 of 
the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN CRC) for the ‘digital age’ 
(UN, 1989). 
The most recent example of how such calls have been translated into practice in Europe is the 
General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679) (hereafter ‘Regulation’), the main personal 
data protection legislation recently adopted in the European Union (EU).1 The Regulation 
updates the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) and aims to strengthen citizens’ fundamental 
rights, especially the right to privacy and personal data protection, in the digital age. At the 
same time, it allows for free data flows in the Digital Single Market by simplifying rules for 
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companies. It establishes, among other requirements, general data protection principles and 
legal grounds for data processing, and imposes various duties on entities processing, or 
deciding how to process, personal data (data controllers). The Regulation also provides 
individuals whose data is processed (data subjects) with certain rights, such as the right of 
access to their personal data, rights to data correction and erasure. 
The Regulation, in contrast to its predecessor, explicitly recognizes that children deserve their 
personal data to be specifically protected, ‘as they may be less aware of the risks, consequences 
and safeguards concerned and their rights in relation to the processing of personal data’ (Recital 
38). It introduces far-reaching changes in relation to the processing of children’s personal data: 
it requires prior parental consent before the processing of children’s personal data and foresees 
other additional rights and safeguards. 
Although much scholarly attention has been paid to the effectiveness of the new data protection 
framework, the Regulation has rarely been examined in relation to the nature and extent of the 
protections afforded to children’s personal data online (Jasmontaite and De Hert, 2014; 
Mantelero, 2016; Savirimuthu, 2016; Van Der Hof, 2014). This article, therefore, explores the 
way in which the Regulation responds to the ‘empowerment versus protection’ dilemma in 
relation to children, that is, empowers children as Internet users able to grasp the opportunities 
of playing, learning and communicating, while protecting them from privacy violations and 
harm. It also explores the extent to which the individual understanding and development of 
each child is taken into consideration by the Regulation when balancing child rights against the 
powers and responsibilities of the parents (‘individualized vs average child’ dilemma). 
The article begins with a brief description of the two dilemmas, both of which are intrinsically 
present in child rights law, created by the adoption of the child-specific online privacy 
protection regime. It then analyses how the EU legislator addressed these dilemmas and 
foresees future challenges. 
 
2. Two old dilemmas in child rights law 
The ‘empowerment vs protection’ dilemma is not new to child rights debates, but is, rather, 
part of a larger fundamental conflict underlying the whole of child rights law. This conflict is 
intrinsic to the UN CRC, due to the potential tensions between articles pertaining to protective 
rights and those pertaining to participatory (emancipatory) rights. Children’s protective rights, 
such as the right to protection from ill treatment and abuse, as well as the right to state 
intervention in order to guarantee said protection, stem from their vulnerability, dependence on 
adults and need for physical and psychological care and nurture. Participatory (emancipatory) 
rights include children’s claims to ‘decision-making rights’ (Fortin, 2009: 17), and are close to 
adult human rights, such as the right to freedom of expression and thought. The dilemma also 
relates to the tensions among several principles on which the UN CRC is built, such as the best 
interests of the child and the evolving capacities, participation and self-determination of the 
child. Efforts to support the best interests of children require participation from children, but 
there is an inherent contradiction between the two children’s roles as ‘beneficiaries of 
intervention by adults’ and ‘competent social agents in their own right’ (Boyden and Levison, 
2000: 52). The dilemma, therefore, can be seen as being ‘one of the most fundamental 
challenges posed by the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (Lansdown, 2005: 32). 
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The same ‘empowerment versus protection’ dilemma has been partially embraced by Article 
24 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. As McGlynn (2002) frames it, ‘Article 24(1) is a 
curious mix of what might loosely be termed children’s “protection” and “empowerment” 
rights, which are often found to be in conflict’ (p. 397). The Charter explicitly echoes the 
tension between the child’s right to express his or her views freely, which should be taken into 
consideration in accordance with a child’s age and maturity, and the right to protection, when 
decisions are taken on behalf of the child, in his or her best interests. 
In his seminal article on children’s rights, Eekelaar (1986) identified three categories of 
interests that children may claim: basic (physical, emotional and intellectual care), 
developmental (equal possibilities to maximize available resources) and autonomy (freedom 
to choose their lifestyle and to enter into social relations). These interests potentially interact: 
the developmental interests can be advanced if autonomy is exercised, even if mistakes are 
made, because a child can learn from them (Gilmore and Glennon, 2014). However, the 
different interests can also conflict, especially in cases when an adolescent’s exercising of their 
autonomy conflicts with their basic interests (e.g. physical wellbeing). A false dichotomy also 
exists between the protection of children and the protection of their interests (Freeman, 1993). 
Freeman (1993) points out how 
[c]hildren who are not protected, whose welfare is not advanced, will not be able to 
exercise self-determination: on the other hand, a failure to recognize the personality of 
children is likely to result in an undermining of their protection with children reduced 
to objects of intervention. (p. 42) 
Although the age and maturity (physical, emotional, cognitive and social development) of the 
child should guide the balancing of the protection and empowerment elements when balanced 
against each other, that is, help to solve the aforementioned ‘empowerment versus protection’ 
dilemma, it is difficult to assess when an individual child is competent to take responsibility 
for a decision affecting him or her. This is the second ‘individualized versus average child’ 
dilemma discussed in this article. 
The challenge underlying the ‘individualized versus average child’ dilemma of determining the 
age at which specific protection for children should be lowered, taking into account the 
individual understanding and development of each child, is well illustrated by Lansdown 
(2005): 
It is not possible to prescribe defined ages at which all children need greater or lesser 
protection or opportunities for assuming responsibility. Nor is it possible to create 
sufficiently flexible legal and social frameworks through which to accommodate the 
widely varying capacities of children over different aspects of their lives. The former 
flies in the face of the evidence about how children’s capacities evolve. The latter risks 
exposing children to exploitation and abuse. (p. xiv) 
Efforts to draw a line, whereby the age demarcating the full legal capacity of children is 
determined, are often artificial and arbitrary when seeking, in the words of anthropologist Mary 
Douglas (2013), ‘to satisfy social demands for clarity, which compete with logical demands 
for consistency’ (p. 113). But from a legal perspective, the legislature may favour the 
application of a bright-line rule based on age, that is, a clearly set standard leaving no room for 
the exercise of discretion and assessment of an individual situation. As noted by the European 
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Court of Human Rights (ECHR, 2006), bright-line rules can help ‘to produce legal certainty 
and to maintain public confidence in the law in a highly sensitive field’. They are also easy to 
apply and eliminate possible arbitrariness and bias (Federle, 2013). A case-by-case assessment 
of the individual’s abilities is, administratively, excessively burdensome, particularly in the 
online environment. In addition, as noted by Scarre (1980), ‘once set, the boundary introduces 
a quantitative distinction between adults and children, which treats (or has treated) everyone 
equally, namely the amount of time allocated to acquire experience before adulthood’ (p. 117). 
However, as bright-line rules are absolute blanket norms, they do not allow for the examining 
of the interests of each child on a case-by-case basis, or for the taking into account of individual 
ability and maturity. They are based on a generalized age limit that is used as a proxy for 
maturity and judgement, and thus may easily exclude children capable of maturely engaging 
in certain activities. Therefore, it is questionable if a bright-line rule can be justified where it 
is important to examine the best interests of each child on an individual basis. 
 
3. European effort to adapt children’s right to privacy to a ‘digital age’: two dilemmas 
 
The Regulation attempts to introduce measures to achieve far-reaching changes in relation to 
the processing of a child’s personal data online. The question is, however, whether the 
Regulation will succeed in guaranteeing the universal child’s right to privacy in the online 
environment while adequately balancing the concerns of online risks and opportunities and 
accounting for the growing maturity of children. 
 
 
3.1. Empowerment versus protection in EU data protection law 
Since the early days of the Internet, the empowerment versus protection dilemma has been 
present in child safety policy. Policy makers have been faced with a need to maximize 
accessibility and opportunities presented by digital spaces while seeking to protect vulnerable 
Internet users from the potential risks and harm associated with their online activities. 
Dominant concerns related to child sexual abuse have led to a very protectionist stance in 
relation to children as Internet users. However, highly paternalistic views have problematic 
consequences for children as rights holders, ‘neglecting their agency and rights to access, 
information, privacy and participation’ (Livingstone et al., 2015: 5). 
Despite strong agreement on the need to create policies that balance children’s opportunities to 
access information online with the need to minimize their exposure to safety and privacy risks 
(Livingstone et al., 2011), achieving this remains a complicated task that requires a careful 
balancing act. Empirical research demonstrates that opportunities and risks online go together. 
More Internet usage allows children to gain more digital skills, and to climb the ‘ladder of 
opportunities’ (Livingstone and Helsper, 2007). However, children who take up more online 
activities encounter more risks. These risks may not necessarily result in harm, and may be 
seen as risky opportunities that ‘allow children to experiment online with relationships, 
intimacy and identity’ (Livingstone et al., 2011: 2). On the one hand, these risky opportunities 
are vital for children in order for them to learn coping behaviour and to build resilience. On the 
other hand, risky opportunities may lead to vulnerability, depending on the specific 
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circumstances of the child (socioeconomic and psychological factors) and on the design of the 
online environment (Livingstone et al., 2011). 
Ideally, data protection law should protect children from privacy risks, such as commercial 
data exploitation and misuse, reputational damage, or harm to one’s identity, dignity and 
personal integrity, while also enhancing online opportunities. This requires a policy framework 
that not only imposes legal compliance requirements on data controllers, but that also aims to 
empower children while addressing the needs of those who require greater protection. The 
Regulation tries to do so with its new empowering and protective provisions. What remains 
questionable, however, is how successfully it has addressed the empowerment versus 
protection dilemma, that is, how well does the Regulation strike an adequate balance between 
the two poles? 
3.1.1. Empowering children as Internet users 
User empowerment relates to ‘the necessary capabilities for interpreting and acting upon a 
social world that is intensively mediated by the new media’ (Mansell, 2002: 409). Pierson 
(2012: 103) underlines the importance of inclusion, digital literacy and privacy as the main 
issues that need to be addressed before individuals can become empowered online. Following 
this understanding of user empowerment, several provisions in the Regulation may be seen as 
aiming to empower children in the digital environment. These empowering provisions are age 
generic, that is, they apply equally to both adults and children, but can be framed as specifically 
relevant to children and their online activities. 
3.1.1.1. The right to be forgotten 
The most prominent empowering right in the Regulation is the right to be forgotten, a facet of 
the right to erasure, and an updated and clarified version of the right of access, both already 
present in the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC). It is an effort to address the fact that 
personal information on the Internet can be universally accessed and searched, but not easily 
removed. 
Particularly aimed at children in online environments, when their data is collected based on 
consent, the right to be forgotten allows children to remove personal information that may be 
damaging to their reputation and personality. It can be exercised even if an individual is no 
longer a child. This right is not absolute and does not apply when the data is necessary for the 
exercise of the right of freedoms of expression and information, archiving purposes or scientific 
and historical research. 
In the ruling of Google vs Spain (C-131/12) the EU Court of Justice had already decided that 
individuals have the right – under certain conditions – to ask search engines to remove links 
with their personal information that is inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant or excessive for the 
original collection purposes. The ruling sparked a wide debate on both sides of the Atlantic due 
to a possible chilling effect on access to information and free expression. 
The application of this right to children may be more problematic than to adults, demanding a 
dynamic perspective: with time, an unknown child may become a public figure, and his or her 
data may therefore change status from private (worth deleting) to something worth public 




3.1.1.2. The right to data portability 
This new right should allow Internet users to shift from one service provider to another by 
moving their personal data. This, according to the European Commission (EC, 2015), should 
benefit both individuals and companies, as ‘start-ups and smaller companies will be able to 
access data markets dominated by digital giants and attract more consumers with privacy-
friendly solutions’. In fact, an easier exit from ‘walled gardens’, such as Facebook (Barnett, 
2010), can reinforce the ongoing trend of social media platform diversification (Cortesi, 2013) 
among children, and consequently empower children to choose more privacy-friendly online 
services. 
3.1.1.3. ‘Data protection by design’ and ‘data protection by default’ 
The ‘data protection by design’ and ‘data protection by default’ principles require data 
protection requirements and safeguards to be built into products and services from the initial 
stage of their design. Privacy-friendly default settings are expected to be the norm on social 
networks or mobile apps (EC, 2015), vital for children, as empirical research indicates that on 
social networking sites (SNSs) ‘not everyone has the digital skills to manage privacy and 
personal disclosure and many 9- to 12-year-olds use SNSs underage, including 20 percent on 
Facebook and 38 percent using SNSs overall’ (Livingstone et al., 2011: 2). 
3.1.1.4. Transparent information and awareness 
As highlighted by Van Dijk (2013), ‘user empowerment is dependent on knowledge of how 
mechanisms operate and from what premise, as well as on the skills to change them’ (p. 171). 
The Regulation obliges data controllers to give information to all data subjects in a clear, 
audience-appropriate language, for example, by using standardized icons, and the time that 
their personal data is collected. Recital 58 frames this requirement in relation to children as 
giving information ‘in such a clear and plain language that the child can easily understand’. 
The challenge that will be faced by data controllers in practice, however, is how to implement 
the transparency requirement in a meaningful way in the case of children (Savirimuthu, 2016). 
3.1.2. Protecting children as data subjects 
Along with a number of empowering provisions, the Regulation introduces two protective 
provisions, specifically for children as data subjects, that is, subjects whose personal data is 
collected, held or processed. Protective provisions impose obligations on external parties: 
negative obligations on data controllers to abstain from certain data collection practices, and 
positive obligations on parents to engage in activities to secure the effective enjoyment of their 
child’s fundamental rights. 
3.1.2.1. Prohibition of profiling 
The Regulation prohibits certain potentially harmful data collection and usage practices 
through restrictions on the activities of data controllers. Recital 38 generally emphasizes that 
specific protection should be afforded to children against marketing or profiling. Under Article 
4(4), ‘profiling’ means any automated data processing activity that involves (a) automated 
processing of personal data and (b) using that personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects 
relating to a natural person, such as personal preferences, interests, behaviour and location. 
Recital 71 acknowledges that automated decision making based on profiling should not 
concern children. This leads to the conclusion that the profiling of children is prohibited, even 
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if the articles of the Regulation do not specifically state so. Given the overarching objective of 
the GDPR to provide children enhanced protection, it would have been desirable to explicitly 
exclude children from profiling. The current wording of the GDPR may lead to the 
interpretation that only automated decisions that produce legal effects or similarly significantly 
affect the child are absolutely prohibited. The prohibition against creating personality or user 
profiles of children follows the position of the Article 29 Working Party (A29WP, 2013), which 
stated that behavioural advertising ‘will be outside the scope of a child’s understanding and 
therefore exceed the boundaries of lawful processing’. 
The prohibition of profiling has the potential to diminish the commercial exploitation of 
children’s data that is now happening through complex marketing, tracking and targeting 
systems used by many online service providers that monitor and monetize children’s online 
behaviour and interactions (Montgomery and Chester, 2015). It may also foster the use of 
contextual, instead of behavioural, advertising by children’s websites and services. 
Nonetheless, it remains to be seen how effectively such a prohibition can be enforced in 
practice. For example, Savirimuthu (2016) claims that children might feel only marginal 
benefits, as profiling is not entirely forbidden in the Regulation and can be carried out in the 
legitimate interests of the data controller, subject to ‘suitable’ instead of ‘effective’ safeguards 
(p. 244). Also, even though it might be possible to infer that a user is a child using modern 
profiling and data mining techniques (European NGO Alliance for Child Safety Online 
[eNACSO], 2016), it is still difficult to reliably distinguish between adults and children online 
(Van Der Hof, 2014). An obligation to identify children in order to completely remove them 
from all targeting may lead to excessive data collection of a large number of adults, and instead 
of protecting one’s privacy and anonymity online, it could diminish and erode both. 
3.1.2.2 Parental consent 
The requirement of prior parental consent or authorization before the processing of the personal 
data of children when they are directly offered ‘Information Society services’ (Article 8) is 
probably the most controversial and important protective provision. As the EC explains, this 
provision ‘aims at protecting children from being pressured to share personal data without fully 
realising the consequences’ (EC, 2015). As a general rule, protection through the parental 
consent mechanism is applicable to children under the age of 16. However, 16 years is not an 
absolute threshold, as member states are allowed to apply a lower age limit, which nevertheless 
cannot be lower than 13 years.2 The parental consent requirement is applicable online, 
excluding offline data processing practices, such as those in the context of school or leisure 
activities. However, virtual and physical realities are frequently entirely intertwined and mixed 
for children, creating one total ‘inter-reality’ (Van Kokswijk, 2007: 40), and thus the consent 
requirement will significantly affect the daily lives of many children. 
The default age of 16 is the most debatable legislative choice, raising concerns of being too 
inclusive and over-protective for several reasons. First, the consent requirement in the 
Regulation is fully applicable. Instead of protecting the most vulnerable Internet users from 
harm, it risks limiting all children in their online activities and restricting their opportunities. 
Except for the preventive or counselling services offered directly to a child, an area where 
children and parents may often have conflicting interests, or where the parental consent 
requirement could cause a delay in an emergency situation, the Regulation does not foresee 
consent exceptions for less risky data collection practices. Rather than being subject to one 
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single rule, the consent requirement could foresee several different scenarios. For example, 
nuanced risk-based requirements for parental consent exists in the US Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) and could have been considered by the EU legislator. Under 
COPPA, commercial services that are not interactive or do not share children’s personal data 
need not obtain parental consent. Where a service uses children’s data for internal purposes, it 
has to employ a lighter consent mechanism, such as the sending of an email to the parent and 
taking an additional confirming step after receiving the parent’s response (‘email plus’ 
method). The highest risk services are those that disclose personal data to third parties, use 
behavioural advertising and enable children to publicly post information. These services must 
comply with the most rigid consent mechanisms, such as parents filling in and returning 
consent forms by mail, fax or scan, the provision of a credit card number, contacting the service 
provider via a toll-free number or video conference, and the verification of an official 
identification document. 
Second, the consent rule is very broad in scope. An Information Society service is ‘any service 
normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual 
request of a recipient of services’.3 As a result, consent will be sought from parents for all types 
of services in different sectors, that not only include social media, but also online gaming, 
entertainment sites, instant messaging and email services (Jasmontaite and De Hert, 2014). 
Some of these services have nothing to do with disclosing personal data online or behavioural 
tracking, the main worries that seem to be driving the establishment of a specific child data 
protection regime. An overload of consent requests may result in ‘consent fatigue’ among 
parents, when a constant consenting process becomes a disturbing irritation rather than a 
serious choice. This can make the entire parental consent provision illusionary. 
Third, the UN CRC obliges state parties to encourage, through legislation and policy, parents 
‘to listen to children and give due weight to their views in matters that concern them’ (CRC, 
2009). However, the consent requirement in the Regulation positions parents as arbiters in 
deciding what is both allowed and beneficial for their children, without formally allowing 
children to influence their decisions. Such a concentration of decisional power placed in the 
hands of parents raises several issues. Parents may not always be in a position to fully grasp 
the best interests of the child. There could be cases of disagreement between parents and 
children over the usefulness and risks in relation to social media, and emotional, moral panic-
driven or simply unjustified consent request rejections from parents. According to boyd (2014), 
adults are not always able to understand the positive and complex interactions between 
technology and young people. Empirical evidence shows that ‘one in three parents (51 percent 
of parents of 9- to 12-year-olds, 15 percent of parents of 13- to 16-year-olds) do not want their 
child to use SNSs’ (Livingstone et al., 2011: 19), even if social media has become a space for 
the exercise of the freedom of expression, access to information, civic engagement and public 
participation for children and young people (boyd, 2014). Even worse, parents may become 
potential invaders of their children’s privacy. For example, by using the right of access to 
personal data on behalf of their children, parents could get to know about their children’s online 
activities (Hoofnagle, 2016). Also, parental consent mechanisms may become parental control 
systems restricting the online freedoms of children (Van Der Hof, 2014). These concerns are 
not reflected in the logic of the Regulation, even if the right to privacy of children against their 
parents and the complexity of privacy boundaries within the family have been evidenced by 
academics (Newell et al., 2015; Shmueli and Blecher-Prigat, 2011). 
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Fourth, the Regulation fails to respect the evolving capacities of children, especially older 
children, and to formally involve them in decisions related to the use of their personal data. It 
makes no effort to adopt a sliding scale approach, and therefore to increasingly recognize the 
agency of children, foster the participation of children in their own protection and support 
coping and resilience through learning by doing. Freeman (1983) wisely states that special 
treatment can be justified due to a child’s incapacity and immaturity, but at the same time, 
children should be brought to ‘a capacity where they are able to take full responsibility as free, 
rational agents for their own system of ends’ (p. 57). The Regulation contradicts the right of 
children to be heard and taken seriously, enshrined in the UN CRC and EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. The Committee on the Rights of the Child (2009) has defined Article 12 
of the UN CRC (the right to be heard) not only as a right but also as a general principle – that 
is, this article should be considered in the interpretation of all other child rights. It requires 
recognizing that children are gradually capable of contributing to decisions about them, such 
as the use of their images or the monitoring of their activities, and should be consulted 
accordingly (A29WP, 2009). In the Regulation, solutions for consent could have varied from 
mere consultation of the child, to the parallel or joint consent of the child and a parent, and 
even to the autonomous consent of a mature child (A29WP, 2009). 
 
3.2. Individualized versus average child dilemma 
Determining a precise age limit after which the processing of personal data becomes subject to 
fewer legal constraints is not a challenge faced solely by data protection law. Other areas such 
as family, civil, criminal and administrative law have also faced the question of whether a line 
indicating a particular age as the starting point of adulthood had to be drawn. Sometimes the 
law looks at the issue on a case-by-case basis, examining factors particular to the individual 
child, and in other situations the law adopts a bright-line (i.e. age of 14, 16, 18 years) rule. This 
is essentially a choice to be made in the ‘individualized vs average child’ dilemma. 
The Regulation chooses to set a single age when all children can be deemed competent to 
consent to the processing of their personal data, relying on an ‘average child’ criteria. Such a 
legislative choice of determining a prescribed age limit can be criticized for several reasons. 
First, the capacities of a child are personal, context-dependent and constantly evolving. An 
assessment in each individual case would show widely differing capacities among children of 
the same age and could, thereby, reflect the best interests of the child. 
In fact, presently, only three member states (Spain, Hungary and the Netherlands) have chosen 
to explicitly state in their national data protection law the exact age threshold for consent.4 
Many remaining member states rely on the individualized child criteria and advise data 
controllers to perform a subjective and context-specific rather than universally applicable 
capacity test. In order to decide whether a child is able to consent, the data controllers should 
assess the concrete situation on a case-by-case basis, applying general criteria of the best 
interests of the child, level of moral and psychological development, the capacity to understand 
the consequences of giving consent and evaluating specific circumstances (age of the child, 
purpose of data processing, type of personal data involved, etc.). Only exemplar assumption-
based age thresholds are sometimes set in case law, legal doctrine or guidelines from the data 
protection authorities. On the European level, national data protection authorities took a 
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similarly flexible approach and did not set precise age limits at which parental consent is 
required. Instead, they underlined the importance of the maturity of a child and complexity of 
the data processing at hand (A29WP, 2009). 
Second, the same child may need protection for one data processing purpose, and autonomy or 
self-determination for another, depending on the potential privacy risks and harm that are at 
stake. For instance, data collection for the purpose of sending a newsletter might not require 
parental consent, while such consent would be necessary to create a social media account in 
relation to the same child (UK Information Commissioner’s Office [ICO], 2010). The 
imposition of legal age limits may disproportionally restrict the rights of other children and 
data subjects, irrespective of a child’s own levels of competence. 
 
3.3. More protection or empowerment? 
At first glance, the Regulation seems to provide many innovative empowerment rights, while 
failing on protective rights for children. A closer look, however, reveals that paternalistic 
protection is a favoured approach in the Regulation over the empowerment of children. The 
Regulation justifies protective measures exclusively in light of children’s inadequacies by 
stating that children merit specific protection due to their potentially lower awareness of risks, 
consequences, safeguards and rights relating to the processing of their personal data (Recital 
38). 
More importantly, although particularly relevant to children, all the empowering provisions in 
the Regulation are addressed to individuals of all ages, while only the protective provisions 
apply exclusively to children. In what Stalford (2012) calls the ‘hegemony of child protection’, 
the strict consent requirement formulated in Article 8 of the Regulation seems to place children 
under the strict over-protection of their parents (p. 224). As a consequence, Article 8 does not 
address the weight to be assigned to the child’s opinion, nor does it acknowledge the 
interrelation between a child’s opinion and his or her best interests. The adoption of broad 
parental oversight through the consent mechanism also raises questions as to whether and to 
what extent children will be able to enjoy the empowering rights, such as the right to be 
forgotten and data portability, without parental involvement. In sum, the highly protective 
consent provision seems to distort the balance between empowerment and protection towards 
the latter, especially for teens. 
 
 
4. A look to the future – beyond the letter of the law 
Despite the promising rights and obligations related to children in the Regulation, in reality, 
only their proper and effective implementation will demonstrate any credible attempt from the 
EU to empower and protect children. In order to reach such implementation, a number of 
complex, practical, structural and intellectual challenges are to be addressed by EU policy 
makers, national data protection authorities and Information Society service providers. 
The biggest practical challenge for the EU will be to ensure that online a child’s age and 
parental consent are verifiable, or the main protective provision in the Regulation will lose its 
effectiveness. As a side effect, an unenforced legal requirement on parental consent might lead 
to the loss of respect for the mere idea of rule-making (eNACSO, 2016). Up until now, there 
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have been no foolproof, adequate mechanisms to universally verify a child’s age online. 
Determined children are able circumvent the majority of age verification mechanisms by 
simply lying about their age or pretending to be their parents without penalty. Ideally, to avoid 
overburdening, age verification would be based on a sliding scale approach and depend on the 
circumstances, such as data processing purpose and use and type of data (A29WP, 2011). 
Although consent verification techniques exist, they have to be both effective and easy to use, 
as well as having to comply with the main data protection principles, such as data minimization, 
purpose limitation, data adequacy and relevance (Jasmontaite and De Hert, 2014).  
The Regulation encourages data controllers to determine techniques for verifiable parental 
consent in the codes of conduct of industry associations. Until now, the success of such 
voluntary codes in practice has been very limited. The number of codes approved by the 
national data protection authorities varies from one member state to another. On the European 
level, very few organizations representing specific sectors have tried, and only one of them has 
managed to draw up a code that was fully endorsed by the European data protection 
authorities.5 Self-regulatory codes are often limited in their ability to protect children, because 
of vague language, inadequate enforcement and monitoring mechanisms (Macenaite, 2016). 
Alternative approaches, such as explicitly integrating the UN CRC principles into self-
regulatory codes, instead of leaving the industry to determine their standards for respecting 
children’s needs and interests, could provide valuable solutions (Savirimuthu, 2016). Stronger 
participation of the EU public authorities in the self-regulatory process, in particular, rule 
formulation and enforcement, could help to achieve a better balance between the interests of 
children to exercise control over their personal data and the desire of businesses to valorize and 
profit from users’ personal data. 
More fundamentally, it should be acknowledged that, on a structural level, informed consent 
to personal data processing is not a panacea tantamount to giving complete control to 
individuals over their personal data in complex networked environments. A rich body of 
literature points to the characteristics of the networked environments that restrain an 
individual’s control over their personal data (Cohen, 2012; Hildebrandt, 2008). Various 
scholars have emphasized the weaknesses of consent as a protection mechanism online 
(Mantelero, 2014; Schermer et al., 2014). Neither parents nor children can take full 
responsibility and control of their personal data online, as their choices and data control 
possibilities are shaped by the design and functionalities of communication spaces (Marwick 
and boyd, 2014). Although there is no easy answer to the structural power imbalances online, 
privacy enhancing engineering and design solutions, if enforced under the data protection by 
design obligations of the Regulation, could provide some realistic possibilities to affect 
networked environments and respond to children’s needs and expectations. 
Finally, an intellectual challenge for member states will be to define an average child in 
different data collection scenarios based on comprehensive research and solid empirical 
evidence. Social and behavioural sciences should be the first areas from which national 
legislators should gather the evidence to justify any given age limit. As it seems highly unlikely 
that fixing a single age limit for consent in all data processing activities online could be the 
most appropriate solution, different sectors, data collection practices and age spans might 
require detailed examination and research. In addition, the views of children themselves should 
be considered in policy making, preparation of national laws related to the processing of 






1. The Regulation was adopted on 14 April 2016, after more than 4 years of debate. It will come into force 
from 25 May 2018. 
2. Previous drafts of the Regulation, consistently with Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 
foresaw 13 as the age of consent. A last minute change during the European Union (EU) trilogue 
negotiations, which raised the age to 16, generated public outrage. The provision has been interpreted as 
banning children from social media and even as being an attack on their human rights, such as freedom 
of expression and right to information. 
3. Point (b) of Article 1(1) of the Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical 
regulations and of rules on Information Society services (OJ L 241 2015). 
4. Parental consent is required for the processing of personal data of children under the age of 14 in Spain 
(Article 13 of the Spanish Royal Decree 1720/2007 of 21 December) and 16 in the Netherlands (Article 
5 of the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act [25 892] of 23 November 1999) and Hungary (Section 6[3] 
of the Hungarian Act CXII of 2011 on the Right of Informational Self-Determination and on Freedom 
of Information). 
5. The European codes of practice for the use of personal data in direct marketing by Federation of European 
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With the recent adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the European 
Union assigned a prominent role to parental consent in order to protect the personal data of 
minors online. For the first time, the GDPR requires parental consent before information 
society service providers can process the personal data of children under 16 years of age. This 
provision is new for Europe and faces many interpretation and implementation challenges, but 
not for the US, which adopted detailed rules for the operators that collect personal information 
from children under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) almost two 
decades ago. The article critically assesses the provisions of the GDPR related to the consent 
of minors, and makes a comparative analysis with the requirements stipulated in the COPPA 
in order to identify pitfalls and lessons to be learnt before the new rules in the EU become 
applicable. 




Children are actively present online at an ever-younger age. It is estimated, that globally one 
in three internet users are under the age of 18.97 Online, children not only enjoy exciting 
opportunities of playing, creating, learning, self-expressing, experimenting with relationships 
and identities, but are also disclosing increasing amounts of their personal data. Ubiquitous 
computing and the increasing datafication of everything98 is seen as enhancing online privacy 
risks, such as commercial exploitation and misuse of personal data, profiling, identity theft, the 
loss of reputation and discrimination. For example, as the consequence of dataveillance 
                                                
97  Sonia Livingstone, John Carr and Jasmina Byrne, ‘One in Three: Internet Governance and Children’s Rights’ 
(2015) Global Commission on Internet Governance Paper Series No. 22. 
98  Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Neil Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We 
Live, Work, and Think (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013) 
36 
 
practices via wearable and mobile devices, social media platforms, and educational software, 
“children are configured as algorithmic assemblages (…) with  the  possibility  that  their  
complexities,  potentialities  and  opportunities  may  be  circumscribed”.99 In addition, due to 
their particular behavioural characteristics, emotional volatility and impulsiveness, children 
(especially teenagers) are seen as being more vulnerable in comparison to adults online.100 
Developmental psychology provides evidence that adolescents can be more active and risk-
prone online.101 They may be less capable of evaluating perilous situations and can be more 
easily misled, given their lack of awareness vis-à-vis the long-term consequences of their 
virtual actions.102 These specific developmental features of children might be easily exploited 
by online marketers who collect personal data and employ special techniques such as “real-
time bidding, location targeting (especially when the user is near a point of purchase), and 
"dynamic creative" ads tailored to their individual profile and behavioral patterns”103.   
Empirical studies show that privacy risks are common on the internet104 and privacy concerns 
constitute one of the main worries among children in Europe.105 In the same vein, adults widely 
support the introduction of the special data protection measures for children. According to an 
Eurobarometer survey, 95% of Europeans believed that “under-age children should be 
specially protected from the collection and disclosure of personal data” and 96% thought that 
“minors should be warned of the consequences of collecting and disclosing personal data”.106 
Given these online risks and public concerns, there have been increasing calls from policy-
makers and academics to  transform children’s rights, in particular the rights guaranteed by the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN CRC), to cater for the ‘digital age’.107 Among 
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people are sometimes at risk not because their brains are different, but because they have not had the 
experience or opportunity to develop the skills and judgment that engagement in those activities and 
experiences supply”.) 
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rights’,  (May 2015); UNICEF, ‘Privacy, protection of personal information and reputation rights’ (2017) 
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the rights to provision and participation, the UN CRC recognises children’s rights to protection, 
including a specific protection against arbitrary or unlawful interference with children’s 
privacy, and unlawful attacks on their honour and reputation (Article 16).108 
 
Yet, protection of informational privacy in the EU has been designed for “everyone”, conflating 
adults and children in one single group of data subjects. Since 1995, minors are covered by the 
age-generic data protection provisions provided by Directive 95/46/EC with no special focus 
on the processing of children’s data. The newly adopted EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (2016/679)109 (hereinafter - ‘GDPR’ or ‘Regulation’) has significantly changed the 
status quo and rejected the “age-blind” approach to data subjects. The GDPR, which has faced 
long debates during its adoption process110, explicitly recognizes that children need more 
protection than adults. As explained by Recital 38 of the GDPR, children merit special 
protection as they “may be less aware of risks, consequences, safeguards and their rights in 
relation to the processing of personal data”, especially online. To provide such special 
protection, the GDPR has introduced far-reaching changes in relation to the processing of 
minor’s personal data online, such as child-appropriate information, a stricter right to erasure, 
and stronger protection against marketing and profiling.111 Most importantly and 
controversially, in cases when the processing of personal data of children takes place on the 
basis of consent (in accordance with Article 6(1)(a) GDPR), Article 8 of the GDPR has 
established a parental consent requirement before the offering of ‘information society services’ 
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directly to children under the age of 16 (unless a lower national age threshold between 13 and 
16 applies). 
Being new, the GDPR’s parental consent requirement remains unclear and faces many practical 
implementation challenges. However, in the US since 1998 the Children's Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPPA) has provided detailed rules for the operators of online services 
directed towards children that collect (or have actual knowledge that they collect) personal 
information from children. As the GDPR has been partially inspired by COPPA, US experience 
could inform the debate in the EU over the new data protection challenges related to children’s 
consent in relation to online services. Thus, the aim of this article is to critically assess the 
provisions of the GDPR related to the consent of minors, and make a comparative analysis with 
the requirements stipulated in the US COPPA in order to identify pitfalls and lessons to be 
learnt before the new rules on the consent of minors in the EU become applicable.  
 
This article is divided in five parts. The first part provides an overview of the context relating 
to the processing of children’s personal data, especially in the online world. The second part 
explores the general notion of consent in the EU data protection law, including the conditions 
for a valid consent. In the third part, the legislative development of Article 8 of the GDPR 
dealing specifically with children’s consent in relation to information society services is 
examined. The fourth part presents the US relevant legislative framework, i.e. COPPA and its 
main requirements. In the fifth part, the challenges related to the practical implementation of 
the provision on the consent of minors in the GDPR will be discussed in light of the US 
experience. Finally, based on this comparison, we will conclude with some recommendations 
for the future application of the new rules on the consent of minors.  
 
 
2. Conception of article 8 – Exploring the context 
 
Since the adoption of Directive 95/46/EC in the pre-internet era which remained silent in 
relation to children, the regulatory context for the GDPR has drastically changed. In particular, 
there have been several driving factors (contextual and legal) behind the vast increase in 
attention for children’s privacy protection on the Internet, that played a role in acknowledging 
children as special data subjects in the GDPR . 
 
2.1. Contextual developments  
 
Several developments can be seen as preparing the ground for the adoption of specific 
provisions in the GDPR relating to the protection of minors with regard to the processing of 
their personal data.  
First, in recent years increased attention has been paid to children and their rights in EU policy 
making. The importance of promoting children rights has become a clear objective of the EU 
as stated in Article 3(3) of the TEU. In Article 24 of the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, the EU committed to safeguarding children’s rights to protection and care. Moreover, 
the effective protection of children in all EU policies having an impact on their rights are 
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identified among the main priorities in EU strategic documents.112 These documents transform 
the EU policy objectives into actions. The need to ensure that children's rights are enhanced 
and respected in all the EU legislative proposals and decisions has been continuously 
acknowledged among the EU institutions. In fact, the EU Agenda for the Rights of the Child 
recognises as one of its objectives the achievement of “a high level of protection of children in 
the digital space, including of their personal data, while fully upholding their right to access 
internet for the benefit of their social and cultural development”.113 In 2015, the European 
Parliament and the Council called on the European Commission to present a new and 
comprehensive strategy and action plan on the rights of the child.114 The commitment of the 
EU institutions to promoting, protecting and fulfilling children’s rights in all relevant policy 
areas and actions means that the principles of the UN CRC should guide the EU policies 
directly or indirectly affecting children. In other words, children’s rights considerations, such 
as the best interest of the child, should be taken into account in the drafting of legislative 
proposals.  
Second, a significant increase in empirical data about children’s internet use and related online 
risks has been gathered across Europe by the EU funded EU Kids Online project and became 
available for policy makers, academics and other stakeholders. In 2011, research indicated that 
9% of children aged 11-16 experienced personal data misuse online and significant amount of 
children faced difficulties when finding and using reporting tools and privacy settings to protect 
themselves online.115 In 2014, research reaffirmed that some of the most important concerns 
among children still remain related to personal data misuse and reputational damage, such as 
hacking of social media accounts, creation of fake profiles, and impersonation.116 
Third, several inspections on the ground raised the concerns around a growing number of 
websites and mobile apps targeted at, or frequently used by, ever younger children and the lack 
of specific data protection rules that would take into account the unique needs of children as 
data subjects. In 2012, the FTC in the US reviewed information provided to users by 400 kids’ 
apps and revealed that many of them lacked transparency and clear disclosure about the 
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children’s data collection practices.117 In 2015 during the time the GDPR was under debate in 
the Council, 29 data protection authorities from around the world carried out a Global Privacy 
Sweep (i.e. a joint review of 1494 websites and apps directed towards children).118 The results 
revealed many problems, such as inadequate, non-child-tailored privacy policies, excessive 
collection of personal data from children, and the frequent disclosure of children’s data to third 
parties. In relation to age verification and parental consent in services, the Sweep report stated 
that “although many sites and apps claimed in their privacy policies to preclude access to 
children under a specified age, only 15% of websites and apps swept had age verification or 
gating to bar younger children from accessing the site or app. Sweepers also found that some 
of those controls did not function (e.g., a child indicating she was 10 years old could still access 
the site) and others were only passive (e.g., a pop-up indicating that a child below a specified 
age should not access the site). Noteworthy, only 24% of sites and apps swept encouraged 
parental involvement.”119 In response to these finding, some data protection authorities, such 
as the French data protection authority (CNIL), published guidelines120 thereby sending a 
reminder to child-directed websites and services regarding their obligations in terms of inter 
alia parental consent for the collection of sensitive data and photographs from children and the 
transferring of data to third parties for marketing purposes. In the wake of the EU data 
protection reform, the results of the sweep could have helped to crystalize the final position on 
the protection of children’s personal data online among the policy makers.  
 
2.2. Lack of harmonisation within the EU 
 
The Directive 95/46/EC failed to explicitly address the age limit of consent and as a result there 
has been lack of clarity on the matter in many EU countries. The question “at what age can   
children   consent   to   have   their   personal   data processed” even became ironically called 
“the million euro question” by European data protection experts.121 Lack of harmonisation 
across the EU caused legal uncertainty among data controllers who were exposed to diverging 
legal rules when collecting children’s personal data.122 In the following paragraphs we will 
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explore why setting the age of consent is a difficult issue and how this issue has been 
approached by national policy makers in the EU. 
 
2.2.1. The concept of child and his legal capacity 
Determination of the legal competence of minors to consent to data processing is a complicated 
task. The complexity of setting an age specific competence threshold stems from conceptions 
of childhood, including the ideas about children’s needs and capacities and how they change 
with growth,123 as well as national historical, cultural and social heritage of a particular country 
and legal system. In addition, as Hodgkin and Nowell have rightly noted “setting an age for the 
acquisition of certain rights or for the loss of certain protections is a complex matter [which] 
balances the concept of the child as a subject of rights whose evolving capacities must be 
respected with the concept of the State’s obligation to provide special protection”.124   
Establishing a precise age limit after which the processing of personal data becomes subject to 
fewer or no additional legal constraints is not a challenge faced solely by data protection law. 
Other areas such as consumer contract law, family, civil, criminal, and administrative law, have 
also faced the question of whether, and if so, where a line indicating a particular age as the 
starting point of adulthood should be drawn. The UN CRC makes use of the term “child”, 
which it defines as “every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law 
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”.  This position was also followed by the 
Article 29 Working Party, which considered a child as someone under the age of 18, unless 
they have acquired legal adulthood before that age.  The European Commission’s draft GDPR 
proposal incorporated the definition of the UN CRC, but this did not make it into the final 
version of the Regulation (discussed below). However, taking into account that the right to data 
protection belongs to the child and not to their representative (who is merely appointed to 
exercise them), legal incapacity until the age of 18 can be easily seen as overprotective. 
Following the requirements of the UN CRC, children should be increasingly consulted on 
matters relating to them and thus solutions for consent could range from mere consultation with 
the child, to parallel or joint consent of the child and a parent, or even to the autonomous 
consent of a mature child.125 As a result, diverging age thresholds, rarely as high as 18, are 
explicitly introduced (or tacitly accepted in practice, depending on the Member State) for 
minors as data subjects while regulating their power to give a valid consent to the data 
processing operations. A large discrepancy exists with regard to the age, after which minors 
are legally competent to give their consent.126 In general, many European countries consider 
minors ranging from 14 to 16 years to be competent to consent to the processing of their data. 
However, the precise question of whether a particular minor is competent and, more 
importantly, has given valid consent in a particular context might still depend on all the 
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circumstances, including both subjective matters such as the maturity of the minor and more 
objective matters such as whether the matter for which consent was given was in the direct 
interest of the minor or not, and indeed whether the parents were, or should have been 
involved.127 
 
2.2.2. Three distinct national choices  
The lack of harmonised general rules on children’s data processing and consent, opened the 
door for individual EU member states to nationally set their age limits at which parental consent 
is required and foresee how valid consent from minors should be obtained. Legal regulations 
or solely existing opinions and best practices on the age threshold for a valid consent of a minor 
notably differ across the EU Member States and the legal capacity to consent to data processing 
operations varies not only in different jurisdictions but also across sectors, like research128 or 
advertising129.  
The broad range of diverging practices among the EU Member States in the area of data 
protection may be divided into three groups in relation to the method and interpretation of the 
exact age threshold enabling minors to consent to their data protection. 
 
2.2.2.1. An objective bright-line approach 
A few Member States explicitly state in their national data protection law the exact age 
threshold from which minors are treated as legally competent to act as data subjects on their 
behalf. This regulatory choice can be called an objective bright-line rule.130 In Spain, the data 
protection law contains specific provisions on the consent for the processing of data on 
minors.131 According to Article 13 of the Spanish Personal Data Protection Law, data 
pertaining to data subjects over 14 years of age may be processed with their consent, except in 
cases when the law requires the assistance of parents or guardians. The same article also forbids 
the collection of data from minors regarding members of their family or its members’ 
characteristics, such as data relating to the professional activity of the parents, financial 
information, sociological or any other such data, without the consent of the persons to whom 
such data refers. The exception is data regarding the identity and address of the father, mother 
or guardian which may be collected for the sole purpose of obtaining their consent. The Spanish 
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law also underlines the responsibility of the data controller for the setting up of the verification 
procedures that guarantee the age of the minor and the authenticity of the parental consent.  
Similarly, although stipulated in less detail, the data protection law in the Netherlands states 
that “(I)n the case that the data subjects are minors and have not yet reached the age of sixteen, 
or have been placed under legal restraint or the care of a mentor, instead of the consent of the 
data subjects, that of their legal representative is required. The data subjects or their legal 
representative may withdraw consent at any time” (Article 5 Dutch Data Protection Law).132 
The Dutch Data Protection Authority specified the obligation to obtain valid consent from those 
under the age of 16 online in its guidelines entitled “Publication of personal data on the 
Internet” which was adopted in 2007.133 The Dutch data protection authority does not specify 
or recommend concrete methods for obtaining the consent of a minor’s parents or legal 
representatives, but underlines the general principle that the data controller must be able to 
demonstrate that consent has been obtained, alternatively consent is void and any subsequent 
processing of the personal data online is unlawful. It also points to a social responsibility of the 
website owners and network environments aimed at those under the age of sixteen to explain 
the rights and obligations of their users in a clear and understandable language. 
Additionally in Hungary, Section 6 sub-section 3 of the Hungarian Privacy Act134 clearly states 
that “(T)he statement of consent of minors over the age of sixteen shall be considered valid 
without the permission or subsequent approval of their legal representative”.  
Finally, the UK Data Protection Act 1998, albeit not directly referring to the age of consent, 
has a special section on the exercise of rights in Scotland by children which states:  “where a 
question falls to be determined in Scotland as to the legal capacity of a person under the age of 
sixteen years to exercise any right conferred by any provision of this Act, that person shall be 
taken to have that capacity where he has a general understanding of what it means to exercise 
that right.” It further specifies: “a person of twelve years of age or more shall be presumed to 
be of sufficient age and maturity to have such understanding” 135. 
All four of the above-mentioned EU countries introduced the age limit for consent of minors 
as a general requirements, without making a specific reference to consent in the online 
environment. Thus, this requirement is equally applicable to data processing online.  
 
2.2.2.2. “Regulation by analogy” approach 
Some other Member States chose the “regulation by analogy” model and invoke civil law 
provisions establishing when a person becomes fully competent to acquire and assume rights 
and obligations and apply them to the area of data protection. For example, in Lithuania 
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children can be considered as competent from 14 years old, as from that age they enjoy partial 
rights and are allowed to carry out basic legal acts without the consent of their representatives. 
Consequently they are also allowed to consent to some basic personal data processing 
operations.136 
 
2.2.2.3. Subjective capacity-based approach 
Many Member States seem to have no bright-line specific provision or rely on the legal 
capacity of agents in other branches of law but instead assess the concrete situation on case-
by-case basis applying the general criteria of the best interest of the child, level of moral and 
psychological development, the capacity to understand the consequences of giving consent and 
evaluating specific circumstances (the age of the child, the purpose of data processing, type of 
personal data involved,137 etc). Such an evaluation of the capacity of the data subject is a 
subjective and context-specific test rather than one that is universally applicable, but 
assumption-based exemplar age thresholds are normally set in case law, legal doctrine or 
guidelines from the data protection authorities. This choice can be called the subjective 
capacity test. For example, in the UK, there is a general presumption that no assumptions about 
an individual under 16 can be made as they lack legal capacity. Although there is no case law 
about children’s capacity to consent to data processing, the existing case law developed some 
guidance on the situations in which children can give consent to a medical treatment or legal 
representation.138 The seminal case on the matter is Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area 
Health Authority. This case developed guidelines under which a doctor can lawfully provide 
contraception to a girl under 16 years old without informing her parents. It established a 
principle that children under 16 can sometimes give their consent to certain things, but there is 
no fixed age when one can presume the competence of a child.139 In the UK, the Data Protection 
Act 1998 does not deal with the issue of obtaining consent from children. The main document 
providing guidance with regard to data collection online is issued by the UK Information 
Commissioner’s Office (UK ICO) through the Personal Information online code of practice 
adopted in 2010. The code states that “assessing understanding, rather than merely determining 
age, is the key to ensuring that personal data about children is collected and used fairly”. When 
services are directed at children, the UK ICO advises: to determine the level of understanding 
of the child rather than only the age; to require parental consent for children under the age of 
12; to collect information in a way that children understand and to which parents are not likely 
to object. When the information obtained from the child is relatively speaking of less 
importance or sensitivity (such as name), then simple notification of parents via email is 
enough, whereas when a photograph of the child is being processed then something more akin 
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to verifiable parental consent is necessary. In Belgium the issue of minors’ consent has been 
addressed in an Advice issued by the Belgian Data Protection Authority.140 The Advice states 
that even though under Belgian law, the age of maturity is 18 years, the gradual development 
of minors and the need for more independence with growth should be acknowledged, especially 
in adolescence, between the ages of 13 and 16 years. When a child is not mature enough to be 
able to understand the implications of the given consent parental consent is necessary. For those 
younger than 13 or 14 consent is required in all cases, however in complicated cases parental 
consent is also mandatory for children younger than 15 years. Parental consent should also be 
gained when sensitive data are collected from those under 16, and in all cases when data 
processing is not in the interest of the child.  
At a European level, the approach is similar to the majority of the national jurisdictions 
described in the third group. The Article 29 Working Party in the Opinion dedicated to the 
protection of children’s privacy,141 took a similarly flexible approach and did not set precise 
age limits at which parental consent is required. Instead, it underlined the importance of the 
maturity of a child and complexity of the data processing at hand. For instance, the Article 29 
Working Party believed that data collection from an 8-year-old child for the purpose of sending 
a free magazine or newsletter does not require parental consent, while such consent would be 
necessary for the same child to take part in a live TV show. 
 
 
3. Consent in EU Data Protection Law  
 
3.1 The concept of consent  
The consent of the data subject as a legitimate basis for personal data processing is recognised 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR)142 and further in the Data 
Protection Directive (Article 7 DPD). The GDPR retains consent of the data subject as one of 
the grounds for lawful processing of personal data (Article 6(1)(a) GDPR). 
The consent of the data subject in the context of the Data Protection Directive is understood as 
“any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject 
signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed” (Article 2(h) DPD). 
The definition of consent in the GDPR remains very close to the definition of the term in the 
DPD: “‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and 
unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by 
                                                
140 Belgian Privacy Commission, ‘Advice No. 38/2002 of 16 September 2002 concerning the protection of the 
private life of minors on the Internet’ (2002) 
<http://www.privacycommission.be/nl/docs/Commission/2002/advies_38_2002.pdf > (Dutch); 
<http://www.privacycommission.be/fr/docs/Commission/2002/avis_38_2002.pdf> (French), accessed 1 
March 2017. 
141 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 2/2009 on the protection of children's personal data 
(General Guidelines and the special case of schools) WP 160’, 11 February 2009. 
142 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which came into force on 1 December 2009, 
besides a right to private life (Article 7), recognised the protection of personal data as a separate right under 
its Article 8. Article 8 of the Charter safeguards the protection of personal data and Article 8 Part 2 stresses 
the processing of personal data on the basis of consent or other legitimate grounds by stating: 
“1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 2. Such data must be 
processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other 
legitimate basis laid down by law.” 
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a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him 
or her” (Article 4(11) GDPR).  
The Article 29 Working Party closely examined the concept of consent in the DPD in its 
opinion on the definition of consent143, specifying and examining the criteria for the consent of 
the data subject to be valid. According to the Article 29 Working Party, the consent must be 
(a) an indication of the wishes of the data subject… signifying…, (b) freely given, (c) specific, 
and (d) informed. These elements will now be briefly discussed as they remain identical to the 
definition of consent contained in the GDPR and will be then followed by a short discussion 
of the “unambiguous” qualification.  
a) Indication of the wishes of the data subject 
An essential element in deciding if the data subject consents to a specific processing operation 
is the examination of whether there is a clear indication of the wishes of the data subject. The 
GDPR clarifies in the definition of consent that data subject should indicate his wishes using a 
statement or a clear affirmative action (Article 4(11) GDPR). Therefore consent cannot be 
inferred from the absolute silence of the data subject. Similarly pre-ticked boxes or lack of any 
action on behalf of the data subject does not constitute consent (Recital 32 GDPR). Recital 32 
GDPR clarifies that an indication of the wishes of the data subject can be provided “by a written 
statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement. This could include ticking a box 
when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information society services 
or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data subject’s 
acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data. […] If the data subject’s 
consent is to be given following a request by electronic means, the request must be clear, 
concise and not unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided” 
(Recital 32 GDPR). 
b) Freely given consent 
There are various influences that can be exercised on data subjects in order to manipulate their 
decision to agree to the processing of their personal data. However, not every exercise of 
external pressure leads to invalidation of consent. The consent of the data subject is still freely 
given when positive pressure is exercised, while the exercise of any kind of negative pressure 
renders the consent invalid. Recital 42 GDPR clearly summarises that “[c]onsent should not be 
regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse 
or withdraw consent without detriment.” The GDPR clearly stipulates that in order to assess 
whether consent in freely given “utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the 
performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the 
processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of the contract” (Article 
7(4) GDPR). Similarly consent will not be deemed to be freely given if this relates to more 
than one data processing operation and it is not possible to separate out consent on the basis of 
each individual data processing operation (Recital 43). Moreover recital 43 clarifies that 
consent should not be considered as freely given and the processing of personal data should 
not rely on it when there is clear imbalance between the data subject and the data controller “in 
                                                




particular where the controller is a public authority and it is therefore unlikely that consent was 
freely given in all the circumstances of that specific situation.” (Recital 43 GDPR).  
 
c) Informed consent  
The provision of adequate information to the data subject is context-related. The types and 
amount of information should be decided on a case-by-case basis in the light of the fairness 
principle. That being said, the information that is specified in Article 13 GDPR should be 
provided to data subjects irrespective of the circumstances as complemented by any other 
information that is required in order to properly informed the data subjects vis-à-vis the specific 
circumstances of the processing. The information should be easily accessible, easy to 
understand and should be provided in an intelligible form (Recital 39 GDPR). Recital 39 GDPR 
provides a short description of the transparency principle and indicates that this in particular 
concerns the provision of “information to the data subjects on the identity of the controller and 
the purposes of the processing and further information to ensure fair and transparent processing 
in respect of the natural persons concerned and their right to obtain confirmation and 
communication of personal data concerning them which are being processed” (Recital 39 
GDPR). In the context of the novelties introduced in the GDPR where risk plays a prominent 
role in the handling of personal data, the GDPR requires that specific information is provided 
to the data subjects with regard to the risks, conditions of processing, relevant safeguards in 
place as well as the rights of the data subjects in relation to the processing of personal data 
(Recital 39 GDPR). In particular the provision of information to children, in light of the fairness 
principle, should be adapted to children, in order to make it easy for them to understand what 
information is collected about them and for what purposes it will be used.144 
d) Specificity of consent 
The GDPR provides that the consent of the data subject should be specific. The requirement 
for specificity relates to all circumstances surrounding the processing of the personal data for 
which the consent is been sought. The specification of the information that is provided to the 
data subject is an intrinsic element of the requirement for informed consent. However, the 
element that the consent has to be specific also relates to the degree of specificity it has to 
ascertain. Valid consent requires the explicit specification of the aimed legitimate purposes 
(recital 39 GDPR). It is unclear to what extent clearly specified consent, covering for instance 
multiple purposes, could be invalid. On this point the GDPR clarified that multiple processing 
operations that are carried out for the same purpose(s) can be covered under one consent 
(Recital 32 GDPR). Similarly, when a processing operation is carried out for multiple purposes, 
then consent should be provided for all of them (Recital 32 GDPR). 
The definition of consent in the GDPR includes the additional requirement that consent needs 
to be unambiguous, a qualification that was required only in two instances under the Data 
Protection Directive: when consent was the ground for legitimate processing of personal data 
(Article 7(a) DPD) and in the context of transfers of data to third countries (Article 26(1) DPD). 
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Several Member States, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, chose not to incorporate 
the qualification of “unambiguously given” consent in their national data protection legislation 
when transposing the Data Protection Directive. Kosta claims that “The additional condition 
that the consent should be given “unambiguously” does not add any real value to the way how 
consent should be interpreted. A consent given “ambiguously” would amount to an unclear 
indication of the wishes of the data subject for processing of his personal data and would not 
qualify as valid consent.”145 The European Commission in its Proposal for the General Data 
Protection Regulation introduced the element that consent has to be “explicit” in the definition 
of the term146, a proposal that was also welcomed by the European Parliament in its first 
reading.147 The Council of the European Union in its first reading did not include either the 
qualification of unambiguous or explicit consent. However, as already discussed, the final 
version of the GDPR, which resulted from the Trialogue debates, included a qualification of 
unambiguous consent in the definition of the term, despite the controversy as to whether this 
qualification has any actual value.  
 
3.2 Special conditions for consent 
 
In Article 7 the GDPR sets out specific conditions with regard to the provision of consent that 
are also of high relevance in the context of the consent of minors. The GDPR clarifies that the 
data controller must be able to demonstrate that the consent of the data subject has been 
provided for specified purposes (Article 7(1) GDPR). As the data controllers will be 
responsible to prove that the consent of the data subject was provided in a valid way for a 
specific data processing operation, they should also use reliable means in order to obtain the 
consent, taking into account the sensitivity of each specific data processing operation.148  
The GDPR also introduces the rule that when data subject consent is provided as part of a 
written declaration that concerns another matter, then the request for consent has to be 
presented in a clearly distinguishable form from the other elements of that written declaration 
in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language (Article 7(2) 
GDPR). This new rule is already to be found in Germany, where the German Federal Court of 
Justice published a decision on the “Payback” case, according to which it was sufficient that 
the clause on the consent to the processing of personal data was clearly highlighted and the 
data subject was given the opportunity to object to such processing.149 The clause on consent 
to data processing should not be simply part of the general terms and conditions of a contract, 
                                                
145 Eleni Kosta, Consent in European data protection law (Brill/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 235.   
146 Commission (EC), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (General Data Protection Regulation) COM(2012) 11 final (Draft Data Protection Regulation), 25 
January 2012.  
147 European Parliament (EP), Legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 
2012/0011(COD)) (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading), 12 March 2014. 
148 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Opinion on the data protection reform package’, 7 March 2012, para. 
129.  
149 Bundesgerichtshof (GERMBGH - German Federal court of Justice), Decision of 16 July 2008, Az: VIII ZR 
348/06 (“Payback”), MMR 2008, 731.  
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without any special highlighting,150 nor can it be included in the fine print of the contract, as 
the data subject can easily overlook it.151 According to Article 7(3) GDPR the data subject has 
the right to withdraw his consent at any time; however the withdrawal does not affect the 
lawfulness of the processing that was based on consent before the withdrawal (Article 7(3) 
GDPR).   
The application of the general requirements for a valid consent (as mentioned above) is 
complex. However, this complexity is further intensified in the context of the consent of minors 
in the online environment. For example, the requirement of a freely given consent becomes 
more complicated in circumstances where children could give their consent without the 
involvement or knowledge of parents and this is particularly problematic given that very often 
their choices may be manipulated and vulnerabilities exploited for commercial purposes due 
to their increasing spending power.152 Fulfilling the requirements for informed consent is 
particularly challenging in case of minors, as their level of understanding and ability to foresee 
possible consequences differs from adults. Although the use of privacy policies is a common 
practice and many of them formally follow legal requirements regarding the obligatory 
information, it is doubtful whether they achieve their goal.153 However, even with extensive 
information available and especially given the complexity of profiling techniques and big data 
analytics that are difficult even for adults to comprehend, many minors would still be unable 
to properly measure the significance of their consent as regards the impact on their privacy and 
personal autonomy. Many privacy policies are long, hard to find and navigate, written in 
complicated language and are beyond the capacity of an average adult to understand.154  
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(January 2017) 
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4. Legislative history of Article 8 
 
The GDPR devotes a specific Article to the processing of the personal data of children which 
pays special attention to issues related to consent. The legislative history of Article 8 of the 
GDPR is thin. It seems that the majority of the debates during the GDPR legislative process 
focused more around articles with a direct economic impact on data controllers’ activities and 
the Digital Single Market, such as the one-stop-shop mechanism or profiling, rather than 
protection of vulnerable data subjects. Article 8 witnessed sporadic renewals of interest during 
the debates and clearly lacked well-reasoned justifications and evidence before adoption. 
Nevertheless, this section aims to chronologically delve into the positions of the EU institutions 
involved in the legislative process and the changes they proposed to Article 8. 
 
4.1. Commission proposal  
 
A first unofficial version of the EC Proposal for the GDPR155 was leaked online in December 
2011 by StateWatch. In this text a child was defined as any person under 18 years (Article 3 
Part 18). This definition echoed the understanding of childhood in accordance with the UN 
CRC. That version of the GDPR did not contain any specific articles on the processing of the 
personal data of a child. Instead, Paragraph 6 of Article 7 which specified the conditions for 
consent established that the consent of a child is only valid when given or authorized by the 
child’s parent or custodian. This approach demonstrates that at the beginning of the data 
protection reform process the European Commission (EC) had no intention of differentiating 
between digital and offline consent and aimed at protecting equally everyone below the age of 
18. The same is confirmed in the questions that the EC posed to the key stakeholders in the 
targeted consultation meetings in 2010, asking if “a harmonized age limit of 18 years in line 
with Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child” should be adopted to better 
protect the personal data of minors.156 
The Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation157, officially presented by the European 
Commission on 25 January 2012, retained the definition of a child as any person below the age 
of 18 years (EC proposal GDPR). However, just before publishing the Proposal (during the 
Commission inter-service consultation process) an amendment to the article on consent was 
                                                
155 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation) Version 56 (29/11/2011), <http://statewatch.org/news/2011/dec/eu-com-draft-dp-reg-
inter-service-consultation.pdf > accessed 10 April 2017. 
156 Commission (EC), ‘Stakeholders' Consultations “Future of data protection”’ (background paper) 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/events/data_protection_regulatory_framework/background_paper_en.pdf 
accessed 10 April 2017, question 4. 
157 Commission (EC), Draft Data Protection Regulation, COM (2012) 11 final. 
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unexpectedly introduced and a new Article on the processing of the personal data of a child 
was added to the GDPR.  
In relation to the offering of information society services directly to children, the age limit at 
which the personal data of a child cannot be processed without parental consent was lowered 
to 13 years (Article 8 Part 1). The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) found this 
approach “reasonable”158, while the Article 29 Working Party suggested that the scope of 
application of this provision was broadened in order to cover other areas where the processing 
of personal data of children is taking place, outside the provision of information society 
services.159 According to the EC proposal the EC would have retained the power to specify 
concrete methods to obtain valid consent for the processing of the personal data of children160 
and to publish delegated acts specifying the criteria and the conditions under which the consent 
of a child can be provided in a valid way161. The EDPS, however, expressed concerns with such 
delegated acts that would specify criteria and requirements for the methods in order to obtain 
verifiable consent in relation to the specific measures which the Commission might envisage 
for micro, small and medium-size enterprises.162 
 
4.2. European Parliament first reading 
 
The Commission’s draft GDPR proposal was subject to intensive discussions and lobbying at 
the European Parliament. In the Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee 
alone 3999 amendments to the GDPR were proposed. On the 21st of October 2013, the LIBE 
Committee adopted the amendments to the EC proposed Regulation, including amendments to 
Article 8. The amendments proposed by the LIBE Committee were almost unanimously 
approved in the first reading of the European Parliament on 12 March 2014.163 
Despite the amount of amendments registered, the discussions at the European Parliament (EP) 
did not lead to major substantive changes for Article 8 but instead only to small modifications. 
The EP, in essence, avoided questioning the necessity of having parental control through 
consent or indeed adopting a more nuanced version. It also refrained from publicly debating 
the reason of limiting the parental consent requirement to children below the age of 13 or 
questioning the burden and ineffectiveness of the parental consent mechanisms. The EP mainly 
introduced a specific information obligation requiring that information be “provided in a clear 
language appropriate to the intended audience” (Article 8(1a) EP first reading). It also deleted 
the authority of the EC to adopt implementing acts with standard forms for verifiable consent. 
Instead it designated the European Data Protection Board as responsible to issue guidelines, 
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recommendations and best practices on how verifiable consent can be obtain or for verifying 
consent (Article 8(3)3). 
However, there were amendments that were tabled in relation to these issues but these were 
not included into the final text. A group of Parliament members (MEPs) proposed to 
specifically underline that the protection of children is particularly important in social 
networks.164 Other such amendments highlighted that “the industry should take its shared 
responsibility to come up with innovative solutions, products and services in order to increase 
the safeguards on protection of personal data, in particular for children, for example through 
codes of conducts and monitoring mechanisms”165. 
One group of the MEPs proposed to delete Article 8 from the text of the GDPR.166 The age of 
a child was questioned by 5 MEPs who proposed to raise the age limit for parental consent 
from 14 to 15 or 16 years.167 One MEP suggested to increase the age limit up to 18, but to limit 
the scope of application (exempt services that “are particularly appropriate and suitable for a 
child and have been notified and are controlled by the relevant national authorities” from 
consent requirement) and to accept unreliable consent methods (parents’ consent via email).168 
Notwithstanding the amendments proposed by a number of MEPs, the EP in its first reading 
made only the following changes. First, it expanded the scope of application of Article 8 and 
imposed the obligation to obtain parental consent to data controllers processing children’s data 
in the offline world, when offering “goods or services” directly to children rather than 
“information society services”. In such a way, the EP followed the suggestion of the Article 29 
Working Party to cover other areas where the processing of the personal data of children is 
taking place, outside the provision of information society services.169 Second, the EP required 
data controllers to give information to children, parents and legal guardians in a clear, audience-
appropriate language. As a result, the European Parliament amendments strengthened consent 
as an informed indication of wishes, in particular in respect to children.170  A similar provision 
already existed in the EC proposal (Article 11) but was formulated in general terms and 
applicable to all data subjects. Third, the EP modified Recital 38 (previously Recital 29) by 
deleting a reference to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as a document from which 
the definition to determine when an individual is a child should be taken. This deletion did not 
substantially change anything, as the definition of a child as an individual under 18 years of 
age still remained in Article 4(18).  
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The EP also added an emphasis on grounds other than consent for the lawful processing of the 
personal data of children: “other grounds of lawful processing such as grounds of public 
interest should remain applicable, such as for processing in the context of preventive or 
counselling services offered directly to a child.”171 This shows that the MEPs realised that 
certain services are created for children who seek help and must be used without their parents’ 
consent, especially in situations where their parents might be closely linked to the problem, 
such as online-chats for victims of sexual abuse.172 In other cases, when the interest of parents 
and children may not coincide consent may also not be the best ground for lawful data 
processing. This provision partly follows the suggestion of the EP Legal services and Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection committees which proposed exceptions to the parental 
consent rule in case of health data processing and social care.173 The justification was that “in 
the context of health and social care authorisation from a child’s parent or guardian should not 
be necessary where the child has the competence to make a decision for him or herself. In Child 
Protection Cases it is not always in the interests of the data subject for their parent or guardian 
to have access to their data, and this needs to be reflected in the legislation.”174 
A similar amendment was tabled by two MEPs who proposed to adopt an exemption for 
parental consent in the context of health and social care where the child has the maturity and 
competence to make a decision on their own.175 It was stressed, that in the UK, for example, a 
person of 12 years is presumed to be old and mature enough to exercise the right to decide who 
else can access their health records.  
Noteworthy here is a sliding scale approach to consent proposed by the Legal service of the 
EP. The proposal took a risk-based approach and recognised various possible forms of consent 
instead of subjecting consent to a single rule. It stated that “the appropriate form for obtaining 
consent should be based on any risk posed to the child by the amount of data, its type and the 
nature of the processing”.176 This proposal was in line with the approach of the Article 29 
Working Party.177 The Article 29 Working Party proposed that the mechanism that would be 
used for age verification in the online environment each time should depend on various factors 
relating to the specific data processing operation, such as the types of personal data that will be 
processed, the purposes for which they will be processed, eventual risks arising from the 
processing etc.178  
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4.3. Council of the European Union drafts    
 
The most heated debates on the future of Article 8 of the General Data Protection Regulation 
took place in the Council of the EU. While the European Parliament proposed only revisions 
to the existing text of the European Commission focusing on the scope of its application, in the 
Council of the EU substantial debates among the Member States arose around the actual 
necessity to include any provisions on minors’ consent in the GDPR.179 The drafts of the GDPR 
published by two different presidencies contain evidence of debates that took place among 
Member States around article 8 of the GDPR. A revised version of the draft GDPR published 
by the Greek Presidency on 30 June 2014, reveals that Member States had opposing opinions 
on the issue.180 Seven Member States (Czech Republic, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Slovenia, 
Portugal, UK) held a scrutiny reservation and two countries (Czech Republic and Slovenia) 
wished Article 8 deleted. Norway181 proposed in line with its national data protection law182 the 
inclusion of a general provision prohibiting the processing of the personal data relating to 
children in a manner that is contrary to the child’s best interest, instead of a specific article on 
children’s consent. Such a provision, it claimed, would allow broader protection as the 
supervisory authorities would be able to intervene also in cases where, for example, “adults 
publish personal data about children on the Internet in a manner which may prove to be 
problematic for the child”. Three Member States (Germany, Slovenia and Romania) suggested 
raising the age limit for consent from 13 to 14 years.183  
The draft published by the Latvian Presidency of the Council184 on 11 June 2015 was the basis 
for the General Approach of the Council on the GDPR. It demonstrated the crystallisation of 
three diverging views among Member States in relation to article 8. Now more Member States 
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voiced a preference to have Article 8 deleted (Czech Republic, Malta, Spain, Slovenia and 
UK). Potential reasons of their preference to abandon the article relate to the difficulties to 
unanimously define a child in different EU countries and practical challenges relating to age 
verification and content obtaining mechanisms. 
A larger group of Member States took a middle ground position as they expressed 
understanding of the merit and would have liked to see a provision on child protection in some 
form (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy and Romania).185 
The third group of states took a different turn and instead of strengthening and clarifying 
parental consent, it proposed adding a limitation on certain data gathering and processing 
practices in relation to minors (profiling and marketing). France, supported by Estonia, 
Denmark, Sweden and Poland, suggested deleting Article 8 and instead inserting a particular 
provision for children when the Articles of the data subjects’ rights were discussed, for example 
in Article 20 on profiling.  
The Council draft from the 11th of  June 2015 recognised the need for the special protection of 
children especially in relation to “the use of personal data of children for the purposes of 
marketing or creating personality or user profiles and the collection of child data when using 
services offered directly to a child” (Recital 29).186 However, the definition of a child as any 
person below the age of 18 years was deleted from the list of definitions. The Council changed 
back the scope of Article 8 to focus on children’s consent in relation to information society 
services. In such cases consent must be “given or authorised by the holder of parental 
responsibility over the child or is given by the child in circumstances where it is treated as valid 
by Union or Member State law” (Article 8(1)). In this way the Council left it up the Member 
States to specify the age and the conditions for considering the consent for the processing of 
personal data of children valid. Moreover, it made it a responsibility of the data controller to 
verify that consent is provided or authorised by the person that holds parental responsibility 
over the child (Article 8(1a)). The Council did not include any provision detailing a 
Commission or European Data Protection Board responsibility to issue guidelines or best 
practices regarding the obtaining of verifiable consent or on the verification of such consent.  
Initially, the Council kept the age limit for parental consent of 13 years that was first introduced 
by the EC, but a last-minute change raised the age of consent to 16 years.187 This change 
generated public outrage, especially among children’s rights activists, companies and youths 
themselves on social media. The provision was interpreted as banning kids from social media 
and even as being an attack on their human rights (i.e. such as freedom of expression and right 
to information).188 In view of the meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives on 9 
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December 2015, the final GDPR draft opted for a compromise: the age of consent was set at 
16 years, but allowed Member States to set a lower age which could not go below 13 years189. 
Thus, unless otherwise provided by Member State law, controllers must obtain the consent of 
a parent or guardian when processing the personal data of a child under the age of 16. The only 
reference to the change in the Council documents that can be found states: “(…) on the 
conditions applicable to consent given by a child, the co-legislators converged on keeping 
‘below the age of 16 years’ as a common ceiling, while allowing Member States to foresee 
lower age limits”190.  
On the 15th of June 2015 the Council agreed on a General Approach on the GDPR based on 
the draft of the 11th of June 2015 and the Presidency of the Council received in this way a 
negotiating mandate to enter into the trialogue phase with the European Parliament and 
Commission. The trialogue resulted in a compromise text that was presented on 15th of 
December 2015191. The focus of Article 8 remained on information society services. Aside from 
the statement that children deserve specific protection of their personal data due to their lower 
awareness of risks, consequences, safeguards and their rights, additional emphasis was also 
placed on where such special protections were especially relevant (i.e. when children’s data is 
processed for the purposes of marketing or creating personality or user profiles and the 
collection of children’s data when using services offered directly to a child). The consent of a 
parent or legal guardian was omitted for preventive or counselling services offered directly to 
a child.  
 
4.4. Article 8 of the GDPR as adopted 
 
The official position of the Council was adopted on the 6th of April 2016 at first reading192, it 
was approved by the EP on the 14th of April 2016 in its second reading193 and was finally 
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adopted on the 27th of April 2016194. No definition of a child was included in the final text of 
the GDPR. As a consequence, a number of questions on how the rights, obligations and 
prohibitions contained in the GDPR (such as the right to erasure, obligations of data protection 
by design and default, transparent information, prohibition of profiling), related to children 
should be applied in terms of scope. It remains unclear whether they cover all children under 
18 years old or different age limits (e.g. national age limits in analogy with Article 8), should 
apply. Article 8 retained its focus on the conditions applicable to children’s consent in relation 
to information society services. An information Society Service is understood under the GPDR 
as “a service as defined in point (b) of Article 1(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council”195 (Article 4(25) GDPR). The age limit of 16 was set as the rule 
for consent to the processing of personal data of a child, but this retained the possibility for 
Member States to use a lower age which could not go below 13 years. Recital 29 was 
renumbered to Recital 38 without however any substantial changes in its content. For the rest, 
Article 8 followed the amendments introduced in the draft of the 15th of June 2015, discussed 
above.  
As a consequence, the adopted Article 8 of the GDPR left the existing state-of-the-art 
essentially unchanged: no coherent and uniform age threshold in the European Digital Market 
on when children can consent to their data processing themselves and to what extent their 
consent is valid. The remaining inconsistent age standards across the EU and between the EU 
and the US, not only undermines much-anticipated harmonisation effect of the GDPR, but also 
maintains significant challenges for companies that provide international services. Also, as 
noted by Kress and Nagel, the “possibility to enact deviations could water down the level of 
protection which is initially awarded by Art. 8 GDPR”196. It is unclear whether Member States 
will act together to unify the age threshold in any way. At the time of writing, there have been 
discussions on lowering the age of consent to 13 years of age in at least two member states, the 
UK197 and Belgium,198 while the German draft for a new Federal Data Protection Act has 
retained the threshold of 16 years199.  
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From a policy making perspective, despite the efforts to promote the rights of the child in the 
EU policy making, the GDPR provision on the age of consent seems to be opaque, inconsistent 
and lacking explanations and evidence from the beginning. The European Commission 
originally did not have a strong position in relation to the protection of the personal data of 
children but changed its view on the age for parental consent during the revision process 
without clear justifications. Despite a number of amendments introduced by various members, 
the European Parliament avoided discussion of Article 8 choosing to focus its attention on 
other, more digital market related, articles. The Council has substantially deviated from the 
original EC proposal. It has initially increased the age limit of consent to 16 years and in the 
last minute of negotiations adopted a flexible approach leaving the decision partially to the 
Member states. Even more controversially, the EU was given a chance to re-affirm its 
commitment to protect the rights of the child in the information society, in the ePrivacy 
Regulation proposed on 10 January 2017200 which is as a lex specialis to the GDPR (Art. 1 I 
GDPR and recital 5 of the GDPR). It missed that opportunity, as the ePrivacy regulation neither 
continues the distinction between adults and children as data subjects nor refers to the specific 
requirements of Article 8 of the GDPR. Although it might be argued that protection of 
electronic communications can be generally addressed, a clear reference to the GDPR parental 
consent requirement would have been welcomed201 and demonstrate consistency and 
commitment to the purpose of protecting children online.   
 
5. The US COPPA and parental consent  
 
Introduced more than 15 years ago in the US, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA)202 is one of the first pieces of legislation adopted to specifically protect the privacy 
of minors under 13 years of age online. Although not entirely uncontroversial, COPPA “seeks 
to put parents in control of what information commercial websites collect from their children 
online”.203 It has been considered by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), COPPA’s primary 
enforcer, as an effective act protecting children without unduly burdening operators of online 
services204, but heavily criticised by others due to its limited scope (children below the age of 
13), the burden of parental consent mechanisms for service operators, the possible impact on 
online anonymity, and the balance between parental and service provider responsibility.205   
As a general rule, COPPA requires online services that are directed towards children or that 
have actual knowledge that they have users under 13 (e.g., because the service collects date of 
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birth) to obtain verifiable parental consent before collecting any personal information. COPPA 
applies only to commercial service providers and non-profit entities generally are not covered 
by the parental consent requirement.  
Under COPPA, “verifiable parental consent” means that the consent method must be 
reasonably calculated, in light of available technology, to ensure that the person providing 
consent is the child’s parent. The FTC specifies several possible methods of obtaining 
verifiable consent, if children’s personal information is going to be disclosed to third parties 
(except service providers) or made publicly available online, such as in a chat, profile or similar 
feature. These include, for example: 
• providing a form the parent can print, fill out, sign and post, fax or scan and email 
back; 
• requiring the parent to use a credit card or similar method of payment (such as 
PayPal) in connection with a monetary transaction (this could include a membership 
or subscription fee, or simply a charge to cover the processing of the card); 
• maintaining a free-phone (toll free) number staffed by trained personnel for parents 
to call in their consent;  
• permitting the parent to connect to trained personnel via video conference; or 
• verifying the parent’s identity by checking a form of government-issued ID against 
a database of such information, provided that the ID is deleted promptly after 
verification is complete.  
 
In cases where the information is not going to be disclosed or made publicly available, an 
additional method known as “email-plus” is allowed. This method involves the service 
operator’s obtaining consent through the receipt of an email from the parent, plus one further 
step. Either the service provider can request a postal address, telephone or fax number for the 
parent and follow up directly with the parent, or it can, after a reasonable delay, send another 
email to the parent to confirm their consent.  
COPPA foresees certain exceptions to the general consent rule. Verifiable consent is not 
needed when: (1) responding to a one-time request from a child, provided that the child’s 
personal information is deleted after the response is made; (2) collecting personal information 
in order to send the child periodic communications such as newsletters, provided that the parent 
is given the opportunity to opt out; (3) where necessary to protect the safety of a child 
participating in the service; or (4) where necessary to protect the security/integrity of the 
service, respond to a judicial request or other public investigation. 
In practice, most child-directed online services appear to operate under one of the exceptions 
to COPPA that allows a one-time use, multiple online contact with simply a notice to a parent 
(and opportunity to opt out), or e-mail plus.206 This limited use of legal COPPA provisions can 
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be claimed to demonstrate the reluctance among industry to fully embrace COPPA in their 
services.  
Contrary to the child-specific services, general audience sites and services do not have to obtain 
parental consent unless they have actual knowledge that their users are under 13.  In practice, 
this means that many general audience services expose themselves to COPPA only if they 
collect age or date of birth. As a result, for them to avoid having to comply with COPPA (i.e. 
to avoid acquiring actual knowledge that a user is a child) it is simply sufficient to avoid the 
collection of the age or the date of birth of users. In contrast, although general audience sites 
and services do not have an obligation to collect age information, some service providers take 
precautions by explicitly prohibiting the users under 13 from using the service in the terms and 
conditions and asking all users to enter their birth date before they can access the service. In 
accordance with the FTC’s suggestion, they ask for the age in a neutral manner, i.e. allowing 
any birth date to be entered without stating or implying that a user has to be at least 13. If the 
date given proves users to be under 13, they age gate and block them. In addition, a cookie can 
be placed on their computer preventing them from simply re-entering false information. 
From the 1st of July 2013 the FTC amended COPPA in order to clarify its scope and strengthen 
protection for children’s personal information (i.e. to minimize the collection of personal 
information from children and create a safer, more secure online experience for them) in light 
of changes in online technology and the evolving use of such technologies by children since 
COPPA first went into effect in April 2000.207 The amendments include modifications to the 
definitions of operator, personal information, and Web site or online service directed to 
children. It also updated the requirements set forth in the notice, parental consent, 
confidentiality and security, and safe harbor provisions, and added a new provision addressing 
data retention and deletion.  
 
6. Understanding parental consent in practice 
 
As Article 8 of the GDPR is without precedent in Europe, its practical implementation raises 
many questions, such as to which services the requirement will apply, how child directed 
services will be delineated, and how consent and age should be verified. These questions will 
need to be addressed by the national legislators, data protection authorities (DPAs) and the 
European Data Protection Board (EDPB) where relevant in the future. In this part we will 
therefore discuss the key uncertainties that merit attention before the GDPR comes into effect. 
 
6.1. Information society services 
 
The general GDPR provisions apply to any service that involves personal data processing, 
wholly or partly by automated means or when personal data form part of a filing system (Article 
2 GDPR). Article 3 explicitly specifies that it applies to free services offered to data subjects 
                                                




in the EU by a controller or processor not established in the EU territory.208 To the contrary, 
the parental consent requirement, i.e. Article 8 GDPR, has a specific material scope and is 
applicable to the information society services offered directly to a child. To define the meaning 
of the specific scope of application of Article 8, the GDPR makes use of the definition of an 
information society service contained in Directive (EU) 2015/1535 which defines such services 
as “any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at 
the individual request of a recipient of services” (Point (b) of Article 1(1) Dir. 2015/1535).209 
The notion of “remuneration” under this definition could be interpreted in a very restrictive 
way, requiring the user to pay for the provided service.  However the majority of the services 
offered in the information society do not directly require remuneration from the users, 
including free social media, online gaming, entertainment sites, email or instant messaging 
services. Therefore, the phrase “normally provided for remuneration”, should be interpreted 
broadly. The European Court of Justice has dealt with the concept of remuneration in the 
context of services offered within the European Union in various cases and has adopted such 
an interpretation. In Belgium v Humbel the European Court of Justice considered that “the 
essential characteristic of remuneration […] lies in the fact that it constitutes consideration for 
the service in question and is normally agreed upon between the provider and the recipient of 
the service”210. It is not the recipient who necessarily gives the remuneration; the critical 
element is that the remuneration is given to the provider of the service. Indeed in Bond van 
Adverteerders v Netherlands, the Court of Justice of the European Union found that the 
remuneration does not need to come from the recipient of the service (i.e. in this case the 
viewer), instead it suffices that the remuneration comes from another party, such as an 
advertiser.211 The Court of Justice of the European Union has further ruled that a service can 
be considered as provided for remuneration even in cases where the provider is a non-profit 
organisation, when there is an “element of chance” inherent in the return or when the service 
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is of recreational or sporting nature, within this interpretation.212 Therefore, an activity that is 
financed via advertising can also be considered as being provided for remuneration, even if the 
remuneration does not come directly from the user.213 This interpretation is also in line with 
the original idea of the EC to protect children on social networks214 and with the understanding 
of Article 8 of the GDPR by the Bavarian data protection authority215. 
As a result of the broad interpretation of the term “information society services”, the GDPR 
parental consent requirement will be potentially applicable to a very wide range of online 
services. The only clear precondition is that personal data is processed by the service and 
consent is the legal grounds on which this processing is based. Hypothetically, it can be 
questioned whether any online services offered directly to children can remain outside the 
parental consent requirement, given the fact that even though there are many websites that can 
be used without actively providing personal data, such as news or entertainment websites, 
personal data is often passively collected through tracking techniques (i.e. browser 
fingerprinting or cookies) and requires users’ consent under the e-Privacy Directive216.   
Such a potential over-reliance on parental consent to process children’s personal data is hardly 
desirable, given the deficiencies of consent as a protection mechanism and possible unintended 
consequences, such as ‘consent fatigue’ among parents, and potential limitation of children’s 
rights and opportunities (discussed below). Instead of consent, it is worth considering if other 
lawful grounds such as ‘legitimate interests’ of data controllers (Article 6.1(f) GDPR) could 
allow to better safeguard the righs of children and ensure a closer scrutiny when personal data 
of children is processed, if they are complemented with stricter audits and data compliance 
mechanisms.  In fact, the UK ICO encourages data controllers to rely on the legitimate interest 
ground, because before invoking it they need to assess the impact of their data processing on 
children, and consider if such processing is fair and proportionate.217 In the same vein, due to a 
high possibility to gain ill-informed consent and the subsequent complications in withdrawing 
such an invalid consent, some DPAs advise against the use of consent of children or do not 
recognise consent given by them to legitimise data processing operations.218  
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If data controllers fully consider  all the factors (e.g. the nature and source of the legitimate 
interest, the aim of the data processing, the impact on children and their reasonable 
expectations, additional  safeguards  to limit  undue  impact  on  children) and  ensure  that  the  
interests  and fundamental rights of children are duly taken into account219, the legitimate 
interest ground can potentially protect children more than the reliance on consent. Even more 
so, because in case of children the interpretation of the legitimate interest grounds is restricted 
by the GDPR. Due to the special status of children as data subjects their rights should be 
considered as overriding the legitimate interest of the data controllers more easily than adult’s 
rights (Article 6.1(f) GDPR).  
 
 
6.2. Services offered directly to children 
 
The GDPR parental consent requirement concerns online services offered directly to children. 
Although the intention of the legislator to create a specific protection regime for services that 
process children’s personal data is clear, the exact distinction of services to which the 
protection applies is a complex issue. In practice, services targeted at children compose only a 
small part of all services that children can access, use, and sign up to. The latter, so called 
general and mixed audience services, generate major privacy concerns and anxieties in 
practice. Various studies in Europe220 and North America221 report that from a broad range of 
websites that children use nowadays, the most popular websites (such as YouTube, Facebook 
and Google search to name just a few) are often not directed specifically to children (at least 
not those under 13). Many of such websites claim in their terms of use that their services are 
not intended for those under 13, even if in practice substantive numbers of young children are 
in fact active users.222 As a result, the young “unauthorised users” are treated as adults and 
presented with the same information and privacy settings, without any consideration of their 
particular needs, online behaviour or the risks for them in the online environment. Thus, an 
important question is to what extent the GDPR will reflect reality and to what extent the 
parental consent requirement will cover general-audience or mixed-audience services and 
sites? 
As the GDPR has just been adopted, the answer to this question is unclear. The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) under COPPA in the US has indicated several criteria to determine whether 
a website or an online service is directed at children. These criteria include: the subject matter 
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of the service, its visual content, the use of animated characters or child-oriented activities and 
incentives, music or other audio content, the age of models, presence of child celebrities or 
celebrities who appeal to children, language or other characteristics of the website or online 
service, or whether advertising promoting or appearing on the website or online service is 
directed to children. 223 Competent and reliable empirical evidence of audience composition 
and evidence regarding the intended audience are also among the factors to be considered.224 
This “totality of the circumstances test”225 seems a solid yardstick if applied holistically226, but 
might prove problematic if taken in parts. For example, in 2014 the FTC brought a case against 
TinyCo, deciding that their fantasy apps were subject to the COPPA requirements based mainly 
on the appearance of these apps’. The FTC claimed that “apps appeal to children by containing 
brightly-colored, animated characters from little animals or zoo creatures to tiny monsters, and 
by involving subject matters such as a zoo, tree house, or resort inspired by a fairy tale [ and] 
the language used to describe the apps in the app stores and the gameplay language is simple 
and would be easy for a child under age 13 to understand”.227 As Hoofnagle noted, “many 
general-audience apps have childish themes”228. This can be well illustrated by the Angry Birds 
app, which entails child appealing, animated characters, such as stylized colourful wingless 
birds and green pigs, and thus seems to meet the FTC’s criteria for being directed at children, 
but in fact is widely used by adults in practice.229  
The FTC has found a solution which, although not entirely uncontested, partially subjects 
general audience services (i.e. services that are not targeting children but are used by them) to 
COPPA requirements. It uses the “actual knowledge” test, according to which the COPPA 
obligations apply to operators of general online services that have actual knowledge that they 
are collecting, using or disclosing the personal information of children. The general service 
providers are not obliged to investigate the age of their users actively, but acquiring passive 
knowledge of children using the service creates obligations under COPPA. Such passive 
knowledge can be gained, for example, if the operator learns that the person is a child under 13 
when dealing with its users, such as responding to an email, seeing the age or the grade in a 
feedback option, or getting to know the age from a concerned parent, or if a child announces 
their age in a post seen by an employee of the operator.230 The actual knowledge standard seems 
to be problematic in its applicability, as not having actual knowledge of underage service users 
seems easy to prove, and the standard encourages service provider’s ignorance as a means of 
avoiding compliance. The standard is likely to be met if a child announces their age in a post 
and the provider monitors the posts, but if the provider does not engage in monitoring, it could 
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be assumed that no one in the organization is aware of the post. The actual knowledge standard 
has been applied by the FTC in several cases to operators that had age screening in place but 
allowed children under the age of 13 to register.231 
The FTC also has a solution for addressing the issue of COPPA applicability to the services 
that target mixed audiences, such as teenagers under and above 13 or both adults and children. 
As a general rule, if a service targets children under 13 as one of its audiences (even if not as 
its primary audience), it is considered to be “directed to children.” However, to avoid COPPA 
applicability to all users in mixed audience services, the amended COPPA Rule foresees a 
narrow possibility to employ an age screen in order to identify children under 13 and provide 
COPPA protection only to them. After identifying the users under 13, service providers can 
choose to either collect parents’ online contact information and obtain parental consent or 
prevent the collection of personal information from these users (e.g. direct them to content that 
does not collect, use, disclose personal data). Services directed wholly or primarily to children, 
in contrast to services directed to the users over 13, cannot use the above-mentioned age screen 
to block children under the age of 13 because of their very nature. According to the FTC, in 
most cases, a service directed to children must consider all visitors as children without 
screening them for age and provide to all of them COPPA’s protection.  
 Taking into account the empirical evidence on children’s wide use of general-audience 
services and extensive direct marketing and profiling carried out by these services, it is hard to 
imagine that the GDPR could not extend the protection to children using these services. The 
first emerging opinions consider general-audience services, such as Facebook, WhatsApp or 
Instagram, to fall under the scope of Art. 8 of the GDPR.232 The next challenging task for the 
EDPB and national DPAs will be to crystallise the approach on this distinction and to specify 
related obligations. One of the possible options could be taking a much more protective and 
rigid approach than the US in COPPA and instead of allowing a simple age screening and 
blocking users under the established age (in the 13 to 16 age span) in mixed audience services, 
the GDPR could require appropriate and adequate age verification of users (as discussed below) 
and protection of those who are under the established age.233 Such protection would ideally 
include no or minimal data collection and no disclosure of personal data to third parties – but 
still provision of interactive and interesting services - or otherwise, if personal data is collected, 
at least a verifiable parental consent or reliance on other carefully considered legitimate ground, 
prohibition of profiling and marketing, and age-adapted information. 
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6.3. Consent authorised by the holder of parental responsibility 
 
Article 8 of the GDPR allows consent not only to be given by the holders of parental 
responsibility over the child but also for the consent to be authorised by them. From the final 
text of the GDPR, it remains unclear if and under what circumstances parents are allowed to 
authorise the consent already provided by the child or other individuals on behalf of the child. 
In this respect, two questions arise: Could the reference to consent authorisation be understood 
as allowing a joint consent, i.e. a possibility for parents to approve post factum the consent of 
a child in specific circumstances? Could the circle of holders of parental responsibility include 
individuals other than parents and legal guardians? 
Consent authorisation is not used as a general or child-specific practice under Directive 
95/46/EC. It remains to be seen what weight and under what conditions the consent 
authorisation mechanism will be afforded by the national legislators, the DPAs and the 
European Data Protection Board in the context of the GDPR. If acknowledged and interpreted 
broadly, the consent authorisation option can allow the parallel or joint consent of the child and 
a parent,234  and thus provide for a more flexible parental consent procedure than is currently 
explicitly acknowledged in the GDPR. Alternatively, Article 8 will continue to be interpreted 
as an over protective and fully applicable (except in preventive or counselling services) 
requirement, that risks limiting children in their online freedoms and opportunities.235 
The second question relates to the flexibility of the GDPR parental consent requirement to 
accommodate a wider circle of competent individuals in the definition of the term “holders of 
parental responsibility”. Some national laws affords such flexibility, for example the Irish data 
protection law allows a grandparent, uncle, aunt, brother or sister of the data subject to consent 
on their behalf, when the giving of such consent is not prohibited by law.236 In Malta, the 
national data protection law not only allows individuals acting in loco parentis but also those 
acting in a professional capacity in relation to a child to process personal information without 
necessarily involving parents, if such processing is in the best interest of the child.237 Similarly, 
in the US schools may act on the parents’ behalf in the educational context when personal data 
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is collected from students for the use and benefit of the school, but not for other commercial 
purposes.238 In this case, it can be presumed that the school’s authorisation for data collection 
is based on the parental consent obtained by the school and that a direct parental consent is not 
required. In order to understand the GDPR in this respect, the interpretation of the “holder of 
parental responsibility” notion should be aligned with the family law.239 The concept “parental 
responsibility” refers to the duties and rights to take care of the child's person (ensure shelter, 
food and clothes, represent legally, responsibility for the child's upbringing) and look after the 
child’s property. The persons having the parental responsibility of a child are the “holders of 
parental responsibility”, most often being the parents. Nevertheless, if the parents are deceased, 
not capable or authorised to take care of their child, a guardian such as a relative, a third person 
or an institution, can be appointed by court to represent the child. Following this definition, the 
circle of competent persons to provide consent under Article 8 of the GDPR is limited to parents 
and legal guardians. Thus, if not appointed by the court, it cannot include a wider circle of 
relatives or expand beyond parents to the professionals working with children. Although 
inflexible, the choice to limit competent persons to provide parental consent is understandable. 
Consent in the GDPR is just one of several grounds for data processing and other legal grounds 
such as compliance with a legal obligation, the performance of a task carried out in the public 
interest or in the exercise of official authority or legitimate interest of the data controller can 
also be applicable to the processing of children’s personal data by individuals acting in their 
professional capacity in relation to children, such as teachers in schools. In addition, the 
parental consent requirement in Article 8 only relates to online services and thus offline data 
collection from children is subject to general GDPR consent requirements and the relevant 
national legislation. Parental consent can still be required in relation to offline collection of 
personal data of children, when this is so required in accordance with national legislation or 
when children lack the legal capacity to provide valid consent.   
 
6.4. Verifiable and verified consent 
 
The original Commission Proposal required parental consent to be verifiable by stating: “the 
controller shall make reasonable efforts to obtain verifiable consent, taking into consideration 
available technology” (Article 8(1) EC proposal). The final text of the GDPR, however, 
adopted a different wording and refers to the effort that data controllers should make to verify 
parental consent. It states that “The controller shall make reasonable efforts to verify (…) that 
consent is given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility over the child, taking 
into consideration available technology” (Article 8(2) GDPR). This change may have different 
implications for data controllers. While the duty to make reasonable efforts to “verify” consent 
refers to a one time parental consent verification (i.e. a single verification moment) which 
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should take place prior to the collection of children’s personal data, the duty to obtain 
“verifiable” consent calls for consent to be verifiable at any time (i.e. an ongoing possibility of 
re-verifying). Even more importantly, the change from “verifiable consent” to “verify consent” 
means a lower burden on data controllers providing child-directed services online. A reference 
to “verifiable consent” would have meant that consent could not have been given if it could not 
be verified and that data controllers should ensure verification through technological means or 
abstain from relying on consent. The requirement to make reasonable efforts to verify consent 
is different as it allows the data controller to show that reasonable efforts were made to verify 
consent and, in circumstances where this was not possible, the data controller may still rely on 
the unverified consent to process children’s data.  
The GDPR parental consent requirement is a flexible liability standard. To be compliant, it 
suffices to make reasonable efforts to obtain verifiable parental consent rather than necessarily 
obtaining it in all cases. The reference to “reasonable efforts” alludes to the fact that data 
controllers cannot guarantee verified consent as a final outcome that has to be achieved under 
the GDPR be that due to a situation beyond their control or due to uncertainty surrounding the 
technological consent verification capabilities. In the former case, it is not clear how much 
effort and proof in relation to obtaining consent can be requested from the controllers in 
situations where it is difficult to acquire verifiable parental consent, for example where 
discovering the whereabouts or contact information of the parents proves challenging or when 
the rights of the parents over the child have been terminated and the other legal representative 
of the child are difficult to reach. How much effort to reach a parent or a legal guardian should 
be sufficient to demonstrate compliance?  How should the exercise of the reasonable efforts be 
documented and proven? By relying on the reasonable efforts yardstick the burden of proof to 
demonstrate that a valid consent has been obtained is problematically weakened.240 In the latter 
case, data controllers are left with the discretion to choose solutions for obtaining parental 
consent, taking into account available technology, which might not always be foolproof or lead 
to very high costs in implementation. If the data controller does not attain parental consent, but 
still processes the personal data of children, it is important to know how to evaluate if the 
efforts were reasonable, and establish clear guidelines when less reliable consent verification 
tools are considered sufficient and how consent verification costs and benefits can be weighted.  
Otherwise, there is a risk that the vagueness of the reasonable efforts standard can become a 
shield for the wilful breach or disregard of the parental consent requirement. As the GDPR fails 
to provide a definition for “reasonable efforts”, it is likely that the DPAs and the courts will 
look into the specific facts and circumstances of the case, examine the controller’s efforts and 
the extent of technological capabilities to obtain verifiable parental consent. 
 
6.5. Consent verification  
 
The GDPR establishes a general requirement to verify parental consent taking into account 
available technology. Specific parental consent mechanisms that can be used by data 
controllers to be compliant with the GDPR are not specified and will require further 
clarification. Lack of clarity on specific methods can lead to GDPR infringements that can 
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attract an administrative fine of up to 2% of total global annual turnover or 10 000 000 EUR 
(Article 83.4).  
Similar to the FTC in the US, the EU should specify the possible parental consent methods that 
are considered to be acceptable in light of available technology to ensure that the person 
providing consent is the child’s parent. The FTC has established a number of acceptable 
methods for attaining parental consent in order to provide a clear set of choices for industry. It 
also allows interested parties to submit new verifiable parental consent methods to the FTC for 
approval. The aim of this provision is to encourage the development of new consent verification 
methods that are effective but also acceptable for industry and can be used by the applicant or 
any other party. After the adoption of the amended COPPA rule, the FTC received a number 
of requests to approve industry proposed verifiable consent methods, thus showing an 
unprecedented boost in this sector.  
In November 2013, the FTC received an application seeking approval of a “social-graph 
verification” mechanism, a verifiable parental consent method submitted by AssertID, Inc.241 
The proposed method would ask a parent’s “friends” on a social network to verify the identity 
of the parent and the existence of the parent-child relationship. In a letter to AssertID, the FTC 
noted that the company’s proposal failed to provide sufficient evidence that its method would 
meet the requirements set out under the COPPA rule. Specifically, the FTC considered the 
approval of this method under the COPPA Rule as premature, noting that there was not yet 
adequate research or market testing to show the effectiveness of the “social-graph verification” 
method.242 Thus such a method cannot ensure that the person providing consent is the child’s 
parent. 
In December 2013, based on an application submitted by Imperium, Inc., the FTC approved 
the use of knowledge-based authentication as a method to verify that the person providing 
consent for a child to use an online service is in fact the child’s parent.243 Knowledge-based 
identification is a way to verify the identity of a user by asking a series of challenge questions, 
typically that rely on so-called “out-of-wallet” information; that is, information that cannot be 
determined by looking at an individual’s wallet and are difficult for someone other than the 
individual to answer. This authentication method has been used by financial institutions and 
credit bureaus for a number of years, and has been acknowledged by the FTC and other 
government agencies as effective for that purpose.  
In January 2015, the FTC denied the AgeCheq proposed method, a device-signed parental 
consent form to obtain verifiable parental consent.  It was a multi-step method requiring the 
entry of a code sent by text message to a mobile device.  The FTC decided that the company’s 
proposed mechanism was not compliant with COPPA’s requirements regarding the type of 
parental information that can be collected as a means to verify a parent’s identity. The 
AgeCheq’s method did not meet the COPPA requirement of a reasonably calculated age 
verification method to ensure that the person providing consent is the child’s parent or guardian 
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as the person providing consent could easily be the child using the very device on which an 
app seeking consent was downloaded.244 
 
6.6. Verification of age 
 
The GDPR requires that the data controllers obtain verifiable parental consent before 
processing personal data of children, but there is no particular requirement to authenticate the 
age of the child, i.e. to verify that the data subject is of a certain age or belong to a certain age 
group. This is the case despite the fact there have been calls to include the rules on adequate 
age verification into the GDPR. 245 The initial proposal of the EC provided for delegated acts 
on this issue, but this proposed provision did not make into the final text of the GDPR.  
Age verification may not be necessary for services that by default focus on very young children 
(i.e. those under 13) which a priori require parental consent from all the users. However, for 
services targeting teens, mixed audiences or general audience services that are also used by 
children, in order to fully comply with the GDPR parental consent requirement a service 
provider needs to know which users are legally competent to consent and from whom parental 
consent should be sought.  
The fact that the GDPR does not refer to age verification is not surprising per se. First, the topic 
of age verification still raises many sensitive and unresolved questions related to online 
anonymity, freedom of speech and expression, and privacy vis-à-vis both children and adults 
online.246 The idea that all internet users in general audience websites could be asked to provide 
their age or even worse to identify themselves might not only lead to increased personal data 
gathering but may also be viewed as disproportionate and thus simply unacceptable. Second, 
although age verification has been already widely used as a regulatory solution across Europe 
in online gambling or online sales of age-restricted goods (alcohols, tobacco, etc.), in these 
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sectors there is extensive evidence related to potential risks and harms associated with the use 
of such restricted goods and services by minors.247 It is not the case with privacy and data 
protection risks and harms, which still lack a detailed and convincing evidence database. The 
privacy risk and harm assessments debate is still in its embryonic phase248 and as of yet there 
is no consensus around what constitutes a privacy harm. Regulators and companies have 
equally failed to identify a comprehensive list of privacy harms and negative impacts on data 
subjects.249,250 Third, some of the existing age verification solutions are not suitable in the data 
protection context, which requires a granular, more complex approach than verifying that a 
person is an adult (18 and above). Age verification, as a means of distinguishing between 
individuals under and over 18, has been used by service providers for controlling access to 
harmful content, such as offensive or sexually explicit, online content,251 through the 
implementation of the Audiovisual Media Service Directive252. In practice, unsuitable content 
is concealed behind a “pay wall” which can be passed by payment methods which are restricted 
to adults (such as payment by credit card) or age can be established using an independent and 
reliable database, such as the electoral roll.253 None of these methods are appropriate for the 
implementation of the GDPR, as the age thresholds (13 to 16) are various and do not coincide 
with the legal majority age of 18. This means that there are a limited number of reliable 
databases on age data for minors, as the majority of the databases (social security number, 
passport number) only demonstrate that an individual is an adult, without any possibility, at 
least in their current form, of obtaining granularity in terms of age.254 Also, the availability of 
datasets differ from country to country, as for example, in Denmark and Belgium there are 
more extensive databases on children that could be used. Crosschecking in public databases is 
reliable and trustworthy, but complex to implement and pose huge privacy concerns because 
of the sensitivity of the data being processed.  
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Finally, despite some efforts in developing standards255, up until now there are no harmonized 
procedures to verify a child’s age online.256 Easy-to-use and adequate procedures are 
unreliable, as determined children can easily circumvent them by lying about their age or 
pretending to be their parents.257 The simplest and most widely used, but also the easiest to 
circumvent, is the self-verification mechanism, where the user is asked for their birth date and 
access to a service or website is granted if they specify an appropriate age.258  More advanced 
age verification methods are based on peer-review, that is, peers decide to grant access to a 
website or network based on users’ profiles and on data collected elsewhere on the web or in 
the real world. In addition to self-verification, Facebook uses this method. These methods can 
also be circumvented easily by creating multiple profiles, and in addition, peer-based 
mechanisms can induce cyber-bulling. A new method of age verification is based on the 
automatic analysis of the semantics of users’ profiles to deduce a user’s age rage.259 These 
mechanisms are typically difficult to circumvent, but they are complex to implement and not 
technologically mature, which make them prone to errors in a number of circumstances. Aside 
from this, it is also only possible to obtain the age range of a user, and not his or her exact age. 
Reliable alternatives to these methods include offline identity verification, identity verification 
using eID cards and using biometric data. The offline identity verification is typically 
implemented by directly contacting the parents or tutors of a minor to verify the age and 
eventually obtain parental consent to access a website or service. While reliable and effective, 
the method is also extremely complex. eID cards in contrast, are physical cards with a chip that 
contains data to perform age and identity verification online. These cards are typically obtained 
from trustworthy data sources, their use is simple for the user and relatively simple for the 
service providers to implement, while also being privacy friendly. However, the heterogeneous 
levels of implementation and the difficulty to enforce it as a standard have limited its 
popularity. Identity verification methods through biometric data exploit users’ unique 
characteristics, such as fingerprints or iris patterns, to identify them. These mechanisms are 
reliable and very difficult to circumvent. However, the disclosure of such sensitive personal 
data raises ethical and privacy concerns. The Article 29 Working Party has called for caution 
in this respect on several occasions, emphasising that the use of biometrics may have a 
significant impact on the dignity, privacy and the right to data protection of young children and 
have potentially harmful effects (e.g. stigmatization or discrimination due to their age or 
inability to enrol).260 Moreover, there are additional concrete problems with the use of 
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biometric data in case of minors. Due to the constantly changing bodily characteristics the 
biometric data of children become inaccurate and outdated much faster. Therefore, there are 
practical difficulties (inaccurate data could increase false acceptance or rejection rates and 
render the whole biometric application unreliable) and legal obstacles as inaccurate data 
processing contradict to the data quality requirements.261 Moreover, biometric based methods 
are still complex to implement and do not allow an exact determination of a user’s age. 
Given the difficulties associated with finding age verification solutions that would be 
proportionate and reliable, more guidance and research is needed. The DPAs and the EDPB 
should take a position on the challenging and largely unresolved issue of age verification and 
provide guidance on the obligation to employ age verification for specific data collection 
practices, specific age verification methods and the level of acceptable reliability. As the 
Article 29 Working Party intends to adopt guidelines on consent in the GDPR in 2017262, the 
data protection authorities in UK263, Ireland264 and France265  have started gathering public 
views on possible solutions for age and consent verification.266 In this context, UK Information 
Commissioner’s Office (UK ICO) announced that it will start considering the area of children’s 
privacy in order to form its own and European guidance on the issue267 and issue guidance on 
how to identify a suitable lawful ground for processing personal data of children, and carry out 
age verification and parental authorisation.268. In Germany, Bavarian data protection authority 
already issued a commentary on Article 8 and raised critical questions related to its unclear 
scope and interpretation.269  
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7. Moving forward and learning from the US experience  
 
7.1. In the footsteps of COPPA… why is 13 not the best idea? 
 
Although officially the EC has not directly explained or provided any other evidence to justify 
the choice, little doubt exist that the choice of 13 as the age threshold was influenced by 
COPPA. To a certain extent the EC itself has recognised the COPPA as being inspiratory. The 
GDPR’s impact assessment published at the same time as the GDPR states: “The specific rules 
on consent in the online environment for children below 13 years – for which parental 
authorisation is required – take inspiration for the age limit from the current US Children 
Online Data Protection Act of 1998”270. In addition, the EC admits that following the US 
legislative choice of the age of 13 would be beneficial for online business. The rules on consent, 
according to the European Commission’s assessment, “are not expected to impose undue and 
unrealistic burden upon providers of online services and other controllers.”271 In fact, since the 
adoption of COPPA in 1998, the age limit of 13 has become a de facto standard for parental 
consent online, used not only by every US-based company, including the most popular social 
networking sites among children such as Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram, but also copied by a 
number of European service providers. The EC explicitly confirmed that it views the age of 13 
as an existing standard during the debate at the Council of the European Union.272 Retaining 
the status quo would not have required so many changes or imposed new burdens on data 
controllers.  
In addition, the US has exerted considerable influence on the GDPR text. Just before the end 
of the inter-service Consultation, which is one of the last steps in the adoption process of a new 
Commission legislative proposal, the US started a lobbying campaign against certain GDPR 
provisions proposed by the EC.273 In an informal note submitted in December 2011 the US 
expressed its concerns in relation to diverging standards proposed by the EU GDPR and the 
obstacles they create vis-à-vis the interoperability between the EU and US privacy regimes.274 
The definition of a child as an individual under 18 in the GDPR was seen by the US as one of 
such obstacles for commercial interoperability. Defining children “so broadly” according to 
the US is not advisable or feasible due to practical difficulties and can conflict with older 
children’s rights to freedom of expression and access to information.275  
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The decision of the EC to propose the age of 13 as the threshold to allow children to consent 
to the processing of their personal data, as well as the final choice of the EU legislator to 
establish the age of 16 as the threshold, but allowing Member States to lower the limit to the 
age of 13 can be criticised.  
First, the age threshold established by COPPA is of questionable use, as the US Congress 
adopted 13 as a consequence of a political compromise rather than as a well-reasoned or 
justified choice. Original drafts of this legislation defined children as individuals under the age 
of 18. When the legislation was introduced it referred to individuals under the age of 16 and 
only in the final version was the age threshold lowered to 13.276 This happened eventually to 
ensure the adoption of the law.277 Equally proposals to raise the age limit for COPPA coverage 
were considered in 2010 when the rule was being updated.278 For example, EPIC recommended 
Congress to raise the age requirement of COPPA to 18, mainly because “the emergence of 
social networks and the powerful commercial forces that are seeing to extract personal data on 
all users of these services, but particularly children, raise new challenges that the original 
COPPA simply did not contemplate”279. The opponents argued that the extension of COPPA 
to teenagers would diminish privacy and anonymity by requiring age verification and data 
gathering of a large number of adults and raise profound free speech concerns.280 
Second, the original intention281 of COPPA was to protect children’s personal information from 
commercial exploitation, primarily related to aggressive online marketing emerging in 
1990s.282 In fact, as claimed by EPIC, the choice of the age of 13 in COPPA predates many of 
the most intrusive and complex data collection practises online, such as the extensive 
behavioural tracking on social networking sites. Therefore, in light of COPPA’s legislative 
history it is strange that none of the EU legislative bodies gathered fresh empirical evidence on 
the appropriate age threshold for parental consent in the GDPR. Instead of relying on COPPA 
as a legal transplant, the EU legislator could have questioned - using its own and up-to-date 
assessment - whether the age limit of 13; 1) can be translated into the completely different Web 
2.0 of today and allows for the effective mitigation of risks associated with complex data 
gathering practises online predated by the original COPPA; 2) reflects the European culture 
and legal traditions of the EU Member States, as discussed above; and 3) is in line with the 
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empirical research and evidence on children’s Internet use.283 In addition, the EU legislative 
bodies should have assessed whether its particular formulation of the parental consent 
requirement might have a negative impact on the child rights as a whole, which are strongly 
promoted by the EU itself. Assessments such as this would have allowed adherence to the UN 
CRC provisions and assessment of the impact of the GDPR by reference to all of the rights 
within the UN CRC. Ex ante child impact assessment is one of the fundamental steps in the 
EU child rights mainstreaming model. The lack of empirical evidence and failure to consult 
with experts and stakeholders, including children,284 unsurprisingly resulted into a wave of 
harsh criticism from child rights experts that have accompanied the developments on Article 8 
from its conception to adoption.  
 
7.2. Overreliance on (parental) consent and the need to shift protection from parents to 
data controllers  
 
Although the GDPR establishes parental consent as a medium to protect children online, 
consent to personal data processing is not a panacea tantamount to giving control to individuals 
over their personal data in complex networked environments. Consent can provide illusionary 
control285 and the agreement to the processing of personal data in situations of imbalance of 
powers is not delivered freely286. A rich body of literature points to the characteristics of 
networked environments that predetermine power imbalances and limit individuals in asserting 
control over their personal data.287 Neither parents nor children can take full responsibility and 
control of their personal data online, as their choices and data management possibilities are 
shaped by the design and functionalities of communication spaces.288 These communication 
spaces are far from neutral and are created to advance business interests rather than to allow 
the user to exercise their autonomy and control over their data. Informed consent online is 
hardly possible due to complex and ubiquitous data collection practises that do not yield to 
comprehensible privacy policies for service users.289 In this sense, consent is often a result of 
a limited understanding of data collection consequences, as users do not actually read long and 
intricate privacy notices. Privacy policies, for children in particular, are long, complex, difficult 
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to find290 and easily confusing in their discourse (valorising ‘sharing’ and ‘control’, despite the 
extensive collection of children’s data).291 Consent can hardly be considered freely given when 
refusal to consent leads to social exclusion292 given that important online services have no real 
alternatives. Various scholars have emphasised the weaknesses of consent as a protection 
mechanism online.293 Many others have demonstrated that strengthening consent will not lead 
to a greater individual control for individuals over personal data294 and that consent cannot 
always be considered a legitimate ground for data processing.295   
Yet, the GDPR is based on the premise that children can be protected through informed parental 
consent. As noted by Savirimuthu, ‘since notice and consent are effectively meaningless, 
children are left with the predicament of making complex and undesirable trade-offs, resorting 
to social stenography techniques or accepting that the costs of obscurity is exclusion from 
participation in communities’.296  
Not only consent in general but also parental consent in particular suffers from significant 
limitations both in terms of adequate protection and impact on children’s rights. As regards 
adequate protection, there are many potential reasons why parental consent does not necessarily 
mean an increased protection of personal data for children. The GDPR requires consent to be 
sought from parents for all types of information society services in different sectors. An 
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overload of consent requests may result in ‘consent fatigue’ among parents, when a constant 
consenting process becomes a disturbing irritation rather than a serious choice and can make 
the entire parental consent provision illusionary. The effectiveness of parental consent 
verification is still questionable, as due to the ambivalent and soft wording of the Article 8 in 
the GDPR, age verification depends on available technology and efforts of the industry that are 
considered ‘reasonable’.297 
In addition, the restriction of access to online services through parental consent, as formulated 
in the GDPR, might also have a negative impact on children’s rights and autonomy.  
Given that the consent requirement in the GDPR is fully applicable to all children under the 
nationally chosen age or the default age of 16 for all data processing cases that take place on 
the basis of consent, except for the preventive or counselling services, children might be 
restricted in their right to freedom of expression on the Internet.  The UN CRC affirms that 
children are entitled to freedom of expression “which includes the freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child’s choice”. The consent 
requirement in the GDPR positions parents as arbiters in deciding what is both allowed and 
beneficial for their children, without formally allowing children to influence their decisions. 
As noted by the Belgian Privacy Protection Commission, “parental consent should not be a 
mechanism permitting a parent to override the child’s decision unless there is a serious risk 
that the child will not correctly appreciate the consequences of its decision or that its natural 
naivety will be exploited.”298 Parents may not always be in a position to fully grasp the best 
interest of the child. There could be cases of disagreement between parents and children over 
the usefulness and risks in relation to social media, and emotional, moral-panic driven or 
simply unjustified consent request rejections from parents. Counterintuitively, parents may 
become potential invaders of their children’s privacy. For example, by using the right of access 
to personal data on behalf of their children, parents could monitor their children’s online 
activities299. Also, parental consent mechanisms may become parental control systems and 
restrict the online freedoms of children300. Finally, the GDPR does not sufficiently take into 
account the right of the child to be heard, a fundamental principle of the UN CRC, and 
guarantee that the right of the child to express their views freely in all matters affecting them 
is taken into account in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
Given the weaknesses of consent in general and parental consent in particular, the GDPR places 
an excessive burden on parents and children to make informed decisions about their personal 
data processing in the complex technology and data-driven environment. 
More realistic possibilities to affect digital data collection practises and respond to children’s 
needs and expectations would seem to entail shifting the responsibility from parents to data 
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controllers. Instead of asking parents to control children’s data collection through consent, the 
law could forbid some undesirable data collection practises through restrictions on the activities 
of data controllers. This would be in line with the thinking developed in the US after almost 
two decades of the COPPA experience. Hoofnagle claims that the real value of COPPA is in 
its limitation on personal data collection, use and retention through obligations on data 
controllers instead of the focus on parental consent requirement.301 Montgomery echoes this 
view and argues that some children’s data collection practises, such as profiling, behavioural 
advertising, cross-platform tracking, geolocation targeting should not be allowed by COPPA 
even with parental permission.302 Similarly, Thierer claims that aside from education and 
empowerment, targeted enforcement of unfair and deceptive practices should be a way forward 
rather than parental consent and age verification expansion.303 Boyd et al. suggest “that policy–
makers shift away from privacy regulation models that are based on age or other demographic 
categories and, instead, develop universal privacy protections for online users” and “provide 
parents with recommendations about the appropriateness of various sites for children of 
different ages and the various risks that users may face”.304 
The GDPR entails provisions that limit the processing of children’s personal data. The use of 
the legitimate interest of the data controller as a ground for lawful children’s data processing 
is restricted in the GDPR. When the data subject is a child, it is highly probable that the 
legitimate interest of the controller are overridden by the interests or rights and freedoms of the 
child. Nevertheless, the legitimate interest ground can still be used by the data controllers in 
relation to children’s data, but the assessment should be documented and the interest balancing 
exercise in general is likely to favour children as data subjects.  
Recital 38 of the GDPR generally emphasises that specific protection should be afforded to 
children against marketing or profiling. Recital 71 refers to automated decision making based 
on profiling and states that such a measure should not concern children. This alludes to the 
conclusion that the profiling of children is prohibited, but upon closer scrutiny of both above-
mentioned recitals, it appears that only automated decisions leading to legal effect or otherwise 
significant effects on children taken based on profiling are entirely forbidden. Taking into 
account the overarching objective of the GDPR to provide children as data subjects enhanced 
protection and the specific intention of the Member States to protect children against profiling 
clearly seen in the Council debate (discussed above), it would have been desirable to explicitly 
exclude children from profiling. It has been widely acknowledged that behavioural advertising  
is “outside the scope of a child's understanding and therefore exceed the boundaries of lawful 
processing’305. As illustrated by Mc Cullagh “children (and indeed most adults) are unlikely to 
be aware that inferences can be made from their disclosures—for instance, that “liking” curly 
fries on Facebook is indicative of high intelligence or that “likes” can be used to predict race 
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or sexual orientation with a high degree of accuracy—and that both disclosed and inferred 
information can be used to generate profiles and produce targeted adverts”.306 
Yet, the vagueness related to children and profiling imbedded in the GDPR can be explained 
by practical challenges. It is questionable how effectively an explicit prohibition to profile 
children could have been enforceable in practice. It is still difficult to reliably distinguish 
between adults and children online.307 An obligation to identify children in order to completely 
remove them from all targeting may lead to excessive data collection of a large number of 
adults, and instead of protecting one’s privacy and anonymity online, could diminish and erode 
both. 
The above mentioned restrictions, if effectively implemented, could have provided an 
alternative to the parental consent requirement as a protection model. Such restrictions on the 
collection of children’s data, coupled with the respect for the fair data processing and 
accountability principles, would be better suited to diminishing its commercial exploitation in 
complex marketing, tracking and targeting systems, than parental consent.  
 
7.4. Deciding on the (single) age threshold 
 
The GDPR sets a single age limit of 16 after which all children can be deemed competent to 
consent to the processing of their personal data, unless a Member State’s national laws set a 
lower age which cannot go below the age of 13. A number of problems and challenges can be 
identified that need to be addressed before the GDPR comes into force. 
Given the many different sectors and data collection practises, the choice of fixing a single age 
limit for consent in all data processing activities online has serious flaws. In order to guarantee 
adequate protection for children as data subjects but not excessively limit their online behaviour 
and rights, the context and data collection purpose should be taken into account. Different 
information society services might carry significantly different risks to a child’s online safety 
and privacy. One and the same child may need protection for one data processing purpose, and 
may be able to autonomously consent to another. This is well illustrated by the case law in 
Germany. The Higher Administrative Court of Lüneburg308 in a case related to video 
surveillance considered that the consent of a child may in general be invalid, if the child had 
not yet reached at least the age of 14 years. However, in 2012, the Higher Regional Court of 
Hamm309 decided that it cannot be presumed that children between the age of 15 and 18 years 
would always have the required capability to foresee the consequences of the respective data 
processing operations. This case related to the processing of personal data for a sweepstake. 
The imposition of a single legal age-limit may disproportionally restrict the rights and 
opportunities for the child, irrespective of a child’s own levels of competence in a specific 
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context. Therefore, it might be worth considering the adoption of different age limits for 
different data collection areas and practices in the 13 to 16 age span. This might prove to be 
complex for children and parents to understand, but could provide more flexibility and account 
for the complexity and potential negative impact on children caused by specific data collection 
practices. 
There could be several ways of determining the specific consent age limits and respective data 
collection areas. The Member States could adopt their national laws as they have the possibility 
to depart from the Regulation default age of 16. Detailed age limits and the identification of 
more and less risky data collection areas or purposes is unlikely to be achievable in the national 
data protection framework or other specific laws. In addition, for the industry this would result 
in increased disparity and an even more patch worked picture in every national jurisdiction.  
Codes of conduct at the European level therefore would seem to be a more flexible and less 
burdensome way of creating standards that account for children’s vulnerabilities in a specific 
activity or sector, instead of treating all children as a homogeneous group of data subjects. As 
mentioned below, the GDPR creates conditions for the adoption of more effective codes of 
conduct. 
If the Member States chose to legislate and lower the age threshold to 13, the industry codes 
of conduct could still go beyond this age requirement and guarantee stringent protection in 
specific data collection scenarios. Increasing the age limit up to 16 in voluntary codes of 
conduct in specific areas is therefore an option which would be in line with the GDPR 
requirements and provide added value by offering more protection for children’s personal data 
in specific sectors. 
During the GDPR adoption process the European institutions provided no evidence based on 
which the proposed age threshold would be grounded. The choice of the most appropriate age 
limit between 13 and 16, be it in national law or in self-regulatory initiatives, should be based 
on extensive empirical research. Social and behavioural sciences should be the first areas in 
which legislators gather solid and profound scientific evidence to justify any given age limit.  
Also, until now, no public consultation to incorporate the voice of children has taken place.310 
During the GDPR adoption process adult driven discourse marked by a very protectionist 
stance in relation to children as internet users dominated. However, highly paternalistic and 
restrictive views have problematic consequences for children as rights holders, as ‘such a 
narrow lens positions children solely as vulnerable victims, neglecting their agency and rights 
to access, information, privacy and participation’.311 Consultations with relevant stakeholders, 
not only governments, industry, civil society, educational actors, but also children and parents 
themselves, should take place before taking decisions that affect children’s rights and interests. 
It is well established that the views of children themselves should be considered in 
policymaking and the preparation of national laws related to the use of children’s personal data, 
as well as in their evaluation.312 As noted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
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‘including children should not only be a momentary act, but the starting point for an intense 
exchange between children and adults on the development of policies, programmes and 
measures in all relevant contexts of children’s lives’.313  
 
7.7. Pursuing the idea of age verification through innovative technological solutions 
 
The implementation of Article 8 of the GDPR provides an opportunity for the EU to explore 
the different challenges and opportunities in adopting innovative online methods of age 
verification. Lessons can be learnt from national efforts and failures in the EU Member States 
and in the US. In the EU, several national age verification schemes using personal ID numbers 
have been facing shortcomings in terms of adequate enforcement, disproportionate data 
collection, and usability. In Germany, an attempt to use an age verification system based on 
the identity card or passport number coupled with the postal code of the city of its issuance has 
been declared by the German Federal Supreme Court as an effective barrier to prevent minors 
from accessing online age-restricted content.314 In Belgium, the kids-ID card has been used as 
an online identification and age verification tool.315 Using an integrated PIN and a card reader, 
from the age of six, children can identify themselves on the Internet with their kids-ID card and 
access online child-friendly chat rooms. However, this age verification tool has been criticised 
as too intrusive and disproportionate due to the use of the National Registry identification 
number embedded in the eID card revealing the date of birth and the gender of the child when 
only the identification of an individual as a child would be sufficient.316 Also, the system was 
abolished quickly due to the fact that no children were found in the child-friendly chat rooms.317 
A more successful effort has been the SaferChat application implemented by the STORK 
project.318 With the aim to implement EU-wide interoperability of electronic identities, the 
SaferChat created a safe online platform allowing for children from different EU Member 
States to communicate in chat rooms, using their national eIDs for identification, authentication 
and authorisation. Yet, the SaferChat application has been tested only as a pilot and did not yet 
lead to its sustainability in the long term or a wider take-up throughout the EU. In the US, as 
mentioned above, COPPA relies on users’ self-assertion of their age which, as a method, is as 
easy to use as it is to circumvent. Children may often not be genuine in registering, use personal 
data that may not belong to them, and circumvent the age gating systems, for example by 
deleting cookies and restating a higher age. Lack of age verification if one of the main reasons 
for which COPPA has been widely claimed to be ineffective319 and faces significant 
implementation and enforcement challenges. Notwithstanding this fact, the EC almost literally 
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copied the COPPA parental consent requirement320 in its proposal for the GDPR, ignoring the 
critics related to its ineffectiveness, without considering any alternatives of a more nuanced 
approach.  
The EU should not blindly follow the US COPPA example, but pave the way in developing 
and adopting innovative and more effective age verification mechanisms. Given the challenges, 
there is a need to look for innovative age-verification mechanisms that are: 1) privacy-
enhancing and respect data minimisation; 2) user-friendly and do not overburden the service 
providers; 3) do not limit children’s opportunities provided by the Internet. The search for such 
solutions can be aligned with the EU’s renewed interest and advancements in online 
authentication, attribute-based ecosystems and public e-ID schemes. The new Regulation 
910/2014 on electronic identification (eIDAS Regulation) enables the adoption of secure eID 
throughout the EU and, accordingly, can facilitate age-related eligibility checks. In the context 
of the Audio Visual Media Services Directive, the European Commission asked content 
platform providers to explore the possibilities of leveraging secure eID, to conduct age-checks, 
in order to restrict children’s access to harmful online content.321 Consequently a multi-
stakeholder group entitled the Alliance for Child Protection has been formed to examine how 
companies can use secure eID to improve the e-safety of children and develop codes of 
conduct.322  
As age verification can range from verifying that an individual is above a certain age threshold, 
to knowing the exact age of a person and identifying an individual based on his age and other 
pieces of personal data (name, ID number, etc.), these various solutions have diverse 
implications to internet users’ privacy. The EU should favour the least intrusive age verification 
method, such as relying on anonymous credentials and attributes through the creation of an 
appropriate legal framework, policies, technical architecture and standards. The use of 
attribute-based credentials in implementing Article 8 of the GDPR looks particularly 
promising, due to the advantages of minimal data disclosures and unlinkability.323 In attribute-
based schemes rather than verifying the full identity of an internet user, only a particular 
attribute, such as age, could be cross-checked in order to establish an internet user’s eligibility 
to access an online service. Private technical architectures and standards are emerging on the 
market that are based on attributes and partial identity disclosure to prevent ineligible users 
from buying age-restricted goods, accessing age-restricted content (e.g. adult content, specific 
categories of advertising) or using age-restricted online services (e.g. dating agencies).324 These 
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solutions that aim for pseudonymous and reliable age checks online could be considered when 
implementing Article 8 of the GDPR. 
There is hardly a ‘one-size fits all’ solution for age verification that reflects the needs of 
different online service providers.325 Different information society services with their particular 
data collection practises pose different degrees of risks to children as data subjects. As a result, 
methods of age verification that afford lower level of assurance might be adequate in lower 
risk online services, leaving high assurance options for high risk information society 
services.326 This sliding scale approach is in line with the risk-based approach embodied into 
the GDPR, implying that the obligations of data controllers can be scalable according to the 
level of risk that their data processing poses to the rights and freedoms of the data subjects. The 
GDPR allows for the implementation of the sliding scale approach through data protection 
impact assessment and the adoption of safeguards, security measures and mechanisms to 
mitigate the risks, such as age verification of varying levels of assurance. High levels of 
assurance could be required for data processing involving profiling, marketing and other 
practises from which the GDPR considers that children merit specific enhanced protection. 
Sliding scale age verification would less likely result in limiting online opportunities and 
benefits for children online, as the costs of obtaining age verification might lead to higher costs 
and lower revenues for data controllers, and consequently less valuable and interesting content 
for children. Proportionality is important for service providers, in the sense that “the costs of 
age verification measures to be introduced must deliver enough benefit to the customer and the 
company to counter any additional costs (not just financial, but also in terms of time, 
convenience etc) imposed”.327  
 
7.8. Consent verification driven by data controllers 
 
When determining acceptable parental consent verification methods, the EU could learn some 
lessons from COPPA. In essence, the US embraces the co-regulation model, according to 
which if industry has a problem, the industry has the burden of solving it, and therefore it can 
propose responsible solutions approved by a regulator.328 The FTC has a long history in 
working with the industry on methods of obtaining verifiable parental consent and deciding 
what methods are “reasonably calculated, in light of available technology, to ensure that the 
person providing consent is the child’s parent”. The EU could equally establish a number of 
acceptable methods for gaining parental consent, at the same time encouraging interested 
parties to submit new verifiable parental consent methods for approval. It would actively 
incentivise the development of new age verification methods that are not only effective but 
also acceptable by the industry and suitable for specific sectors.  
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Codes of conduct could be one possible way to create standards for effective consent 
verification and specify Article 8 of the GDPR.  Both the current DPD and the future GDPR 
encourages data controllers to adopt codes of conduct of industry associations that take account 
of the specific features of the various processing sectors. Codes of conduct are considered as 
“market driven tools for application” of the GDPR provisions329 and are attractive due the 
socio-technological expertise of the industry, innovation, reactive speed and reduced costs for 
the public bodies.330 The GDPR provides additional incentives for data controllers to create or 
adhere to approved codes of conduct: adherence to a code of conduct may demonstrate 
compliance with the obligations of data controllers, provide the basis for international data 
transfers, be a positive factor in a Data Protection Impact Assessment and when fines are being 
imposed upon the adherent party. The GDPR explicitly refers to the protection of children and 
the manner in which parental consent should be obtained as one of the possible areas in which 
the GDPR’s requirements could be specified (Article 40 GDPR). Thus, parental consent 
verification methods could be proposed by the industry through the codes of conduct. 
Nevertheless, in order to ensure that self-regulation is accountable, efficient and able to deliver 
on its societal goals331, the EU should actively participate in the formulation of self-regulatory 
rules, and their effective monitoring and enforcement. Under the Directive 95/46/EC, the 
success of voluntary data protection codes has been very limited. The number of codes 
approved by the national data protection authorities vary significantly from one Member State 
to another. At the European level, very few organisations representing specific sectors have 
tried, and only one of them has managed to draw up a code that was fully endorsed by the 
European data protection authorities.332 The process of self-regulation took several years and 
was not necessarily shorter than a legislative procedure. Also, self-regulatory codes were 
limited in their ability to protect children as internet users, because of vague language, 
inadequate enforcement and monitoring mechanisms, and low market penetration.333 In the 
area of online child safety, although little research is available on the actual impact of self-
regulatory systems, the questionable efficacy of the major existing voluntary initiatives, such 
as the Safer Social Networking Principles for the EU, raise doubts as to their full 
implementation and compliance.334 Stronger EU participation in the self-regulatory process, in 
particular rule formulation and enforcement, could help to achieve a better balance between 
the interests of children to exercise control over their personal data and the desire of  businesses 
to valorise and profit from users’ personal data. The GDPR, in contrast to the DPD, takes a 
step in that direction and requires: a) data protection authorities to evaluate whether the code 
                                                
329 Irina Vasiliu, ‘Speech at the 7th Plenary Meeting of the Community of Practice for Better Self- and Co-
Regulation. Synthesis of the Plenary’, 24 June 2016 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-28/cop_7_-
_synthesis_of_the_discussions_16585.pdf> 
330 Eva Lievens, ‘Protecting Children in the New Media Environment: Rising to the Regulatory Challenge?’ 
(2007) 24(4) Telematics and Informatics 315. 
331 European Commission, Principles for Better Self- and Co-Regulation <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/sites/digital-agenda/files/CoP%20-%20Principles%20for%20better%20self-%20and%20co-
regulation.pdf> accessed 2 February 2017. 
332 The only finalised code of conduct on the EU level is the ‘European Codes of practice for the use of personal 
data in direct marketing’ including an annex on online direct marketing by FEDMA 
<http://www.fedma.org/index.php?id=56> accessed 15 January 2017. 
333 Milda Macenaite, ‘Protecting Children’s Privacy Online: A Critical Look to Four European Self-regulatory 
Initiatives’ (2016) 2 European Journal of Law and Technology. 
334 Jos De Haan et al., ‘Self-regulation’ in Brian O’Neill, Elisabeth Staksrud and Sharon McLaughlin (eds) 
Towards a better Internet for Children. Policy pillars, player and paradoxes (Nordicom, 2013). 
86 
 
complies with the GDPR and, approve it, as well as register and publish the code; b) an 
independent body, which has an appropriate level of expertise and is accredited by the 





The growing importance of children’s rights in EU policy making, empirical evidence vis-à-
vis the risks for children and excessive and complex children’s data collection practices online 
have driven the recognition in Europe that children’s personal data deserves specific protection. 
The EU General Data Protection Regulation, which will be applicable from the 25th of May 
2018, has established the requirement to obtain parental consent for the processing of the 
personal data of a child below the age of 16 years (unless national laws specifies a lower age 
threshold which cannot be lower than 13) when offering information society services (Article 
8). Under the current Directive 95/46/EC, which has no specific rules on the consent of minors, 
the requirements related to the age and validity of consent have been diverging within the EU. 
Member States took three distinct approaches to regulate children’s capacity to provide consent 
to their data processing, namely an objective bright-line, “regulation by analogy”, and a 
subjective capacity-based approach. 
 
The analysis of the legislative history of Article 8 in the GDPR reveals the lack of well-
reasoned justifications and evidence in terms of the substantive requirements adopted in the 
final version. With most of the GDPR debate being focused around articles with a direct 
economic impact on data controllers’ activities and the Digital Single Market rather than the 
protection of vulnerable data subjects, Article 8 witnessed only sporadic renewals of interest 
during the debates in the EU institutions. 
The European Commission almost literally copied the parental consent requirement from 
COPPA in its proposal for the GDPR, without taking into account the criticisms related to 
ineffective parental consent and age verification mechanisms or considering any alternatives 
of a more nuanced approach to child protection. Despite many valuable amendments being 
registered, the discussions at the European Parliament did not lead to major substantive changes 
either. The Council has only substantially deviated from the original GDPR proposal on the 
age of consent. It initially increased the age limit of consent to 16 years and in the last minute 
of negotiations took a flexible approach leaving the decision partially to the Member states. As 
a consequence, this left the EU without coherent and uniform age threshold in the European 
Digital Market and undermined the much-anticipated harmonisation effect of the GDPR. In 
summary, none of the EU institutions failed to employ an up-to-date means of assessment, 
question the age limit for consent, assess the impact on children’s rights and the effectiveness 
of a particular formulation of the parental consent requirement, and to consider adopting a more 
nuanced version of parental consent. 
 
Due to the failure to use well-reasoned justifications and evidence during the legislative process 
and the ongoing lack of guidelines, the GDPR parental consent requirement faces many 
practical challenges related to its interpretation and implementation. First, the requirement is 
applicable to information society services offered directly to a child. As information society 
services are normally provided for remuneration, this causes uncertainty as to the particular 
material scope of Article 8, especially its applicability to free services. Second, the requirement 
concerns online services offered directly to children, but it is complicated to draw the exact 
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distinction between services to which the protection should apply. The extent to which the 
GDPR parental consent requirement will cover general-audience or mixed-audience services 
and sites remains unclear. The FTC solution of subjecting different services to a parental 
consent requirement through the “totality of the circumstances test” and “actual knowledge 
test” is useful, despite its flaws. Third, as the GDPR allows consent authorisation by the parents 
or the holders of parental responsibility over the child, it remains unclear if the reference to 
consent authorisation can be understood as allowing a joint consent and if the circle of holders 
of parental responsibility can include individuals other than parents and legal guardians. 
Fourth, to comply with the GDPR it suffices to make reasonable efforts to obtain verifiable 
parental consent rather than guarantee verified consent as a final outcome. It is not clear how 
much effort and proof in relation to obtaining consent can be requested from the controllers in 
order to sufficiently demonstrate compliance nor how reasonable efforts should be documented 
and proved. Fifth, specific parental consent mechanisms that can be used by data controllers to 
be compliant with the GDPR require further clarification and the guidance of the FTC on 
COPPA can be informative in specifying adequate and GDPR-compliant consent verification 
methods. Finally, the GDPR does not explicitly require the verification of a child’s age, and 
thus more specification is needed on the relationship between consent and age verification, and 
the need for concrete proportionate and reliable age verification solutions. 
 
Drawing on COPPA in the US, we identified pitfalls to be avoided and lessons to be learned 
when moving forward in the implementation of the EU parental consent requirement. Given 
the weaknesses of consent in general and parental consent in particular, the GDPR places an 
excessive burden on parents and children to make informed decisions about their personal data 
processing in the complex technology and data-driven environment. Instead of asking parents 
to control children’s data collection through consent, restrictions on the most undesirable data 
processing practises in relation to children should be enforced. Effective GDPR restrictions on 
children’s data collection such as prohibition of profiling, marketing, the use of legitimate 
interest as a ground to process children’s data, may provide an alternative to the parental 
consent requirement as a protection model. Purpose dependent restrictions on the collection of 
children’s data would be better suited to diminishing its commercial exploitation in complex 
marketing, tracking and targeting systems, than parental consent. 
The implementation of Article 8 of the GDPR provides an opportunity for the EU to address 
the different challenges and opportunities in adopting innovative online methods of age 
verification. Instead, of purely relying on the internet users’ self-assertion of their age, as 
provided in the COPPA regime in the US, the EU should explore innovative, effective and 
privacy-friendly age verification mechanisms, aligning them with the advancements in online 
authentication, attribute-based ecosystems and public e-ID schemes. The use of attribute-based 
credentials in implementing Article 8 of the GDPR looks particularly promising, allowing for 
pseudonymous and reliable age checks online. In line with the risk-based approach embodied 
into the GDPR, methods of age verification that afford lower levels of assurance might be 
adequate in online services posing lower risks to the rights and freedoms of children, leaving 
high assurance options for high risk information society services, such as services involving 
profiling, marketing and other practises from which the GDPR considers that children merit 
specific enhanced protection. 
 
When determining acceptable parental consent verification methods, the EU could follow the 
US example and encourage industry to propose effective, acceptable (from an industry 
perspective) and sector-tailored solutions for approval. Codes of conduct could be one possible 
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way to create standards for effective consent verification and the further specification of Article 
8 of the GDPR.  Nevertheless, in order to ensure that self-regulation is accountable, efficient 
and able to deliver on its societal goals, the EU should actively participate in the formulation 
of self-regulatory rules, and their effective monitoring and enforcement.  
 
As regards the age threshold for consent, it might be worth adopting different age limits for 
different data collection areas and practises in the 13 to 16 year age span. Specific consent age 
limits could be determined in national laws as Member States can depart from the GDPR 
default age of 16 or in codes of conduct at the European level. The latter could help to create 
standards that account for children’s vulnerabilities in a specific activity or sector. If the 
Member States chose to lower the age threshold to 13, the industry codes of conduct could still 
go beyond this age requirement and guarantee stringent protection in specific data collection 
scenarios offering more protection for children’s personal data depending on the context. In 
any case, the choice of the most appropriate age limit between 13 and 16, be it in national law 
or in self-regulatory initiatives, should be based on extensive empirical evidence and 
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The newly adopted EU General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679) has explicitly 
recognised that children deserve more protection than adults, especially online. Yet, as the 
GDPR’s child-specific protection regime is new and without precedent in Europe, both its 
underlying logic and its practical implementation remain unclear. The chapter explores the 
extent to which EU consumer law, which has already taken account of children as a particularly 
vulnerable group of consumers, can inform the newly adopted General Data Protection 
Regulation. The analysis focuses on the reasons justifying the child-specific protection regime, 
principles (fairness, transparency) in relation to children and conceptual questions (definition 
of an average child and services directed to children). 
 




Children and young people are often at the forefront of grasping the new and exciting 
opportunities that the Internet can offer, such as playing, communicating, experimenting with 
relationships and identities, learning, creating and expressing themselves. It is estimated that 
globally one in three Internet users is under the age of 18.335 In being both early adopters and 
active users of the Internet, children are also becoming increasingly influential as consumers, 
especially in the digital-content market.336 A growing preference for online shopping rather 
than for brick-and-mortar stores can be observed in Europe, despite the lack of reliable and 
recent EU-wide data about children’s expenditure on digital goods and services.337 Young 
people using the Internet in particular show a big increase in online purchasing. In 2016, almost 
70 percent of Internet users aged 16 to 24 in Europe had bought goods or services online.338  
                                                
335 Livingstone / Carr / Byrne (2015).  
336 Helberger / Guibault / Loos / Mak / Pessers / Van der Sloot (2013). 
337 The numbers of children purchasing, for example, apps online are significant. According to the European 
Commission (which cites an external study of Bitkom) only in Germany from 2012 to 2013 in-app purchases 
doubled amounting to 240 million EUR. More than one million of the app users were individuals aged 
between 10 and 19 years. European Commission (2014). 
338 Eurostat (2016). 
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Although the level of children’s perception and attitudes towards online shopping varies 
and is influenced by many factors, such as age, parental guidance, social networks and peers,339 
and smaller children still might prefer physical over digital stores due to the variety of goods 
and instant gratification,340 children undoubtedly as a consumer market have become very 
attractive for sellers and marketers. In fact, children are known to be a three-layer market: a 
primary market for their own purchasing power related to pocket money or income, an 
influence market, as children influence the buying patterns of their parents, and a future market, 
given their future spending power as purchasing habits and preference for brands continue into 
adulthood.341 
Yet children are increasingly acting not only as consumers but also and at the same time 
as data subjects in their online activities. In the current data-driven information economy and 
the proliferation of the Internet of Things, almost any “smart” service or product comes with 
the collection of personal data and it is hard to imagine anyone being a consumer342 without 
becoming a data subject (a natural person whose personal data is processed). As noted by 
Helberger et al., ‘(w)ith the integration of more and more data into consumer products, many 
data protection issues also become consumer issues, and vice versa’343. Consequently, there is 
a growing tendency to speak of consumers’ rather than individuals’ rights to data protection344 
and to look for an integrated vision of ‘data consumer law’345, reinforcing the close relationship 
between the roles of data subjects and consumers in the digital environment. 
As ‘(p)ersonal data are economic assets, and are used to develop modern services, to 
categorise consumers, and to influence consumers’346, the roles of consumers and data subjects 
are intertwined and the switch from the former to the latter can be hardly noticeable from a 
practical perspective. On a daily basis, consumers conclude agreements and consent to the 
collection of their data without necessarily fully realising that by simply ticking ‘I agree’ 
buttons on a website or adjusting device settings they consent to their data collection and use. 
For example, in order to create an account on social-networking sites, users accept the terms 
of use (virtually sign a legally binding contract as consumers) and consent to their personal 
data being processed by agreeing to the privacy policy of a site (act as data subjects).347 
Widely spread business practices, such as combining contracts with consent (consent 
bundling)348, when consumers allow collection and analysis of their personal data in addition 
to the provision of the main ‘agreed’ service, further contribute to blurring the line between 
consumers and data subjects and increase ‘datafication’,349 which results in constant and 
opaque collection of consumers’ personal data. In fact, the datafication of children’s online 
activities is an increasingly growing research area, with studies examining digital dataveillance 
practices and their potential impact on children and their rights350 and critically analyzing 
advertising, branding and marketing in games and apps directed towards children351. 
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342 Consumer is defined as ‘any natural person who is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business 
or profession’ Article 2(b), Directive 93/13/EC. 
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Although the EU has paid specific attention to the vulnerability of children as consumers 
in the Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices352, protection of children’s 
informational privacy has been designed to conflate adults and children in one single group of 
data subjects. Since 1995, minors have been covered by the age-neutral data protection 
provisions of Directive 95/46/EC with no special focus on the processing of children’s data, 
despite the fact that on a normative level, it is clearly acknowledged that a child’s right to 
privacy needs to be considered separately from an adult’s right to privacy.353 
The newly adopted EU General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679)354 (GDPR) has 
significantly changed the status quo and rejected the ‘age-blind’ approach to data subjects. For 
the first time, it explicitly recognises that children need more protection than adults, especially 
online, as ‘they may be less aware of risks, consequences, safeguards and their rights in relation 
to the processing of personal data’ (Recital 38). Such specific protection is afforded through a 
new two-tiered child-specific protection regime.355 As the GDPR child-specific protection 
regime is new and without precedents in Europe,356 both the underlying logic and the practical 
implementation of it remain unclear. For example, a lack of clarity exists about conceptual 
questions (definition of an average child and services directed to children) and principles 
(fairness, transparency) in relation to children.  
The aim of this chapter is to explore the extent to which EU consumer law, which has 
taken account of children as a particularly vulnerable group of consumers, can inform the 
GDPR and reduce the clarity gap in relation to the above-mentioned GDPR concepts and 
principles. 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, it defines consumers and data subjects in 
today’s data-driven online environment and explores the legal qualification of the two roles in 
the case of children. It then examines the justifications for having a specific child-tailored data 
protection regime, going beyond the GDPR’s obvious and explicit lack-of-knowledge 
yardstick. It broadens the view and takes into account the insights from social sciences on 
particular vulnerabilities and needs of children, as well as from consumer law and its legal 
vulnerability benchmark, partially embodying the social science insights. Finally, the chapter 
explores how consumer protection can inform data protection law by: 1) improving 
transparency through the information on data collection adapted to the specific needs and age 
of children; 2) enhancing fairness of data processing; 3) delineating services offered directly to 
                                                
352  Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the 
internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive), 11.06.2005, L149/22. 
353 For example, Livingstone / Carr / Byrne (2015), 15 claim that ‘greater steps are needed, because children’s 
human rights necessitate special provision (special protection measures, best interest of the child, evolving 
capacity, participation, and so on), and there are good reasons to be concerned about whether children’s 
rights will be met even where children and adults’ rights are the same. This is because infringements of harm 
generally have a disproportionate impact on the vulnerable, and thus an approach that is age-generic 
(arguably, age-blind, by analogy gender-blind or disability-blind approaches) is unlikely to suffice.’ 
354  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 119, 
4.5.2016, 1–88. 
355  For a more detailed description of the two-tiered child-specific protection GDPR regime see Macenaite 
(2017). 
356  This regulatory effort is new for the EU, but the US almost two decades ago adopted detailed rules for the 
operators that collect personal information from children under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA). See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. 6501–6505. For a detailed 




children 4) defining an average child to decide when a child is able to provide a valid consent 
for the processing of his or her personal data. 
2. Children as Data Subjects and Consumers Online: Defining Roles and Responsibilities 
 
In the majority of the consumer law legal instruments ‘consumer’ is defined as a natural 
person who enters into a contract which falls outside his trade or profession.357 This definition 
might prove problematic for adults. If interpreted in a narrow sense, it could catch individuals 
who use online services for both personal and professional purposes, for example send 
professional emails from their personal email accounts, store work-related documents on cloud 
storage services etc. This definition is less problematic for minors, who are rarely engaged in 
professional activities or trade.  
However, a more relevant distinction for children is that between consumers and 
prosumers and between data subjects and data controllers. Children, in particular adolescents, 
actively take part in the collaborative or sharing economy and become co-creators of digital 
products and services. For example, they not only consume video games but also produce 
artefacts in the game-related affinity spaces,358 not only watching but also creating and 
monetising digital content, such as videos, through advertising run on them on YouTube or 
blog posts through product endorsement and promotion. As technological developments and 
advancements, such as open design, additive manufacturing, crowd sourcing and open data, 
allow users to be a producer and a consumer at the same time, ‘prosumer’ as a legal concept 
escapes a clear legal definition, resulting in legal uncertainty about relevant rights and 
responsibilities. For example, when a third party (e.g. crowdsourcing platform) sells the co-
created product and prosumers get part of the profit, an individual can be considered in a trade 
or business relation with the platform (i.e. producer) and might not be necessarily protected by 
consumer law in all cases.359 Due to the unclear legal distinction between consumers, producers 
and prosumers, facts play a key role in courts when deciding if an individual qualifies as a 
consumer and ‘the turnover, the amount of products, frequency or time involved in an activity 
of a prosumer helps to define in which quality a person acts’.360 Also, due to the fact that 
consumers co-create their products or services, lack of clarity exists in relation to insurance 
coverage of potential accidents or the qualification of consumers when producing the goods 
and services.361 
A similar shift is reflected in scenarios when Internet users change roles from data 
subjects to data controllers, losing the rights granted by data protection law. In line with its 
predecessor, the GDPR includes the ‘household exception’ (Article 2(c) GDPR). It clearly 
states that the Regulation ‘does not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural person 
in the course of a purely personal or household activity and thus with no connection to a 
professional or commercial activity’, such as social networking and online activity undertaken 
within the context of personal correspondence (Recital 18). However, the exact meaning of 
‘personal or household activity’ is not entirely clear. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) in the Lindqvist case362 concluded that the household exception is not applicable 
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when information is accessible ‘to an indefinite number of people’, but the exact meaning of 
‘an indefinite number of people’ lacks clarity. In the same vein, the Article 29 Working Party 
has acknowledged that a user ‘may acquire a high number of third party contacts, some of 
whom he may not actually know’ and this ‘could be an indication that the household exception 
does not apply’.363 As a result, the user who acts online and discloses personal data to a high 
or indefinite number of people could be considered a data controller and be obliged to comply 
with all the obligations stemming from the GDPR.  
Such a provision no longer reflects the reality of today’s data-driven online environment 
and expanded data processing capabilities of amateurs, and might have unintended 
consequences for social-network users.364 Scholars have argued that it would be too 
burdensome to apply data protection rules to private individuals365 and that supervisory 
authorities could not ensure compliance366 and have noted even possible interference with 
individuals’ fundamental right to privacy.367  
On the other hand, excluded from the scope of data protection law harmed individuals 
would lose the possibility to lodge a complaint as data subjects and would need to opt for more 
burdensome civil-law actions (defamation, the right to protection of one’s image) in courts.368 
Some potential solutions proposed, yet not directly implemented in the GDPR, include using a 
combination of five criteria to decide whether the household exemption applies to a particular 
processing activity: publicity of the disclosed data, types of data subject involved, scale and 
frequency of the processing, whether the activity is carried out singly or as a collective, and 
adverse impact.369 Data protection authorities referring to these criteria would become more 
objective and gain a certain degree of discretion when deciding whether to take action in a 
specific situation.  
When considering online behaviour, the application of data protection rules to children 
as data controllers appears to be theoretically probable even if undesirable. Empirical evidence 
suggests that adolescents have more contacts on social networks than adults or young adults 
and add more unknown people to contact lists simply as they want to know them or because 
they are popular or famous.370 Networks of ‘friends’ tend to grow during the upper secondary 
school years and generally amount to approximately 500 contacts.371 Given the conventional 
understanding of the data protection framework, it is unlikely that the finding children to be 
data controllers could be clearly excluded. However, as discussed below, the positioning of 
children as competent data subjects is already challenging and debatable and thus, the 
assignment of the complex duties and obligations imposed on data controllers may be even 
more problematic. 
Nevertheless, from a theoretical perspective it is interesting to explore how data 
protection law could accommodate children as data controllers even if the household 
exemption did not apply. More specifically one could question whether a child could benefit 
from the exemption for the purposes of artistic or literary expression in the context of using a 
social network and thus how the balance between freedom of expression and the right to 
privacy could be struck in such circumstances. In addition, one could question how legitimate 
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interests as a condition for lawful processing in Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR would be 
interpreted if a child is deemed to be a data controller and also how the ‘legitimate grounds’ 
for refusing the exercising of data subject rights could operate in practice. These abstract 
questions may have practical consequences and therefore may only be made clear via case law 
and CJEU interpretation. In the interim however doubt and room for abstract legal reasoning 
remain. As such, more research is required in this area. 
2.1. Consumers of ‘Free’ Services? 
 
Consumer protection has typically dealt with markets where products and services are 
traded in exchange of money. In fact, consumer rights have been traditionally guaranteed in 
sales and service contracts when the consumer pays a ‘price’, meaning payment in money, 
vouchers, gift cards or loyalty points with a specified monetary value rather than the services 
promoted by the trader as ‘free’.372 However, in the current data-driven information society the 
distinction between paid and ‘free’ electronic services has become obsolete both in theory and 
in practice. Paying not only with money but also with (personal) data for digital services and 
content has become an increasingly important way of bargaining online.  
Such bargaining is particularly popular among younger Internet users, as various studies 
in Europe373 and North America374 report that the most favourite websites among children are 
those that do not require their users to pay for their services in terms of money, such as 
YouTube, Facebook and Google. 
Although hidden costs of free services375 and their detriment to consumers376 have long 
been acknowledged by academics, the regulation of contracts in which a consumer ‘pays’ for 
a product or service by providing personal or other data to the supplier has been much slower.377 
Nevertheless, in its recent draft of a Directive on certain aspects concerning contracts for the 
supply of digital content (the proposed Digital Content Directive),378 aiming to regulate digital 
content contracts such as downloading or web streamed of movies or digital services like cloud 
storage or social media, the European Commission has broadened the understanding of regular 
contract law, explicitly putting contracts in which the counter-performance refers to the 
payment of a price on equal basis with contracts where ‘the consumer actively provides 
counter-performance other than money in the form of personal data or any other data’ (Article 
3(1)). Until this explicit acknowledgment of personal data as actual online currency, there were 
only sporadic references to this issue in several consumer-related EU guidance documents. The 
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European Commission’s guidance document on unfair commercial practices refers to 
‘increasing awareness of the economic value of information related to consumers’ preferences, 
personal data and other user-generated content’.379 It stresses the importance of being 
transparent and informing consumers how their preferences, personal data and user-generated 
content are going to be used.380 If consumers are not informed then the marketing of products 
that requires the exchange of personal data of users as ‘free’ could constitute a misleading 
practice.381 Also, recently the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network in the social media 
context stressed that Directive 93/13/EC on Unfair Contract Terms is applicable to all types of 
contracts between consumers and businesses, explicitly mentioning as an example ‘contracts 
where consumer generated content and profiling represent the counter-performance alternative 
to money’.382  
Similarly, although without an explicit reference to personal data, the Directive 
2011/83/EU on Consumer Rights (Consumer Rights Directive)383 does not fully exclude ‘free’ 
online services from its scope and legal requirements. It distinguishes between sales and service 
contracts and contracts for the supply of online digital content.384 Contrary to the definition of 
sales and service contracts, the Directive does not mention ‘payment’ for the digital-content 
contracts. Therefore, according to the European Commission, ‘the Directive would seem to 
apply also to contracts for the supply of (…) online digital content even if they do not involve 
payment’, such as the contracts for a free download of a game from an app store.385 However, 
express contractual agreement needs to be concluded between consumers and traders and a 
mere access to a website is not necessarily considered a contract.386 Therefore, ‘contracts (for 
the supply of digital content in exchange of data) that are concluded by tacit agreement would 
escape the application of the Consumer Rights Directive’.387   
That being said, it is unclear how this line of argumentation aligns with Article 5(3) of 
the ePrivacy Directive388 which requires prior informed opt-in consent for storage and access 
to information on users’ terminal equipment. It is uncertain how the collection of personal data 
via cookies for commercial purposes could be seen as a tacit agreement. In this regard, one 
could refer to the European Data Protection Supervisor’s criticism of the proposed Digital 
Content Directive which delineates active and passive data collection despite the ePrivacy 
Directive’s provisions.389 Accordingly, there is a huge amount of debate and confusion 
surrounding a correct interpretation of the positioning of consent and its relationship with 
contract and contractual protections. 
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In the same vein, the GDPR seems to hint that its scope extends to unpaid online services, 
i.e. to the processing of personal data when offering goods or services to data subjects in the 
EU, irrespective of whether a payment is required of the data subject (Article 3). Yet in Article 
8 defining the conditions applicable to child's consent in relation to information society services 
the GDPR also explicitly refers to paid services, as information-society services are defined as 
‘any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the 
individual request of a recipient of services’ (Point b of Article 1(1) Directive 2015/1535390)). 
At first glance therefore it may seem that the reference to electronic services provided for 
remuneration requires direct remuneration from the users. However, in practice the phrase 
‘normally provided for remuneration’ has been assigned a broad meaning. The CJEU has dealt 
with the concept of remuneration in various cases. It has ruled that the important element is 
that the remuneration is given to the provider of the service but it is not necessarily the recipient 
who has to give the remuneration. In Belgium v Humbel the CJEU considered that ‘the essential 
characteristic of remuneration (…) lies in the fact that it constitutes consideration for the 
service in question’.391 In Bond van Adverteerders v Netherlands, the CJEU found that the 
remuneration does not need to come from the recipient of the service, i.e. the viewer; it suffices 
that the remuneration comes from another party, such as an advertiser.392 The CJEU has 
explained the concept of remuneration in the context of services offered within the European 
Union. It is unclear, however, if a service should be deemed distinct from a service contract, 
given that contract law remains largely dominated by national contract law vis-à-vis the 
requirements for contract formation.393 
 
2.2. Legally (In)capable Consumers in (In)valid Consumer Contracts? 
 
There is no clear definition of ‘child’ in the EU consumer law. The Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive includes some provisions designed to protect children against unfair 
commercial practices, but does not specify who is a child. The guidance document mentions 
not only children but also teenagers as vulnerable consumers, but equally fails to provide 
concrete age ranges.394 An interesting exception is the Toy Safety Directive,395 where the 
concept of ‘child’ is linked to the notion of ‘toy’. The Directive is applicable to ‘products 
designed or intended, whether or not exclusively, for use in play by children under 14 years of 
age (hereinafter referred to as toys)’ (Article 2.1).  
Regulation or self-regulation fills this gap in certain cases on a national level. For 
example, the UK Code of Non-broadcast Advertising, Sales Promotion and Direct Marketing, 
adopted by the UK’s Advertising Standard Authority, defines a child as an individual under 
16.396 In addition, as a general principle it acknowledges that ‘the way in which children 
perceive and react to marketing communications is influenced by their age, experience and the 
context in which the message is delivered’ and therefore, these factors are considered when 
examining whether specific marketing communication complies with the code. Interestingly, 
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the age threshold to become a data subject is much lower in the same code. Advertisers are 
allowed to collect personal data from children over 12 years old without parental consent.397 
When defining a ‘child’ in consumer law, contract law is relevant to establish when a 
child may enter into contractual relations, but even contract law does not help in qualifying 
pre-contractual relations, such as product marketing or other commercial practices. In the 
majority of the national laws children are not considered legally capable to enter into valid 
contracts or do not have the competence to conclude agreements without parental permission. 
This prohibition follows from the assumption that minors are not fully capable of understanding 
the nature and legal consequences of their acts. Nevertheless, children between the ages of 14 
and 18 in various jurisdictions are allowed to consent to agreements in small, day-to-day 
activities, such as those related to their income or daily life (e.g. buy food, clothes, transport 
tickets), without the involvement of their legal representatives.398 For example, in Finland 
children under 15 can purchase only ordinary goods of small significance, such as spending 
their pocket money, without parental consent.399  
The limits of the legal capacity to act online are much less clear. According to Wauters 
et al., actions of underage social-network users can have legal consequences if they can be 
qualified as ‘daily acts’ as well as if the minors are able to understand the scope of their actions 
(have reached the age of discernment).400 A contract concluded by a minor who has not yet 
reached the age of discernment will be considered invalid or void.  
The question of whether a minor can conclude a valid agreement online, e.g. accept the 
terms of service of a web-based service, should be answered according to the national contract 
law. For example, in Belgium a concluded standard contract is valid if the user has actual 
knowledge of the content of the contract and accepts the agreement.401 Availability, visibility 
and comprehensibility of the contract terms are important, but the existence of actual 
knowledge has to be decided by a judge in a specific case.402  
 
2.3. (In)competent Data Subjects? 
 
Defining the ‘legal competence’ of children to consent to their personal data processing 
is a complicated task. Although the GDPR will mandate the establishment of clear age 
thresholds (leaving it to the Member States to define the precise age between 13 and 16 years), 
currently diverging age thresholds are explicitly introduced (or tacitly accepted in practice, 
depending on the Member State) for minors as data subjects while regulating their power to 
give valid consent to the data processing operations.403 In general, many European countries 
consider minors of 14, 15 or 16 years as competent to consent to the processing of their data.404 
A few national data protection laws in the EU explicitly state the exact age threshold 
from which minors are treated as legally competent to act as data subjects on their own 
behalf.405 Other national legal frameworks do not include specific provisions, but rely on the 
                                                
397 Ibid. 
398 For a comparative overview of the legal capacity of minors in contract law see Loos / Helberger / Guibault / 
Mak / Pessers / Cseres / van der Sloot / Tigner (2011), 138-141. 
399 Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (2015). 
400 Wauters / Lievens / Valcke (2015). 
401 Wauters / Lievens / Valcke (2015). 
402 Ibid. 
403 Macenaite / Kosta (2017). 
404 Dowty / Korff (2009).  
405 Parental consent is required for the processing of personal data of children under the age of 14 in Spain 
(Article 13 of the Spanish Royal Decree 1720/2007 of 21 December) and 16 in the Netherlands (Article 5 of 
98 
 
legal capacity of minors as actors in civil law or assess the concrete situation on a case-by-case 
basis.406 In the latter case, the general criteria of the best interest of the child, the level of moral 
and psychological development, the capacity to understand the consequences of giving consent 
and evaluating specific circumstances (the age of the child, the purpose of data processing, type 
of personal data involved, etc) are taken into account in carrying out the assessment.407 Such 
evaluation of the capacity of the data subject is a context-specific rather than universally 
applicable test, but assumption-based exemplary age thresholds are normally set in case law, 
legal doctrine or guidelines from the data protection authorities.408 
 
3. Beyond the Obvious and Explicit: A Multitude of Raisons D'Être for a Specific 
Personal Data Protection Regime 
 
The GDPR justifies its child-specific provisions exclusively in light of children’s 
potentially lower awareness about the risks and safeguards related to the collection and use of 
their data. However, if the only reason for protecting children and young people was a lack of 
awareness, this problem could be addressed by intensive awareness-raising activities and 
would not necessarily require legislative action.409 The following sections aim to explore the 
various additional factors which motivate the establishment of a specific, child-tailored data 
protection regime.  
 
3.1. GDPR and the Lack-of-Knowledge Yardstick  
 
The GDPR refers to children’s lower awareness as a yardstick providing a normative 
justification for establishing its specific child-protection regime. 
Lack of knowledge and of a full understanding of complex personal data-collection 
practices, along with their implications, especially online, is an undeniable problem not only 
for children and young people, but for many adults too. Research shows that some more 
advanced data-collection and tracking techniques, such as canvas fingerprinting and 
evercookies and their possible impact, are hard to understand even for sophisticated users.410 
Websites that are popular among children employ increasingly sophisticated methods to gather 
children’s data as they play, communicate or browse online, resulting in constant surveillance. 
As Montgomery points out, the goal of these surveillance practices, used on many websites, is 
to create a cognitive, emotional and behavioral relationship between the child and the website, 
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through micro-targeted ‘one-on-one’ marketing and communication strategies.411 Similar 
worries about the commercial surveillance of children in networked spaces, and the subsequent 
effects this may have, have been raised by a number of academics.412 
For young people, privacy policies are long, complex, difficult to find and often age-
inappropriate.413 The privacy policies of the most widely used social-networking sites, such as 
Facebook and Twitter, can easily confuse users by valorising ‘sharing’ and ‘control’, despite 
the ongoing ubiquitous collection, use and disclosure of their data.414 
Even though some children might be tech-savvy and informed Internet users, this does 
not necessarily render them capable of fully realising the consequences of pervasive online 
data-collection practices. For example, children do not intuitively perceive their online actions 
as actions that are being constantly monitored.415 Even the mere positioning of children as 
‘digital natives’416 or as part of ‘the Net generation’417 has been widely debated in the academic 
literature.418 Empirical evidence suggests that other factors such as breadth of use, experience 
and education are in some cases even more decisive than generational differences in defining 
someone as a ‘digital native’.419 
 
3.2. Different Online Behaviour, Needs and Privacy Perceptions  
 
The GDPR refers only to the (lack of) certain capacities pertaining to children rather than 
to the specific features characterising children, and especially adolescents, as individuals. 
Developmental psychology provides evidence that adolescents have particular needs and 
interests, such as identity formation, developing their agency and establishing autonomy, and 
creating peer relations.420  
Making friends and forming peer relations become increasingly important with growth 
and can even affect the psychological, social and academic development of the adolescents.421 
Adolescents are eager to make new friends422 and often establish more friendships than 
adults.423 In contrast, young adults feel less need to engage in new friendships but more need 
to make the existing relationships more intimate and satisfying.424 Adults spent less time with 
friends than do adolescents.425 These claims are confirmed in the social-media context by 
several authors in Europe and beyond. In the Netherlands, Steijn and Schouten showed that 
younger social media users tend to create new relationships more often, while older users often 
strengthen ties with the existing friends.426 In the same vein, Mantelero found that with 
increasing age adolescents in Italy consider it less important to look for new friends on social 
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networks but rather communicate with the existing friends or family members.427 The same 
trend is confirmed by Third et al. in relation to children from 16 countries around the world.428 
Identity creation is an equally important need during adolescence.429 Adolescents spend 
a lot of time with their peers, who become important circles where adolescent’s identity is 
established.430  Boneva et al. state that ‘[a]dolescence is defined by the need for intense person-
to-person communication with a friend—spending a lot of time together ... and self-
disclosing’.431 Valkenburg and Peter show that the Internet social media have become a new 
arena for adolescents to present and experiment with their identities.432 In contrast to children, 
older individuals have already developed their identities433 and are willing to make them more 
solid and adults ‘have less of a need to experiment with their identities or to present themselves 
favourably to others’.434 Identity development and creation of relations as developmental needs 
are potentially connected with user online behaviour, such as adding contacts on their social 
networks and disclosure of personal information.435 
Academics have established the link between developmental phases and online behaviour 
in relation to adolescents.436 Empirical research also has elucidated that privacy perceptions 
and concerns are different between children, adolescents and adults. In particular, as claimed 
by Steijn, a developmental perspective can help to understand, and thus justify, the different 
privacy concerns and behaviour of individuals of different ages on social media.437 Steijn relies 
on empirical evidence gathered in the Netherlands from 16 000 individuals in three age groups: 
adolescents (12- to 19-year-olds), young adults (20- to 30-year-olds) and adults (31-year-olds 
and older). He shows that behaviour of individuals on social media (e.g. having more contacts, 
posting information more frequently) can be related to characteristics that are typical for 
adolescents, young adults and adults in their life stages. Thus, developmental characteristics of 
relationship development and identity development are related to user behaviour on social 
media and can partially explain the lower concerns for privacy among adolescents.  
 
3.3. Particular Vulnerabilities and Immaturities   
 
The reliance on neurotechnology, in particular magnetic resonance imaging, in the last 
decade has provided neurological evidence to compare the different structures and functioning 
of adolescent and adult brains. Scientists have demonstrated that there are structural and 
functional immaturities in the brain of adolescents.438  This has resulted in the questioning of 
Jean Piaget’s previously dominant claim that by the age of 15, adolescents’ cognitive capability 
to understand, appreciate, and articulate decisions are on par with those of an adult.439 It has 
been instead acknowledged that ‘teenagers may have the ability to reason like adults, but do so 
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with vexing inconsistency’440 due to, among others, their emotional volatility, impulsiveness, 
lower ability to deflect the pressure of peers.  
Since the part of the brain controlling inhibitions fully matures only in early adulthood, 
adolescents can be less capable of evaluating risky situations and can be more easily misled. 
441  They are less likely to consider the long-term consequences of their actions, and are more 
likely to be risk-prone.442 As summarised by Preston and Crowther, ‘(n)otwithstanding 
growing research on the capabilities of teenagers and their need for respect and autonomy, the 
developmental science shows that, alongside these positive qualities, minors are nonetheless 
still impulsive, take more risks than adults, and are less capable of controlling their emotions’ 
443. The authors continue: ‘(t)hese behavioral immaturities suggest that minors are not in the 
same position as adults when making long-term decisions, especially when surrounded by their 
peers’ and further note that ‘in the Internet age, they are always surrounded by their peers, 
using social media to bounce every decision off a host of other teenagers’444.  
These specific developmental features might influence their online behaviour and 
increase the possibility of online victimisation among peers, as well as the possibility of 
commercial personal data exploitation, to a level higher than that of cases involving younger 
children or adults. In the latter case, for example, online marketers can employ special 
strategies to take advantage of the adolescents’ vulnerabilities, knowing that ‘[b]ecause of 
adolescents’ emotional volatility and their tendency to act impulsively, they are also more 
vulnerable than adults to such techniques as real-time bidding, geolocation targeting (especially 
when an individual is near a point of purchase) and ‘dynamic creative’ adverts tailored to their 
individual profiles and behaviour patterns’.445  
The manipulative and unfair techniques often used online to satisfy adolescent needs and 
the key features of online services that strongly meet adolescent needs have raised concerns 
among academics and policy makers.446 As a result, the question has emerged whether certain 
data-collection practices with a potential negative impact that are directed to children, such as 
intrusive profiling or emotional manipulation, can be considered unfair and should be clearly 
prohibited in law, a question which will be discussed below. 
 
3.4. Learning from Consumer Law – Vulnerability as a Legislative Benchmark  
 
EU consumer law, in contrast to the data protection law, has already distinguished a 
special category of ‘vulnerable consumers’ and provided justification for their protection. 
Article 5(3) of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive states: ‘Commercial practices which 
are likely to materially distort the economic behaviour only of a clearly identifiable group of 
consumers who are particularly vulnerable to the practice or the underlying product because of 
their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity in a way which the trader could reasonably 
be expected to foresee, shall be assessed from the perspective of the average member of that 
group.’  
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive creates a specific protection regime for 
vulnerable consumers as a special group because ‘vulnerable consumers can be presumed to 
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be in need of more protection than the “average consumer”’.447 This regime provides enhanced 
protection departing from the general standard of consumer protection from unfair commercial 
practices, which is tailored to the average, ‘reasonably circumspect’ consumer. This approach, 
which Mak calls targeted differentiation, creates a criterion which follows specific needs of 
consumers in need of protection.448 
This concept of vulnerability in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive is essentially 
related to the personal situation of weakness in which individuals might find themselves due 
to their physical or demographic characteristics. The European Consumer Consultative Group 
calls this ‘the personal dimension or horizontal approach’ to consumer vulnerability.449 
Although there exists no single, universally adopted definition of consumer vulnerability, 
the understanding of this concept in academic literature is much broader than in the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive. In addition to the personal characteristics of the consumer, 
increasingly more definitions include among vulnerability factors the overall situation in which 
the consumers find themselves. These factors can be divided into ‘endogenous’ (internal) and 
‘exogenous’ (external) factors.450 ‘Endogenous’ refers to ‘causes that are inherent to the 
consumer or his or her physical or mental situation (children, adolescents, seniors, the disabled, 
etc.)’.451 They can be temporary (e.g. illness) or permanent (e.g. impairment).452 Exogenous 
causes include lack of knowledge of the language, lack of general or market-specific education 
or the need to use unknown new technologies.453 Waddington claims that even ‘the nature of 
the products’, such as complex financial and investment products, or ‘services and the selling 
arrangements’, such as sales in combination with a free gift or special marketing practices, 
should count as external vulnerability factors.454  
On the policy-making level as well, there have been calls to expand the definition of 
vulnerable consumers and incorporate ‘situational vulnerability’ or a ‘sectoral approach’.455 
This approach would indeed recognise that the same consumers that in some markets are 
‘average consumers’, i.e. reasonably well-informed, observant and circumspect, in other 
markets are vulnerable consumers who are not able to make informed, rational consumer 
choices. 
Both groups of factors turn out to be important in practice. A recent empirical study on 
vulnerability demonstrates that the broader market environment is an important element of 
vulnerability, but that temporary or permanent characteristics of the consumer also play an 
important role.456 Vulnerability can be both ‘a permanent or long-term condition, often related 
to factors internal to the consumer, such as age, inexperience or a disability’, and ‘dynamic and 
relative’ in its nature, arising in interaction with markets and services. Thus, any consumer can 
become vulnerable at times depending on his personal situation and characteristics and on the 
products or services and marketing used.457 According to the European Commission’s recent 
interpretation of the vulnerability concept, ‘[V]ulnerability is not a static condition. Consumers 
may move in and out of states of vulnerability and they may be vulnerable in respect of some 
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categories of transaction but not others. In addition, vulnerability is best viewed as a spectrum 
rather than a binary state’.458  
A recent EU study tried to provide an evidence-based definition of consumer 
vulnerability that can be used to update and enhance existing vulnerability definitions. 
According to the study, a ‘vulnerable consumer’ is: 
 
A consumer who, as a result of socio-demographic characteristics, behavioural 
characteristics, personal situation, or market environment: 
• Is at higher risk of experiencing negative outcomes in the market;  
• Has limited ability to maximise their well-being;  
• Has difficulty in obtaining or assimilating information;  
• Is less able to buy, choose or access suitable products; or  
• Is more susceptible to certain marketing practices459  
This definition provides a comprehensive picture of vulnerability factors and resulting negative 
outcomes or limitations in consumer economic behaviour. It takes into account not only the 
demographic characteristics, such as age, and the market environment, but also behavioural 
features. In relation to children the latter is an important, albeit an often disregarded factor.  
Personal factors, i.e. youth and consequently inexperience, are the primary causes of 
vulnerability. Youth is an enduring characteristic for this group of consumers. However, it 
could be claimed that children can be considered more vulnerable than many other types of 
consumers. While many other groups of consumers change their states of vulnerability by 
acquiring and losing external vulnerability factors, children will often fall under both groups 
of internal and external vulnerability factors. Children could be permanently vulnerable 
consumers due to their personal situation and often vulnerable due to the characteristics of 
products, services and marketing techniques. 
 
3.5. Critical Understanding and Susceptibility 
 
From a consumer law perspective, children and teenagers may be more vulnerable as 
consumers not only because they lack knowledge and skills, but also because (partially due of 
this lack) they can be more easily influenced by others.460  
Research on consumer socialisation deals with the development of consumer skills, 
knowledge and attitudes of children and adolescents.461 It indicates that the ability to act as 
consumers is increasingly acquired with growth. Research on the ability to understand 
advertising demonstrates that younger children are not able to identify, critically assess and 
understand the persuasive aim of advertising.462 From 7 to 8 years of age children start to 
distinguish the persuasive intent and realise that advertisements can be deceptive or biased.463 
From 11 years children become more sceptical in relation to advertisements and their intent 
and tactics.464 Rozendaal et al. specifically studied the differences in cognitive advertising 
competencies between children (8-12 years old) and adults (18-30 years old).465 They showed 
that around the age of 9 to 10 children become able to recognise advertising to the same extent 
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as adults but at age 12 children still cannot understand selling and persuasive intent of 
advertising equally to adults.466 Recognition of the selling intent of advertising develops earlier 
than the understanding of the persuasive intent.467 Yet these age thresholds of recognising and 
understanding advertisements are not absolute or certain. Oates et al. claim that not all children 
who are 10 years old can understand the persuasive aim of advertisers.468 Livingstone and 
Helsper show a more complex picture on the relationship between influence and age: ‘different 
processes of persuasion are effective at different ages, precisely because literacy levels vary 
with age’.469  
The findings on age ranges often reflect the research outcomes in the context of 
traditional advertising, such as on television or in newspapers, but are not to be directly 
transferred into the online context. Recognition of sophisticated advertising techniques in new 
media directed at children is much less explored than in traditional media. For example, there 
is only limited evidence on how children respond to embedded advertising on social media or 
advergames. The latter are particularly confusing due to the intrinsic intertwinement of 
commercial content and entertainment elements.470 Even older children have difficulties in 
categorising advergames as entertainment or persuasion.471 Their understanding even in later 
years of adolescence can be manipulated by advertisers through various covert techniques.472 
Product placement, host selling, branded websites and the use of celebrities all make it more 
difficult to understand the persuasive goal of marketing practices. A recent EU study confirms 
this conclusion by showing that although the most popular online games (of 25 studied games, 
all advergames, all social media games and half of the games provided through popular 
application platforms) contain embedded or contextual advertisements, children have difficulty 
in recognising the marketing intent of the content, in shielding themselves from it and in taking 
decisions.473 The impact of imbedded advertising is considerable on children, subliminally 
changing their behaviour and purchasing decisions.474 
Recent empirical data in the UK demonstrates the lack of critical understanding among 
children in the increasingly complex new-media landscape. Critical understanding is defined 
as ‘a wide range of knowledge and skills, including the ability to make judgements about where 
information comes from and whether it is likely to be true’ and ‘awareness and understanding 
of advertising’.475 Thus, the term describes the skills and knowledge children need to 
understand, question and manage online information and services. For example, only a small 
portion of surveyed 12- to 15-year-old children are able to identify sponsored links on Google 
as advertising (24% of 8- to 11-year-olds and 38% of 12- to 15-year-olds).476 
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4. Combining the Safeguards of the Personal Data and Consumer Protection Regimes… 
Benefiting Children?  
The introduction of the specific child-related rules in the GDPR brings practical 
challenges in relation to the implementation of well-established but age-blind data protection 
principles, such as fairness and transparency. For example, data controllers in practice will 
have to figure out how to provide information about their data-collection practices to children 
in a meaningful way.477 The GDPR child-specific rules also raise conceptual questions, such 
as how to define an average child and delineate services directed to children. Given that 
consumer protection law has dealt with children as vulnerable consumers, could it inform the 
application of data protection in the commercial context?  
The answer to this question to a large extent depends on the agreement that consumer 
and data protection - despite their differences - can be matched as legal frameworks.478  
At a first glance, the combination of consumer and data protection regimes seems rather 
intuitive. This is due to the fact that convergence between the two regimes is already happening 
in practice, in EU policy making and in EU law. As outlined above, the roles of consumers and 
data subjects are intrinsically intertwined in the digital environment, and therefore ‘the 
protection of consumers’ personal data is an integral part of consumer protection’479. On the 
EU policy level, the interrelation between data protection, competition law, and consumer 
protection in the Digital Economy has become an object of discussions introduced by the 
European Data Protection Supervisor.480 The proposed Digital Content Directive 
acknowledged that consumers actually often pay for services not with money but with their 
personal data. The GDPR explicitly referred to the Unfair Terms Directive481 in its Recital 42 
when requiring the data controllers to provide intelligible and easily accessible pre-formulated 
declaration of consent without unfair terms and tackled other issues that are closely related to 
consumer protection, such as data portability. In addition to these convergences, more generally 
data protection and consumer protection share many common features: they are both 
recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Article 8 (the right to 
data protection) and Article 38 (the consumer protection principle)482, both are rooted in 
national laws of the Member States and developed as rights starting from bottom-up secondary 
EU legislation483.  Both areas of law, generally, aim to protect weaker parties (consumers, data 
subjects) seen as often having asymmetric information and acting in an intrinsic power 
imbalance. 
However, the interplay between consumer protection and data protection presents many 
challenges and the debate about these challenges is still in its nascent phase.484 Despite their 
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similarities, consumer and data protection pursue different goals, especially evident in terms of 
interests they protect. Consumer law essentially protects economic interests of consumers by 
regulating their relations with product and service providers and granting specific rights to 
consumers in economic transactions. Data protection law, instead, protects fundamental rights 
of individuals and strives for fairness and lawfulness when their personal data is processed. In 
short, ‘(c)onsumer law deals with fair contracting; data protection law with fair processing’.485 
This difference in goals also leads to additional complexities. For example, some of the 
underlying notions, such as fairness, damages or data, are not equivalent in data protection and 
consumer protection law and cannot be easily matched.486 
Finally, and most importantly, conceptually there are some fundamental obstacles for 
merging consumer and data protection law. One of the main normative issues stemming from 
the differences in scope is that combining the rules of these two policy areas arguably 
necessitates assumption that personal data can be treated as property and reduced to a monetary 
value. Yet, as claimed by Helberger et al., ‘fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy and 
to personal data protection, which also have a societal dimension, should not be downgraded 
to mere individual consumer interests’487. Therefore, ‘neither laws nor policies should fuel the 
idea that people can renounce their rights in exchange of services’.488 As a result, these 
concerns have to be addressed, or at least clearly explicated, before fully supporting the 
extension of consumer law rationales and rules into data protection, the area of fundamental 
human rights where personal data is much more than a commodity. 
While acknowledging the differences between consumer protection and data protection 
and related conceptual challenges, it cannot be denied that the combination of the two areas 
can be informative and potentially enhance protection of children as data subjects and 
consumers in the data-driven digital world. Indeed, one must acknowledge the somewhat ironic 
oxymoronic consequences of failing to accept the economic significance of personal data as 
illustrated by the motivation behind the proposed Digital Content Directive to extend consumer 
protections. More specifically, although the EDPS has criticised the positioning of personal 
data as counter-performance489, failing to do so also eliminates the proposed contractual 
protections where the only “price” paid is personal data thereby actually negatively impact the 
data subject’s consumer rights and protections. Although the EDPS has recommended 
alternatives490 in the opinion on the proposal, no clear solution has presented itself. 
 
4.1. Child-Adapted Transparency 
 
The GDPR requires data controllers to give information to all data subjects in a clear, 
audience-appropriate language when their personal data is collected. They are asked to adapt 
the information on data collection to children, as Recital 58 requires that information be given 
‘in such a clear and plain language that the child can easily understand’. In order to properly 
implement this requirement a change of mentality should happen, and data controllers should 
take account of the age, cognitive development, needs and abilities of the data subjects. As 
noted by Danoso et al.: 
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it is fundamental to re-think legal documents such as Terms of Use and Privacy 
Policies from a perspective that better fits children’s needs, their rights and their 
not-yet fully developed cognitive capabilities. Increasing transparency in the case 
of children means communicating things differently, but openly, establishing 
clear boundaries regarding what is allowed on the website and what is not and, 
above all, relating the legal content as much as possible to the children’s 
worldviews and experiences so that it becomes truly meaningful and engaging. 
Children are not adults, and therefore when it comes to legal communication, they 
should not be treated as such.491 
 
In reflecting on a possible implementation of child-adapted transparency, personalised 
information, symbols and participatory transparency are considered as tentative solutions 
below.  
4.1.1 Personalised Information  
  
Consumer protection law has been based on the assumption that information 
asymmetry exists between service providers and consumers and that legislative obligations 
imposed on providers to make specific information available could correct the imbalance.492 
Therefore, presumably, if traders provide clear, accurate and substantiated information to 
consumers, consumers are enabled to make informed and meaningful choices. This 
information-based approach constituted ‘the hallmark of EU consumer law’ since the 1970s.493 
However, in recent years, drawing on the insights from behavioural economics, psychology 
and the neurosciences, this approach relying on the rational-choice model has been challenged 
as being no longer effective and reflecting neither consumer behaviour nor digital reality. 
Reliance on the average consumer as a yardstick contradicts empirical findings, and provision 
of standardised information is no longer able to restore symmetry between traders and 
consumers.494 Thus, ‘“regulating for information” is passé and the new challenge is to ‘regulate 
for rationality’, or put more simply, to help consumers overcome cognitive biases that may be 
exploited by traders’.495 As a consequence, alternative approaches replacing the information 
paradigm have been proposed, ranging from nudging496 to personalised information 
disclosures.497 The latter, invented by Busch, is particularly interesting in the case of children, 
although still at an early stage of academic debate. This approach proposes to use big-data 
analytics to provide personalised information disclosure to consumers instead of standard pre-
contractual information, as currently prescribed by EU consumer law.498  
Provision of such a personalised information theoretically looks very promising as it 
could take into account the specific needs, behaviour and vulnerabilities of consumers like 
children and tailor information to their age, personality, cognitive capacity. For example, based 
on past online behaviour, browsing history and demographic characteristics, algorithms could 
recognise a user as a child or even a child of a certain age and gender, and provide child-adapted 
information. The same logic and mechanism are employed by the behavioural advertising 
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industry when serving targeted adds to the users, so could they be turned into the benefit of 
consumers? 
Nevertheless, although promising and interesting from a consumer law perspective, 
personalised information as a transparency mechanism cannot be easily aligned with the core 
data-protection requirements. The implementation of this mechanism requires prior and 
potentially continuous personal data collection and profiling of children.499 The GDPR allows 
measures based on profiling of adults with their explicit consent but limits the possibilities for 
profiling children, even if none of its articles explicitly states so. Recital 38 states that specific 
protection should apply when children’s data is used for the purposes of creating personality 
or user profiles. Recital 71 instructs that solely automated decision-making, including profiling, 
with legal or similarly significant effects should not concern children. Yet recitals are not 
legally binding and cannot create rights and obligations that are not mentioned in the main 
legislative text.500 Due to the lack of a clear position in the GDPR text, it can be debated 
whether the above-mentioned automated decisions are completely prohibited. The prohibition 
against creating personality or user profiles of children for targeted advertising purposes, for 
example, would be in line with the position of the Article 29 Working Party, which stated that 
behavioural advertising ‘will be outside the scope of a child’s understanding and therefore 
exceed the boundaries of lawful processing’.501 Even when profiling measures in relation to 
children are allowed by the GDPR, Article 22 of the GDPR will be interpreted strictly and in 
favour of children, for example, when deciding what decisions might have a significant effect 
on children.502 
Nevertheless, in relation to personalised information as a transparency tool, it is 
questionable whether measures involving automated decisions based on profiling that aim to 
benefit children and enhance their rights, i.e. have no significant (negative) effect, should be 
allowed. If such measures were considered in line with the GDPR, what would be the legal 
ground for the related data processing? Would children be asked for explicit consent to be 
profiled, can such consent be informed and if so, at what age? If commercial profiling is 
allowed, even if for supposedly positive purposes, what additional safeguards can guarantee 
that the major problems associated with profiling, such as the lack of control over the profile, 
its possible use and abuse or opaque steering of consumer choices,503 are accounted for? 
 
4.1.2 Information in Symbols 
 
The Consumer Rights Directive requires that information be provided in a ‘clear and 
comprehensible manner’. The recitals of the Directive take particular account of vulnerable 
consumers, stating that the trader should take into consideration ‘the specific needs of 
consumers who are particularly vulnerable because of their mental, physical or psychological 
infirmity, age or credulity in a way which the trader could reasonably be expected to foresee’ 
(Recital 34). Not only the content of information is important, but also its presentation and 
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visualisation.504 Legal information for users should not only be as clear as possible, but also 
accessible and engaging. In fact, ‘multi-layered’ privacy notices505 or visceral notices506 have 
been proposed to improve the understanding and readability of information provided to the 
users. Visceral notices use intuitive, familiar visual signals in order to show consumers, instead 
of telling them, when their data is collected. 
Although the GDPR has made its first steps in using symbols to improve transparency, 
icons have long been used in various sectors to inform consumers about products. Online digital 
products are not an exception, as the Guidance on the Consumer Rights Directive refers to the 
use of icons to provide information to consumers in a uniform and comparable way.507 Its 
Annex I provides a set of icons to illustrate the relevant information categories, such as model 
for the display of consumer pre-contractual information about online digital products in 
accordance with Article 8(2) and (4) of the Consumer Rights Directive. It encourages traders 
to use the information categories with their icons.  
The GDPR also mentions the use of standardised icons as easily visible and intuitive 
symbols for conveying privacy policies to the Internet users. Nevertheless, in the adopted text 
of the Regulation there is no effort to compose a list of such privacy icons. The European 
Parliament in its first reading provided a provisional list of icons and related particulars.508 
However, the list has been abandoned in the further GDPR adoption process and in practice 
has turned out to be controversial as to its comprehensiveness. This is not surprising, given that 
‘privacy safeguards are not easily reduced to metrics as are vitamins and calories on a 
nutritional label or miles per gallon on an auto sticker’.509 In fact, research shows that 
representing privacy in icons is difficult, the icons are not always noticed by the users and the 
users need to learn the meaning of the icons, thus, user education is necessary in parallel.510 
Various icons have been developed by industry and academics, but their success has been 
limited.511 For example, the AdChoices icon adopted by the online advertising industry has 
been seen as a failure as users had major troubles in understanding it.512 However, it is also 
recognised that standard information mechanisms are necessary - although if used alone they 
are not sufficient – as such mechanisms help to find information more quickly and facilitate 
comparison among products and services.513 For example, research found that a privacy 
“nutrition label” - a label inspired by actual nutrition labels used in food production -  helped 
users to get information more accurately and quickly compared to traditional privacy 
policies.514 Even if promising in research, this label has not yet been widely adopted in practice. 
It is debatable if and to which extent icons, pictograms and other non-verbal ways of 
transmitting information can be effective and feasible for the implementation of the GDPR. In 
the light of empirical findings, it has been claimed that icons could provide a more intuitive 
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and easy to read privacy notices for children but traditional notices should remain available at 
the same time.515 Indeed, the design and layout of visual notices, that might include not only 
images, icons but also text or the combination of all these elements, can influence users’ 
attention and comprehension of the notice.516 As younger children are less able to compare and 
select products and to deal with huge amounts of information when making decisions,517  icons 
might turn out to be useful to them in finding and comparing information. 
Notwithstanding the lack of effective solutions, the experience of consumer law can be 
inspirational for data protection law. For example, learning about the problems that the icons 
related to pre-contractual information about online digital products under the Consumer Rights 
Directive face could allow avoiding the same mistakes in data protection or help framing 
discussions about where changes are needed.  
In the interim however not only the effectiveness of visual mechanisms to convey 
information to individuals should be increased but also adequate incentives should be put in 
place for the developed solutions to be adopted and enforced. Such an approach might better 
align the mismatch between the positive results in academic research versus the complete 
failure of self-regulatory transparency mechanism, such as the AdChoices icon. Moreover, 
definitive transparency mechanisms developed in collaboration with data protection authorities 
could create industry standards and common icons facilitating data subject awareness and 
allowing for the recognition of iconographic meaning. 
 
4.1.3 Participatory Transparency 
 
  
Even in child-adapted and easily readable or visualised privacy policies several 
discrepancies among users might remain, especially ‘a gap between what users assume the 
terms contain and what they actually say’ and the thinking among the users that terms and 
policies ‘are there to protect them rather than consisting of a contract with legal obligations and 
duties’.518 Empirical data on children demonstrates the existence of these cognitive biases. For 
example, 68 percent of Canadian children think that ‘if a website has a privacy policy, that 
means it will not share my personal information with others’.519 Similarly, in Italy many 
adolescents consider that ‘the mere existence of a published privacy policy is per se sufficient 
to guarantee an adequate level of protection’.520  
Instead of trusting that service providers will adapt their complex and legalese privacy 
policies to particular users and help to overcome the above-mentioned biases, user education 
and participation seems to be key in order to enhance transparency. Dreyer and Ziebarth 
propose relying on direct user engagement to improve transparency and readability of 
information that social-media services and platforms provide to their users.521 More 
specifically, they suggest the participatory transparency approach, i.e. ‘the use of autonomous 
bodies of third-party users to crowd-source platform-specific suggestions for improvements, 
and to translate terms and provisions into practical pointers’.522 
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The participatory transparency approach enables users to become active in explaining 
and transferring knowledge on the privacy policies and the terms of use to other users instead 
of being passive information receivers. In concrete terms, according to this approach, users can 
be organised in different forms ranging from formally institutionalised user boards and councils 
to informal forum and action groups. They are envisioned to contribute to the terms of use and 
privacy policies by unravelling their content and consequences, identifying problematic aspects 
and cognitive biases, demonstrating illegible and unclear provisions, aligning provisions with 
user expectations and social norms and providing crowd-sourced suggestions for 
improvements.523 As proposed by Donoso et al., concrete mechanisms to realise this idea could 
be, for example, ‘providing an 'idea-box' for children to send suggestions about new (examples 
of) rules or agreements, or modifications to existing ones’ or ‘to develop a sort of “crowd-
sourcing” feature where children can actively interact, discuss, propose and eventually vote on 
current and new rules’.524 
The participatory transparency approach would not only make privacy policies of 
digital services and products more comprehensive, increase user awareness and possibly lead 
to improvements, but would also be aligned with the child-rights perspective. It would enable 
children to be heard and respect their rights to participate and express their views freely in all 
matters affecting them, as enshrined in Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. Child participation means ‘ongoing processes, which include information-sharing and 
dialogue between children and adults based on mutual respect, and in which children can learn 
how their views and those of adults are taken into account and shape the outcome of such 
processes’.525 Meaningful participation and representation of children as Internet users can 
demonstrate their perspectives and values and contribute to the design of the rules that better 
resonate with children’s viewpoints. 
Improvement of transparency through the involvement of children has been used by 
scholars526 and public institutions527 studying the readability and comprehensibility of privacy 
policies within groups of children and exploring online privacy and transparency through youth 
juries.528 Children’s participation has proved to be particularly useful in identifying 
transparency issues, testing child-adapted privacy policies and deliberating and transferring 
knowledge about their implications. 
 
4.2.  Fairness  
 
In addition to the duty of providing information to individuals, both data-protection and 
consumer protection law rely on the principle of fairness. Although it is challenging to combine 
the notions of fairness in both fields due to the potential differences in their scope and meaning, 
this is a necessary analysis in order to facilitate the alignment of these respective policy 
agendas. 
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4.2.1. Fairness in data protection 
 
The GDPR, like its predecessor Directive 95/46/EC, requires data controllers to process 
personal data fairly. This principle generally enjoys a broad interpretation and means that 
personal data should be processed in a transparent way, i.e. data controllers are clear and open 
with data subjects about how and why their information will be collected and used. Besides 
transparent information, some interpret fairness as additionally requiring that personal data be 
handled only in ways individuals would reasonably expect, and most importantly, that personal 
data not be used in ways that unjustifiably cause a negative impact on individuals.529 Bygrave 
claims: ‘at a very general level, the notion of fairness undoubtedly means that, in striving to 
achieve their data-processing goals, data controllers must take account of the interests and 
reasonable expectations of data subjects; controllers cannot ride roughshod over the latter.’530 
There is a consensus among data protection authorities that ‘any processing of personal data 
that gives rise to unlawful or arbitrary discrimination against the data subject shall be deemed 
unfair’531. 
Several authors have distinguished this broad role for fairness noting implicit and explicit 
meanings of the term. In particular, explicit fairness here strongly refers to transparency with 
implicit fairness relating instead to the balancing of interests and the reasonable expectations 
of the data subject.532 In commenting on this division, Clifford and Ausloos instead propose a 
distinction between procedural fairness and fair balancing, given the modifications introduced 
by the GDPR in relation to fairness.533 In short, the authors suggest a procedural fairness 
element composed of three components (namely transparency, timeliness and the burden of 
care) given the role played by data controllers in the implementation of the requirements.534 In 
addition to this, the fair balancing elements relate to the principles of proportionality and 
necessity and their application to the balancing of the rights and interests in the context of the 
given circumstances.535  
Due to the broadness of the overarching principle of fairness it is difficult to understand 
its precise meaning. As such, it is arguable that this principle could be informed by the fairness 
principle in consumer protection law (as contained in the Unfair Terms and Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directives).  
 
4.2.2. Consumer protection and fair data gathering and use 
 
Given that data protection is an omnibus regime, in consumer protection law the principle 
of fairness is more specific as it is restricted to the commercial business-to-consumer context. 
Fairness in consumer law refers not only to transparent contractual information, but also to the 
way in which a consumer is persuaded to agree to the contractual clauses and to the content of 
the clauses themselves. In short, there are two clear manifestations in fairness, namely: 1) the 
Unfair Terms Directive and 2) the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. 
The Unfair Terms Directive qualifies a non-negotiated term in a contract or a consent 
statement as unfair if, ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of 
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the consumer’.536 Therefore, all contractual clauses are taken into account in determining 
unfairness, not limited to those related to the processing of personal data.537  
The fairness test in the Unfair Terms Directive could be used to evaluate the fairness of 
terms and conditions related to personal data (e.g. excessive data collection, unlimited data 
sharing with the third parties) and the fairness of the position of the consumer in a commercial 
context. The fairness of contractual clauses could also be assessed using data protection 
requirements as an assessment criteria, e.g. a contract could be considered unfair if it violates 
data minimisation, security or data protection by default requirements.538  
Consumer organisations have already referred to consumer law to test the fairness of the 
terms and conditions of companies collecting personal data. A recent example is an action 
which combined data protection and consumer protection to scrutinise the terms of use and 
privacy notices of connected toys.539  Also in the context of social networks, the Unfair Term 
Directive has been applied to all types of contracts between consumers and businesses by the 
Consumer Protection Cooperation Network.540 
Furthermore, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive protects consumers from unfair 
commercial practices, i.e. any conduct by a trader directly connected with the promotion, sale 
or supply of a product, ‘before, during and after a commercial transaction in relation to a 
product’.541 As noted by Helberger et al., given that consent to personal data processing can be 
considered a transactional decision, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive ‘could help to 
assess the fairness of the conditions under which users are required to agree to the collection 
and use of their personal data – e.g. take-it-or-leave-it choices, misinforming about the 
functionality of the service if consumers do not agree, etc.’542 
A practice is unfair if it is ‘contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and 
materially distorts or is likely materially to distort the economic behaviour of the average 
consumer with regard to the product’.543 Data processing practices that might have a 
detrimental effect on the average data subject, therefore, could be considered as violating the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’s fairness principle even if the data subject consented 
to them.  
The use of consumer fairness test could have potential benefits for children and allow 
assessing them in the light of children’s vulnerability to the practice or the underlying product.  
As outlined before, due to specific characteristics, needs and preferences children might be 
particularly vulnerable as consumers. For example, it has been argued that the use of certain 
techniques such advergames can have a manipulative effect with such techniques often 
implementing personal data gathering as part of the commercial offering.544 Given the 
gamification of the personal data collection it is arguable that such a technique could fall foul 
of the fairness test in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. Interestingly, it is also 
questionable whether advergames themselves (i.e. aside from the data gathering aspects) may 
be in breach of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’s fairness test due to the manner in 
which they integrate commercial and non-commercial content combined with the capacity to 
personalise such content. 
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Indeed, using personalised marketing ‘companies could automatically adapt 
advertisements to (inferred) characteristics, biases and weaknesses of individual consumers’545. 
Thus, children’s characteristics can be exploited by companies, taking advantage of their 
developmental features and manipulating their behaviour and decisions. A recent example of 
such manipulation is Facebook’s ability to exploit emotional vulnerability of teenagers as 
allegedly ‘the company can monitor posts and photos in real time to determine when young 
people feel “stressed”, “defeated”, “overwhelmed”, “anxious”, “nervous”, “stupid”, “silly”, 
“useless” and a “failure”’546 and allow advertisers to target ads accordingly. 
Consumer law and its fairness principle could potentially address this concern. Relying 
on consumer protection, the GDPR could be interpreted as forbidding a priori some unfair and 
undesirable data collection and use (e.g. personalisation) practices. Consumer law would also 
allow to establish violation of fairness even in cases where the child or his representative has 
consented to the processing. In addition, the blacklist contained in Annex 1 in the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive could be updated to include a list of unfair commercial data-
processing practices in order to ban them as misleading or aggressive, taking into account the 
aggressiveness, particular characteristics of children of differing age groups and the context. 
This would be in line with the thinking which has developed in the US after almost two decades 
of the COPPA experience. Montgomery and Chester argue that some collection practices of 
children’s data, such as profiling, behavioral advertising, cross-platform tracking and 
geolocation targeting should not be allowed by law even with parental permission.547  
Yet, the impact of these suggestions should be carefully considered in light of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which in addition to protection provide children with 
strong claims related to participation and provision.548 A blunt prohibition of specific data 
collection practices could be viewed as overprotection for older children, who (if properly 
informed) might be increasingly able to decide for themselves to consent to such practices or 
not. However, the limitations and shortcomings of consent are widely acknowledged in relation 
to adults, let alone children.549 Also, many data processing practices might not be easily 
classified as having a purely negative effect and might in parallel bring some benefits for a 
child, which can easily be curtailed by taking too paternalistic approach. Despite this, one must 
acknowledge that the very purpose of many of these practices is to manipulate. 
Therefore, reliance on fairness as it is understood in consumer protection law could allow 
data protection to shift the focus from procedural safeguards (e.g. parental consent to data 
processing) to a fundamental and comprehensive assessment of data processing practices and 
terms as fair.550  
4.3.  Services Offered Directly to Children 
 
The GDPR requires parental consent when online services are offered directly to children 
under the age of 16 (unless national laws specify a lower age threshold between 13 and 16). 
However, websites with mixed audiences rather than services created for children are the ones 
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to generate major privacy concerns and anxieties. Various studies in Europe551 and North 
America552 report that from a broad range of websites that children nowadays use, the most 
favorite websites are often not directed to or targeting children (at least not those under 13), 
such as YouTube, Facebook and Google. Many of these websites claim in their terms of use 
that their services are not intended for those under 13, even if in practice young children are 
active there in substantive numbers. It is well documented that services not directed or clearly 
appealing to children, e.g. contain no cartoon characters, are used by children.553 
Due to the very recent GDPR adoption, there has been no official guidance at the EU 
level on the extent that the parental-consent requirement will cover general-audience or mixed-
audience services and sites. Therefore, many uncertainties and questions remain: How to 
delineate information-society services offered directly to a child from general-audience 
services? How many children should the service have among its users to be covered by the 
GDPR parental-consent requirement, i.e. what if it does not target children as its primary 
audience? When, if at all, does the GDPR apply to mixed-audience websites? Do data 
controllers need to have ‘actual knowledge’ that children are providing them with personal 
data?554 
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive entails a similar difficulty to distinguish 
marketing directed at children from marketing directed at other consumers and could become 
a useful reference in the GDPR implementation process. In order to decide whether marketing 
is directed at children, the European Commission requires a case-by-case assessment, which 
should not be limited to the trader’s target-group definition. 
In interpreting the application of Article 5(3) and (5) and point No. 28 of Annex I to the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to games, the European national consumer protection 
authorities, acting through the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Network, took the 
position that the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive applies not only to games ‘solely or 
specifically targeted at children’, but also to games that are ‘likely to appeal to children’.555 
The trader should be reasonably able to foresee that his service is likely to appeal to children.556 
In addition, national authorities have adopted criteria to determine whether services are 
likely to appeal to children. For example, the Principles for online and app-based games 
developed by the UK Office of Fair Trading establish the following open list of criteria related 
to the content, style and presentation of the game: characters popular with children, cartoon-
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like graphics, bright colours, simplistic language, activity appealing to or popular among 
children, no age restriction for downloading, availability in the child section in an app store.557 
The guidance for data controllers on the definition of information-society services 
offered directly to a child could take into account the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’s 
interpretation of marketing directed at children and include services that are likely to appeal to 
children due to their content, style and presentation and services actually used by children 
(based on e.g. empirical evidence on audience composition), even if the service provider 
employs a different target-group definition. 
 
 
4.4.  Defining an Average Child 
 
When a commercial practice is specifically aimed at a particular group of consumers, 
such as children, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive advises that the impact of the 
commercial practice be assessed from the perspective of the average member of that group. 
The average-consumer standard, although criticised as imprecise and ambiguous,558 is 
dynamic. National courts and authorities have to exercise their own discretion and judgment 
and determine the typical reaction of the average consumer in a particular case. According to 
Mak, ‘the “unfair” character of advertising is determined on the basis of consumer perception’ 
and the risk of ‘consumer confusion’ is a touchstone for the applicability of the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive.559  
If a commercial practice is targeting a group of consumers who are less than averagely 
informed and circumspect, the average member of that group (rather than the average consumer 
in general) should be taken as the standard of assessment. For example, in advertising for 
children, the consumers addressed are potentially less critical and less knowledgeable of 
influencing practices, leading to a stricter evaluation of the advertising involved.560 
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive implicitly requires examining the age of the 
group of children targeted by the commercial practice, and determining whether this age group 
is vulnerable to the practice at hand. The GDPR also relies on an average-child criteria when 
providing protection to children as data subjects through parental consent. However, instead of 
evaluating an average child of a particular targeted age group, the GDPR chooses to set an age 
when children can be deemed competent to consent to the processing of their personal data. 
Such a legislative choice of determining a prescribed age limit does not account for particular 
age groups, their vulnerability to the particular data-collection practice or their perception. 
Data-protection law could therefore define an average child in different data-collection 
scenarios based on comprehensive research and solid empirical evidence. As it seems highly 
unlikely that fixing a single age limit for consent in all data-processing activities online could 
be the most appropriate solution, different sectors, data-collection practices and age spans 
might require detailed examination and research.  
Following the logic of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the GDPR could start 
searching for an average data subject among children and explore the correlation between the 
characteristics of certain age groups of children and their likelihood of being vulnerable for 
specific commercial data-collection practices.561 
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5. Conclusions  
When trying to solve the new data-protection challenges pertaining to the child-specific 
protection regime of the GDPR, the EU data-protection law should not try to invent the wheel 
but combine its efforts with consumer protection law. A holistic view on the rationale and 
particular provisions of both fields would not only provide inspiration from consumer law, 
which has been dealing with children as vulnerable consumers for some time, but also reflect 
the dual role of data subjects and consumers that children today play online. 
In the GDPR, children, as a specific group of data subjects, are considered separately 
from adults because of their possible lower awareness of risks, consequences, safeguards and 
rights in relation to the processing of personal data online. However, the need for more 
protection stems from various additional factors which did not evidently motivate the European 
Commission. This chapter aims to broaden the understanding of the normative justifications 
for establishing a specific, child-tailored two-tiered data protection regime. It has showed that 
EU consumer protection law portrays children as vulnerable consumers due to their possible 
susceptibility to advertising and manipulation by traders and marketers. Both internal (e.g. age) 
and external (e.g. complex products and data-driven markets) elements contribute to such 
vulnerability. Not less important are specific interests of persons who have not yet reached 
physical, psychological and intellectual maturity and need to freely develop into adults. 
Developmental psychology underlines specific developmental features, such as emotional 
volatility and impulsiveness, need of identity and autonomy formation that can increase the 
possibility of online victimisation and commercial exploitation of personal data among 
children.  
The chapter has also demonstrated that the GDPR can learn from consumer law in 
implementing child-adapted transparency, for example through participatory transparency and 
icons, and broadening the understanding of the fairness principle and as a result banning data 
collection practices that are contrary to good faith and might have detrimental effects on 
children as data subjects. Consumer law can provide guidance on how to interpret the definition 
of information-society services offered directly to a child, making it possible to include not 
only services directly targeting children but also those that are likely to appeal to children due 
to their content, style and presentation. Finally, following the logic of the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive, the GDPR could rely on an average data subject, define an average child 
in different data collection scenarios and explore the correlation between the characteristics of 
certain age groups of children and their likelihood of being vulnerable to specific commercial 
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The importance of the concept of risk and risk management in the data protection field has 
explosively grown with the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679). 
The article explores the concept and the role of risk, as well as associated risk regulation 
mechanisms in EU data protection law. It shows that with the adoption of the General Data 
Protection Regulation there is evidence of a two-fold shift: first on a practical level, a shift 
towards risk-based data protection enforcement and compliance, and second a shift towards 
risk regulation on the broader regulatory level. The article analyses each of these shifts to 
enhance the understanding of the changing relationship between risk and EU data protection 
law. The article also discuses associated potential challenges when trying to manage multiple 
and heterogeneous risks to the rights and freedoms of individuals resulting from the processing 
of personal data.  
 
Keywords: General Data Protection Regulation, Directive 95/46/EC, risk, risk-based 
approach, risk regulation. 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Personal data is becoming the driver and the most valuable commercial asset for many 
current business models both online and offline. Technological advancements, such as those 
related to big data applications or Internet-connected devices, rely increasingly on capturing 
and processing of personal data on a large scale. In parallel, based on the analysis of the 
collected data, individual decision-making may be enabled or influenced. Smart, data-
generating devices create new complex risks, which differ from the traditional safety risks (i.e. 
to consumers and the environment) stemming from the more common industrial products.562 
Indeed, as noted by Spina, “the additional smart feature modifies the risk profile of the use of 
the product” 563. The author goes on to further observe that personal data-driven products and 
services demand a different trade-off between the risks and alleged benefits and thus raise 
complex challenges in the accounting for ethical issues when assessing and managing risks.564 
Although the development of the data-driven economy is desirable for the EU Digital Single 
Market and the many benefits it affords individuals, this development cannot come at the 
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Journal of Risk Regulation, 8(1), 88-94. 




expense of fundamental rights and freedoms. In trying to balance these two (in essence 
contradictory) goals, the EU is repeatedly delineating the right to data protection, established 
in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as a qualified right, 
which needs to be balanced with other competing fundamental rights and interests, such as the 
freedom to conduct a business.565 
The EU has recently reformed its regulatory framework, adopting the General Data 
Protection Regulation (2016/679)566 (hereinafter – ‘GDPR’ or ‘Regulation’) which will come 
into force on the 25th of May 2018 and will replace the Data Protection Directive (Directive 
95/46/EC)567. In trying to satisfy the same two goals as its predecessor namely, to ensure the 
functioning of the internal market through free personal data flows and to safeguard the 
fundamental right to privacy and personal data protection of the data subjects,568 the GDPR 
relies heavily on risk and builds a substantial number of the new provisions around it. In 
essence, risk has become a new boundary in the data protection field and a key indicator in 
deciding whether additional legal and procedural safeguards are required in a particular context 
in order to shield data subjects from potential negative impacts stemming from specific data 
processing activities. In this vein Spina notes, that EU data protection legislation is undergoing 
a progressive“riskification”.569 He defines the ‘riskification’ as a shift ‘from the limited 
boundaries of formal legality of processing of data and enforcement of individual rights against 
companies’ towards ‘a model of “enforced self-regulation” for managing technological 
innovation in uncertain scenarios’570. This model entails different governance measures that 
data controllers should rely on when controlling risks, such as data protection impact 
                                                
565 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert (2010) ECR I-0000. See also Recital 
4 of the General Data Protection Regulation which states: “The processing of personal data should be designed 
to serve mankind. The right to the protection of personal data is not an absolute right; it must be considered 
in relation to its function in society and be balanced against other fundamental rights, in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality. This Regulation respects all fundamental rights and observes the freedoms and 
principles recognised in the Charter as enshrined in the Treaties, in particular the respect for private and 
family life, home and communications, the protection of personal data, freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, freedom of expression and information, freedom to conduct a business, the right to an effective 
remedy and to a fair trial, and cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.” Article 29 Working Party: “The 
protection of personal data is a fundamental right. Personal data (which includes metadata) may not be 
treated solely as an object of trade, an economic asset or a common good” and “Data protection rights must 
be balanced with other fundamental rights, including non-discrimination and freedom of expression, which 
are of equal value in a democratic society.“ Joint Statement of the European Data Protection Authorities 
assembled in the Article 29 Working Party, WP 227 (2014), 26 November 2014, 2. 
566 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 L 119/1. 
567 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (1995) OJ 
L281/31. 
568 The General Data Protection Regulation, in addition to these two main goals, introduces several additional new 
goals, such as the accomplishment of an area of freedom, security and justice and an economic union, 
economic and social progress, the strengthening and the convergence of the economies within the internal 
market, and the well-being of natural persons (Recital 2).  
569 A. Spina (2017). A Regulatory Mariage de Figaro: Risk Regulation, Data Protection, and Data Ethics. European 
Journal of Risk Regulation, 8(1), 88-94. The term ‘riskification’ has been borrowed for the title of this article 
from A. Spina (cited above), who was the first to use it in the data protection context. Yet, this term was first 
introduced in security studies and although used in a different policy domain can provide interesting insights 
for data protection, especially when thinking about information security risks. see Olaf Corry, Securitisation 
and ‘Riskification’: Second-order Security and the Politics of Climate Change, Millennium, Vol 40, Issue 2, 
pp. 235- 258 See also William Clapton, Risk in International Relations, International Relations, Vol 25, Issue 
3, pp. 280 – 295. 
570 A. Spina (2017). A Regulatory Mariage de Figaro: Risk Regulation, Data Protection, and Data Ethics. European 
Journal of Risk Regulation, 8(1), 89. 
128 
 
assessments, the appointment of data protection officers, and regulatory strategies to implement 
data protection by design and by default.571 
Although since the start of the data protection reform, much has been written on the 
GDPR and its envisaged novelties, the changing relationship between risk and EU data 
protection law is still substantially unexplored. The debate around risk regulation and data 
governance is just nascent among regulation and governance scholars who are starting to 
examine connections between digital data, ethics and risks.572 Some legal contributions have 
analysed the injection of the risk-based approach into data protection and its implications573 or 
future related challenges574, but few575 have extensively looked into the multidimensional 
concept of risk and how it shapes the GDPR as a regulatory instrument. The main purpose of 
the article is to explore the concept and the role of risk, as well as associated risk regulation 
mechanisms in EU data protection law. It does so by categorizing data protection law as 
undergoing a two-fold shift: on the practical enforcement level though a shift towards risk-
based data protection and, on the broader regulatory level, towards risk regulation. The article 
analyses each of these shifts to enhance the understanding of risk and associated challenges 
when trying to manage multiple and heterogeneous risks to the rights and freedoms of 
individuals resulting from the processing of personal data. 
First, the article more generally explores the relationship between risk and regulation. 
It draws on the regulation and governance disciplines to conceptually distinguish between risk 
regulation and a risk-based approach to regulation (or risk-based regulation). Next, the first 
shift towards risk-based regulation illustrated through the increased reliance on the risk concept 
in the Data Protection Directive and the GDPR is analysed. Then, the second shift towards risk 
regulation is explored comparing the GDPR with other EU risk-regulation domains (in 
particular, based on the existing risk scoring and assessing systems, the institutional 
arrangements and public participation in risk regulation). Finally, the paper concludes by 





                                                
571 A. Spina (2017). A Regulatory Mariage de Figaro: Risk Regulation, Data Protection, and Data Ethics. European 
Journal of Risk Regulation, 8(1), 88-94. 
572 Part of the forward-looking research agenda delineated in the inaugural issue of the recent European Journal 
of Risk Regulation is dedicated to risk regulation, data protection and ethics. See A. Spina (2017). A 
Regulatory Mariage de Figaro: Risk Regulation, Data Protection, and Data Ethics. European Journal of Risk 
Regulation, 8(1), 88-94. 
573 Raphaël Gellert, ‘Data protection: a risk regulation? Between the risk management of everything and the 
precautionary alternative’ (2015) 5(1) International Data Privacy Law, 3-19. Raphaël Gellert, We Have 
Always Managed Risks in Data Protection Law: Understanding the Similarities and Differences Between the 
Rights-Based and the Risk-Based Approaches to Data Protection, European Data Protection Law Review, 
Volume 2 (2016), Issue 4, 481 – 492; Niels van Dijka, Raphaël Gellerta, Kjetil Rommetveitb, A risk to a right? 
Beyond data protection risk assessments, Computer Law & Security Review, 32 (2), 2016, 286–306.  
574 Christopher Kuner, Fred H. Cate, Christopher Millard, Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, and Orla Lynskey , Risk 
management in data protection, International Data Privacy Law, 2015 5 (2): 95-98. 
575 One of the few existing comprehensive efforts to address risk-based approach in the GDPR is Quelle, Claudia, 
The ‘Risk Revolution’ in EU Data Protection Law: We Can't Have Our Cake and Eat It, Too (July 11, 2017). 
R Leenes, R van Brakel, S Gutwirth and P De Hert (eds), Data Protection and Privacy: The Age of Intelligent 
Machines (Hart Publishing, Forthcoming); Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 17, available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3000382. To a certain degree the notion of risk in the GDPR has been also recently 
analysed by István Böröcz, Risk to the Right to the Protection of Personal Data: An Analysis Through the 
Lenses of Hermagoras, European Data Protection Law Review, Volume 2 (2016), Issue 4, 467 – 480 (he 
distinguishes several basic attributes of risk to the right of personal data protection, such as the meaning of 
risk, subjects exposed to/conceptualising risk, the time and means to address risks) 
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II. Risk and Regulation  
 
Risk regulation has initially developed in relation to the legal instruments and 
management techniques of environmental, human health and safety hazards. To address these 
hazards, regulators started setting up legal frameworks based on the tripartite management of 
intrinsic risks, i.e. risk assessment, risk management, risk communication.576 Risk regulation, 
thus, has emerged as a model to control risks stemming from new technologies or industries 
and to address related market failures, such as information asymmetry or unwanted side-effects 
of the progressive advancements. During the last two decades, however, the role of risk has 
increasingly grown and diversified in various national and international regulatory regimes, 
private business settings and wider governance systems.577 In parallel with risk regulation, risk-
based regulation appeared, as a model relying on a proportionate and targeted strategy for 
regulatory enforcement primarily with the aim to manage the resources and reputation of 
regulators. This strategy has grown in popularity and risk for the regulators has increasingly 
become ‘a new lens through which to view the world’578. In part as the result of the ‘regulatory 
crisis’ experienced by many European countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s, risk-based 
regulation represents an effort to fight against over-regulation, legalistic and prescriptive rules, 
and the high costs of regulation.579 It has been argued that more evidence-based policy making, 
reliance on economic cost-benefit approaches, and the usage of scientific risk-assessment tools 
and techniques can lead to more objective, transparent and better cost-benefit balanced 
regulation.580 As a result, this climate favored a conscious orientation towards risk-based 
regulation across many different policy domains ranging far beyond the environmental and 
human safety areas, such as finance, utility, housing, child protection.581 Risk became a central 
concept not only in regulation, but also in broader governance terms, relating to a multitude of 
private and public actors, purposes and instruments and thus, ‘a significant organizing principle 
of government’ and ‘a benchmark of good governance’.582 
The expansion and diversity of risk functions in regulation and governance with time 
can be better grasped through three aspects of the relationship between risk and regulation. 
First, a growing amount of modern societal risks stemming from technological and scientific 
advancements appeared or have been discovered and required mitigation through regulation, 
i.e. societal risks directly pushed forward unmediated regulatory response, often beyond the 
limits of a single state.583 Risk became an object for regulation and helped to justify regulatory 
                                                
576 See E.Fisher Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism 2007. 
577 Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society, London: Sage; Jasanoff S. (1999) ‘The songlines of risk’, Environmental 
Values 8: 135, 52. Hood C., Rothstein, H. and Baldwin, R. (2001) The Government of Risk: Understanding 
Risk Regulation Regimes, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Garland, D.(2003) ‘The rise of risk’, in R. 
Ericson and A. Doyle (eds) Risk and Morality, Toronto: University of Toronto Press; Smith, M. (2004) 
‘Mad cows and mad-money: problems of risk in the making and understanding of policy’, The British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 6(3). Michael Power, The Risk Management of Everything—
Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty (Demos, London 2004) 
578 Bridget M. Hutter, ‘The Attractions of Risk-based Regulation: accounting for the emergence of risk ideas in 
regulation’ (2005) Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, Discussion paper No. 33, 1-21, 1, 
<http://grammatikhilfe.com/researchAndExpertise/units/CARR/pdf/DPs/Disspaper33.pdf>, accessed 4 
November 2014, 1. 
579 Ibid., 1-3 
580 Ibid. 
581 Rothstein, Henry, Huber, Michael, Gaskell, George, A theory of risk colonization: the spiralling regulatory 
logics of societal and  institutional risk, Economy and society, 35(1) 91-112, 2006   
582 Julia Black, ‘The Role of risk in regulatory processes’ in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, Martin Lodge (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) 302-348, 303. 
583 Rothstein, Henry, Huber, Michael, Gaskell, George, A theory of risk colonization: the spiralling regulatory 
logics of societal and  institutional risk, Economy and society, 35(1) 91-112, 2006   
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interventions.584 As argued by Beck in his famous ‘Risk Society’, late modernity is 
characterised by the replacement of class relationships with risk relationships, which are key 
elements in societal conflict and change.585 Power adds that in our current ‘risk society’ we are 
dealing with the ‘risk management of everything’586.  
Second, on the institutional level, the scope and character of the regulatory frameworks 
changed. It has been argued that in the last half of the 20th century the ‘regulatory state’ 
emerged, i.e. the role of the state shifted from redistributive welfare to the improvement of 
economic efficiency and developing regulatory frameworks, institutions and mechanisms.587 
Independent regulatory agencies appeared, which could gather scientific evidence and 
strengthen the focus on risk. Enhanced scrutiny and control of regulatory behaviours also 
allowed for regulators to better define their regulatory goals, understand limited regulatory 
capacity and institutional risks related to their regulatory activities. Risk thus came in 
operationalizing the goals of regulators.588 Third, risk also became ‘a method for organising 
regulatory activity’, for example it allowed for the prioritisation of regulatory enforcement or 
standard setting according to the seriousness of the related risks.589 It defined organizational 
accountability and evaluation.590 As summarized by Black in the context of public institutions, 
‘risk-based regulation involves the development of decision-making frameworks and 
procedures to prioritise regulatory activities and the deployment of resources, principally 
inspection and enforcement activities, organised around the assessment of the risks that 
regulated firms pose to the regulators objectives’591. 
The importance of risk to regulation and governance stems not only from the risk 
society and the growing amount of diverse societal risks but also from the frameworks 
themselves aiming to regulate these risks that are inherently entailing institutional risks. Some 
authors called this a simultaneous expansion of the duality of risks592 and others emphasising 
the dynamic interaction between societal and institutional risks referred to ‘the colonisation of 
regulatory decision-making by risk’ and its spiralling aspect.593 
 
2.1. Risk regulation in the EU 
 
Risk regulation has been particularly visible across the policies of the European Union, 
albeit not equally, such in as environmental, agro/food and financial sectors. An increasing 
                                                
584 Julia Black, ‘The Role of risk in regulatory processes’ in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, Martin Lodge (eds), 
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number of regulatory activities have been framed in terms of risk with risk providing 
justification for regulation. Regulation of human health and safety in the EU, for example, is 
clearly defined in terms of risk. One of the policy aims in the EU food safety area is to prevent, 
eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level risks to humans and animals.594 Thus, as noted by 
Alemanno, risks to human health and safety do not only constitute an object for regulation, but 
also ‘one of the rationales for the EU regulatory action’.595 Indeed, it is claimed that we could 
see an emerging European risk regulation model, even if in its embryonic stage, which not only 
uses the classical risk analysis framework (risk assessment, management, communication), but 
also has its own particular features, such as regulatory impact assessments, reliance on 
precautionary and proportionality principles, consideration of legitimate (non-scientific) 
factors in the risk management stage, and a general tension between the rational, evidence-
based and flexible, precautionary decision-making.596  
Although there is no uniform analytical approach to risk and scientific risk assessments 
in the EU are conducted by various EU bodies following different, often diverging, 
methodologies, a number of EU laws include risk assessment procedures. For example, the 
Regulation 178/2002 protecting human health and consumers’ interest in relation to food, 
establishes the principle that food law is based on risk analysis, comprising three 
interconnected processes: risk assessment, risk management and risk communication.597 In the 
same vein, risk assessment plays an important role in the area of chemicals and products. The 
Regulation on chemicals598, the Plant Protection Regulation599 and the Cosmetics Regulation600 
require the assessment of the risks of chemicals and products based on their specific hazardous 
properties and exposure to them in two steps: first, hazard identification and characterization 
(the potential to cause harm) and then risk assessment (the likelihood of harm). The extent to 
which in practice regulatory decisions rely on both steps (classification of hazards and 
assessment of risks), however, seems to be questionable.601 The Medical product Directive602 
makes medical product authorization subject to a favorable risk-benefit balance and requires 
the setting up of a risk management systems, i.e. a set of activities designed to identify, 
characterise, prevent or minimise risks relating to a medicinal product.  
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controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal 
welfare rules (2004) OJ L 165, with later amendments by Regulation (EC) No 1029/2008 (2008) OJ L 278 
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Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (2001) OJ L 311/67 
132 
 
2.2. Risk-based approach to regulation  
 
The essence of risk-based regulation is providing a model to achieve a proportionate 
and adaptive strategy for regulatory enforcement.603 It allows the regulatory bodies to set 
priorities and explicitly explain their selective decisions based on the assessment of the risk 
that the regulated actors (companies or individuals) present.604 Although risk-based regulatory 
models can vary depending on the policy domain, the particular country and in their 
complexity, they all start from the basic premise that it is impossible and costly to entirely 
eliminate all hazards and risks.605 Therefore, the focus is on identifying the risks that the 
regulators want to manage instead of enforcing all the existing rules on all the regulated 
entities.606  
Black and Baldwin distinguish five main features shared by the majority of the risk-
based frameworks that can be summarised as follows.607  First, the regulators that use these 
frameworks define their own objectives and the risks to their achievement. Second, regulators 
determine the acceptance threshold for specific risks and their level (risk appetite). Third, they 
assess risks that the regulated actors present in terms of negative impact and probability or 
likelihood. The terminology (in human safety the focus is on hazards and exposure while in 
financial sector on impact and probability) and methodology (qualitative or quantitative) differ 
depending on the policy area. Fourth, regulators use the assigned numerical scores or categories 
in order to rank and prioritise the actors, their activities or policy issues. Finally, they allocate 
resources for supervisions, inspection and enforcement based on the rankings mentioned above. 
As the regulators following a risk-based approach focus their regulatory activities and 
resources on the most risky and harmful policy outcomes, this allows them to solve their wider 
legitimacy and accountability problems. It is claimed, that reliance on risk and emphasis on 
rational decisions can help bureaucracies to justify their decisions in terms of technocratic 
legitimacy regardless of the real methodological value of such decisions.608 Thus, risk-based 
frameworks may also be seen as techniques used by regulators ‘to shift or dissipate blame’609 
or even to set forth when blame should fall on them in the first place.610 Risks that are defined 
                                                
603 Some confusion exists between the terms of ‘risk regulation’, ‘risk-based regulation’ and ‘risk-based approach 
to regulation’ due to the conflating meanings these terms are assigned by various authors. Black, for example, 
in her work refers to risk-based regulation as having two distinct meanings: 1) the regulation of societal risks 
to health, safety, the environment and financial wellbeing. In this sense, risk-based regulation determines 
whether public institutions should regulate specific activity and which preventive measures employ; 2) refers 
to the risk that a public institution will not meet its objectives (regulatory or institutional risk) and denotes 
procedures and decisions to prioritize activities and resources based on risk assessment that regulated entities 
pose. Black, Julia (2005) The emergence of risk-based regulation and the new public management in the 
United Kingdom. Public Law, 2005, pp. 512-549, 514. 
604 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practise (2 ed., 
Oxford University Press, New York 2012) 281-282. 
605 Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and reason: Safety, law, and the environment (CUP Cambridge 2002); Robert Baldwin, 
Julia Black ‘Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation’ (2010) 3 Law and Policy 2(2), 181-213; Julia Black, 
Robert Baldwin, ‘When risk-based regulation aims low: Approaches and challenges’ (2011) Regulation and 
Governance 6(1), 2-22. D John Graham J ‘Why Governments Need Guidelines for Risk Assessment and 
Management’ in OECD, Risk and regulatory policy: Improving the governance of risk (OECD, Paris 2010). 
606 Julia Black, Robert Baldwin ‘Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation’ (2010) 3 Law and Policy 2(2), 184. 
607 Ibid., 184. 
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as tolerable by regulators, are thus considered to be politically acceptable, should not be 
expected to result in blame, once they occur.611 In the rapidly changing and technologically 
complex environment such a defensive stance based on risk is ever more important for 
regulators of new technologies, as they are inevitably lagging behind in terms of intervention.  
In practice, in the UK, an EU-member state that paved the way for European 
developments in risk-based approach to regulation, since 2005 risk has been shaping policies 
far beyond human health and safety or the environmental protection, i.e. the areas that are 
traditionally associated with risk. Risk also has been defining a wide range of policy processes, 
like information gathering, policy making, service delivery, implementation and enforcement. 
UK public administration has endorsed the risk-based approach and has been trying to achieve 
effective inspection and enforcement using risk-assessments to determine enforcement 
actions.612 Public institutions are required to base their regulatory activities on risk when 
determining priorities in their area of competence and the allocating scarce resources. They are 
also expected to take into account risk at every stage of their decision-making processes, such 
as in selecting the most appropriate type of intervention, performing checks on compliance, 
and the taking of enforcement actions.613 
The risk-based approach to regulation has had much more limited application in other 
Member States, where risk was incorporated into regulation principally because of 
international and EU constraints.614 In France and Germany, for example, risk is still mainly 
used in policy domains traditionally concerned with risk, such as nuclear or food safety, the 
environment, or financial services. Risk in these Member States has also a more restricted role 
in framing regulatory processes, mainly only as far as such processes relate to obligatory risk 
assessments.615  
 
2.3. Aligning risk-based regulation literature with data protection  
 
Risk-based regulation literature discussed above deals with risk-based regulation as a 
regulatory strategy used by the governments and regulatory agencies to deal with societal and 
institutional risks in a risk-based manner. However, the GDPR in comparison, mainly relies on 
private entities, the data controllers, and to a large extent entrusts them with a detailed 
definition, assessment and management of societal risks related to their data processing 
activities. Nonetheless, the two at first sight diverging theoretical and practical perspectives on 
risk-based regulation can be aligned. On the one hand, as stated by Quelle, “under a decentred 
understanding of regulation, it is possible to see controllers themselves as regulators engaged 
in risk-based regulation as well as risk regulation”616. On the other hand, a regulator in the 
GDPR has arguably already prioritised some risks by establishing general criteria of high risk 
data processing operations and subjecting risky or highly risky processing operations to 
specific requirements, such as a representative in the EU, notification of supervisory authorities 
and data subjects about a data breach, maintenance of records, data protection impact 
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assessments and the prior consultation. Regulatory agencies, the national data protection 
authorities, can provide guidelines on impact assessments and further select and define risks to 
be prioritised and assessed by deciding on the detailed list of the processing presenting high 
risks. A part of the risk regulatory process, the actual risk assessment, a task which costs 
considerable time and effort, is ‘outsourced’ to data controllers.617 In practice, however, this 
outsourcing raises serious fears: data protection authorities become a secondary and weaker 
players while the scope and the necessity of the private impact assessments is uncertain.618 In 
addition, if the impact assessment reveals that data processing can result in high risk that the 
taken measures cannot mitigate, data controllers need to turn to data protection authorities for 
a prior consultation. This GDPR requirement follows a reversed logic than the general 
notification obligation present in its predecessor, as “the idea appears to be that, rather than 
sifting through endless notifications, supervisory authorities can sit back and wait until 
controllers start a prior consultation (…) on their own accord”.619 As a consequence, the GDPR 
risk-based provisions even if imposed directly on the data controllers as an end results allows 
the supervisory authorities to enforce the GDPR compliance in a risk-based manner, save 
resources and prioritise their enforcement activities.  
 
III. The First Shift – Risk-Based Approach to Data Protection 
 
3.1. The Emergence of the Idea 
 
The idea to protect individuals based on potential risk and negative impact instead of 
considering all personal data inherently worthy of protection has emerged in the EU prior the 
launch of the data protection reform. It can be traced back to the RAND Europe Review of the 
Data Protection Directive, a key report in the data protection reform process, commissioned by 
the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) in 2009.620 The report underlined a missing 
clear link between the concept of personal data and real privacy risks, showing that not all data 
processing acts covered by the Directive 95/46/EC have a noticeable privacy impact on 
individuals.621, 622  To create more effective protection in the future that focuses on the exchange 
and use of large amounts of personal data globally, the report suggested to look into the impact 
on privacy as a relevant criterion to determine the applicability of the data protection rules. In 
this sense, the RAND proposal is closer to a harm-based rather than a risk-based approach, 
which concentrates on the regulatory outcome (damage prevention) and does not extend to the 
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potential and actual adverse impacts.623 Procedurally, the limited regulatory outcome of 
damage prevention is to be achieved largely by the data controllers themselves rather than 
through the ex ante process and obligations established by the regulatory framework. The 
GDPR did not take the harm-based approach, but if it had, risk analysis and management 
carried out by data controllers at their own discretion would dominate in the legal 
framework.624 
Unsurprisingly, the idea of risk-based data protection has increasingly found support 
among different stakeholders. First, reliance on risk envisioned more effective and 
contextualised data protection instead of merely a compliance-based prescriptive framework. 
In other words, risk would enable to shift data protection from a box ticking exercise to 
protection on the ground by nuancing obligations for data controllers according to the risk 
involved. Kuner denotes the new obligation to evaluate risks using Data protection Impact 
Assessments as a part of a shift from ‘paper-based bureaucratic requirements’ towards 
‘compliance in practice’.625 Second, the risk-based approach can be expected to enhance 
accountability, transparency and foster the data protection culture among data controllers. The 
European Commission perceives the evaluation of risks through the Data Protection Impact 
Assessments as a way to force the data controllers to assume more responsibility vis-à-vis data 
subjects.626 The approach could even steer the data controllers “towards the least risky 
processing possible if this is rewarded by fewer and more appropriate obligations (scaled and 
proportionate to the risk involved)”.627 One more benefit of this approach is the flexibility as 
regards the future technological advancements. The risk based approach may provide a solution 
to the current data protection practises such as big data analytics or Internet of Things where 
the traditional compliance based approach does not work.628 Application of the core principles, 
such as purpose limitation (purpose specification and compatible data use) and data 
minimisation, or reliance on the data subject’s consent has become increasingly difficult when 
dealing with big data.629 Finally, the turn to a more flexible risk-based legislation has been 
driven by economic argumentation - the internal market can be enhanced through reduction of 
administrative and compliance costs for companies. The discontent of the industry 
representatives with high financial and administrative burdens that data protection compliance 
causes and little actual protection for individuals brought by such formal compliance featured 
in responses to the European Commission’s public consultations.630  
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The rhetoric of ‘regulatory burdens’, in particular for micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) is not something completely new in the European regulatory arena. It has 
shaped a number of other legislative acts across various EU policy areas. Several different 
tactics have been used to shield the SMEs from regulatory burdens, such as exemptions from 
legal obligations, reduced record keeping duties, simplified inspection procedures, and 
obligations proportionate to risk, being just some of them.631 For example, SMEs with fewer 
than 250 employees are not obliged to follow the neutral selection requirements in relation to 
women on company boards632 or micro non-toxic pesticide distributors by national derogations 
can be exempted from the provisions of the Directive 2009/128/EC633. An example of the 
implemented risk-based approach, are Regulations 852/2004 and 853/2004 that require food 
producers to implement hygiene procedures based on risk and take measures in relation to 
identifiable hazards. As a result, the main underlying idea, at least of the Commission, has been 
to foresee lighter touch regulation to small-scale low risk data processing operations and, where 
possible, to lower the administrative and compliance burden for companies processing 
‘ordinary’ personal data in today’s information society. Similar examples of this so-called 
‘risk-burden balance model’ can be found in several countries outside the EU, such as Japan 
and Australia, which exempt entities that are considered as presenting no danger for individuals 
(e.g. small entities, holders of limited amount of personal data for short time period) from data 
protection regulation activities.634 
Being new and still emerging in its meaning, the risk-based approach has been 
advocated by various stakeholders in distinct interpretations. The narrowest interpretation, the 
most closely reflected in the adopted GDPR text, views risk as a yardstick to tailor data 
controllers’ obligations.635 In this sense, the risk-based approach means ‘a scalable and 
proportionate approach to compliance’636. A broader version of the risk-based approach 
promulgated risk as an organizing concept not only for compliance but also for data protection 
enforcement. In this respect policing and enforcement carried out by data protection authorities 
should target risky rather than all data processing activities.637 Those following the broadest 
                                                
2015. Summary of the Replies to the Public Consultation on the Commission’s Communication on a 
Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union (Annex 4) (2012) 
      <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/sec_2012_72_annexes_en.pdf> accessed 
5 February 2015 
631 Cf. Adapting Legislation to Minimise Regulatory Burdens for SMEs: Best Practise Examples, Group of High 
Level National Regulatory Experts - SME Working Group (2013) <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/best_practices_examples/docs/eu/lighter_regimes_for_smes_oct_2013.pdf> accessed 5 
February 2015 
632 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving 
the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related 
measures’ COM(2012) 614 final, 14 November 2012. 
633 Directive  2009/128/EC  of  21  October  2009 establishing  a  framework  for  Community  action  to  achieve  
the  sustainable  use  of  pesticides, 24.11.2009, L 309/71. 
634 Terwangne, Is a Global Data Protection Regulatory Model Possible, in Serge Gutwirth et. al. (eds.), 
Reinventing Data Protection?, Springer 2009, p. 180 
635 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Communication from the Commission  
     to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions - "A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union”, 14.1.2011, (“The 
higher the risks, the higher the need to  implement  concrete  measures  that  protect  information  at  a  
practical  level  and  deliver  effective protection”, 21. EDPS claims that data protection law should be scalable, 
excluding the requirements of privacy by design, data protection officers and privacy impact assessments 
which should remain mandatory, p. 22-23). 
636 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Statement on the Role of a Risk-based Approach in Data Protection 
Legal Frameworks’, WP 218, 30 May 2014. 
637 The Information Commissioner (United Kingdom), ‘Response to “A comprehensive approach on personal data 
protection in the European Union A Communication from the European Commission to the European  
137 
 
interpretation have viewed the risk-based approach as eliminating core data protection 
principles or even data subjects’ rights.638 For example, industry representatives DigitalEurope 
proposed to keep data controllers responsible only for materialized privacy harms caused by 
the data processing and fully allow them to choose means to assess and mitigate the risks. As 
the regulatory outcome dominates over the process, according to the proposal, regulation and 
detailed rules on procedures and obligations for privacy harm prevention are burdensome and 
unnecessary.639 The DigitalEurope proposal in essence aligns with the APEC Privacy 
Framework and its controversial primary principle to prevent harm to individuals640, which 
considerably lowers the European data protection standards. 
 
3.2. Risk and risk-based approach in the Directive 95/46/EC and the GDPR 
 
Although the risk-based approach has been the subject of intense interest in the past 
years, in essence, reliance on risk as a concept cannot be considered a novelty in the area of 
personal data protection.641 Indeed, the Data Protection Directive of 1995 referred to risk in 
five articles long before the term ‘risk-based approach’ entered the parlance of the EU policy 
makers during the discussions at the European Parliament and at the Council on the proposed 
General Data Protection Regulation.642 Also, many national data protection laws already 
foresaw risk management as an explicit requirement.643 Although the concept of risk does not 
entail radical changes, the functional role assigned to risk in the GDPR is novel compared to 
its predecessor. Starting with an overview of the roots of risk in the Directive 95/46/EC, the 
new functions of the risk concept in the GDPR are discussed below. 
 
3.2.1. Root of the genesis of risk – data and information security 
 
Risk has long been an essential integral component of data and information security. 
Already the early methodologies, that started emerging in 1990s in Europe, used risk 
assessment and management frameworks to protect networks and information assets from the 
threats to which they were exposed.644 For example, the first national data security risk 
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assessment methodologies adopted by public institutions, such as the Dutch A&K analysis645 
developed in the 1980s, the British CRAMM methodology of 1985646, the French MARION 
methodology of 1990647 or the German IT- Grundschutz model of 1994,648  provided a set of 
steps for IT security management through threat identification, characterization, exposure 
assessment and risk characterization. In the same vein, later developed international standards 
and tools,649 such as ISO/IEC 27005:2011 on Information security risk management650, 
provided frameworks for organizations to assess their information security risks based on a risk 
management approach. 
The need to rely on risk in the information security field might be related to the shift 
from computer to information and data security.651 While initially the information security 
concerns mainly lay with the physical site security, growing integration of various IT 
applications and systems and social and organisational components has led to increased 
complexity, incomplete human knowledge and uncertainty (e.g. unintended side effects caused 
by human intervention), which resulted in enhanced risks.652 In addition, threats to information 
security have become increasingly global, sophisticated and continuously evolving, while 
(personal) data have grown into a valuable company asset.653 Thus, there was a need and 
urgency “to take a holistic view of the risks associated with information systems and look at 
the threats arising from physical events, human failings as well as technological vulnerabilities 
and deliberate attacks”654. As a result, companies started integrating security risk management 
into the logic of mainstream management and business engineering in order to mitigate as much 
as possible the uncertainties and risks related to their information systems with limited 
resources. They turned to the toolsets and methodologies that were used in other management 
areas, such as financial risk management. Reliance on risk management methodologies 
essentially allowed them “to substitute(s) the unachievable and immeasurable goal of fully 
securing the information system with the achievable and measureable goal of reducing the risk 
that the information system faces to within acceptable limits”.655 
The aim of information and data security is to protect three main characteristics of 
information (data), which is oftentimes the primary asset of the company: confidentiality, 
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integrity, availability656, the commonly called CIA triad. This triad reveals the goal to ensure 
that information does not become available to unauthorized individuals, entities or processes, 
that it remains accurate and complete, and that information (and its supporting assets) can be 
accessed and used when needed by the authorized individuals and entities. 
The field of information and data security has its own aim, predefined (yet continually 
evolving) vocabulary and thus its own interpretation of risk. Risk, essentially refers to the 
probability that a vulnerability of an asset (intentionally or non-intentionally) is exploited by a 
threat and negatively affects the three above mentioned characteristic of information (data) and 
the impact of that effect.657 According to Vacca, risk might be expressed as the following 
function of four elements R= f(A,T,V,I), where: (a) A, the value of the assets; (b) T, the severity 
and likelihood of the threat; (c) V, the nature and the extent of vulnerabilities and the likelihood 
that a threat can successfully exploit them; d) I, the likely impact of the harm, if the threat 
occurs.658  
As evidenced by the above definition, the components of risk, revolve around several 
main subjects that also constitute not only specific vocabulary of information security experts, 
but also common criteria in security risk assessments.659 The first component is an asset and 
refers to any tangible or intangible object that is valuable for a company, such as primary assets 
like information, data, and supporting assets like IT systems, facilities, networks and people. 
The second component is a threat, a term which denotes a future event (action or inaction) that 
can lead to an undesirable situation. ENISA created a threat taxonomy, which illustrates a 
multitude of possible security threats, ranging from physical attacks on IT assets, natural 
disasters, outages and system or device failures to individual nefarious cyber-activities.660 The 
most frequent cyber-threats, for example, in the last year were malware, web based and 
application attacks, and botnets.661 The third component is vulnerability, a weakness in an asset 
or a factor that increases the probability or likelihood of the threat being successful. Examples 
of vulnerabilities may include (in line with the above-mentioned threats) unprotected public 
network connections, locations vulnerable to flooding, equipment sensitive to changes in 
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voltage and a lack of identification and authentication systems. The last core component is the 
impact on the asset if the threat exploits the vulnerability, such as the (potential) loss or damage 
when the negative event happens.   
Theoretically, numerical values, such as monetary expression of impact and probability 
calculations for other elements, can be assigned to the risk element.662 This facilitates a cost-
benefit analysis and hence a comparison of the risk with the cost of the adopted security 
measures. However, expression of risk in monetary value raises significant concerns, as it is 
difficult and undesirable to express some assets, like human life, in economic terms.663  
International and national standards on information security management all employ 
the specific above-mentioned terminology related to the central concepts of threat, 
vulnerability, and impact. However, this terminology which coincides with the interest of the 
company to protect its assets, does not entirely correspond to the needs of data protection law 
to assess the impact on the rights and freedoms of individuals whose data are processed, as 
envisioned in the GDPR. There are several reasons for this mismatch. First, the rights and 
freedoms of individuals can hardly fit into the corporate conception of an asset to be 
safeguarded, along with hardware, software, or networks. That being said, company reputation 
or trust of the users can nevertheless be important and provide an incentive to process personal 
data in line with the expectations of the users. Also, while security threats are posed by 
outsiders (e.g. hackers, natural disasters) or insiders (e.g. employees) in relation to personal 
data protection, the major sources of threats are often the companies and their business models 
themselves. Companies take strategic decisions regarding how much personal data to collect, 
how long to keep it, how to create data flows and transfers, which technologies and security 
measures to use. Second, according to Vacca, in the information security field “risk can be 
reduced by applying security measures; it can be shared by outsourcing or by insuring; it can 
be avoided; or it can be accepted, in the sense that the organization accepts the likely impact 
of a security incident.”664 The idea of insuring or accepting the negative impact on the rights 
and freedoms of individuals is not easy to accommodate within the human rights discourse. 
Cost-benefit calculations are also at odds with the protection of human rights and it is not clear 
how risks to individuals should be weighted with the benefits of the processing. Third, harms 
from security breaches are well defined and understood, but this understanding is lacking 
around privacy harms. For the privacy engineering objectives to mitigate the risk of privacy 
harms, such harms need to be clearly explicated.665 Yet, privacy harms might be more difficult 
to recognise and control than security harms. Privacy harms “may arise even though the system 
is performing data actions in accordance with its operational purpose”, for example beyond 
harms arising from malicious actors or attacks, and privacy harms “may occur externally to the 
system, and beyond the system owner's awareness”666. 
Despite the divergence in data security and privacy domains, there have been efforts to 
partially adapt and apply technical data security terminology to assess privacy risks for data 
subjects. On a high level, international standards such as the ISO Privacy Framework adds to 
the data security a focus relevant to personal data processing. 667 Several works have tried to 
operationalize privacy in the context of information security. In the PRIAM report, for 
example, computer scientists expanded the well-established notions in data security in order to 
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account for threats that can lead to privacy harms and included privacy harms, which they 
derived from the feared events and external factors, such as social norms, laws, among the 
privacy risks assessment criteria.668 The CNIL similarly in trying to help the use of a EBIOS 
software tool developed by Central Information Systems Security Division in France for risk 
analysis and management in the specific context of personal data protection adapted the 
information security concepts to the personal data protection area. It views risk as consisting 
of “a feared event and all the threats that may allow it to occur” and focusses on the protection 
of personal data supporting assets.669 Most extensively, in the US, similar to the CIA triad, 
NIST created privacy engineering objectives underlining core characteristics of systems to 
implement measurable control for assessing privacy risks.670 
The logic and aim of the information security management is reflected in Article 17 of 
the Directive 95/46/EC. It embodies the requirement for data controllers to adopt technical or 
organisational data security measures to protect personal data against “accidental or unlawful 
destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure or access”, i.e. respectively 
guarantee data availability, integrity, and confidentiality. This general requirement does not 
refer to a specific risk definition and its assessment methodologies, but mentions risk as one of 
the criteria to judge the appropriateness of data security measures. According to the wording 
of Article 17, data controllers are obliged to guarantee technical and organizational security 
measures ‘appropriate to the risks represented by the processing and the nature of the data to 
be protected’. Thus, although it is not explicitly specified, the Directive requires, first, to know 
the risks posed by particular data processing operations and, second, based on this knowledge 
to determine adequate security measures that prevent or diminish possibilities of unlawful data 
processing activities. In other words, security measures should be systematically prepared to 
avoid unlawful data processing tailored to the risks that a particular processing operation 
entails, based on so called risk reduction principle.671 In this respect, risk is a determinant factor 
for application of adequate (depending on the given situation) security measures.  
 
3.2.2. Risk as an obligation adjuster   
 
In the Data Protection Directive, risk has been used to steer the way in which Member 
States are to make use of their discretion to adjust legal duties and obligations of data 
controllers in their national laws in relation to the notification procedure (Article 18)672, prior 
checking procedure (Article 20), and the exemption from an obligation to provide access to 
personal data in specified cases (Article 13). First, the Directive establishes a general 
requirement of notification about personal data processing to the supervisory authority, which 
aims to ensure that the purposes and the main features of data processing operations are public 
and open for verification. However, ‘in order to avoid unsuitable administrative formalities’ 
(Recital 49), the Directive uses ‘risk’ as a criterion to be considered by the Member States 
when deciding whether certain data controllers can be exempted from or be subject to 
simplified notification procedure. This could be the case ‘where processing is unlikely 
adversely to affect the rights and freedoms of data subjects’ taking account of the personal data 
to be processed, or where an independent data protection official ‘ensures that the processing 
                                                
668 Sourya Joyee De, Daniel Le Métayer. PRIAM: A Privacy Risk Analysis Methodology. [Research Report] RR-
8876, Inria - Research Centre Grenoble – Rhône-Alpes (2016) <hal-01302541>; 
669 CNIL, Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), Methodology (how to carry out a PIA), June 2015 edition, 
https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/typo/document/CNIL-PIA-1-Methodology.pdf  
670 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2017/NIST.IR.8062.pdf p. 17 
671 Ulrich Dammann, Spiros Simitis, EG-Datenschutzrichtlinie:Kommentar (1 ed., Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1997) 
Art. 17.7. 
672 Article 18 does not mention the word „risk’ as such, but refers to it as a likelihood of adverse effect to the 
rights and freedoms of data subjects. 
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carried out is not likely adversely to affect the rights and freedoms of data subjects’ (Recital 
49). In other words, Member States are given considerable room for manoeuvre to exempt 
controllers from the notification duty or simplify it if the risk associated with the processing is 
low. For example, many Member States exclude standard processing operations relating to 
internal administrative purposes (salary and personnel administration, accounts records, or data 
on customers, suppliers and membership) on the condition that they are carried out in 
accordance with specific legal rules as such low risk processing.673 In general, however, the 
lists of national exemptions from notification procedure differ significantly in their scope and 
specific requirements among the Member States.674 
Second, the Data Protection Directive recognizes that some – according to the text a 
limited number - of data processing operations pose more specific risks to data subjects than 
others. Therefore, they cannot start without prior checking of the national supervisory 
authority. Based on the examination, the supervisory authority may give an opinion or an 
authorization regarding such, supposedly more risky, processing activities. According to the 
text of the Directive, decisive elements showing that certain operations pose higher risk to the 
rights and freedoms of individuals are: ‘their nature, their scope or their purposes, such as that 
of excluding individuals from a right, benefit or a contract’ or ‘the specific use of new 
technologies’ (Recital 53). Practical examples that the Member States determined as likely to 
present specific risks to the data subjects and thus are subject to prior checking often include 
sensitive data, processing related to interconnection of databases, credit referencing, or the use 
of new technologies to carry out data processing.675  
Third, risk justifies the exceptions to the rights of access of data subjects (Article 13(2))  
that might be introduced by Member States if the processing occurs for the sole purpose of 
scientific research or the creation of statistics, when ‘where there is clearly no risk of breaching 
the privacy of the data subject’. Such an exception should be subject to adequate national legal 
safeguards, especially the data cannot be used for taking measures or decisions regarding any 
particular individual. 
 
3.2.3. Risk as a regulatory object delineator  
 
Risk has been implicitly used to define the object of data protection law as conceptually 
it is a criterion to categorize personal data as ‘sensitive’ or ‘ordinary’ (Article 8) and to treat 
the processing of the former more rigidly. The rationale behind the categorisation is based on 
the understanding that although normally the harm that can be caused to privacy depends on 
the context in which data are processed rather than on the content of the data as such, 
                                                
673 Douwe Korff, EC Study on Implementation of Data Protection Directive (Study Contract Etd/2001/B5-
3001/A/49) Comparative summary of national laws, 2002, at 
http://194.242.234.211/documents/10160/10704/Stato+di+attuazione+della+Direttiva+95-46-CE 
674 European Commission, First report on the implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), 15 
March 2003, COM/2003/265 final (First Implementation Report). Communication on the follow-up of the 
Work programme for a better implementation of the Data Protection Directive, 7 March 2007, COM (2007)87 
final (Second Implementation Report). Annex 2 to the Impact Assessment, Accompanying the General Data 
Protection Regulation and Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of 
prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, 
and the free movement of such data, Brussels, 25 January 2012 SEC(2012) 72 final (Third  
      Implementation Report). 
675 Douwe Korff, EC Study on Implementation of Data Protection Directive (Study Contract Etd/2001/B5-
3001/A/49) Comparative summary of national laws, 2002. For a detailed overview of the operations subject 
to prior checking in different EU Member States see Gwendal Le Grand , Emilie Barrau, Prior Checking, a 
Forerunner to Privacy Impact Assessments in David Wright, Paul De Hert (eds.), Privacy Impact Assessment, 
Volume 6 of the series Law, Governance and Technology Series, 2012, pp 97-116 
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nevertheless, ‘certain categories of data do by their nature pose a threat to privacy’.676 In this 
sense, there is an a priori presumption of riskiness in relation to sensitive data and 
independently of the actual context the legislator relies on precautionary principle as to its 
processing. Special attention to sensitive data follows the logic of higher, particularly adversary 
or discriminatory, effect that processing of sensitive data can have to individuals, groups or 
society as a whole. Indeed, sensitive data are referred to as the area where the main privacy 
concerns would normally lie677 or named as ‘’hard core’ of the private life’.678 Sensitive data 
pertain to the very private or intimate aspects of one’s life, like racial or ethical origin, religion, 
political, philosophical or ethical persuasions, trade-union membership, health, sexual life.679 
However, as claimed by Poullet: ‘it is not the privacy – a vague and undefinable concept – but 
the fear of discriminatory practices which justified the severe restrictions a priori on the 
collection storage of such data’.680 
 
3.3. General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679) 
  
In the General Data Protection Regulation, increased number of data protection 
provisions have been built around the concept of risk. This risk-based turn, to a large extent, 
can be explained not only by the aim of compliance cost reduction and efficiency, but also by 
the need to ensure greater harmonisation and greater consistency of the data protection across 
the EU. The Regulation as a directly applicable legal instrument can no longer declare that risk 
should be used as a yardstick to adjust data controllers’ obligation by Member States, as did 
the Directive, but actually has to specify the calibrated obligations in its text itself.681  
 
3.3.1. Risk as a core of the accountability principle 
 
In contrast to five references to risk in the Data Protection Directive, in the General 
Data Protection Regulation the term risk is spilled out over the whole text. Most importantly, 
risk becomes a core element of the accountability (responsibility) principle and risk 
management is at the center of the data protection impact assessments, a new tool that helps to 
achieve and demonstrate compliance with the Regulation. As noted by Spina, such assessments 
become the “new enforced self-regulation model” through which risk control is 
materialising.682  Article 24, on the responsibility of the controller, sets forth that ‘taking into 
                                                
676  Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data (‘Amended Proposal’), COM (92) 422 final—SYN 287, 
15 October 1992. It can be accessed on the Archive of European Integration of the University of Pittsburgh 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/10375>. 
677 Paul De Hert, Vagelis Papakonstantinou, ‘The proposed data protection Regulation replacing Directive 
95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of individuals’ (2012) 28(2) Computer Law & Security Review 
130-142. 
678 Yves Poullet, ‘Data Protection between Property and Liberties – A Civil Law Approach’ in Guy P. V. 
Vandenberghe, H.W.K. Kaspersen, Ania Oskamp (eds), Amongst Friends in Computers and Law: A Collection 
of Essays in Remembrance of Guy Vandenberghe (Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers, Deventer / Boston 
1990) 161-181, 163. 
679     The notion ‘Sensitive data’ is changed to ‘Special categories of personal data’ in the Regulation and is meant 
as personal data ‘revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade 
union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying 
a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation’.  
680  Yves Poullet, Data Protection between Property and Liberties (supra note) 163. 
681  Quelle, Claudia Quelle, The ‘risk revolution’ in EU data protection law: we can’t have our cake and eat it, too, 
2017. 
682  A. Spina (2017). A Regulatory Mariage de Figaro: Risk Regulation, Data Protection, and Data Ethics. 
European Journal of Risk Regulation, 8(1), 89-90. 
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account the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying 
likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall 
implement appropriate technical and organisational measures’, including appropriate data 
protection policies, to achieve compliance with the Regulation. This article goes beyond the 
data security measures and refers to all the measures necessary to comply with the data 
protection principles, meet all obligations stemming from the Regulation, and be accountable 
according to Article 5(2). It allows scaling (but not eliminating) data processors’ obligations 
and accountability according to the risks posed by the relevant processing operations. As 
explained by Hustinx “more detailed obligations should apply where the risk is higher and less 
burdensome obligations where it is lower”.683 The rights of the data subject, however, are not 
called into question and must be guaranteed by data controllers, whatever risks are posed to 
data subjects.684 Equally, data controllers remain accountable regardless of the risk involved.685  
Despite the apparent clarity that the risk-based approach in the GDPR refers to nothing 
more than scalable and proportionate compliance, it is debatable what the real impact of the 
risk-based provisions will be in practice.686 The Article 29 Working Party does not provide any 
clarity but rather complicates the answer by putting forward the following statements: 
controllers remain always accountable for the GDPR compliance, but there are different levels 
of accountability obligations depending on the risks; fundamental data protection principles 
applicable to the controllers are the same independently from risks, but these principles are 
inherently scalable.687 Given the possibility to scale the majority of the GDPR provisions, it 
remains debatable whether any of the GDPR rules are completely immune from the risk-based 
approach.  
 
3.3.2. Risk as a trigger of new obligations 
 
The Regulation not only further extends the same reference to risk in relation to data 
security as in the Directive 95/46/EC, but also involves risk in the context of new obligations, 
such as an obligation to keep records of processing activities (Article 30), and to observe the 
principle of data protection by design and by default (Article 25). Rather than tailoring the 
scope of the obligations, risk and its level triggers the applicability of some new requirements 
which become obligatory to data controllers only if their processing activities pose a risk or a 
high risk to data subjects (Data Protection Impact Assessments (Article 35), appointment of a 
data protection officers (Articles 37-39), and data breach notifications (Article 33-34)).  
 
IV. The Second Shift – The GDPR and Risk Regulation 
 
As the analysis above demonstrates, risk has gained a number of new manifestations 
with the implementation of the risk-based approach in the General Data Protection Regulation. 
Yet, in addition to tailoring compliance to risk, the GDPR seems to contain a number of more 
                                                
683  Peter Hustinx, EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the Proposed General Data 
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684  Ibid. 
685  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Annex to the Letters from the Art. 29 WP to LV Ambassador Ilze 
Juhansone, MEP Jan Philip Albrecht, and Commissioner Vẽra Jourová in view of the trilogue (17 June 2015), 
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686  See Claudia Quelle, The ‘risk revolution’ in EU data protection law: we can’t have our cake and eat it, too, 
2017. 
687  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Statement on the Role of a Risk-based Approach in Data Protection 
Legal Frameworks’, WP 218, 30 May 2014. 
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structural elements and mechanisms present in risk regulation, ranging from the risk scoring 
and assessing systems, the institutional arrangements and to public participation in risk 
regulation.  
 
4.1. System for assessing and scoring risks 
 
In the risk regulatory frameworks regulators develop a system that allows them to 
measure and score identified risks.688 In such risk-scoring systems, risk typically is viewed as 
‘the product of the gravity of a potential harm or impact and the probability of its 
occurrence’.689 There may be various ways of measurement, in some countries predominantly 
qualitative or in contrary quantitative, but in essence the measurements will be based on the 
elements of quantum and probability.690 Most often numerical scores would be assigned and 
categorisation such as ‘high’, ‘medium’, ‘low’ risks would be used. 
If we look to data protection law, except for the national guidelines adopted by the UK, 
French and Spanish data protection authorities,691 there are no uniform risk measurement and 
scoring systems. The situation has changed somewhat with the General Data Protection 
Regulation. Severity and probability as important risk measurement elements receive more 
intentional focus in the Regulation. Recital 76 states that the likelihood and severity of a risk 
“should be determined by reference to the nature, scope, context and purposes of the 
processing” on the basis of an objective assessment. The assessment should establish whether 
a risk or a high risk exists to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. The Article 29 Working 
Party has also recently recognised that the severity of risk and the likelihood of negative impact 
should be taken into account while evaluating the risks for individuals’ privacy.692 Although 
there is not yet a uniform system for assessing and scoring risks to the rights and freedoms of 
data subjects, there is a clear tendency to subject risk in the area of data protection law to 
quantification and measurement. The Article 29 Working Party in its recent guidelines has 
recognised that various methodologies can be used by data controllers to assess risks as long 
as they meet the standards of the GDPR, i.e. provide a description of the processing operations 
and their purposes, assess the necessity, proportionality, and the risks to the rights and freedoms 
of data subjects, foresee the measures to address the risks.693  
One further step which is often made by regulators in relation to the seriousness 
assigned to risks, is the prioritisation of the higher risk producers for attention and 
intervention.694  This is not yet reflected in the legal data protection framework, or at least 
officially the enforcement of data protection law is not related to risk in the General Data 
Protection Regulation. In practise, though, on a national data protection authority (DPA) level, 
risk is already has been shaping the way in which public supervisory functions are performed. 
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The risk-based approach in some Member States is seen as providing a more effective and 
efficient way to handle data subjects’ complaints, check compliance with data protection law 
and, as a result, to better use the limited resources assigned to the DPAs. Risk as a driving 
factor to prioritize and select complaints to be handled is already present in the working practice 
of several DPAs to a certain extent. For example, the Dutch DPA selects complaints to be 
handled on the basis of five criteria: 1) serious violations; 2) structural violations; 3) violations 
that concern many people; 4) violations where the Dutch DPA can effectively intervene with 
its enforcement instruments; 5) violations that occur within the (annual) focus.695 Similarly, the 
ICO in the UK has recently taken a new approach and started focusing on systematic issues 
and patterns of poor behaviour of organizations rather than on each and single individual 
case.696  
Although the current European data protection system does not have a uniform 
framework to measure and score identified privacy risks, some changes in this respect are 
happening. Severity and probability are inserted into the General Data Protection Regulation 
as important risk measurement elements. There is an EU-level agreement between the DPAs 
that different types of risk assessment frameworks can be used by data controllers, given that 
they satisfy the main GDPR standards. Yet, as it will be discussed below, some of the risk 
assessment frameworks can arguably be better equipped to assess risks than others. 
 
 
4.2. Institutional arrangements   
 
In traditional risk regulation domains, a well-established division between risk 
assessment, a scientific process, and risk management, a purely political process, exists.697 
Since the 1990s, the EU also has tried to separate the scientific risk assessment and the political 
process of risk management in regulation of risks to human health, safety and the environment. 
This effort has led to a process of institutionalising risk assessment tasks and the so called 
‘mushrooming’ of specialized European agencies.698 Risk assessment in relation to the 
environment, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and food is formally dedicated to the respective 
regulatory agencies namely, the European Environment Agency, the European Chemicals 
Agency, the European Medicines Agency, and the European Food Safety Agency.  
Decisions about risk management remain within the discretion of the European Commission 
and other EU institutions. This is a way to ‘disentangle scientific risks assessment from political 
risk management’699 and to grant more legitimacy to the EU policy-making, even if in the daily 
practise the separation the two aspects is not so clear-cut.700 Normally, a regulatory agency is 
defined as an independent ‘administrative organization with a distinct, formal identity, an 
internal hierarchy, functional capacities, and, most important, at least one principal’.701 
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Attributed with special, less political, but more technical and scientific tasks, such specialised 
agencies differ from the EU institutions.  
A similar tendency to ‘depoliticize’ risk assessment processes assigning this role to an 
independent and technical body can be noticed in the GDPR. The main expert body under the 
Data Protection Directive is a Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data (hereinafter – the Article 29 Working Party). It acts 
independently based on its own rules of procedure and has an advisory status. It is a formal 
network composed of established independent national data protection authorities, the 
European Data Protection Supervisor and the European Commission. The Article 29 Working 
Party elects its temporal Chair and two Vice-Chairs by means of a secret ballot for a term of 
two-years.702 The main functions of the Working Party are: to examine any question related to 
the uniform application and amendments of the Data Protection Directive, to advise the 
European Commission on the level of data protection in the EU and in third countries, and to 
issue opinions on European codes of conduct.703 The Article 29 Working Party has already 
started providing guidelines on high risk data processing operations, i.e. defining and partially 
assessing risks to the data subjects stemming from data processing operations.704 
The General Data Protection Regulation transformed the Article 29 Working Party to 
an independent European Data Protection Board. There are at least three new aspects in relation 
to its formation, structure, and tasks that are worth noting. First, the composition of the group 
changes slightly but significantly. The European Data Protection Board formally consists of a 
head of a supervisory authority of each Member State and of the European Data Protection 
Supervisor. Differently from the Article 29 Working Party, the Commission can only 
participate in the Data Protection Board’s activities without a voting right (Article 68.5). This 
participatory right even totally disappeared in the amendments of the European Parliament, but 
has been restored in the final text of the Regulation. This shows a clear will of the Parliament 
members to eliminate any political ‘flavour’ and to create a specialised, independent, 
knowledge-based entity.  
Second, the secretariat previously provided by the European Commission has now been 
placed within the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) (Article 75). The Commission 
justified this change with the aim ‘to provide a strong basis for cooperation among data 
protection authorities, including the European Data Protection Supervisor’ and ‘to enhance 
synergies and effectiveness’.705 In order to fully understand the implications of this change, the 
status and role of the EDPS should be first clarified. The EDPS, contrary to the European 
Commission, is a specialised and politically independent EU office, with the main objective to 
ensure that EU institutions and bodies respect the right to privacy while processing personal 
data and developing new policy instruments, rules laid down in Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.706 
Among other functions, the EDPS monitors the processing of personal data in the EU 
administration and ensures compliance with the data protection rules, advises the EU 
institutions on new legislative proposals, and cooperates with other data protection authorities 
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through the Article 29 Working Party.  As a result, this change means that the Article 29 
Working Party from politically imbedded, even if composed of independent national data 
protection authorities, becomes increasingly institutionalised and formalised, with its own 
distinct legal personality. The European Commission loses the right to formally be a member 
of this new structure and have any influence through hosting its activities.  
Third, with the GDPR the decision power of the European Data Protection Board 
increases and becomes binding. As its predecessor, the Board maintains the consultative role. 
From advising the Commission to adopting guidelines for the purpose of specifying a high 
number of articles in the Regulation or encouraging consistent application of any other relevant 
GDPR provision on its own initiative. These wide powers are the result of the Parliament’s 
decision to diminish the discretion that the European Commission granted to itself in 26 
instances to supplement the GDPR by delegating acts and represent the shift of power away 
from the Commission to a politically independent body. 
Even more importantly, the role of the Board is made central and decisions binding in 
the consistency mechanism. Before a DPA adopts an important decision, it must first obtain an 
opinion of the Board (Article 64). One of these such decisions is the list of the processing 
operations subject to the requirement for a data protection impact assessments, i.e. definition 
of the high risk data processing operations.707 The DPA should “take utmost account of the 
opinion of the Board” and inform how it is reflected in the draft decision (Article 64.7). When 
the DPA does not follow the opinion of the Board, in order to ensure the correct and consistent 
application of the GDPR, the Board adopts a binding decision (Article 65). In the same vein, 
the Board acquires binding decision making power in case of disagreement between the DPAs, 
as opposed to the non-binding merely authoritative nature of the Article 29 Working Party 
opinions. In applying the consistency mechanism, the European Data Protection Board is 
empowered to issue an opinion or to adopt legally binding decisions in clearly specified cases 
where there are conflicting views or disputes among supervisory authorities by a two-thirds 
majority of its members, in particular deciding whether there is an infringement of the GDPR. 
The Board thus becomes “the highest executive data protection monitoring party in the EU”, 
that is “capable of deciding on itself and enforcing its opinions”.708 
In sum, the General Data Protection Regulation introduces major changes in relation to 
the formation, tasks and structure of the main European data protection expert body - the Article 
29 Working Party. The European Data Protection Board compared to its predecessor is 
completely ‘depolitizised’, institutionalised and its functions are extended to include binding 
decision making. Creation of this specialised, independent, knowledge-based entity partially 
denotes a shift toward independent, scientific risk assessment in data protection.  
 
4.3. Public engagement in risk regulation 
 
Engaging stakeholders and the general public into risk management process is a well 
acknowledged necessity in risk regulation. The mere fact that the aim of the risk-based 
regulation to manage contestable risks, opens the door for society to participate in the 
understanding and formulation of risks.709 This is not the case in relation to the regulation 
defined in terms of the market or human rights. 
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There is a wide acknowledgment of the benefits that public participation can have to 
risk identification and management. These include the help of the stakeholders to discover risks 
that otherwise may ‘fly under the radar’ of the assessor, provide input on the perceptions of the 
severity of risks and on possible ways to mitigate them.710 If the data protection impact 
assessment (DPIA) is meant to be more than a mere compliance check with the data protection 
rules, it should engage stakeholders in identifying and assessing risks and impacts.711 The ICO 
PIA Handbook recommends stakeholder engagement.712 It also states that wider consultation 
of affected individuals is important not only because “it enables an organisation to understand 
the concerns of those individuals” but also it “improve(s) transparency by making people aware 
of how information about them is being used”.713 As Roger Clarke noted, ‘the objectives of a 
PIA cannot be achieved if the process is undertaken behind closed doors. In a complex project 
applying powerful technologies, there are many segments of the population that are affected. 
It is intrinsic to the process that members of the public provide input to the assessment, and 
that the outcomes reflect their concerns.’714 In the same vein, “In the same vein, Wright and 
Mordini claim that given the right to good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, consultation with stakeholders in the process 
of the DPIA “is not only desirable but necessary”.715  
For the first time the Regulation makes an effort to involve the stakeholders and the 
public at large in to the actual process of risk evaluation. Article 35.9 of the General Data 
Protection Regulation requires, where appropriate, to ‘seek the views of data subjects or their 
representatives on the intended processing, without prejudice to the protection of commercial 
or public interests or the security of processing operations.’ One would, indeed, expect those 
who are to be effected, i.e. the end users, to be in the best position to articulate their fears and 
negative possible effects of the particular technologies or systems. In practice, however, this 
requirements is a soft obligation. As public engagement might be related to individualised risks 
assessment and high costs for companies, it is not surprising that the obligation to take 
individual views into account is seen as hardly achievable in all the cases and thus applicable 
only ‘where appropriate’. The ‘appropriateness’ standard is not defined in the  
Regulation and thus is left to the discretion of the data controllers. Moreover, data controllers 
are exempted from the obligation to consult with data subjects when there is a need to protect 
their commercial interests. This need might be less pressing and obvious for the projects and 
systems in the public sector, but private companies might try to retain business secrets from 
the beginning of the development of their new products and services in order to gain 
competitive advantage.716 Therefore, it is questionable to what extent they will be willing to 
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713  Ibid., 18. 
714  Clarke Roger, ‘PIAs in Australia: A work-in-progress report’, in David Wright and Paul de Hert (eds), 
Privacy Impact Assessment (Springer, Netherlands 2012). 
715  David Wright and Emilio Mordini, “Privacy and Ethical Impact Assessment” in David Wright and Paul de 
Hert  (eds), Privacy Impact Assessment (Springer, 2012) 397, 402.  
716  David Wright, Raphaël Gellert, Serge Gutwirth & Michael Friedewald, Precaution and privacy impact 
assessment as modes towards risk governance in René von Schomberg (ed.), Towards Responsible Research 
and  Innovation in the  Information and  Communication Technologies  and Security  Technologies Fields, A 
Report from the European Commission Services, available at: http://philpapers.org/archive/VONTRR.pdf 
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disclose detailed information about the data collection practises and projects and involve a wide 
range of relevant stakeholders. In addition, the Regulation requires the views of the data 
subjects to be heard but does not oblige controllers to take these views into account or to 
implement changes following data subjects’ suggestions. Thus, ultimately stakeholder 
consultation is purely of an informational nature and neither provides assurances of 
comprehensive risk identification nor guarantees a full-pledged protection from risks. 
Besides the DPIA, there is also an additional tendency in the Regulation to engage with the 
public concerning risks. Education, training and communication is seen as a core aspect of the 
regulatory function. Risks are to be made intelligible to non-specialists as according to the 
General Data Protection Regulation each supervisory authority shall ‘promote public 
awareness and understanding of the risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation to processing’ 
(Article 57.1.b).  
In sum, the effort to include data subjects and their representatives in the risk 
management process proposing a separate article on this in the General Data Protection 
Regulation would provide a possibility for external stakeholders and the public to participate 
in defining risks and deciding on their impact in data protection law. On a practical level, 
however, there are debates on how data subjects and other stakeholders could have a say in the 
related data protection risk assessments. First emerging considerations demonstrate not only 
the early stage of reflections on the public involvement in the privacy impact assessments, but 
also possible difficulties to achieve such involvement in practise. For example, as queried by 
the Centre for Information Policy Leadership: 1) should data subjects be allowed to participate 
directly in the risk assessment or just get access to its findings?; 2) should (and if so how 
should) companies can take into account individuals’ perception of risk and harm in practise, 
e.g. through monitoring their opinions via social media?717 It has been suggested that risk 
assessment should be based on objective characteristics of harm and examine ‘harm imposed 
on the reasonable man or woman’ in a particular context: ‘in the same way as tort law ignores 
the ‘egg shell skull’, the test is not and cannot be, concerned with the impact on each particular 
individual, let alone an individual with particular sensibilities.’718 Similar positions appear to 
be delineated in the Regulation (Recital 76), which requires data controllers to carry out an 
‘objective’ risk assessment. 
 
V. Reflections on the Two Shifts 
 
The two shifts present a number of unresolved challenge with the nature of an 
individual fundamental right of data protection. This sections focuses on three of them – the 
difficulty to align the risk with rights regulation due to data protection foundations, unjustified 
faith in self-regulatory enforcement of data protection rules, and undefinable and unmeasurable 





                                                
(they claim “companies are not obliged to be as “democratic” and participatory as governments in developed 
countries have to be. And the involvement of stakeholders in the development is notoriously difficult and 
costly even if the products, services or policies have the potential for intrusion on privacy or are ethically 
dubious. Furthermore, competition in the private sector, especially in the development and promotion of new 
products and services, often involves secrecy in the early stages.”, 95) 
717  Centre for Information Policy Leadership, ‘A Risk-based Approach to Privacy: Improving Effectiveness in 
Practice’ (2014) <http://www.hunton.com/files/upload/Post-Paris_Risk_Paper_June_2014.pdf> accessed 20 
June 2017. 
718  Ibid, 7. 
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5.1. Data protection law and its foundations   
 
Historically, risk regulation is known as regulation that tackles the risks related to 
human safety, health and the environment. Several main elements of risk regulation have been 
distilled in the regulatory literature. First, the ultimate aim of risk regulation is ‘to control 
relevant risks, not to secure compliance with sets of rules’.719 Thus, regulators should establish 
clear objectives and the risks that those regulated pose for the achievement of these 
objectives.720 In the mid-90’s, European data protection legislation emerged as a regulatory 
effort aiming to protect individuals with regard to the processing of personal data while at the 
same time allowing free data flows. In essence, the regulatory goal was to protect individuals 
against the misuse of their personal data, and thus against violations of their privacy and other 
rights, which initially revolved mainly around data security-related concerns.721 Such 
protection of human rights was envisioned through securing compliance with specific data 
protection principles and provisions rather than through the control of data processing-related 
risks. The Directive 95/46/EC does not even refer to concrete risks to privacy and personal data 
protection and avoids explicit references to three classical steps of the risk analysis framework 
(risk assessment, management and communication). The General Data Protection Regulation 
comes closer to the classical risk regulation concept, as it names a number of specific risky 
data processing activities (Article 35(3)) and possible damages to individuals (Recital 85). The 
latter include physical, material or non-material damage to such as loss of control over one’s 
personal data or limitation of one’s rights, discrimination, identity theft or fraud, financial loss, 
damage to reputation.  Yet, the risks remain defined in a flexible and abstract way and need to 
be specified and assessed by data controllers depending on the particularities and specificities 
of each data processing case.  
Second, and even more importantly, risk regulation is focused on (potential) ‘harm’ and 
‘negative consequences’ to individuals or to the environment. For example, as stated by the 
aim of much modern environmental law is “to prevent harm to the environment before it occurs, 
with an implementation structure that includes prior approvals, permits that embody standards 
to be met, and the monitoring of compliance, all with that goal in mind.”722 Data protection law 
has a broader aim than just protecting an individual from harm through risk control and 
mitigation. The right to data protection is safeguarded regardless of harms or possible adverse 
effects on individuals.723 Lynskey claims that ‘there is a general interest in conferring control 
                                                
719  Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practise (2 
ed., Oxford University Press, New York 2012) 281. 
720  Ibid. 281-282. 
721  Although the goal of the EU Data Protection Directive is not framed in terms of addressing risks to privacy, 
the goal of other data protection laws and statutes, e.g. the first data protection legislation of the German 
Lander of Hesse or 1980 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data, may be considered to address the risks to privacy stemming from the development of new technologies. 
See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, "Generational Development of Data Protection in Europe." In Technology 
and Privacy: The New Landscape, Eds. Agre, Phillip E. and Marc Rotenberg. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1997, 219-242 (he states that the first data-protection laws were enacted in response to the emergence 
of electronic data processing within government and large corporations and the plans to centralize all personal 
data files in gigantic national data banks). Raphaël Gellert, ‘Data protection: a risk regulation? Between the 
risk management of everything and the precautionary alternative’ (2015) 5(1) International Data Privacy Law, 
3-19 (he claims that the explicit object of many data protection statutes is to address the ‘risks to privacy’ 
stemming from the development of ICTs). 
722  Donald K. Anton, Dinah L. Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights (Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 38.  
723  Lynskey, Orla (2015) The foundations of EU data protection law, Oxford studies in European law (Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
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over personal data to individuals even in the absence of tangible or intangible harm’ and it can 
be comparable to the protection of other general interests, such as the protection of liberty.724 
Also, several normative values underlie the fundamental right to data protection: autonomy, 
informational self-determination, balance of powers, integrity and dignity.725 The majority of 
data protection laws identify privacy as the main justification for their adoption.726 Privacy 
plays an instrumental role in protecting individual’s interests, such as autonomy, welfare, 
equality, justice, dignity, status, tranquillity, 727  and freedoms, such as freedom of expression, 
and violations of privacy can harm their enjoyment.728   
European data protection law, therefore, being a fundamental rights (sui generis) 
regulation, is built on different foundations than risk regulation. The possibility to reconcile or 
align the risk with rights regulation is contested and presents complex questions, which fall 
outside the scope of this article. A pure risk regulation and risk-based approach would not 
sufficiently protect the right to data protection because ‘it would presuppose the legality of data 
processing activities regardless of individuals’ fundamental rights’.729   
 
5.2. Shifts towards risk as a response to a regulatory crisis 
 
Reliance of risk in regulation can be seen as a way to bridge the gap between law and 
technological developments. Data protection law is known for the disconnect between law in 
the books and law in action.730 It is not able to catch up with the rapidly evolving technologies 
and ubiquitous data collection. It can no longer give control over their personal data to 
individuals in the era of profiling, and Big Data, and address all the negative impacts stemming 
from the collection and use of data on data subjects.731 Any regulatory response to the new 
socio-technological challenges has its clear limits. On the one hand, the reliance on high-level 
principles renders it difficult to address and solve the actual problems, i.e. to focus on the 
objectives of data protection.732 On the other hand, including more and more concrete types of 
                                                
724  Ibid., 195. 
725 Paul De Hert and Serge Gutwirth, ‘Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: 
Constitutionalisation in Action, In S. Gutwirth, Y. Poullet, P. de Hert, C. de Terwangne, & S. Nouwt (Eds.), 
Reinventing Data Protection? (Springer Netherlands, 2009), 3–44. Orla Lynskey, The foundations of EU data 
protection law, Oxford studies in European law (Oxford University Press, 2015). Paul Bernal, Internet Privacy 
Rights: Rights to Protect Autonomy (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
726  J. Bing, A Comparative Outline of Privacy Legislation, Comparative Law Yearbook 1978, vol 2, p. 170. 
727  Anton Vedder, Privacy 3.0. In Van der Hof S., Groothuis M. (eds.) Innovating government: Normative, Policy 
and Technological Dimensions of Modern Government. (Springer/TMC Asser Press, 2011). 
728  Privacy can be conceptualise in different ways, most importantly as a right ‘to be let alone’, limited access to 
the self, secrecy, control over one’s personal data, personhood (the ability to develop personal relations and 
make choices without undue interference), intimacy. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 Cal. 
L. Rev. 1087-1155 (2002). 
729 Kristina Irion, Giacomo Luchetta, ‘Online personal data processing and the EU data protection reform’, 
Regulatory Policy, CEPS Task Force Reports, 2013, 23. 
730  Bert-Jaap Koops; The trouble with European data protection law. International Data Privacy Law 2014; 4 (4): 
250-261. See also Christopher Kuner, Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Fred H. Cate, Orla Lynskey, Christopher 
Millard; The language of data privacy law (and how it differs from reality). International Data Privacy Law 
2016; 6 (4): 259-260 (who claim in relation to the GDPR, that there is “a troubling disconnect between what 
the rule in question is seeking to achieve and any result it realistically may hope to produce”).  
731  Bert-Jaap Koops; The trouble with European data protection law. International Data Privacy Law 2014; 4 (4): 
250-261. 
732  Christopher Kuner, Fred H. Cate, Christopher Millard, Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Orla Lynskey; The data 
protection credibility crisis. International Data Privacy Law 2015; 5 (3): 161-162.  
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data processing into data protection law leads to artificial expansion of its scope and to the 
“framing [of] Internet-related problems as data protection problems”.733 
The use of risk and reliance on risk assessments as a regulatory tool demonstrates the 
“ongoing crisis of policy-making”. 734 Potential risks and their impact are too complex to be 
caught by “comprehensive regulatory instruments such as the law or political decision-making 
processes”735. Therefore, ex ante focus on enforced self-regulation, and in particular a new 
obligation on data controllers to conduct Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs), allows 
for a shift in the responsibility and blame from policy makers to data controllers.  
Yet, it is questionable whether the GDPR has “too much faith in controller actions” and 
they capacity and position to assess risks and prevent unnecessary data processing.736 Data 
“controllers do not intend to restrict data processing to the bare minimum” and can easily 
accommodate their practices into what is ‘necessary’ for the purposes they define themselves 
until in rare situations they are checked by the data protection authorities.737 Also, due to the 
absence of legislative rules and responsibility on their behalf, data controllers are likely to use 
“upstream adjudication”: anticipate court opinion on a specific risky processing and 
interferences with the rights and freedoms of data subjects and obligations to use certain 
procedures, such as stakeholder consultations.738  The risk-based approach as “the key 
enforcement method (…) leaving data protection issues mainly to data controllers to decide” 
is certainly debatable as regards its effectiveness.739 
 
5.2. Undefinable and unmeasurable risk as a core element of the shifts 
 
Risk regulation and the risk-based approach first and foremost requires a clear 
understanding and definition of risk. However, both in theory and in practise privacy risks do 
not yield an easy definition. Theoretically, risk as a concept can be studied from various 
disciplines, ranging from philosophy, to natural sciences and economics, and across those 
different fields acquire diverse connotations.740 In fact, in the risk literature, the concept of risk 
can refer to an expected value, a probability or a cause of an unwanted event, which may or 
may not occur, as much as to the unwanted event or uncertainty as such.741 Without aiming to 
provide an exhaustive summary of these definitions, a brief look into the main risk features in 
several selected fields is provided below. 
Natural scientists, in the disciplines such as engineering, toxicology, epidemiology, 
adopt a rationalist approach to risk and generally treat risk as an objective, measurable 
                                                
733  Bert-Jaap Koops; The trouble with European data protection law. International Data Privacy Law 2014; 4 (4): 
250-261, 258. 
734  L Hempel and H Lammerant, ‘Impact Assessments as Negotiated Knowledge’ in S Gutwirth, R Leenes, and 
P De Hert (eds), Reforming European Data Protection Law (Springer 2015) 130. 
735  Ibid. 
736  Bert-Jaap Koops; The trouble with European data protection law. International Data Privacy Law 2014; 4 (4): 
250-261, 255 (“I fear that, as long as data protection is not in the hearts and minds of data controllers—and 
the law so far has done a poor job in reaching those hearts and minds […] —mandatory data protection impact 
assessments will function as paper checklists that controllers duly fill in, tick off, and file away to duly show 
to auditors or supervisory authorities if they ever ask for it. Procedure followed, problem solved.”) 
737  Bert-Jaap Koops, supra note, 254 - 255. 
738  N van Dijk, R Gellert, and K Rommetveit, ‘A risk to a right? Beyond data protection risk assessments’ 
32(2)(2015)  Computer Law & Security Review 286, 300. 
739  ME Gonçalves, ‘The EU data protection reform and the challenges of big data: remaining uncertainties and 
ways forward’ (2017) 26(2) Information & Communications Technology Law 90, 114. 
740 For a detailed review of risk definitions see Ortwin Renn, Concepts of Risk: A Classification. In: S. Krimsky 
and D. Golding (eds.): Social Theories of Risk. Westport, CT (Praeger 1992), pp. 53-79 
741  Terje Aven, Ortwin Renn, Risk Management and Governance: Concepts, Guidelines and Applications, Series: 
Risk, Governance and Society, Vol. 16, 2010 
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phenomenon. They focus on identification of risks, their causes, predictive models of risks and 
individual responses to risks, or proposals on how to limit the effects of risks. Expert 
knowledge and scientific calculations dominate in this, so called technico-scientific, approach 
to risk.742 The natural science perspective is useful to “anticipate potential physical harm to 
human being or ecosystems, average these events over time and space, and use relative 
frequencies (observed or modeled) as a means to specify probabilities”743. 
In contrast to technico-scientific approach, sociologists refer to risk as a socio-cultural 
phenomenon.744 Risk is seen as a cultural and social construction undertaken by humans rather 
as a taken-for-granted objective, material condition, which can be quantified and measured.745 
Despite their nuanced theoretical assumptions of social and cultural theories, and competing 
positions on risk ranging from a weak social constructionist to relativist, social scientists 
generally tend to emphasise the broader social, cultural and political context from which risk 
gains its meaning.746 The understanding of risk is created through social interpretation and is 
always linked to group values and interests.747 Sociologists are therefore less interested in the 
nature of risk itself, but rather “the forms of knowledge, the dominant discourses and expert 
techniques and institutions that serve to render risk calculable and knowable, bringing it into 
being”.748  
Data protection law does not seem to systematically follow one of the above-mentioned 
understandings of risk. From the inception of the Data Protection Directive the understanding 
of the concept of risk seems to fit at least in two perspectives: technico-scientific and 
sociological. Risk first entered the data protection domain as an objective, measurable 
phenomenon.The travaux préparatoires of the Data Protection Directive demonstrate that risk 
as a term initially was used only in a purely technical, data security-related context. Risk 
referred to the security measures that were needed in the assessment of the potential security 
                                                
742  Deborah Lupton (ed.), Risk and Sociocultural Theory: New Directions and Perspectives, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000. 
743  Ortwin Renn, Concepts of Risk: A Classification. In: S. Krimsky and D. Golding (eds.): Social Theories of 
Risk. Westport, CT (Praeger 1992), p. 59 
744  Lupton Risk and Sociocultural Theory: New Directions and Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 2000.   
745 Taylor-Gooby & Zin (eds.), Risk in Social Science, Oxford University Press, 2006. Sheldon Krimsky and 
Dominic Golding (eds.)  Social theories of risk, Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992. Also on 
Cultural approach see: M. Douglas and A.B. Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of 
      Technical and Environmental Dangers. Berkeley, 1982, CA: University of California Press. M. Thompson 
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Society see: Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London, Newbury Park,  Calif: Sage 
Publications. U. Beck, A. Giddens, and S. Lash (eds.), Reflexive Modernisation: Politics, Tradition and 
Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Cambridge: Polity Press. On governmentality approach see: 
Foucault, M. (1991). ‘Governmentality’, in G. Burchell et al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect. London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, pp. 87–104. 
746  On a more detailed model of the risk continuum ranging from a realist approach offered in technico-scientific 
approaches to a highly relativist constructionist approach see Deborah Lupton  (ed.), Risk and Sociocultural 
Theory: New Directions and Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 1999, Chapter 2. On a taxonomy of 
sociological approaches to risk see Ortwin Renn, Concepts of Risk: A Classification. In: S. Krimsky and D. 
Golding (eds.): Social Theories of Risk. Westport, CT (Praeger 1992), pp. 67-72 (Renn orders sociological 
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Risk. Westport, CT (Praeger 1992), p. 72 
748  Deborah Lupton (ed.), Risk and Sociocultural Theory: New Directions and Perspectives, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, p. 6 
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risks.749 This technical reference to risk is not surprising, considering the fact that the Proposal 
for the Directive was submitted together with two other highly technical legislative acts: a 
Directive related to the protection of personal data and privacy in the context of public digital 
telecommunications network and a Decision concerning the field of information security.750 
Later, more subjective, individual-centered references to risk, i.e. risk as negative impact on a 
data subject’s rights and freedoms, were added after the amendments to the Data Protection 
Directive proposed by the Parliament. However, in this sense risk as a term was used erratically 
and equated to danger and threat.751 The latter terms are used interchangeably with risk in the 
Commentary attached to the Amended Proposal for a Directive.752 Yet, risk is conceptually 
different and should not be conflated with danger.753  
The debate around the General Data Protection Regulation in the Council once again 
revealed diverging perception and understanding of risk in the area of personal data protection. 
It demonstrated a high level of uncertainty among the Member States as to how risk as a term 
should be understood and categorised. It has been claimed that definition of risk is problematic 
or non-achievable as: 1) the level of risk is highly context-dependent; 2) it is difficult to arrive 
at a risk definition that would stand the test of time; 3) law cannot take into account all current 
risks, but even less regulate future risks, famously called ‘unknown unknowns’ (‘things we 
don’t know that we don’t know’)754.  
Although risk assessment and measurement were not of a paramount importance 
before, with the General Data Protection Regulation, which relies on risk in the context of 
obligations for data controllers, data protection authorities and data controllers will be asked to 
assess and measure the risks to individuals. The value of risk in quantitative or qualitative terms 
in the information security area can be objectively defined and established through the 
undesirable events and threats that make such events possible. Numerous methodologies in this 
field can help to identify, measure (establish probability and severity), score and mitigate 
security risks.755  
The risk evaluation seems to be much more problematic as far as the negative impact 
on a data subject’s rights and freedoms (sociological perspective) is concerned. Some 
                                                
749 Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection of individuals in relation to the processing of 
personal data, COM (1990)314—2, 1990/0287/COD (‘Initial Proposal’). 
750  Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection of personal data and privacy in the context of 
public digital telecommunications networks, in particular the integrated services digital network (ISDN) and 
public digital mobile networks, COM/90/314FINAL - SYN 288, OJ C 277, 5.11.1990; Proposal for a 
Council Decision in the field of information security, COM/90/314FINAL, OJ C 277, 5.11.1990. 
751  For example, commentary on Article 17 ‘Security of Processing’ refers to the ‘potential danger to the data 
subject’s right to privacy’ emanating from a data controller or a third party (Amended Proposal,  27) 
752  Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data (‘Amended Proposal’), COM (92) 422 final—SYN 287, 
15 October 1992. It can be accessed on the Archive of European Integration of the University of Pittsburgh 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/10375>. 
753  Niklas Luhmann (1987) The morality of risk and the risk of morality, International Review of Sociology 
     Series 1, 1:3, 87-101 (notes that risk refers to a possibility of negative effect attributable to one’s own decision, 
danger refers to the possibility of being harmed caused by an external source without individual’s choice). 
754  Council of the European Union, ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (General Data Protection Regulation) – Risk based approach’ 12267/2/14 REV 2, 2 September 2014, 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2012267%202014%20REV%202> accessed 15 
February 2015.          
755  See also e.g. ISO/IEC 27002 security standard ‘Information technology – Security techniques – Code of 
practice for information security management’.  
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academics have tried to articulate the harms of privacy violations756, but there is still no 
consensus around what constitutes such harms and it is hardly possible to develop an 
exhaustive list of harms resulting from data processing. Regulators and companies have equally 
failed to identify a comprehensive list of privacy harms and negative impacts on data 
subjects.757 It should be mentioned, however, that the Council in the General Data Protection 
Regulation tried to articulate an indicative list of harms in the context of the DPIA referring to 
“discrimination, identity theft or fraud, financial loss, damage to the reputation, unauthorised 
reversal of pseudonymisation, loss of confidentiality of data protected by professional secrecy 
or any other significant economic or social disadvantage” (Article 33.2a). Nonetheless, the list 
is more illustrative than comprehensive and cannot be easily transferred into operational risk 
management methodologies. The full understanding of the harms and potential as well as actual 
negative impacts on individuals is a starting point for the discussion on risk assessment in data 
protection.  
Not less importantly, data driven-technologies and applications can have a negative 
impact not only to the rights of individuals but also to their groups and the society at large. The 
GDPR acknowledges the group and societal dimension of privacy risks, but remains unclear 
about their assessment and measurement in practice. As noted by Spina, “(t)he new digital 
service and products, in fact, present risks that cannot be easily measured or quantified in 
accordance with a mere technocratic paradigm; they do not only affect the individuals that use 
them, but transform the collective fabric of our society; they concern the cognitive rather than 
the physical integrity of human beings.”758  
However even if better conceptualized, negative impact on individuals (damage) will 
often be nonphysical and intangible, such as discrimination, reputational and moral damage or 
any other social disadvantage. Therefore, in practice it will not easily yield to quantification 
and measurement. Negative impact can also be very subjective, vary from one individual to 
another or from group to group and cannot be easily known by the data controller. On an 
individual level, the perception of something as being risky is often based on one’s own 
previous experience, age and understanding.  Also, many collective factors, such as education 
system, cultural values or regulatory framework, may determine that something is being seen 
as a risk by particular people or nations. For example, as regards children’s activities online, 
their perception of privacy risks, among many other factors, could be shaped by the mediating 
practises of parents and teachers, influence of school and peers, and individual usage of the 
Internet.759 As a result, individuals exposed to the same risks will not experience the same 
harm. Some will be able to cope with risks while others not. Are the general DPIA frameworks 
then adequate to fully address the risks to vulnerable data subjects, such as children, or should 
they be tailored to specific data subjects’ needs and vulnerabilities? As the harm is non-
physical, and thus hardly measurable, and is subjective (best known to the individuals 
themselves), it is questionable if the burden for evaluating risks and preventing harm is rightly 
placed on the data controllers. Can they be expected to foresee and adequately assess all 
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757  National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Privacy Engineering Objectives and Risk Model 
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759  Ellen J Helsper,  et  al, “Country  Classification:  Opportunities,  Risks,  Harm  and  Parental  Mediation” 
(2013) LSE-EU  Kids  Online, available  at <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/52023/> accessed 30 August 2017 
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potential negative impacts (harm) on individuals of their proposed data uses and device 
appropriate protection measures?760 How to guarantee that their assessments ensure an even 
level of protection across the EU when there are different risk assessment methodologies 
used?761 How can data controllers be liable for the methodological choices and subjective risk 
perceptions?762 These questions underline the challenges that the reliance on risks and risk 
management in data protection has brought, that require further guidance and clarification from 
the EDPB and the courts. In the meantime, if risk to individuals cannot be adequately defined 
and evaluated, the shift towards risk regulation can lead to lowering the data protection level 
from the perspective of the data subjects. As noted by Lynskey, a concern exists that ‘data 
controllers, processors, and DPAs will underestimate the risks entailed by certain personal data 
processing, leading to an under-enforcement of rules’763. 
The General Data Protection Regulation heavily relies on risk management through 
Data Protection Impact Assessments. In order to manage privacy risks, they have to be 
simplified, operationalized and measured according to a chosen methodology. Given the 
ambiguous nature of risk as a concept, uncertainty and limited knowledge of risks, risk 
assessment techniques have been criticised due to the lack of objectivity, the unclear 
methodological assumptions and choices and the limits of scientific knowledge.764 As Power 
notes too much manageability of risks according to ‘well tried, incrementally adjusted, linear 
frameworks of understanding’ can lead to a pretence of control and rather than effective 
mechanisms.765 Thus, when risks are integrated into formalised risk management frameworks, 
they may lose substance and meaning.766 
Existing privacy risk management methodologies and guidelines try to express data 
protection concepts and principles in risk management terminology, but face epistemic 
challenges.767 For example, in the CNIL’s methodology, risk means a ‘scenario describing a 
feared event and all threats that make it possible’.768 Thus, risk is expressed through two 
measurable components: undesirable events (what do we fear?) and threats (how can this 
                                                
760  De Hert and Papakonstantinou state “great expectations for data controllers’ responsible behaviour are made” 
in the GDPR requiring to conduct DPIA and “It remains therefore to be seen whether the positive example of 
environmental and other impact assessments will be repeated in the data protection field as well”. Paul De 
Hert, Vagelis Papakonstantinou, The proposed data protection Regulation replacing Directive 95/46/EC: A 
sound system for the protection of individuals, Computer Law & Security Review, 28(2), 2012, Pages 130–
142, p. 141. 
761 Raphaël Gellert, Data protection: a risk regulation? Between the risk management of everything and the 
precautionary alternative, International Data Privacy Law (2015) 5 (1): 3-19. 
762  Ibid. 
763  Lynskey, Orla (2015) The foundations of EU data protection law, Oxford studies in European law (Oxford 
University Press, 2015), p. 86. 
764  See Paul Harremoës and others (eds), The Precautionary Principle in the 20th Century: Late Lessons from 
Early Warnings (Earthscan, London; Sterling, VA 2002), p. 22. 
765  Michael Power, The Risk Management of Everything—Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty (Demos, London 
2004), p. 19 
766 Raphaël Gellert, Data protection: a risk regulation? Between the risk management of everything and the 
precautionary alternative, International Data Privacy Law (2015) 5 (1): 3-19, 16. 
767  Ibid, 16-17. See also Stuart S. Shapiro, “Situating Anonymization Within a Privacy Risk Model,” Homeland 
Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (2012) at p. 2, available at 
https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/12_0353.pdf. 
     who claims that similarly in the US the Fair Information Practice Principles “encourage framing of privacy 
harms purely in terms of principle violations, as opposed to the actual impact on individuals.”  
768  Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), ‘Methodology for Privacy Risk  Management 
(2012) <http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/CNIL-ManagingPrivacyRisks-Methodology.pdf> 
accessed 15 February 2015 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), ‘Measures for 
the privacy risk treatment’ (2012) A Catalogue of good practices, 




occur?), both evaluated in terms of probability and severity according to the scale of 
‘negligible, limited, significant or maximum’ risks.769 Feared events (e.g. unavailability of 
legal processes, excessive or unfair data collection, illegitimate access to personal data) are 
essentially violations of the data protection principles. The majority of threats through which 
risks may happen are framed in data security terms. They involve function creep, espionage, 
exceeded limits of operation or damage of supporting assets, property losses. Although this 
methodology is highly operational and provides a formalised risk management tool, its validity 
and effectiveness are limited. It fails not only to take into account all the possible threats but 
also more generally, does not provide much insight regarding the level of data protection within 
an organisation770 or indeed adequately consider the actual impact on individuals. 
The epistemic problem outlined above is expected to be applicable to other privacy risk 
management tools and methodologies. While managing privacy risks, they can easily be 
reduced to void and meaningless statistical expressions of probabilities, focusing on process 




European data protection law is in a progressive “riskification” process as manifested 
in a two-fold shift. Through the implementation of the risk-based approach in the General Data 
Protection Regulation (the first shift), risk is assigned new functional roles and shapes the 
regulation. Rooted in data and information security in the Directive 95/46/EC, the new 
functions of risk expand in constructing the core of the accountability principle, and triggering 
new obligations for data controllers. 
EU data protection law also comes closer to risk regulation (the second shift). It has 
been demonstrated that the General Data Protection Regulation increasingly reflects the main 
features that risk regulation, such as regulation of human safety, health or environmental risks, 
has. Severity and probability are inserted into the General Data Protection Regulation as 
important risk measurement elements. Risk assessment may be expected to be defined by a 
specialised, independent, knowledge-based entity the European Data Protection Board - 
partially denoting a shift toward independent, scientific risk assessment in data protection. 
There is an effort to hear the views of the data subjects and their representatives on intended 
data processing operations, and thus let them participate in defining risks and deciding on their 
management in personal data protection law. 
The two shifts present an (unresolved) challenge with the nature of an individual 
fundamental right of data protection. Fundamental rights regulation, is built on different 
foundations than risk regulation and the possibility to align them presents complex questions. 
The use of risk and reliance on risk assessments as a regulatory tool partially shifts the 
responsibility for the protection of fundamental rights and the blame from policy makers to 
data controllers. Yet, data controllers are not necessarily in a position to assess risks and prevent 
unnecessary data processing.  
The two shifts are based on an undefined and multidimensional notion of risk, which is 
not only an obstacle to successfully assess and measure risks, but also might lower the 
protection level for individuals. In data security, risk is an objective phenomenon, which can 
be expressed and quantified through feared events and threats. Privacy risks are more 
subjective and ‘individualised’, and thus hard to establish, evaluate, and quantify. No uniform 
understanding of the privacy harms and negative impacts on individuals exists, and privacy 
risks are too complex to be fully caught by privacy risk management tools and methodologies.  
                                                
769  Methodology for Privacy Risk Management (supra note) 6. 
770 Raphaël Gellert, Data protection: a risk regulation? Between the risk management of everything and the 
precautionary alternative, International Data Privacy Law (2015) 5 (1): 3-19, 17. 
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However, the GDPR envisions data protection impact assessments as a key tool that data 
controllers should rely upon when controlling risks. Indeed, DPIAs will be a mandatory 
requirement from May 2018. Some of the unresolved challenges, mentioned above, could be 
addressed through the development of sector-specific or technology-specific DPIA 
frameworks or codes of practice, allowing for the development of methodologies specialized 
for specific application contexts or architectures. Frameworks for a specific type of data 
subjects, such as children, the elderly and others groups of individuals requiring special 
protection, could also be considered as they could address the particular needs and rights of 
these data subjects. In conclusion, therefore such focused analysis of particular risks requires 
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From 25 May 2018, data protection impact assessments (DPIAs) will become a key tool that 
data controllers should rely upon when controlling high risk to the rights and freedoms of 
individuals. Given the need to tailor DPIAs to specific technologies, sectors, and data subjects, 
the paper provides guidelines to facilitate the achievement of the child-specific DPIA. Based 
on the PRIAM methodology, the paper discusses technical aspects of the child-tailored DPIA 
specifying its concrete component (personal data, risk sources, feared events, privacy 
weaknesses and privacy harms) and their attributes, and provides examples related to risks for 
children in the information society context. The proposed framework enables data controller to 









The EU General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR)771 envisions data 
protection impact assessments as a key tool that data controllers should rely upon when 
controlling high risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals. DPIAs will be a mandatory 
requirement from 25 May 2018. This new requirement aims to shift data protection from paper-
based bureaucratic requirements towards compliance in practice772 and enhance accountability, 
transparency, as well as potentially foster the data protection culture and responsibility vis-à-
vis data subjects among data controllers. Beyond this legal requirement, conducting a DPIA is 
a recommended step for any company intending to develop and operate a system or a service 
that processes personal data. Technological developments that are developed too hastily 
without the assessment of risk can have a negative impact on individuals, thus leading to 
                                                
771 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1. 
772 Christopher Kuner, ‘The European Commission’s Proposed Data Protection Regulation: A Copernican 
Revolution in European Data Protection Law’ (2012) 11 Privacy & Security Law Report, 6, p. 1. 
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considerable damage to the company’s reputation and potentially triggering strong public 
opposition.773  
The GDPR provides general criteria that have to be met by DPIA methodologies. The 
DPIA is envisioned as being carried out from data subjects’, rather than from data controllers’, 
perspective in order to actually to take into account risks to the rights and freedoms of 
individuals.774 Therefore, not only the development of sector-specific or technology-specific 
DPIA frameworks, specialized for specific application contexts or architectures, should be 
encouraged, but also frameworks for a specific type of data subjects, such as children, the 
elderly and others groups of individuals requiring special protection. These data subject-
tailored DPIAs could address the particular needs and rights of specific data subjects.  
The GDPR explicitly recognises that children deserve special protection as data 
subjects (Recital 38), especially online, and specific safeguards and protections should apply 
to children’s personal data. The importance to consider the status of the data subject, e.g. if the 
data subject is a child or otherwise belongs to a more vulnerable segment of the population, 
when assessing the impact of data processing operations has been underlined by the Article 29 
Working Party on several occasions.775 In the same vein, in the context of personal data 
protection online, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) has acknowledged that 
data protection and privacy risks to children ‘must be addressed in a manner appropriate to the 
specificity and vulnerability of the category of individuals at risk’776. Assessing risks to 
children and other vulnerable members of the population is already a frequent practice in other 
risk regulation areas, such as in the EU chemicals regulation.777 As a consequence, when 
children’s personal data is collected and processed, data controllers should consider carrying 
out a child-specific DPIA. With this in mind, the paper proposes a way to adapt the general 
GDPR requirements for the DPIA to cases when data subjects are children and illustrates how 
a child-specific DPIA could be carried out based on the PRIAM methodology. The paper 
particularly focuses on personal data processing online and provides examples related to risks 
for children in the information society context. 
This paper is divided in five parts. The second part identifies the reasons for carrying 
child-specific DPIAs when processing children’s personal data in the online world. The third 
part lists the general GDPR criteria for the DPIA content. In the fourth part, the specific risk 
                                                
773 Public campaign by the child development and privacy experts and thousands of parents against Aristotle, an 
IoT system for children, developed by Mattel, Inc. due to privacy and child development concerns. See Letter 
to Mattel, 2 October 2017, 
http://www.commercialfreechildhood.org/sites/default/files/Letter%20to%20Mattel.pdf. As a result, the 
product has been cancelled before its release. See Hayley Tsukayama, Mattel has cancelled plans for a kid-
focused AI device that drew privacy concerns, 4 October 2017, available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/04/mattel-has-an-ai-device-to-soothe-babies-
experts-are-begging-them-not-to-sell-it/?utm_term=.14c79beeb1be 
    Public campaign by child advocacy, consumer and privacy groups against “smartwatches” that allow the 
monitoring of young children due to major security and privacy problems, Letter to the Federal Trade 
Commission, available at: 18 October 2017, available at: 
http://www.commercialfreechildhood.org/sites/default/files/Smart%20Watch%20FTC%20letter%2010.18%2
0FINAL.pdf , Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood, Stop Mattel’s "Hello Barbie" Eavesdropping 
Doll, (Feb. 2015) http://www.commercialfreechildhood.org/action/shut-down-hello-barbie  
774 Christopher Kuner, ‘The European Commission’s Proposed Data Protection Regulation: A Copernican 
Revolution in European Data Protection Law’ (2012) 11 Privacy & Security Law Report, 6 
775 Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 
95/46/EC, 9 April 2014, WP 217 ; Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation, 2 April 2013, WP 203. 
776 EDPS, Opinion on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - "European Strategy for a 
Better Internet for Children", 17 July 2012. 
777 Kristina Nordlander, Carl-Michael Simon and Hazel Pearson, ‘Hazard v. Risk in EU Chemicals Regulation’ 
(2010) European Journal of Risk Regulation 3, 239-250, 241. 
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management methodology (PRIAM) chosen for this paper is presented. The fifth part adapts 
PRIAM risk management methodology focusing on its criteria (personal data, risk sources, 
feared events, privacy weaknesses and privacy harms) and attributes for the proposed child-
specific DPIA framework. Conclusions are drawn in the last part. 
 
 
2. Why child-specific DPIAs? 
 
The GDPR data protection impact assessment process is generic and does not address 
specifically the risks to children as data subjects. The lack of adaptation of the DPIA framework 
to children as data subjects when assessing risks to their rights and freedoms resulting from 
data processing operations presents several problems. First, the general DPIA framework is not 
able to take into account the specific characteristics of children as data subjects and consumers, 
i.e. specific developmental features (vulnerabilities, needs) and the different behaviour of 
children. For example, due to their particular behavioural characteristics, such as emotional 
volatility and impulsiveness, children (especially teenagers) are seen as being vulnerable in 
comparison to adults online778: more active and risk-prone,779 less capable of evaluating 
perilous situations, given their lack of awareness vis-à-vis the long-term consequences of their 
virtual actions.780 The data controllers should take into account these specific developmental 
features and make sure that they are not exploited in their services and data collection practices. 
Concerns have been raised, for example, about special techniques employed by companies 
towards children, such as “real-time bidding, location targeting (especially when the user is 
near a point of purchase), and "dynamic creative" ads tailored to their individual profile and 
behavioral patterns”781. Unfair commercial practices, in particular emotional manipulation 
based on profiling in online services, aggressive and immersive marketing and advertising, 
have been criticised as having negative impact on children’s rights and wellbeing.782 
Second, the risk factors should be considered in a different way for children than for 
adult data subjects due to the different inputs, or parameters, of the risk analysis. In case of 
children, potential negative impacts (harm) can be more serious or damaging and there might 
(often) be a higher probability of such an impact occurring.  
                                                
778 Judith Bessant, ‘Hard wired for risk: neurological science, ‘the adolescent brain’ and developmental theory’, 
(2008) 11(3) Journal of Youth Studies 347, 358 (criticises research on adolescent brain as “it begins with a 
prejudice (‘they’ are ‘different’ ‘irrational’ and ‘deficient’) and then threatens to expand the civil and social 
disadvantages that already severely affect too many of our young people”. Bessant claims that “some young 
people are sometimes at risk not because their brains are different, but because they have not had the 
experience or opportunity to develop the skills and judgment that engagement in those activities and 
experiences supply”.) 
779 Andrew Hope, ‘Risk-taking, boundary-performance and intentional school internet 'misuse'’, (2007) 28(1) 
Discourse: studies in the cultural politics of education 87. 
780 Jay N Giedd, ‘The Teen Brain: Insights from neuroimaging’, (2008) 42(4) Journal of Adolescent Health 335; 
Elizabeth R McAnarney, ‘Adolescent Brain Development: Forging New Links?’ (2008) 42(4) Journal of 
Adolescent Health 321; Tim McCreanor et al. ‘Consuming identities: Alcohol marketing and the 
commodification of youth experience’, (2009) 13 (6) Addiction Research & Theory 579; Laurence Steinberg, 
‘Risk taking in adolescence: New perspectives from brain and behavioral science’, (2007) 16 (2) Current 
Directions in Psychological Science 55; Laurence Steinberg, ‘Social neuroscience perspective on adolescent 
risk-taking’ (2008) 28(1) Developmental Review 78. 
781 Kathryn C. Montgomery, ‘Youth and surveillance in the Facebook era’, (2015) 39(9) Telecommunications 
Policy 771; Kathryn C Montgomery and Jeff Chester, ‘Data protection for youth in the digital age: 
Developing a rights -based global framework’, (2015)1(4) European Data Protection Law Review 291. 
782 European NGO Alliance for Child Safety Online (eNACSO) (2016) When Free Isn’t: Business, Children and 
the Internet. Rome: eNACSO. Available at: www.enacso.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/free-isnt.pdf; 
Verdoodt, V., Clifford, D., Lievens, E. (2016), Toying with Children’s Emotions, the New Game in Town? 
The Legality of Advergames in the EU, 32 Computer Law & Security Review 599 
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Third, a specific catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms should be taken into 
account by child-oriented product and service providers in DPIAs. The Article 29 Working 
Party stressed that the GDPR refers to risks posed not only to the rights to privacy and personal 
data protection, but also to other human rights and freedoms, such as freedom of speech, 
freedom of thought, freedom of movement, prohibition of discrimination, right to liberty, 
conscience and religion.783 Children are entitled to more elaborate catalogue of internationally 
recognised fundamental rights compared to adults as established by the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UN CRC). Some UN CRC principles, such as the best interest of the child 
principle and the right to be heard, and some rights, such as the protection from harmful 
information or the right to play, are uniquely granted to children and not to adults by 
international law. As shown in Table 1, the child rights enshrined in the UN CRC can be divided 
into general principles, i.e. fundamental values to be considered when interpreting and 
implementing all the other child rights, and three right categories: protection, provision and 
participation rights. These distinctions are useful as far as they clearly convey the primary aim 
of the specific child rights but are not clear-cut as, according to the general principles of the 
UN CRC, all rights should incorporate a participation, provision and protection component.784 
In other words, even if the right to privacy traditionally falls under the protection category785, 
its provision and participation aspects are equally important.786  
Although the UN CRC, as an instrument, is applicable to the states and does not directly 
impose positive obligations to the same extent on the companies, data controllers are obliged 
to respect child rights. EU law is interpreted in light of the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States and public international law. As the UN CRC is public international law which 
the EU Member States all have incorporated as part of their national regimes and constitutional 
traditions it is necessary to assume that laws need to be interpreted with the children’s rights 
framework in mind. 
Another reason why businesses should respect and support children’s rights stems from 
their corporate social responsibility and the global standards, such as UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights787, the Children’s Rights and Business Principles788 and 
Guidelines for Industry on Child Online Protection789. According to the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights, the responsibility of business to respect human rights means: 
1) “avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, 
and address such impacts when they occur”; and 2) “seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human 
                                                
783 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Statement on the Role of a Risk-based Approach in Data 
Protection Legal Frameworks’, WP 218, 30 May 2014. 
784 Eugeen Verhellen, 'The Convention on the Rights of the Child: reflections from a historical, social policy and 
educational perspective' in Wouter Vandenhole, Ellen Desmet, Didier Reynaert, Sara Lembrechts (eds.) 
Routledge International Handbook of Children’s Rights Studies, 2015. 
785 For a possible categorization of child rights see e.g. Sonia Livingstone, Children's digital rights: a priority. 
Intermedia, 2014, 42 (4/5). 
786 In the context of privacy, it could be argued that children’s participatory rights should be brought to the 
forefront and used to inform all of the issues listed in Table 1 in order to counter the protective bias within 
the GDPR and more fully actualize the promise of agency within the UN CRC. On the protective bias and the 
GDPR see Macenaite M., From universal towards child-specific protection of the right to privacy online: 
Dilemmas in the EU General Data Protection Regulation, 19(5) New Media & Society, 2017, pp. 765 - 779. 
787 UN, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 2011, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf 
788 UNICEF, the UN Global Compact and Save the Children, Children’s Rights and Business Principles, 2013, 
at:https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/human_rights/CRBP/Childrens_Rights_and_Business_
Principles.pdf 
789 International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 




rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business 
relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts”.790 
Therefore, when assessing the risks to the rights and freedoms of individuals, in addition 
to the age-generic human rights, data controllers should carefully consider children’s rights and 
the general principles enshrined in the UN CRC. Moreover, it is not only the impact on relevant 
rights that has to be assessed but also the balance between the rights should be taken into 
account. For example, a balance must be struck between participation and protection rights, 
that reflects a particular child’s age and maturity. In this respect, it has been noted that “a rights 
framework provides a normative lens through which to critically examine and evaluate the 
benefits or harms of children’s growing access to and provision of digital technologies”791. 
Indeed, for example one should avoid discussing “protection challenges without recognising 
how the resulting policy can curtail children’s freedoms to participate online”.792  
 
 
Table 1: UN CRC child rights catalogue relevant for the child-specific DPIAs 
 
Categories UN CRC provision Examples of relevant 




Art. 2: the right to non-discrimination Profiling and data mining 
resulting in discriminatory 
decisions, discrimination 
in accessing online 
services 
Art. 3: the best interest of the child 
principle – ‘in all actions concerning 
children (...) the best interests of the 
child shall be a primary consideration’ 
Services and products that 
are directed to children 
and are       designed 
without considering the 
best interest of the child 
principle, e.g. a location 
tracking device meant for 
children not having 
adequate data security 
measures leading to the 
leak of the location of the 
child to people other than 
parents. 
Art. 6: Right to life, survival and 
development: 
 
Services and products do 
not allow the development 
of the child's personality, 
talents and mental and 
physical abilities to their 
fullest potential. 
Art. 12: the right to be heard - the right Overprotective parental 
consent mechanisms not 
                                                
790 UN, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 2011, at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf, p. 14. 
791 Mariya Stoilova, Livingstone, S. and Kardefelt-Winther, Global Kids Online: Researching children′s rights in 




of children (capable of forming their 
own views) to be consulted in all matters 
affecting them and being given due 
weight in accordance with the age and 
maturity 
allowing to consult 
children, DPIAs carried 
out without consulting 






Art. 19: Protection against all forms of 
physical or mental violence, injury or 
abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, 





Art. 34: Protection from sexual 
exploitation and sexual abuse 
Grooming, sexual 
exploitation, 
inappropriate notice and 
takedown procedures of 
child sexual abuse 
material 
Art. 36: Protection from ‘all other forms 
of exploitation prejudicial to any aspects 
of the child's welfare’ 
Unfair commercial 
practices (e.g. emotional 
manipulation in online 
services, aggressive and 
immersive marketing and 
advertising), inadequate 
children’s data security 
and protection measures 
Art. 17(e): Protection of the child from 
‘information and material injurious to 
his or her well-being’ 
Unlimited exposure to 
(extreme and illegal) 
pornography or violence 
Article 16: Protection from ‘arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with (…) privacy, 
family, or correspondence’, unlawful 
attacks on child’s honour and 
reputation’ 
Unlawful and unfair 
personal data processing 
(e.g. invalid consent, 
inadequate and unclear 
information disclosure, 
ineffective data subject 
rights), personal data 
misuse, excessive parental 
monitoring, filtering and 
tracking of online 
activities. 
Art. 8: the right of the child to preserve 
his or her identity 
Online impersonation, 
profile hacking, 
ineffective right to erasure 
Art. 31: Provision and support of 
children’s rights to ‘rest and leisure, to 
engage in play and recreational 
activities appropriate to the age’ 
Lack of age-verification in 
child-inappropriate online 
services 
Art. 28 and 29: provision of an 
education that will support the 
development of child’s full potential and 




services and features, lack 





Art. 17:  provision ‘access to 
information and material from a 
diversity of national and international 
sources, especially those aimed at the 
promotion of (…) social, spiritual and 
moral well-being and physical and 
mental health 




Art. 13: the child’s right to freedom of 
expression (including ‘freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the 
form of art, or through any other media 
of the child's choice’) 
Unjustified or 
disproportionate 
limitations of online 
connections, access to 
virtual communities and 
social networking 
websites. 
Art. 15: the child’s right to freedom of 
association and peaceful assembly. 
 
Limited networking 
opportunities, restrictions  
to associate  with others 




Adapted from Sonia Livingstone (2014) Children's digital rights: a priority. Intermedia, 
42 (4/5). 20-24; UK Children’s Commissioner, ‘Growing Up Digital: A report of the 
Growing Up Digital Taskforce’ (January 2017) 
 
 
3. GDPR requirements for the data protection impact assessments 
 
The need to account for new risks to individuals created by technological, in particular 
data-driven, advances and developments has led to the introduction of a new enforced self-
regulatory tool, the DPIA, in data protection law. Under certain conditions, the DPIA has 
become a new obligation for data controllers in Europe requiring to manage risks to the rights 
and freedoms of data subjects through three interconnected processes: context description (the 
nature, scope, context and purposes of data processing, the sources of the risk), risk assessment, 
and risk mitigation.793 
In line with the risk-based approach followed by the GDPR, the DPIA is not always 
required, but only when data processing is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and 
freedoms of natural persons (Article 35(1)). Some of the examples, illustrated by Article 35(3), 
include automated data processing for the purpose of profiling intended to evaluate personal 
aspects of individuals that create legal effects or have a significant impact, processing of special 
data categories such as health data on a large scale and a systematic monitoring of public areas 
on a large scale. Although neither the GDPR in Article 35(3)794 nor the Article 29 Working 
                                                
793 Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is “likely to 
result in a high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, WP 248, 4 April 2017. 
794 The initial GDPR proposal published by the European Commission on 25 January 2012 included children’s 
data among the data categories for which the DPIA was required. Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 




Party in its recent guidelines795 explicitly ask for a mandatory DPIA for all the systems 
involving personal data about children, it acknowledges that the processing of data belonging 
to vulnerable data subjects could require a DPIA. The main reason for this is “the increased 
power imbalance between the data subject and the data controller, meaning the individual may 
be unable to consent to, or oppose, the processing of his or her data”.796 In particular, “children 
can be considered as not able to knowingly and thoughtfully oppose or consent to the 
processing of their data”.797 Also, given the fact that the GDPR establishes a non-exhaustive 
list of “high risk” data processing operations that are subject to the DPIA requirement, national 
data protection authorities might include children’s data into their lists of data processing 
operations under the DPIA obligation (Article 35.4). In addition, the Article 29 Working Party 
advices to carry out a DPIA in situations when it is not entirely clear if it is necessary according 
to the GDPR, as a DPIA is a useful tool to ensure GDPR compliance.798 Thus, in many cases, 
the DPIA will need to be conducted when personal data about children is collected, especially 
before the creation and deployment of a new product or service. 
A DPIA is not formally defined in the GDPR but, according to the Article 29 Working 
Party, it is “a process designed to describe the processing, assess the necessity and 
proportionality of a processing and to help manage the risks to the rights and freedoms of 
natural persons resulting from the processing of personal data”799. The requirements for its 
content listed in the GDPR (Article 35(7), and recitals 84, 90) include: 1) a description of the 
processing operations and their purposes, 2) the assessment of the necessity and proportionality 
of data processing, 3) the assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects 




4. Child-specific data protection impact assessments 
 
A number of data protection impact assessment and privacy impact assessment 
(hereinafter jointly referred to as (D)PIAs) frameworks exists. For example, D. Wright 
proposes a sixteen-step optimized PIA process based on a review of various existing PIA 
methodologies.800 Official bodies such as the CNIL, the ICO, and the Spanish data protection 
authority have published their (D)PIA guidelines.801 The Article 29 Working Party (A29WP) 
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799 Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is “likely to 
result in a high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, WP 248, 4 April 2017, p. 4. 
800 David Wright. Making privacy impact assessment more effective. The Information Society, 29(5):307–315, 
2013. 
801 Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Conducting Privacy Impact Assessments’ (2014) Code of Practise, 
available at: 
http://ico.org.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/topic_guides/~/media/documents/library/data_protection/p
ractical_application/pia-code-of-practice-final-draft.pdf; Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, ‘Guía 
para una Evaluación del Impacto en la Protección de Datos Personales’  (2014)       available at: 
http://www.agpd.es/portalwebAGPD/canaldocumentacion/publicaciones/common/Guias/Guia_EIPD.pdf. 
Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) 




has recently adopted its own guidelines on DPIA802. In addition, several (D)PIAs for specific 
products have been published.803 All these contributions are very useful to establish the general 
framework and to help the experts to conduct complex tasks such as deciding whether a full 
PIA is required or not, organizing the overall process (including planning, stakeholders 
consultation, resource allocation, audits, etc.) and the main analysis phases (definition of the 
stakeholders, sources of risk, privacy threats, etc.). However, the majority of them do not define 
very precisely how the technical part on risks analysis of the privacy risk assessment should be 
performed. 
In contrast, the PRIAM framework804 chosen as a methodology for this paper, precisely 
fills this gap and proposes a DPIA methodology which is both rigorous and systematic. It 
provides all the information required for the risk assessment process and indicates how they 
can be gathered by clearly listing various attribute-attribute, attribute-category and category-
category links. It also takes into account the influence of external factors such as social or legal 
norms in determining certain categories and attributes. For example, it demonstrates that 
different attributes of data such as form, retention, sensitivity, volume, etc. along with attributes 
of other components such as the system805 can help to determine categories of privacy 
weaknesses and feared events. Such links are not well-established or, at least, not well-depicted 
in other DPIA methodologies. PRIAM also allows to connect privacy weaknesses and risk 
sources to harms via feared events through harm trees.  
  The PRIAM framework relies on seven components (system, stakeholders, data, risk 
sources, feared events, harms and privacy weaknesses)806, the last five are further discussed in 
the paper. The paper does not present or discuss in detail all the steps and aspects of the PRIAM 
methodology, but focuses on the main categories and attributes of components which have to 
be dealt with in a specific way for children. For example, the representation of the system (e.g. 
based on data flow graphs) is not discussed as it is not affected by the fact that the analysis 
applies to children.   
In a nutshell, risk sources can exploit privacy weaknesses of the system to bring about 
feared events leading to privacy harms. The methodology consists of two main phases: 
information gathering and risk assessment based on harm trees. The output of the second phase 
is the risk level of a harm, expressed as the pair of severity and likelihood. The PRIAM 
framework includes, for each component: 
                                                
802 Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is “likely to 
result in a high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679. 
803 Privacy Impact Assessment for RFID Applications, 2011, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp180_annex_en.pdf. Data Protection Impact 
Assessment Template for Smart Grid and Smart Metering Systems, 2014, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014-dpia-smart-grids-forces.pdf. 
804 Sourya Joyee De, Daniel Le Métayer,  PRIAM: A Privacy Risk Analysis Methodology (PRIAM Report), 
RR-8876, Inria - Research Centre Grenoble – Rhône-Alpes, 2016, available at: hal-01302541; Privacy Risk 
Management for Federal Information Systems, 2015, available at: 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/nistir-8062/nistir-8062-draft.pdf 
805 The system encompasses the entire life-cycle of the personal data for the application (or set of applications) 
considered. It consists of various hardware and software components, e.g. the functional specification 
describing the services that it provides, the interface, the data flows, the supporting assets (e.g., hardware, 
applications, data stores, software), the actors having access to the system or interacting with it, the controls 
consisting of legal measures (e.g., contracts between data controllers and third parties) and technical 
measures (e.g., anonymization techniques, encryption schemes). See Sourya Joyee De, Daniel Le Métayer, 
PRIAM: A Privacy Risk Analysis Methodology (PRIAM Report), RR-8876, Inria - Research Centre 
Grenoble – Rhône-Alpes, 2016. 
806 Sourya Joyee De, Daniel Le Métayer, PRIAM: A Privacy Risk Analysis Methodology (PRIAM Report), RR-
8876, Inria - Research Centre Grenoble – Rhône-Alpes, 2016. 
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• a set of categories from which the relevant elements have to be chosen for a given 
system and 
• a set of attributes which have to be defined and used for the computation of the risks. 
The categories are useful to find all the relevant input information for the analysis of a given 
system. For example, data categories include, among others, health data, location data, 
financial data and contact data; stakeholder categories include data subjects, data controllers, 
data processors and third parties. The attributes of a component refer to the aspects of the 
component that can have an effect on privacy risks. For example, the precision level and the 
retention delay of the personal data collected by a system can affect the likelihood of a privacy 
risk. The value assigned to an attribute can be either qualitative (e.g., using a fixed scale such 
as {low, medium, high} or quantitative. 
The final output of a risk analysis consists of a list of potential harms with the risk level 
of a harm being presented as the pair of severity and likelihood. In PRIAM, the likelihood of a 
harm can be evaluated using harm trees, which is a convenient way to represent the relationship 
among the exploitation of privacy weaknesses by the risk sources, the feared events and the 
privacy harms and to assess their probabilities. In a nutshell, the root node of a harm tree 
denotes a harm. Leaf nodes represent privacy weaknesses exploited by the risk source for the 
particular harm. Intermediate nodes represent feared events. The tree is structured in branches 
leading to the harm. Child nodes are connected by an AND node if all of them are necessary to 
lead to the parent node and OR node if any one of them is enough to lead to the parent node.  
PRIAM is a very general methodology which has been applied to various case studies 
such as smart grids, quantified self and biometric access control systems. As shown by Sourya 
De and Le Metayer807, the methodology can also be specialized for specific application 
contexts or architectures. An interesting question, which is the focus of this paper, is its 
specialization for a specific type of data subjects, namely children in order to address their 
needs and rights presented earlier. 
 
 
5. Components and attributes of child-specific data protection impact assessments 
 
In the next sections, the paper will focus on the main components of the child-specific 
DPIAs (personal data, risk sources, feared events, privacy weaknesses and privacy harms) and 
their  attributes drawing on the PRIAM methodology. 
 
 
5.1. Personal Data 
 
The personal data involved in the processing is one of the key components of a DPIA. 
Personal data, in this paper, refers to any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person and any information allowing such a person to be singled out or treated 
differently.808 The particular types of personal data processed by the system are defined by its 
functional specification. Social networking sites, for example, according to the taxonomy 
proposed by C. Richthammer et al., collect the following 13 data categories: login data, 
                                                
807 Sourya De, Daniel Le Metayer.  A Risk-based Approach to Privacy by Design (Extended Version), Research 
Report,  RR-9001,  Inria  -  Research  Centre  Grenoble  –  Rhˆone-Alpes,  2016, available at:  hal-01420954. 
808 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1. Directive 95/46/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L 281/0031. 
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connection data, application data, mandatory and extended profile data, ratings/interests, 
network data, contextual data, private communication data, disclosed data, entrusted data, 
incidental data, disseminated data.809 
In the following, we first discuss the categories of personal data that are especially 
relevant for children (Section 5.1.1) before presenting the relevant attributes (Section 5.1.2). 
 
5.1.1. Categories of Personal Data 
 
Although all personal data related to children merit enhanced protection, some 
particular types of data collected by all information society service providers (regardless of the 
concrete application or system) can cause higher risks to children than others and their impact 
should be carefully assessed. For example, IT applications and products that collect and process 
children’s contact information, identification data, biometric data, geolocation, or data related 
to children’s behavior/habits require special attention.810 Equally, stringent protection measures 
should be envisioned when IT products and applications are designed to allow the public 
disclosure of personal data or sharing it with third parties (discussed below). 
 
5.1.1.1.  Contact and identification data 
 
Contact information constitute data that permit direct contact with a user online and 
include his or her phone number, physical address, email address, instant messaging user 
identifiers, voice over internet protocol identifiers, internet chat user identifiers, and other 
identifiers, e.g. persistent identifiers that allow users to be recognized and tracked for 
advertising and other purposes across various online services and websites. Unauthorized 
access and misuse of contact information and identification data of children may lead not only 
to minor psychological harms (e.g. undesirable commercial advertising) but also to physical 
(safety) harms, ranging from cyber or physical bullying, stalking, grooming or other types of 
physical aggression or sexual exploitation. For example, a child may be groomed and sexually 
exploited when a paedophile uses his contact or location data. 
 
5.1.1.2.  Biometric data 
 
Biometric data (biological properties, behavioural and physiological characteristics, 
living traits) are unique to a certain individual and measurable.811 They create a direct link 
between a human body and his identity due to the translation of human body traits into a 
machine-readable form.812 Raw biometric data, e.g. images of children contained in photos, 
                                                
809 C. Richthammer, M. Netter, M. Riesner and G. Pernul, "Taxonomy for Social Network Data Types from the 
Viewpoint of Privacy and User Control," 2013 International Conference on Availability, Reliability and 
Security, Regensburg, 2013, pp. 141-150. 
810 The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) in the US is one of the few examples of the laws 
which specifically focus on the protection of children’s privacy online. COPPA, for example, protects the 
following categories of personal information of children: first and last name; a home or other physical 
address including street name and name of a city or town; online contact information; a screen or user name 
that functions as online contact information; a telephone number; a social security number; a persistent 
identifier that can be used to recognize a user over time and across different websites or online services; a 
photograph, video, or audio file, where such file contains a child’s image or voice; geolocation information 
sufficient to identify street name and name of a city or town; or information concerning the child or the 
parents of that child that the operator collects online from the child and combines with an identifier 
mentioned above. 
811 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric technologies, 27 




videos, and audio files can convey a large amount of personal information about a child, such 
as information about health, race, ethnic origin, religion or political views (e.g. when wearing 
religious or political outfits or symbols) and thus images and videos can be considered sensitive 
data. For example, the Vividown case in Italy demonstrated that a video posted in Google 
Videos about a disabled child who was bullied and insulted by his classmates, contained 
sensitive data revealing the child’s health condition (autism).813 However, it would be 
impractical to subject all images from which religion or ethnicity can be inferred with various 
degrees of certainty, to stringent data protection requirements applicable to sensitive data. It is 
therefore acknowledged that images of individuals on the internet do not contain sensitive 
personal data “unless the images are clearly used to reveal sensitive data about 
individuals.”814,815 
Processing, especially disclosure, of images and videos related to children potentially 
can put their personal safety at risk. Images and videos can also contain embedded geolocation 
data. The use of facial and voice recognition technologies, makes images identifiable thus 
permitting the establishment of physical or online contact with a specific individual”.816 
Examples of such technologies used by children and generating complaints from privacy 
advocates include a facial recognition software used by Facebook to suggest tags and its new 
facial recognition app “Moments” and voice recognition deployed by the Genesis Toys in their 
"smart" toys - the My Friend Cayla doll and the i-Que Intelligent Robot.817 
In addition, some biometric data reveals physical information about a child. This 
information can be used for profiling, predicting behaviour or preferences and taking 
automated decisions and lead to discrimination, stigmatization or unwanted confrontation with 
unexpected or undesirable information.818 
Employment of biometric technologies for identification and access control purposes 
raises specific concerns in relation to children. Contrary to the storage of personal data in a row 
form (a face in photograph, a voice recording), such technologies rely on extracted personal 
characteristics that are saved as a template.  A29WP emphasizes the need of appropriate 
safeguards in place against the risks of stigmatization or discrimination of children due to their 
age or their inability to enrol in biometric systems. It stated: “(t)he use of biometrics could 
impact significantly on the dignity, privacy and the right to data protection of vulnerable people 
                                                
813 Giovanni Sartor, Mario Viola de Azevedo Cunha; The Italian Google-Case: Privacy, Freedom of Speech and 
Responsibility of Providers for User-Generated Contents. Int J Law Info Tech 2010; 18 (4): 356-378.  
814 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking, 12 June 2009, WP 
163, p. 8. 
815 The UK Information Commissioner (ICO) took a similar position regarding names and images: “Religion or 
ethnicity, or both, can often be inferred with varying degrees of certainty from dress or name. For example, 
many surnames are associated with a particular ethnicity or religion, or both, and may indicate the ethnicity 
and religion of the individuals concerned. However, it would be absurd to treat all such names as “sensitive 
personal data”, which would mean that to hold such names on customer databases you had to satisfy a 
condition for processing sensitive personal data. Nevertheless, if you processed such names specifically 
because they indicated ethnicity or religion, for example to send marketing materials for products and 
services targeted at individuals of that ethnicity or religion, then you would be processing sensitive personal 
data.” (UK Information Commissioner's Office. ‘The Guide to Data Protection’. Available at: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/the_guide_to_data_pr
otection.pdf (30.03.2010), p. 24. 
816 FTC, 2011 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule 
(COPPA), available at: https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/federal_register_notices/16-
c.f.r.part-312-childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule-proposed-rule-request-comment-proposal-amend-
rule/110915coppa.pdf 
817 EPIC et al., Complaint to the FTC, 6 December, 2016, available at: https://epic.org/privacy/kids/EPIC-IPR-
FTC-Genesis-Complaint.pdf 
818 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric technologies, 27 
April 2012, WP 193.  
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such as young children […] to complete the  enrolment  process  successfully.  Given  the  
potentially  harmful consequences  for  the  persons  concerned,  more  stringent  requirements  
will  have  to  be  met  in the  impact  assessment  process  of  any  measure  interfering  with  
an individual’s  dignity  in terms  of questioning  the necessity  and  proportionality as  well  as  
the  possibilities  of  the individual  to  exercise  his right  to  data  protection  in  order  for  that 
measure  to  be  deemed admissible.”819   
 
 
5.1.1.3.  Geolocation data 
 
Many geolocation data can be collected from children by their smart mobile devices 
through location sensors such as GPS or provided by children themselves, for instance, by 
geotagging of content on the Internet (e.g. embedding location in the videos and photos). For 
example, Flickr allows users to provide geolocation information or coordinates for their 
pictures with the help of a map interface. Geo-personalised services (including nearby places 
of interests), augmented reality, maps, geotagging, tracking the whereabouts of friends, looking 
for a person to date in the area, child control and location based advertising are just a few 
location based services used by children.820 
The main risk to privacy related to the collection of location data stems from the fact 
that many other pieces of personal data can be derived from location data.821 For example, it 
might be possible to infer the following: social relations between  individuals, itinerary of a 
journey, points of interest related to hobbies, religious beliefs, political preferences or even 
potential diseases, movement patterns of an individual and mode of transport, the age or even 
the lifestyle, and mobility semantics.822 
A recent revision of COPPA in the US explicitly included geolocation data among the 
protected categories of personal data of children. The FTC acknowledged that geolocation data 
(latitude and longitude coordinates, and may also include altitude, bearing, distance, and place 
names) is commonly embedded as hidden ‘‘metadata’’ within digital images and may be used 
by operators and accessed by the viewing public. COPPA covers the collection of geolocation 
information that is sufficient to identify the street name and the name of the town.  It does not 
require the identification of the actual address using the information at the time of 
collection.  When an application uses the child’s longitude and latitude coordinates and locates 
them precisely on a map, COPPA protections would apply. 
Empirical research indicates that many teenagers consider geolocation data sensitive. 
Pew Research Center found that around 46% of American teens have turned off location 
services on their cell phone or in an app because they were worried about other people or 
companies having access to that information.823 Some of them were concerned about their own 
                                                
819 Ibid., p. 15. 
820 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation services on smart mobile devices, 
16 May 2011, WP 185. 
821 Jesús Friginal, Jérémie Guiochet, Marc-Olivier Killijian. AMORES L1.2 - A Privacy Risk Assessment 
Methodology for Location-Based Systems, Research Report, AMORES1.2/1.0; Rapport LAAS n° 16048, 
LAAS-CNRS, 2014, available at: hal-01282191 
822 Ibid. 





parents.824 An earlier Pew Internet Project showed that about half of the parents of teens who 
owned cell phones monitored their child’s location.825 
 
5.1.1.4. Behaviour and habits 
 
Behaviour and habits (repeated site visits, interactions, keywords, online content 
production, etc.) are the core elements observed by ad network providers in order to construct 
user profiles and serve them targeted advertisements. Advertisers can potentially gain a very 
detailed picture of a data subject’s life online. Profiles can be the basis for taking decisions that 
significantly affect the child. Also, understanding of children can be manipulated by advertisers 
through various covert targeting techniques.826 A recent EU study confirms this conclusion by 
showing that although the most popular online games (from 25 studied all advergames, all 
social media games and half of the games provided through popular application platforms) 
provide embedded or targeted contextual advertisements, children have difficulty in 
recognizing marketing intent of the content, in shielding themselves from it and in taking 
decisions.827 The impact of embedded advertising is considerable on children from 
subliminally changing their behaviour and purchasing.828 Also, increasingly sophisticated 
methods to gather children’s data as they play, communicate or browse online, result in their 
constant surveillance. As Montgomery points out, the goal of these surveillance practices, that 
are used on many websites, is to create a cognitive, emotional and behavioural relationship 
between the child and the website, through micro-targeted ‘one-on-one’ marketing and 
communications strategies.829 Similar worries about the commercial surveillance of children in 
networked spaces, and its subsequent effects, have been raised by a number of academics.830 
Collection of geolocation information might also be used for user profiling through the 
collection of behavioural data. The provider of geolocation related services can gain an 
overview of habits and patterns of the child and create his extensive profile. Home, school and 
locations of other favoured places where a child travels regularly at certain times can be 
inferred.831 Data derived from the movement patterns of friends (the so-called social graph) 
can also be linked to the profile of a child.832 Given the vulnerability of children and the 
problems related to obtaining informed (parental) consent before a cookie or a similar device 
is placed or information stored in the user's terminal equipment, the Article 29 Working Party 
concludes that “ad network providers should not offer interest categories intended to serve 
                                                
824 Ibid. 
825 Amanda Lenhart, Rich Ling, Scott Campbell and Kristen Purcell, How parents and schools regulate teens’ 
mobile phones, 20 April 2010, available at: http://www.pewinternet.org/2010/04/20/chapter-four-how-
parents-and-schools-regulate-teens-mobile-phones/ 
826 Fielder, A., Gardner, W., Nairn, A. and Pitt, J., Fair Game? Assessing commercial activity on children’s 
favourite websites and online environments, UK National Consumer Council, 2008. 
827 European Commission, Study on the impact of marketing through social media, online games and mobile 




829 K. Montgomery, Youth and surveillance in the Facebook era: Policy interventions and social implications, 
Telecommunications Policy 2015 (39), 771-786. 
830 S. Grimes, Persistent and emerging questions about the use of end-user licence agreements in children's 
online games and virtual worlds. UBC Law Review, 2013 46 (3), 681-791; S. Grimes, Playing by the Market 
Rules: Promotional Priorities and Commercialization in Children’s Virtual Worlds, Journal of Consumer 
Culture 2015, 15(1), 110-134; K. Montgomery, Youth and surveillance in the Facebook era: Policy 
interventions and social implications, Telecommunications Policy 2015 (39), 771-786. 





behavioural advertising or influence children”833. In the same vein, A29WP claimed that 
“behavioural advertising is “outside the scope of a child's understanding and therefore exceed 
the boundaries of lawful processing”834. 
The GDPR emphasises that specific protection should be provided to children against 
marketing or profiling (Recital 38). More specifically, children should not be subjected to 
automated decision making based on profiling (Recital 71). Similarly, COPPA in the US 
prohibits online tracking of children under the age of 13, including sharing of their data with 
third-party services such as ad networks and analytics services. Yet, in reality, research has 
demonstrated that “over 80% of the apps potentially used by children use at least one tracking 
service, as opposed to 65% of the apps falling in other app categories”835. The same research 
identified 19 games having more than 10 third-party tracking and advertising domains.836 
Other specific data categories that might reveal behaviour and habits of a child and thus 
are to be considered in specific cases include, e.g., student data from educational institutions, 
including a child's attendance, progress in school, discipline, various assessment scores etc. 
and data related to juvenile offenders. 
 
5.1.2. Attributes of Personal Data 
 
Each data category relevant for the system under consideration should be described 
using the data attributes related to the nature of the data, the context, the purpose of data 
processing, control over data. These attributes are discussed below. 
 
5.1.2.1. Sensitivity  
 
The sensitivity attribute refers to whether the data is considered sensitive from the legal 
point of view. Children’s personal data can be considered sensitive by its very nature. Although 
in Europe, neither the Directive 95/46/EC or the national data protection laws implementing it 
nor the General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679) explicitly include personal data of 
children among the sensitive data categories, there have been several suggestions to do so.837 
Nevertheless, specific safeguards and protections apply to children’s data, showing its de facto 
sensitivity. The GDPR recognizes that children are vulnerable data subjects compared to adults, 
as “they may be less aware of risks, consequences, safeguards and their rights in relation to the 
processing of personal data”, and thus deserve specific protection of their personal data (Recital 
38). It constructs a specific, more restrictive protection regime for data controllers processing 
children’s personal data: requires verifiable parental consent before processing personal data 
of children under the age of 16 (unless the Member States choose another age limit between 
13 and 16) online, obliges data controllers to give information to children in a clear, audience-
                                                
833 Ibid., p. 17. 
834 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices, WP 202, 27 February 
2013. 
835 Irwin Reyes et al., Is Our Children’s Apps Learning?” Automatically Detecting COPPA Violations, 2017, 
available at: http://eprints.networks.imdea.org/1557/1/conpro.pdf 
836 Ibid. 
837 European Commission before starting the revision of the Directive 95/46/EC considered extending the list of 
sensitive data categories to include minor’s data, see European Commission, Stakeholders' Consultations 
“Future of data protection”, Background paper, question 4, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/events/data_protection_regulatory_framework/background_paper_en.pdf; 
Also, some Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) have proposed to add to the Directive 95/46/EC data of 





appropriate language, restricts the use of the legitimate interest as a legal ground to justify data 
processing838, and foresees additional safeguards in case of marketing and profiling. It clearly 
states that processing of children’s personal data may lead to risks, of varying likelihood and 
severity, to children’s rights and freedoms and cause harm (physical, material or non-material 
damage) (Recital 75). 
 
 
5.1.2.2 Origin describing the data source  
 
This data attribute relates to the origin of the data source, such as explicit disclosure by 
the subject, implicit disclosure (e.g. collection of IP address, MAC address, video-camera 
pictures), disclosure by a third party (e.g. friend), creation by the controller (e.g. inference). 
Explicit disclosure of personal data by an adult would be considered in compliance with the 
Directive 95/46/EC and the GDPR if, for example, based on transparent and clear information 
he or she provides free consent. In the case of children the validity of consent may be 
questioned.839 The child-specific developmental needs and interests might have an impact on 
personal data sharing online. For example, as claimed by Steijn, behaviour of adolescents on 
social media (e.g. having more contacts, posting information more frequently) can be related 
to characteristics that are typical in their life stages (i.e. relationship development and identity 
development).840 Peer pressure and the urge to explore one’s identity also contributes to the 
tendency of sharing data and images on social networks.841 In fact, oversharing of vast amounts 
of personal data online is common among children: on Facebook and Twitter 26% of youth 
publicly share their personal information, 14% even include address and telephone number in 
their profiles.842 Children might not be aware of the long-term consequences of their sharing 
activities and realize the irretrievable and persistent nature of personal data posted online.843 
Moreover, not all children not able to understand and manage their privacy settings properly.844 
Default-settings (they rarely set the highest level of privacy protection), therefore, might have 
a direct influence on the online behavior and practices of children. Often children may not 
comprehend and skip reading privacy policies, especially because of their difficult language 
and length.845 Services targeting or attracting children often fail to provide effective and reliable 
mechanisms through which parents can give their consent on behalf of their children.846 
                                                
838 Article 6 of the GDPR sates that data processing shall be lawful when processing is necessary for the 
purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests 
are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require 
protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. 
839 S. Van der Hof, I Agree, or Do I: A Rights-Based Analysis of the Law on Children's Consent in the Digital 
World, 34 Wis. Int'l L.J., 2016, 409 - 445. 
840 W. Steijn, Developing a sense of privacy, Phd dissertation, Tilburg University, 2014, available at: 
https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/7737309/Steijn_Developing_05_09_2014_emb_tot_06_09_2015.pdf. 
841 Marwick, A., Murgia-Diaz, D. and Palfrey, J. (2010), "Youth, Privacy and Reputation" (Literature Review), 
Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2010-5, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1588163, p. 5. 
842 YPRT (Youth Protection Roundtable) (2009), Stiftung Digitale Chancen. Youth Protection Toolkit. 
Available at www.yprt.eu/transfer/assets/final_YPRT_Toolkit.pdf, 2009, p. 11. 
843 Ibid. 
844 Livingstone, Sonia and Ólafsson, Kjartan and Staksrud, Elisabeth, Social networking, age and privacy, EU 
Kids Online, London, UK, 2011. 
845 UK Children’s Commissioner (2017) Growing up Digital: A Report of the Growing Up Digital Taskforce, 
January 2017. 
846 In 2015, 29 data protection authorities from around the world carried out a Global Privacy Sweep (i.e. a joint 
review of 1494 websites and apps directed towards children). In their final report they stated that “although 
many sites and apps claimed in their privacy policies to preclude access to children under a specified age, 
only 15% of websites and apps swept had age verification or gating to bar younger children from accessing 
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If children cannot fully control and comprehend explicit data disclosure online, implicit 
data disclosure (e.g. online tracking and profiling) is even more problematic. In fact, as noted 
above, data protection authorities consider that behavioural advertising, which is often based 
on the surreptitious use of cookies as web tracking devices, is “outside the scope of a child's 
understanding”847. 
In addition to excessive voluntary sharing, personal information can also be spread 
online by others. For example, ‘tagging’, i.e., a way to link a person to a picture, location or 
event, is an increased information sharing practice, often happening without consent from the 
persons concerned.  Dooley et al. found that more than 40% of young people had pictures of 
themselves uploaded online without their permission848, Lenhart observed that 6% of youth 
reported having an embarrassing photo of them uploaded online without their prior 
permission.849 Sharenting is an emerging practice, when parents overshare the detailed 
information about their children on social networking sites without children’s knowledge or 
consent.850 Minkus et al. revealed that 35% of the  2,383  observed Facebook users publicly 
shared at least one photo of a child, while from the users in the age group of 30 to 49,  43% 
shared a photo of a child on their public  pages.851   
 
 
5.1.2.3.  Purpose 
 
Data processing systems can be created for different purposes. A distinction should be 
made between commercial and public or child best interest purposes of data processing (e.g. 
welfare, education, social security, health services). The purpose and the nature of the 
underlying relationship between the controller and the data subjects, whether it is commercial 
or otherwise, are important considerations in relation to legitimacy of the data processing. 
The specific purpose of data processing is important when assessing possible negative 
impacts on data subjects and it is a prerequisite for other data quality requirements, such as 
adequacy, relevance and proportionality, accuracy and completeness, and requirements 
regarding the duration of data retention. Personal data can be “collected for specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those 
purposes” (Article 5 GDPR).  In a narrow sense, in order for the purposes to be legitimate, the 
processing must at all times be based on at least one of the legal grounds provided for data 
processing, ranging from consent of the data subject to a balance of interests test (Article 6 
Directive 95/46/EC and 6 GDPR). However, in a broad sense, the legitimate purpose also 
                                                
the site or app. Sweepers also found that some of those controls did not function (e.g., a child indicating she 
was 10 years old could still access the site) and others were only passive (e.g., a pop-up indicating that a child 
below a specified age should not access the site). Noteworthy, only 24% of sites and apps swept encouraged 
parental involvement.” GPEN, ‘2015 GPEN Sweep - Children’s Privacy’, 2015, available at: 
http://194.242.234.211/documents/10160/0/GPEN+Privacy+Sweep+2015.pdf 
847 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices, WP 202, 27 February 
2013. 
848 Dooley, J.J., Cross, D., Hearn, L. and Treyvaud, R., "Review of existing Australian and international cyber-
safety research". Child Health Promotion Research Centre, Edith Cowan University, Perth, 2009, available at 
www.dbcde.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/119416/ECU_Review_of_existing_Australian_and_internati
onal_cyber-safety_research.pdf, p. 11 
849 Lenhart, Amanda, Cyberbullying and Online Teens, Pew Internet & American Life Project, 27 June 2007, 
available at: http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/216/report_display.asp 
850 Stacey Steinberg, “Sharenting: Children’s Privacy in the Age of Social Media” University of Florida Levin 
College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No 16-41, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2711442 
851 Tehila Minkus, Kelvin Liu and Keith W. Ross, Children Seen But Not Heard: When Parents Compromise 
Children’s Online Privacy, 2015, available at: http://cse.poly.edu/~tehila/pubs/WWW2015children.pdf  
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“requires that the purposes must be in accordance with all provisions of  applicable  data  
protection  law,  as  well  as other  applicable  laws such  as employment law, contract law, 
consumer protection law”852. This means that when determining whether a particular purpose 
is legitimate data controllers should consider all forms of written and common law, 
constitutional   principles, fundamental rights, jurisprudence, and other elements such as codes 
of conduct, codes of ethics, and  the  general  context  and  facts  of  the  case.853 The list of 
child rights provided earlier in this paper thus constitutes one of such considerations. Consumer 
protection law, in particular the rules on unfair commercial practices and vulnerable consumers, 
is another important source of law to be considered. For example, the use of certain techniques 
such advergames can have a manipulative effect with such techniques often implementing 
personal data gathering as part of the commercial offering.854 Given the gamification of the 
personal data collection it is arguable that such a technique could fall foul of the fairness test 
in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.855 Also more generally, due to the vulnerability 
of children, the collection of their personal data for direct advertising purposes may result in 
the personalisation having an undue influence on the decision-making capacity of the child. 
Therefore, the collection of data of children who have not reached a sufficient degree of 
maturity for marketing purposes has been declared as illegitimate by some data protection 
authorities.856 Similarly, the Article 29 Working Party has made it clear that direct marketing 
should not be aimed at children and that data (e.g. data about children’s interests) should not 
be collected from children with the purpose to serve behavioural advertising or influence 
them.857 
Data controllers should not only ensure that the purpose for data processing is 
legitimate, but also that any further processing is compatible with the initially specified 
purpose. Purpose compatibility should be more rigidly evaluated when data controllers process 
personal data of children.858 
 
 
5.1.2.4.  Retention 
 
This data attribute relates to the period of time after which the data will be deleted. 
Irrelevant data cannot be retained by the data controllers (Article 6(e) Directive 95/46/EC and 
5(1e) GDPR). As noted by the A29WP, “(b)ecause children are  developing,  the  data  relating  
to  them  change,  and  can  quickly  become outdated and irrelevant to the original purpose of 
collection”.859 
Data retention is affected by an enhanced possibilities that the GDPR provides for children to 
erase their personal data (Article 17 GDPR). The right to erasure (“right to be forgotten”) is 
                                                
852 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation, 2 April 2013, WP 203, p. 20. 
853 Ibid. 
854 V. Verdoodt, D. Clifford, E. Lievens, Toying with Children’s Emotions, the New Game in Town? The 
Legality of  Advergames in the EU, 32 Computer Law & Security Review, 2016, 599 – 614. 
855 Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the 
internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive), 11.06.2005, L149/22. 
856 Opinion 38/2002 of the Belgian Data Protection Authority relating to the protection of the privacy of minors 
on the Internet, availabe at: 
http://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/avis_38_2002.pdf, p. 5. 
857 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking, 12 June 2009, p. 
12, Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising, 22 June 2010, p. 17. 
858 Opinion 2/2009 on the protection of children's personal data  (General Guidelines and the special case of 




particularly aimed at children in online environments, when their data is collected based on 
consent, and allows children to remove personal information that may be damaging to their 
reputation and personality. It can be exercised even if an individual is no longer a child. 
 
 
5.1.2.5.  Intervenability 
  
Intervenability refers to control over data and the possibilities for the data subject to 
exercise his rights (access, modification, deletion, challenge, etc.). The rights of children as 
data subjects (the right to be informed, the right of access and correction/deletion/blocking, and 
the right to object) are the same in their nature as the rights of adults, but are particular in terms 
of their (often indirect) exercise. Access to the child’s personal data and consequently other 
rights will normally be exercised by the child’s representative, i.e. his parent or legal guardian, 
but as noted by the Article 29 Working Party, in some circumstances the child's right to privacy 
may prevail over the representative’s right of access.860 Data controllers should always take 
into consideration the best interests of the child, national laws, the age of the child and who - 
the child or the representative - provided the data. The latter indicates the degree of child’s 
maturity and autonomy. In the UK, for example, children from the age of 12 can exercise their 
right of access alone861, but in many other EU Member States this age limit is not explicitly 
defined. Therefore, not providing a child (when he is mature enough) the possibility to update, 
modify, correct or challenge incorrect or outdated data about himself might create a stronger 
possibility of a feared event of inaccurate data processing. 
In contrast to adults, children may not be aware of their data subject’s rights. Therefore, 
data controllers are required to inform the child of their rights in a clear and accessible 
language.  
When the data subject has the right to object to the processing on compelling legitimate 
grounds (when data is processed based on Art 7 e) and f) of Directive 95/46/EC) these grounds 
can be particularly compelling in case of children.862  
 
 
5.2. Risk Sources 
 
A risk source is any entity (individual or organization) which may process (legally or 
illegally) data belonging to a data subject and whose actions may directly or indirectly, 
intentionally or unintentionally lead to privacy harms. The literature often refers to the 
adversary or the attacker. But, here, we prefer to use the term “risk sources” as it is less security 
connotated and is not limited to malicious actors. In the following, we first discuss the 
categories of risk sources that are especially relevant for children (Section 5.2.1) before 




                                                
860 Ibid. 
861 UK Data Protection Act 1998 has a special section on the exercise of rights in Scotland by children which 
states:  “where a question falls to be determined in Scotland as to the legal capacity of a person under the age 
of sixteen years to exercise any right conferred by any provision of this Act, that person shall be taken to 
have that capacity where he has a general understanding of what it means to exercise that right.” It further 
specifies: “a person of twelve years of age or more shall be presumed to be of sufficient age and maturity to 
have such understanding”. 
862 See the data subject's right to object in Article 14 of the Directive 95/46/EC and Article 21 of the GDPR 
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5.2.1. Categories of risk sources 
 
The general categories of risk sources to be considered are: insiders (eg., system 
administrator, employee), outsiders (eg., users of the system), the data controller itself, 
governments and law enforcement bodies, criminals and other organizations. These categories 
can be derived from actors and interface attributes of the system, the data flow view attribute 
of the stakeholders and the categories of data involved. The actors attribute specifies various 
roles in the organization of the data controller that may act as risk sources. The interface 
attribute determines the contact points between the system and the external world and hence 
helps identifying the potential risk sources outside the system, such as hackers, friends, 
acquaintances or family of data subjects, etc. The data flow view identifies different 
stakeholders that handle the data and enables to identify stakeholders such as third parties, other 
data subjects, data processors and data controllers themselves as potential risk sources. 
The specific categories of risk sources that are relevant to children’s data processing 
systems are data controllers themselves and related third parties, outsiders like hackers, trusted 
individuals like friends, family members or others with whom the child may interact frequently, 
such as teachers. For example, third parties like ad network providers can be classified as risk 
sources as they collect, aggregate and link children’s personal data in order to create their 
profiles.  
Two particular risk sources merit further discussion in the case of children. First, friends 
are normally very closely trusted by children and thus they might often have a detailed 
background information about the data subject. Steeves et al.863 show that youth do not think 
it is risky to share email addresses and passwords with their friends. Disclosure of personal 
data easily becomes a mean to maintain intimate relations with friends.864 A way for friends to 
control the social networking sites on behalf of password owners is a demonstration of trust 
similar to telling to a friend a combination for a locker in the offline world.865 
Yet, the notion of friends itself should be critically assessed in the digital context. As 
Livingstone asserts, youth “work with a subtle classification of ‘friends’, graded in terms of 
intimacy, which is poorly matched by the notion of ‘public’ and ‘private’ designed into social 
networking sites.”866 Ties between friends on social networks can be weak.867 Children, 
especially teenagers, view different social environments as multiple and possibly overlapping, 
making distinction between various groups of friends, parents, future employers, a process 
called “audience segregation”.868 They create and use different partial identities according to 
different contexts.869 
Second, in specific circumstances children have the right to privacy against their own 
parents. The complexity of privacy boundaries within the family have been evidenced by 
academics.870  As a result, parents although being the primary representatives of children and 
                                                
863 V. Steeves and C. Webster, Closing the barn door: the effect of parental supervision on Canadian children's 
online privacy. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 2008, 28(1), p. 419. 
864 Ibid. 
865 Ibid. 
866 S. Livingstone, Taking risky opportunities in youthful content creation: teenagers' use of  social networking 
sites for intimacy, privacy and self-expression. New Media Society, 2008, 10(3), 393-411, p. 404. 
867 Gross, Ralph, and Alessandro Acquisti, Information revelation and privacy in online social networks, 
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society. ACM, 2005. 
868 B. van den Berg, R. Leenes, Keeping Up Appearances: Audience Segregation in Social Network Sites. In: 
Gutwirth S., Poullet Y., De Hert P., Leenes R. (eds) Computers, Privacy and Data Protection: an Element of 
Choice. Springer, Dordrecht, 2011. 
869 danah boyd, It's Complicated: the Social Lives of Networked Teens, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2014. 
870 Newell BC, Metoyer C and Moore AD (2015) Privacy in the family. In: Roessler B and Mokrosinska D (eds) 
Social Dimensions of Privacy: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
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their interests, can also  potentially invade their own children’s privacy and become risk 
sources. For example, by using the right of access to personal data on behalf of their (more 
mature) children, parents could learn about their children’s online activities. Also, parents can 
sell or publish children’s personal data breaching the privacy of their children. In this case, 
children might have difficulties in exercising their right to delete their data and lodge a 
complaint as they need a legal guardian. To protect their right to privacy, children who are 
mature enough to understand that their privacy has been breached, should have the right to be 
heard by data controllers and competent authorities.871 
 
5.2.2. Attributes of risk sources 
 
Each risk source must be described using the following attributes. The first attribute is 
the relationships between the risk sources and different stakeholders. Such relationship can be 
defined as 1) insider / outsider, describing whether the risk source works within the data 
controller organization or not; 2) individual / organization describing whether the risk source 
acts as an individual or as an organization; 3) the relationship with data subjects describing 
trust relationships between risk sources and data subjects. For example, a friend or a family 
member is usually trusted by the data subject, whereas limited trust is placed on the service 
provider or a service technician. 
The second attribute is the level of motivation of the risk source. Such motivation can 
relate to the potential value of the privacy breach for the risk source (e.g., financial benefit, 
retaliation, thrill, etc.) and all incentives and dis-incentives (e.g., the risk of being caught). 
The third attribute refers to resources available to the risk source. Background 
information, i. e., additional information available to the risk source, may help it to carry out a 
privacy breach (e.g., detailed knowledge of the system, security flaws, etc.). Other attributes 
that should be considered are access rights to different types of data being processed by the 
system (for e.g., a system administrator may already have access to some data whereas other 
employees do not) and tools or skills, and computation power available to the risk source. 
The values of some of the above attributes such as insider/outsider, 
individual/organization and relationship with data subjects can influence the values of other 
attributes such as background information, motivation/fear, access rights, etc. The fact that the 
risk source is an insider or outsider can strongly determine whether it possesses access rights 
to personal data, background information and also influences the nature of tools/skills or 
computation power it possesses and its possible motivation/fear.  
A system administrator in charge of a critical sub-system can be assumed to have 
extensive knowledge about the system including its weaknesses and may have been given 
access rights to personal data processed by the system. However, being in such a responsible 
position, he may be subject to constant scrutiny (possibly at a higher level than other 
employees) and hence, expect high chances of getting caught and fear losing his job and other 
severe punishments if he tries to exploit a privacy weakness. Similarly, a risk source’s 
relationship with the data subject strongly determines the background information he has and 
also influences his motivation/ fear. For example, as discussed above, friends may be deemed 
more trustworthy by a chid (making him prone to share secret information such as passwords 
than by an adult. Also, when a data subject is a child a close family member may be able to 
have substantially more background information about a child than in the case of an adult data 
subject. Family members may even have information about the child about which the child 
                                                
104–121. Shmueli B and Blecher-Prigat A (2011) Privacy for children. Columbia Human Rights Law Review 
42: 759–795. 
871 Opinion 2/2009 on the protection of children's personal data  (General Guidelines and the special case of 
schools)  WP 160, 11 February 2009. 
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himself is not well aware (e.g., health data). However, family members will generally have less 
motivation to invade children’s privacy. If the risk source is an organization (such as a third 
party), it may have high financial motivations to, for example, re-identify anonymized data to 
utilize it for its own business purposes. Risk sources backed by an organization will also 
generally have higher financial and technical resources and hence possess better tools/skills 
and computation power than individual risk sources. 
The value of a privacy breach for a risk source is influenced by the data attributes 
precision, sensitivity and volume. Sensitive data such as financial data, health data definitely 
have more appeal to a risk source. Similarly, high volume and precision data may be attractive 
to a risk source because of the possibilities of data inference that they provide. 
 
 
5.3. Feared events 
 
A feared event is an event of the system that might occur as a result of the exploitation 
of one or more privacy weaknesses and may lead to privacy harms. We introduce a distinction 
between feared events which are “technical events” and privacy harms (defined in the next 
section) which correspond to the impact of feared events on people. In the following, we first 
discuss the exemplar categories of feared events that are especially relevant for children 
(Section 5.3.1) before presenting the relevant attributes (Section 5.3.2). 
 
 
5.3.1. Categories of feared events 
 
Categories of feared events that a privacy analyst should consider when processing 
personal data are closely related to the data protection principles and the grounds for lawful 
data processing listed in the data protection law.872 The most relevant examples of the 
categories of feared events in applications and services requested and delivered over the 
internet (information society services) that process children’s data include: 
 
1) Excessive data collection (e.g., collection of data from children regarding members of 
their family, such as data relating to the professional activity of the parents, financial 
information, sociological or any other such data, without the consent of the persons to 
whom such data refers). Excessive data collection could infringe the principles of 
purpose limitation and data minimisation873. These principles require to process 
personal data only for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and collect adequate, 
relevant and limited to the specified purposes data. 
2) Unauthorized access to data (e.g., access to data by hackers) and unauthorised 
modification of data (e.g., modification of data by the service provider). Lack of 
appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or 
unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, would infringe 
the principle of data integrity and confidentiality874. 
3) Use of data for unauthorized purposes (e.g., use of browsing data by the data controller 
to build detailed profiles) and unjustified data inference or re-identification (e.g., 
inference about child’s sleeping patterns from Facebook access data). Processing of 
personal data for unspecified or incompatible purposes with the initially defined 
purposes could infringe the principle of lawfulness, fairness and transparency and the 
                                                
872 Articles 6 and 7 of the Directive 95/46/EC, Articles 5 and 6 of the GDPR. 
873 Article 5 Part 1 (b) and (c) of the GDPR. 
874 Article 5 part 1 (f) of the GDPR 
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principle of purpose limitation.875 Fairness and transparency require specific and more 
rigid interpretation in the case of children’s data processing, as discussed below. 
4) Storage or use of inaccurate data (e.g., not providing children the ability to update, 
modify, correct or challenge incorrect or outdated data about himself). Processing of 
outdated or otherwise inaccurate personal data could infringe the data accuracy 
principle.876 Accuracy of children’s personal data can change particularly quickly due 
to their growth. If no easy way to access and correct or delete inaccurate personal data 
is ensured by the data controller, data subject’s rights might be also violated.877 
5) Disclosure of data to unauthorized actors or unauthorized publication (e.g., data 
controllers giving access to data to third parties without data subject’s consent or with 
expired parental consent as the child reached the age at which he can consent). 
Unauthorised data disclosure to third parties would infringe the principle of lawful, fair 
and transparent data processing.878 
6) Retaining data more than necessary (e.g. lack of deletion or ineffective deletion of 
personal data). Unnecessary data storage could contradict the storage limitation 
principle, which requires to store personal data no longer than necessary for the 
purposes for which the data were collected.879 It is allowed to process personal data, 
however, for longer periods in specific cases, e.g. archiving purposes in the public 
interest, scientific, historical research or statistical purposes, under defined conditions. 
In relation to children’s personal data, particular attention should be paid to the 
interpretation of some principles relating to the processing of personal data and the grounds for 
lawful data processing. First, the principle of fairness must be awarded a broader scope when 
children’s data is processed.880 It requires not only to collect data in a transparent manner but 
also to act with the utmost good faith, such as to handle personal data only in ways data subjects 
would reasonably expect and not to use personal data in ways that unjustifiably causes a 
negative impact on individuals.881 For example, on an individual level, a “derogatory, 
threatening and abusive online postings” by organisations or individuals acting for non-
domestic purposes, can be considered unfair882. In a commercial context, deceptive or 
manipulative data collection practices from children (e.g. advergames, manipulative and 
aggressive tracking) would be unfair. 
Second, to comply with the lawfulness requirement data controllers need to rely on an 
appropriate legal ground for children’s data processing. The most common legal ground is data 
                                                
875 Article 5 part 1 (a) and (b) of the GDPR. 
876 Article 5 part 1 (d) of the GDPR 
877 Articles 12-22 of the GDPR 
878 Article 5 part 1 (a) of the GDPR. 
879 Article 5 part 1 (b) of the GDPR. 
880 Bygrave defines fairness as a principle: “at a very general level, the notion of fairness undoubtedly means 
that, in striving to achieve their data processing goals, data controllers must take account of the interests and 
reasonable expectations of data subjects; controllers cannot ride roughshod over these. This means that the 
collection and further processing of personal data must be carried out in a manner that does not, in the 
circumstances, intrude unreasonably upon the data subjects’ privacy nor interfere unreasonably with their 
autonomy and integrity. In other words, fairness requires balance and proportion. These requirements are 
applicable not just at the level of individual data processing operations; they are equally applicable to the way 
in which the information systems supporting such operations are designed and structured.” Lee A Bygrave, 
Core principles of data protection, 7(9) Privacy Law and Policy Reporter, 2001, 169. 
881 UK Information Commissioner’s Office, The Guide to Data Protection, 11 May 2016, available at: 
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection-2-4.pdf On the detailed discussion of the 
principles of fairness in data protection law also see D. Clifford  and J. Ausloos, 'Data Protection and the 
Role of Fairness', CiTiP Working Paper 29/2017, at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3013139 
882 ICO, Social networking and online forums–when does the DPA apply?, Data Protection Act 
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subject’s consent. For this ground to be valid consent has to be freely given, specific, informed 
and unambiguous. Where services requested and delivered over the internet are directed to a 
child under 16 years old (unless a Member State’s national laws set a lower age which cannot 
go below the age of 13), processing of his personal data is lawful only if consent is given or 
authorised by the holder of parental responsibility over the child (Article 8 GDPR). To acquire 
a valid parental consent, the data controller has to reliably establish that a child is under the 
default age of consent (i.e. to verify child’s age) and to make reasonable efforts to ensure that 
consent was given by a parent or a legal representative. 
Third, data controllers should make extra efforts to guarantee transparency for children. 
Children, and even many adults, encounter difficulties in reading and understanding privacy 
policies. Bonneau and Priebusch in their assessment of privacy policies of social networking 
sites showed “great diversity in the length and content of formal privacy policies” and, 
evidenced that “almost all policies are not accessible to ordinary users due to obfuscating legal 
jargon”.883 As one could expect, users are reluctant to read such complex and long documents. 
A recent Eurobarometer survey in EU Member States showed that 56% of internet and online-
platform adult users do not read terms and conditions at all while a further 18% read them 
without taking them into account.884 As a result, “if a child lacks the knowledge or 
understanding of data protection rules then they are unlikely to appreciate that SNSs are 
processing their personal data when they post it online, nor are they likely to appreciate that 
some personal data is considered “sensitive” and should be subject to more stringent processing 
conditions (for example, if they upload a photo of a Hanukkah celebration)”.885 
The GDPR obliges data controllers to give information to all data subjects in clear, 
audience-appropriate language before their personal data is collected. Recital 58 of the GDPR 
frames this requirement in relation to children as giving information ‘in such a clear and plain 
language that the child can easily understand’. This means that a full privacy policy providing 
detailed information to users about the processing of their personal data should be always 
available but that in addition service providers should create notices that are meaningful and 
meet the specific needs of children in the target group of the service. In other words, child-
adapted information should be complementary and cannot be used as a substitute when 
implementing the requirement886 - for which data controllers are held accountable - to provide 
detailed information to data subjects according to EU data protection law.887 As regards the 
form of child-appropriate information, data controllers should adapt information to the child’s 
level of maturity.888  
A broad range of suggestions has been made on how to improve the understanding and 
readability of the information provided to the users in general, such as “multi-layered” privacy 
                                                
883 Joseph Bonneau and Sören Preibusch, The Privacy Jungle: On the Market for Data Protection in Social 
Networks, the Eighth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, London, 24 June 2009, available 
at: http://www.jbonneau.com/doc/BP09-WEIS-privacy_jungle.pdf 
884 European Commission, “Special Eurobarometer 447: Online platforms” (June 2016), availabe at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-24/ebs_447_en_16136.pdf, 65 
885 Karen Mc Cullagh, The General Data Protection Regulation: a partial success for children on social network 
sites?’, in Tobias Bräutigam and Samuli Miettinen (eds.) Data Protection, Privacy And European Regulation 
in the Digital Age, Unigrafia, Helsinki, 2016. 
886 Article 10 of Directive 95/46/EC and Article 13 of the GDPR require to provide detailed information to users 
about the processing of their data, describing, amongst others, the processing activities that data controllers 
may carry out (such as further using the data for profiling, data mining, etc), the rights of individuals and how 
they can exercise them. 
887 EDPS, Opinion on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - "European Strategy for a 
Better Internet for Children", 17 July 2012. 
888 Opinion 2/2009 on the protection of children's personal data (General Guidelines and the special case of 
schools) WP 160, 11 February 2009. 
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notices889 or visceral notices890. Less has been written on how to adapt the information to 
children’s needs.891 One of the suggestions, made by the European Commission, to the industry 
is to implement “contextual information” of every piece of personal data collected to set up an 
online profile.892 The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) has clarified that such 
“contextual information” could mean that service providers inform children about “the level of 
sensitivity of each piece of information they provide when creating an online profile” and about 
“potential risks or harms they may encounter with the disclosure of such information to a 
restrained, larger or indefinite number of people”.893 For this purposes, the EDPS has 
suggested, that industry could develop a common taxonomy to explain the level of such 
potential harms (e.g. the possible harm that might be caused by the acceptance of cookies, 
profiling or identification) and sensitivity of each piece of personal data.894 Another possibility 
for creating child-adapted privacy policies and testing their comprehensiveness among children 
is to involve children themselves. Academics have shown that children’s participation is 
particularly useful in identifying transparency and privacy issues in order to consider their 
implications in the reformulation of privacy policies.895 Innovative mechanisms, such as 
participatory design, co-creation sessions or collaborative platforms can be used for developing 
child adapted information and protection tools.896 
Consultation with children as key stakeholders and the incorporation of their views, 
needs and interests in all the matters affecting them is a requirement under Article 12 of the 
UN CRC. It is also a recommendation for industry issued by the ITU897 and part of the 
Corporate Social Responsibility in relation to respect for human rights. 898 
 
5.3.2. Attributes of feared events 
 
The first important attribute of a feared event is its scale. Scale refers to the number of 
potential individuals whose personal data is concerned by a feared event. For example, public 
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890 Calo (2012), 1033. 
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892 European Commission, Communication on a "European Strategy for a Better Internet for Children", COM 
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data disclosure may happen for some, but not all users, since not all users use the default 
privacy setting. However, if the data controller discloses data intentionally to third parties it 
may do so for all users. This attribute should not be confused with the victims attribute of the 
harm component. Usually, the number of victims of a feared event is smaller than the number 
of victims of the corresponding harm. For example, behavioral trends observed for a small 
group of individuals (victims of the feared event) of a particular age or gender may often be 
generalized for all individuals (victims of the harm) belonging to the same group. 
A second attribute of a feared event is irreversibility, i.e., the difficulty with which the 
feared event can be reversed. Two main factors influence irreversibility: the extent of exposure 
of the personal data and the technical difficulty to reverse the effect of a feared event. As to the 
first factor, it may be difficult to remove all traces of personal data once disclosed to the public 
online. The second factor depends on the intervenability attribute of the data. The settings of a 
social networking site may be poorly designed thus becoming a technical obstacle for a child 
who wants to remove an embarrassing information about him posted by a friend. 
 
 
5.4. Privacy Weaknesses 
 
A privacy weakness is a weakness in the data protection mechanisms (whether 
technical, organizational or legal) of a system or lack thereof that can ultimately result in 
privacy harms. Privacy weaknesses include: 1) weaknesses introduced by design choices or 
choices of functionalities; 2) system design errors and 3) implementation errors. Privacy 
weaknesses due to implementation errors or design flaws are akin to vulnerabilities in 
traditional computer security. Privacy weaknesses due to design choices or the definition of 
the functionalities of the system itself are specific to privacy. Typically, the excessive 
collection of data can be a deliberate choice (either at specification time or at design time) to 
accumulate data that could be exploited in the future. In the following, we discuss the 
categories of privacy weaknesses (5.4.1) that are especially relevant for children and their 
attributes (5.4.2.). 
 
5.4.1. Categories of privacy weaknesses 
 
Specific categories of potential privacy weaknesses of the systems processing children’s 
data are the following: 
- Inappropriate interface that is difficult to understand or misleading for a child 
Specific design choices that are not user-friendly and implemented into the system can facilitate 
excessive personal data disclosure. For example, empirical research shows that children 
experience problems in finding privacy protecting tools, such as privacy settings to limit 
personal data sharing. According to the Net Children Go Mobile project, only around half 
(55%) of 11-13 years old children in Europe are able to change the privacy settings of their 
social network profiles.899 
As a result, privacy by design and the use of Privacy Enhancing Technologies are 
particularly important in data processing activities targeting children. One of the essential 
requirements is the  implementation of age-appropriate privacy settings by default. Although 
basic default settings should be embedded by default for all users, such settings for children 
                                                
899 Giovanna Mascheroni and Kjartan Ólafsson, Net children go mobile: risks and opportunities (2nd edn 
Educatt, Milan 2014)  
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should be more protective.900 The EDPS has noted, for example, that “it would be particularly 
appropriate to have specific settings implemented on online social networking sites used by 
children, such as a tool checking the age of friends before a child can accept them, combined 
with settings providing for an additional check by the parents or the legal guardians of children, 
to validate in order to get adult friends.”901 When designing the system, attention should be 
paid not only to the initial default settings, but also to their changes which should be 
accompanied by clear information and warnings in a clearly understandable language for 
children about the impact and potential harms.902 Also, the possibility to change the default 
settings should be related to the age and maturity of the child and when necessary parental 
consent should be obtained before a child can change the default settings.903 
 
- Excessive data collection through age and parental consent verification mechanisms   
Some age and consent verification implementations may lead to excessive data collection of a 
large number of both children and adults, and diminish anonymity online. For example, instead 
of verifying that an individual is above a certain age threshold the data controller asks for the 
exact age of a person or even fully identifies an individual based on his age and other pieces of 
personal data (name, ID number, etc.). 
 
- Unauthorised data collection by third parties 
For instance, the surreptitious use of cookies as web tracking devices would undoubtedly be an 
unauthorised collection of personal data given that consent as defined in the GDPR is required 
as per Article 5(3) e-Privacy Directive.904 Moreover, given that the e-Privacy Directive relies 
on the definition of consent as provided for in the GDPR, it is also unclear how a child could 
consent to the placing of information or the accessing of information already stored (such as a 
cookie) on the terminal equipment of the user. As such, in the context of services directed 
towards children one must question whether such technologies are in fact permissible outside 
of the two exemptions provided for in the e-Privacy Directive (i.e. for functional cookies) given 
the requirements relating to parental consent. In addition, one must also wonder how the cookie 
consent rules will apply in practice to general services which although not specifically targeted 
to children are often used by them. 
 




Exploitability values of some relevant privacy weaknesses of the system can be: 
 
1. Low means difficult to exploit (for e.g., the associated data is encrypted, not visible to 
many actors or properly de-identified, the concerned supporting assets are difficult to access 
by risk sources); 
 
                                                
900 EDPS (2012), Opinion on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - "European 




904 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (e-Privacy 
Directive), Official Journal [2002] OJ L 201/37. 
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2. Medium means exploitable with moderate difficulty (e.g., the associated data is 
unencrypted but is of low volume and precision or not properly de-identified, the concerned 
supporting assets are moderately difficult to access by risk sources); 
 
3. High means easily exploitable (e.g., the associated data is unencrypted, is of high 
volume or precision, not de-identified at all, the concerned supporting assets can be very easily 
accessed by risk sources, associated data is visible to risk sources, no possibilities of 
intervention by data subject, etc.). 
 
The values are assumed to be assigned by a privacy expert. 
     
 
5.5. Privacy Harms 
 
Privacy harm assessment is the ultimate goal of the analysis. A privacy harm is the 
negative impact on a data subject, or a group of data subjects, or the society as a whole, from 
the standpoint of physical, mental, or financial well-being or reputation, dignity, freedom, 
acceptance in society, self-actualization, domestic life, freedom of expression, or any 
fundamental right, resulting from one or more feared events. In the following, we first discuss 
the categories of privacy harms that are especially relevant for children (Section 3.5.1) before 
presenting the relevant attributes (Section 3.5.2.). 
 
5.5.1. Categories of privacy harms 
 
The relevant privacy harms are derived from the feared events and external factors such 
as societal norms, legal environment, etc. The following categories of harms have been 
identified in previous works905 and should be considered in the DPIA: 
 
 
5.5.1.1. Physical harms 
 
Physical harms are linked to physical ailments, death, injury, etc. For example, a 
criminal may stalk and injure a child or a sexual predator may exploit a child after coming to 
know his precise location every evening from check-ins posted by the individual on a social 
networking site. In one of the few cases directly related to personal data of children online 
brought before the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) K.U. v. Finland, when physical 
and moral welfare of a child was threatened the ECtHR emphasised the vulnerability of 
children.906 KU, a 12-year old applicant, lodged a complaint because an unknown person 
placed an advertisement on a dating site on the internet in his name, without his knowledge. 
The advertisement included KU’s personal data, such as age and year of birth, gave a detailed 
description of his physical characteristics and provided a link to his web page with his picture. 
In the advertisement, it was claimed that KU was looking for an intimate relationship with a 
boy of his age or older. The ECtHR emphasized ‘the potential threat to the applicant’s physical 
                                                
905 Ryan Calo. Boundaries of Privacy Harm, The. Ind. LJ, 86:1131, 2011; Julie E Cohen. Examined lives: 
Informational privacy and the subject as object. Stanford Law Review, pp. 1373–1438, 2000. Paul M 
Schwartz. Privacy and democracy in cyberspace. Vand. L. Rev., 52:1607,1999. Paul M Schwartz and Daniel 
J Solove. PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, The. NYUL Rev., 
86:1814, 2011. Daniel J Solove. A taxonomy of privacy. University of Pennsylvania law review, pages 477–
564, 2006. 
906 App no. 2872/02, 2009, 48 EHRR 52. 
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and mental welfare (…) and his vulnerability in view of his young age’ (he was aged 12 at the 
time of the alleged infringement). Due to the advertisement, the child became a potential target 
of paedophiles, and therefore, there was a risk of physical and mental harms occurring. 
 
5.5.1.2. Economic or financial harms 
 
Economic harms can be loss or damage of property, unanticipated financial loss, etc. 
For example, from vacation pictures posted on a social networking sites burglars may infer 
when the home is empty. Behavioral profiling might also be seen as causing economic harms 
to consumers as advertisers might offer goods at different prices and set a maximum price on 
an individual base for each consumer.907 
 
5.5.1.3. Mental or psychological harms 
 
Mental and psychological harms constitute fear of misuse of personal data, fear of being 
observed, fear of being treated unfairly, anxiety, mental distress, etc. Occurrence and negative 
effects of these type of harms online is high among children, especially in the context of 
cyberbullying and cybervictimisation.908 Research estimates that from 20 to 40 percent of 
children and adolescents have experienced cyberbullying.909 There is an extensive body of 
research on cyberbullying, showing very serious effects on the adolescents who become 
victims of cyberbullying. Cyberbullying has been linked with the following harms: an increase 
in anxiety910, low self-esteem911, depression912, suicidal ideas913. Some national studies, in 
addition, found associations between cyberbullying and the psychological and emotional 
effects of ‘confusion, guilt, shame, self-harm, distress and withdrawal from friends’.914 As a 
result of the negative effects, negative consequences can also be noted in learning due to the 
association of cyberbullying with concentration problems, poor performance at school.915 
  Academics define cyberbullying underlining some of its specific elements, such as the 
use of electronic means, intentional harm, imbalance of power, repetition, sense of anonymity 
                                                
907 FTC, How Big Data Enables Economic Harm to Consumers, Especially to Low-Income and Other 
Vulnerable Sectors of the Population, 2014, available at: 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2014/08/00015-92370.pdf 
908 David Álvarez-García, José Carlos Núñez, Alejandra Barreiro-Collazo, Trinidad García, Validation of the 
Cybervictimization Questionnaire (CYVIC) for adolescents, Computers in Human Behavior, 2017 (70), 270-
281. 
909 E. Aboujaoude, M.W. Savage, V. Starcevic, W.O. Salame, Cyberbullying: Review of an old problem gone 
viral, Journal of Adolescent Health, 2015, 57 (1), pp. 10-18. 
910 Ch A. Rose, B.M. Tynes, Longitudinal associations between cybervictimization and mental health among 
U.S. adolescents, Journal of Adolescent Health, 20015, 57 (3), pp. 305-312 
911 F.C. Chang, C.M. Lee, C.H. Chiu, W.Y. Hsi, T.F. Huang, Y.C. Pan, Relationships among cyberbullying, 
school bullying, and mental health in Taiwanese adolescents, Journal of School Health, 2012, 83 (6), pp. 454-
462 
912 R.A. Bonanno, S. Hymel, Cyber bullying and internalizing difficulties: Above and beyond the impact of 
traditional forms of bullying, Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 2013, 42, pp. 685-697. 
913 M. Van Geel, P. Vedder, J. Tanilon Relationship between peer victimization, cyberbullying, and suicide in 
children and adolescents. A meta-analysis, JAMA Pediatrics, 2014, 168 (5), pp. 435-442. 
914 Baker, Ö., & Tanrikulu, I. Psychological consequences of cyber bullying experiences among Turkish 
secondary school children. Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2010, 2(2), pp. 2771–2776. 
915 A. Tsitsika, M. Janikian, S. Wójcik, K. Makaruk, E. Tzavela, C. Tzavara, et al. Cyberbullying victimization 
prevalence and associations with internalizing and externalizing problems among adolescents in six European 
countries, Computers in Human Behavior, 51 (2015), pp. 1-7. 
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and lack of accountability.916 Cyberbullying may have many different forms and only some of 
its forms coincide with data protection violations. These forms are fraping and impersonating 
(logging into the victims social networking account and impersonating him by posting 
inappropriate content), catfishing (stealing online identities, e.g. photos, and creating social 
networking profiles for deceptive purposes).917 Another phenomenon of this type, ironically 
called as “happy slapping”, refers to the recording of a physical attack (most often via mobile 
devices) and the uploading of the video online918. Cyberbullying is not always and certainly 
not only a matter for data protection law. In particular, forms of cyberbullying are specifically 
regulated under criminal law in the framework of harassment, stalking, violence, violation of 
victim’s honour, dignity, reputation, computer-related crimes (hacking, illegal access to data 
stored in a computer). In practice, the problem of cyberbullying is addressed using data 
protection law and authorities.919 
Cyberbullying is not always and not only the matter of data protection law. Academics 
define cyberbullying underlining some of its specific elements, such as the use of electronic 
means, intentional harm, imbalance of power, repetition, sense of anonymity and lack of 
accountability.920 Cyberbullying may have many different forms and only some of its forms 
coincide with data protection violations. These forms are fraping and impersonating (logging 
into the victims social networking account and impersonating him by posting inappropriate 
content), catfishing (stealing online identities, e.g. photos, and creating social networking 
profiles for deceptive purposes).921 Another phenomenon of this type, ironically called as 
“happy slapping”, refers to recording of a physical attack (most often via mobile devices) and 
uploading the video online922.  In practice, the problem of cyberbullying is also addressed using 
data protection law and authorities.923 Other forms of cyberbullying are regulated under 
criminal law in the framework of harassment, stalking, violence, violation of victim’s honour, 
dignity, reputation, computer-related crimes (hacking, illegal access to data stored in a 
computer). 
 
5.5.1.4. Harms to dignity and reputation 
 
Harms to dignity and reputation include embarrassment, humiliation, etc. Harm to 
dignity and reputation might arise from violations of data protection law, e.g. publication of 
photos without individual’s consent, but also from other crimes closely related to personal data 
disclosure such as defamation, cyberharassment, cyberbullying, online impersonation or 
revenge porn924.  For example, disclosure of intimate personal habits, humiliating statements 
                                                
916 On the definition and regulation of cyberbullying see European Parliament, Cyberbullying among young 
people, Study for the LIBE Committee, 2016, available at:  
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Interpersonal Violence, 28 (9) (2013), pp. 1909-1923 
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920 European Parliament, Cyberbullying among young people, Study for the LIBE Committee, 2016, 
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or images to the public may cause embarrassment. Technological attack on a bullied person’s 
blog (hacking into his or her accounts, sending offending messages in his or her name, or setting 
up a defamatory internet website to disseminate the victim’s personal information or video clips 
without consent) harms the victim’s dignity and reputation. Empirical research confirms the 
occurrence of violations related to personal data misuse on an individual level listing the 
hacking of social media accounts, creation of fake profiles, and impersonation as actual 
situation that upset children online.925 
  
 
5.5.1.5. Societal or architectural harms 
 
Societal hams may include the sense of being always observed resulting in a chilling 
effect or loss of creativity. Constant parental monitoring of children through location tracking 
apps may also have negative consequences including psychological problems. The continuous 
monitoring of children’s location and conversations through the use of smartwatches might 
have potentially negative effects on children’s development and create false sense of 
security.926 The extensive “monitoring” function of some smartwatches (e.g., the Viksjord 
device/SeTracker app) can be seen as problematic as it not only enables one to listen to the 
conversations of children without their knowledge, but also to monitor anyone who is close to 
the child.927 Permanent CCTV surveillance in classrooms can affect students' freedom of 
learning and of speech, thus also impacting their right to the development of a personality.928 
Even, the still “developing conception of their own freedom can become compromised” if 
children “assume from an early age that it is normal to be monitored”.929 Harms from profiling, 
such as stigmatisation, discrimination, could also be attributed to societal harms. Profiling can 
lead to surreptitious influence and customisation of individual behaviour930, constraints to 
individual autonomy931, unfair discriminatory decisions (“narrowed options and social 
discrimination”)932, power asymmetries and associated power inequalities933. 
 
 
5.5.2. Attributes of privacy harms 
 
Two attributes should be considered for each harm. First, the victims of the harm which 
may belong to the following categories: 1) individual data subjects; 2) specific groups of data 
subjects based on age, gender, religion, ethnicity or interests/behaviour, etc. and 3) society. It 
is influenced by the scale attribute of the feared event. Individual child as a data subject might 
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931  Ibid., p. 63. 
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be the victim of the harm when he is a single subject on which the harm is inflicted, for example 
his personal data is disclosed online and he is impersonated, etc. Children using a particular 
service or product can be profiled and targeted as a group infringing their group privacy. Recent 
class actions brought by consumer groups against intrusive data collection practices from 
children using connected toys 934 demonstrate how children can be victims as a specific group. 
Similarly, a class at a school could be affected as a defined group: video surveillance and 
constant monitoring at school might cause damage to the development of personality, 
construction of one’s identity, autonomous action, group flourishing to the fullest extent.935 
It is also important to consider various attributes of the data subject itself in a DPIA 
framework as these attributes have various effects on the rest of the analysis. Some useful 
attributes could be, for example, whether the data subject belongs to a vulnerable section of the 
society, such as children coming from disadvantaged families, children with psychological 
difficulties, and other factors. The societal context would also be important in deciding what 
constitutes a vulnerable section.   
The second attribute is the intensity of a harm, which expresses the various effects of a 
harm on the victims. It depends on factors such as the duration of the harm or the extent of 
damage caused. It is also influenced by the irreversibility of the corresponding feared event, 
the stakeholder relationships and external factors such as societal norms. If a feared event has 
high irreversibility, then its impact on the victim is more intense than if it has low irreversibility. 
Similarly, weaker power positions of data subjects with respect to data controllers may make 
it more difficult for data subjects to have the harm stopped or addressed, thus increasing the 
intensity of the harm. 
Privacy harms suffered by children are difficult to measure and the literature on this 
subject is sparse.936 Harms that may result from internet use (online safety harms such as 
bullying, contact with strangers, exposure to pornography) more generally have been studied 
by the EU Kids Online project members, but privacy has not featured prominently in this 
research.937 Some  evidence, based on police, hospital, court and medical records, exists on 
actual harms when children are sexually abused and traumatised psychologically or physically 
after getting into contact with a perpetrator online.938 Often, empirical surveys report “not the 
actual risk (i.e., the probability of harm to the child population) but the risk of the risk (the 
probability of something happening – commonly called ‘online risk’) that might result in harm; 
but whether it does, and for how many it does, remains unknown.”939 Yet, not all children who 
encountered online risks experience a harm. Important risk factors are “social psychological 
factors on the part of the child (such as facing psychological difficulties or having a tendency 
to sensation-seeking); as for protective factors, children’s self-esteem and their parents’ 
strategies for mediating the internet were shown to matter, though not in any simple fashion.”940 
                                                
934 On group privacy see Linnet Taylor, Luciano Floridi, Bart van der Sloot (eds.), Group privacy: New 
Challenges of Data Technologies, Springer 2017. 
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Kids Online, London 2011) 
938 Vera Slavtcheva-Petkova, Victoria Jane Nash & Monica Bulger, Evidence on the extent of harms 
experienced by children as a result of online risks: implications for policy and research, Information, 
Communication & Society Vol. 18 , Iss. 1, 2015. 
939 Sonia Livingstone, Online risk, harm and vulnerability: Reflections on the evidence base for child Internet 




Nevertheless, it could be claimed that the same harms may be more serious and have a 
more damaging impact on children than on adults. A child is a person who "has not yet achieved 
physical and psychological maturity" but is "in the process of developing physically and 
mentally to become an adult."941 These two aspects makes him a particular victim of the harm. 
Harm can be caused to his harmonious development and growth, and the creation of a child’s 
- still-developing – personality can be constrained. The importance of privacy for persons who 
have not yet reached physical, psychological and intellectual maturity has been explicitly 
underlined in case law relating to children’s privacy, in several national courts around the 
world. In Germany, the Constitutional court explicitly recognised that children are ‘persons-in-
the-making’ and they have a ‘right to become [i.e., to freely develop into] a [full] person’942. 
As a consequence, children deserve extra protection in so far as the collection and disclosure 
of their personal data must be more rigorously justified than for adults whose personality is 
already-developed. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada also underlined the ‘undoubted 
constitutional significance’ of children’s privacy and the special necessity to protect it. In its 
case law, the Court has recognised the ‘inherent vulnerability of children’ and their ‘diminished 
moral culpability’.  It has  held  that  the privacy of children should be equally, if not more 
strongly protected, than that of adults, not only to avoid concrete harms, such as labelling and 
stigmatization, but, fundamentally, to guarantee the physical and moral autonomy and the well-
being of the individual.943 The French data protection authority (CNIL) equally described a 
child as someone who lacks psychological, intellectual and physical maturity, and who is still 
constructing his personality ‘through a series of metamorphoses’.944 Due to their personality 
being in development, law considers children to be in need of special protection against 
themselves (negative decisions that they themselves may take) and various risk sources. 
Some harms may be irreversible for children as they can have a negative impact on 
child personality and development, i.e. the effect might last for the whole life. Also, the duration 
of the harm might be longer not only because it might take time to understand the harm but 
also for children it might be difficult to have the inflicted harm stopped due to their weaker 
position and lack of representation, lower understanding of the harm or technical and legal 
means to be used. For example, a personal data misuse (identity hacking) online on a massive 
scale could be difficult to stop due to slow or non-existing cooperation from the side of the 
internet service providers.945 Practice shows that in some cases it can take more than one year 
to terminate the harm (to remove offensive posts, videos, pictures, to close fake profiles on 
social networking sites, to eliminate related results from search engines) and to mitigate the 
consequences, as the internet allows for personal data to be easily copied and replicated.946 Re-
emerging publication of personal data online can result into  secondary victimisation and 
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The paper proposed that data controllers processing personal data of children should 
consider carrying out child-specific rather than generic data protection impact assessments 
(DPIAs). Based on the PRIAM methodology, the paper discussed technical aspects of the child-
tailored DPIA specifying its concrete components (personal data, risk sources, feared events, 
privacy weaknesses and privacy harms) and their attributes, and provided examples related to 
risks for children in the information society context. The proposed framework enables data 
controllers to address the particular needs and rights of children as data subjects. 
Several questions are not fully addressed in this paper and require further research and 
analysis. More general questions include: whether and how child-specific DPIAs should be 
used by information society service providers offering mixed audience services; how the DPIA 
process should involve children as data subjects and take into account their views, and other 
broader questions related to the assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the 
processing. There is, further, a need for detailed research to develop harm trees to represent the 
relationship among the exploitation of privacy weaknesses by the risk sources, the feared 
events and the privacy harms in the context of children and to specify how data controllers 
should select a set of counter-measures that brings the risk level of all harms associated with 
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Abstract 
This article examines the rise of self-regulatory initiatives as private governance mechanisms 
adopted by the Internet industry in the EU to protect children's privacy online. It analyses four 
specific initiatives and performs a formal self-regulatory process analysis focusing on 
procedural (rule formulation, monitoring, enforcement) and organizational (organizational 
structures, role of public actors) aspects, in order to reflect on the strengths and shortcomings 
of the self-regulatory process. The analysis shows significant limitations of self-regulation in 
the area of online child safety, characterized by broadly formulated statements and 
unmeasurable commitments, limited monitoring mechanisms and often inexistent sanctions. It 
is argued that sector-specific, institutionalized European codes of conduct, which disentangle 
protection of online safety and privacy as policy aims, could permit achieving better 
formulation, adoption and enforcement of voluntary rules, and thus better safeguard the privacy 
of children in the dynamic multi-jurisdictional, multi-stakeholder dominated online 
environment. 
Keywords: children; European Union; online risks; privacy; self-regulation; soft law 
  
I.  Introduction and background 
The area of children's privacy protection on the Internet has recently witnessed a vast increase 
in attention and regulation within the EU. There are several driving factors behind such 
developments. First, the importance of children rights, including the right to privacy and 
personal data protection, has grown. The EU has not only enshrined children's rights to 
protection and care in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, but also has identified 
effective protection of these rights among the main priorities in its strategic documents 
(European Commission 2006, 2012). Second, a sharp increase in Internet usage by ever 
younger children and the complexity of the technology mediated environment has raised 
serious concerns about online child safety (Van der Hof, 2014). Protection of privacy and 
personal data in such a complex environment has become a prerequisite for guaranteeing online 
child safety and, thus, has started to constitute a separate, though interrelated, pillar within 
many online child safety initiatives. Third, since 1999 the European Commission's Safer 
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Internet Program has achieved remarkable progress in awareness raising and educational 
initiatives, multi-stakeholder involvement in safer Internet policy making and Internet content 
creation. Part of this Program fostered the gathering of more empirical data about online risks 
and their impact on children's online experiences across Europe (Livingston et al. 2012; 
O'Neill et al. 2013) which provided policy recommendations and implications (O'Neill et 
al. 2011). Empirical research has indicated that some of the most important concerns among 
children are related to personal data misuse and reputational damage, such as hacking of social 
media accounts, creation of fake profiles, and impersonation (Mascheroni & Ólafsson 2014). 
These concerns are well grounded, as 9% of children aged 11-16 have experienced personal 
data misuse online (Livingstone at al. 2011). Research has also clearly revealed the difficulties 
that children face when finding and using reporting tools and privacy settings to protect 
themselves online (Livingstone at al. 2012). All this in turn has penetrated discussions and has 
called for action among policy makers, academics and other stakeholders. 
Since the very beginning, the protection of children online as a policy area in the EU has 
entailed an "unshakable commitment to self-regulation" (O'Neillet al. 2013, p. 15). [1] As 
paradoxical as it may seem, the implementation of protection of children's rights to privacy and 
personal data protection - both fundamental human rights - has to a large extent been playing 
into the hands of the industry in their online safety initiatives. As self-regulation and private 
rule-making has been put forward by the European Commission as a cornerstone of the 
regulatory process of online child protection, the effectiveness of the concrete self-regulatory 
rules becomes crucial in order to guarantee actual protection. Despite the obvious advantages 
proposed by soft law, such as the socio-technological expertise of the industry, innovation, 
reactive speed and reduced costs for the public bodies, in essence private rule-making, in 
particular where self-regulation is involved, is still often perceived as inherently feeble or 
ineffective regulation (Scott et al. 2011). Due to the lack of transparency, accountability 
coupled with ineffective enforcement, legal and media governance scholars question the results 
that self-regulation can provide, perceiving them as rather limited in practice (Latzer et 
al. 2013; Koops et al.2006; Bonnici 2008). Scholars within regulation studies (Scott et 
al. 2011) worry that self-regulation - as a community-based mode of private governing - raises 
legitimacy problems, due to its significant differences from the traditional democratic 
government model. If private regulation is more than technical implementation of authority, it 
is questionable to what extent it can advance a fair struggle between competing public and 
private interests (Scott 2012). In cases involving a public interest, such as the protection of 
vulnerable Internet users, there is a question whether self-regulatory initiatives can afford such 
protection to the same extent as serve the interests of the private sector (Livingstone 2011). 
This is particularly true for the area of online self-regulation which in general is known to 
"suffer from the perception that the individual's privacy rights are in the hands of those who 
have the most to gain from the processing of personal data" (Bennett 2004, p. 233). As a 
consequence, self-regulation may easily result in "self-service by the industry, with public 
interests being neglected vis-à-vis private interests" (Latzer et al. 2013, p. 375). It is not 
surprising, therefore, that in order to balance public and private goals in the self-regulatory 
process, in reality public actors often need to play a more active (co-regulator's) role. However, 
due to the many different forms that co-regulation may take, it does not necessarily ensure 
effective regulatory outcome either. 
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Despite the diversity of rules and their adoption processes, the Internet industry has, until now, 
managed on a European level to agree on four alternative regulatory initiatives that, among 
their other provisions, substantially deal with the protection of the online privacy of 
children. [2] These initiatives include: an arrangement among social networking service 
providers - the Safer Social Networking Principles for the EU; two documents adopted by 
broad industry Coalitions - ICT and CEO Coalitions; and a sectorial code of conduct adopted 
by direct marketing companies to regulate the use of personal data in their activities. Although 
different, these four initiatives all have amongst their other objectives the aim to mitigate online 
privacy risks, such as personal data misuse, commercial data exploitation, conduct and contact 
risks. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the emergence of self-regulatory initiatives in the EU, 
aiming to address online privacy risks for children as governance mechanisms and explore their 
strengths and shortcomings. By analyzing the key provisions in four self-regulatory initiatives, 
the paper aims to perform a formal self-regulatory process analysis, rather than self-regulatory 
outcome analysis, focusing on procedural regulatory aspects. The analysis is based on the 
evaluation criteria that, according to regulatory scholars, must be present in self-regulatory 
regimes to consider them as effective and legitimate, i.e. procedural criteria (rule formulation, 
monitoring, enforcement) and organizational criteria (organizational structures, role of public 
actors). 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section provides a short overview of the rise of 
self-regulation in order to protect children from risks in the Digital Single Market, discussing 
the main drivers and catalysts of such a rise. The second section describes the current self-
regulatory regime for the online privacy protection of children, drawing on two different areas: 
online child safety and online advertising. Four self-regulatory initiatives are analyzed: the 
Safer Social Networking Principles, the CEO Coalition's Statement of Purpose, the ICT 
Coalition's Principles, and the FEDMA code. [3] These are the only existing self-regulatory 
initiatives dealing with online child privacy as a substantial part of their content. A formal self-
regulatory process analysis focusing on the above-mentioned procedural and organizational 
aspects of the initiatives is performed in the third section, in order to evaluate their adequacy 
as regulatory mechanisms. The fourth section provides an evaluation of the initiatives. 
Conclusions are drawn in the last section. 
 
1. The rise of self-regulation in the digital single market 
Self-regulation related to the Internet has a long tradition. A wide range of voluntary initiatives, 
such as codes of conduct, rating/filtering systems, hotlines, standards, have been contributing 
to the protection of public interests and supplementing the existing state regulatory frameworks 
for two decades. One of the most prominent regulatory goals pursued by the means of self-
regulation is the protection of minors in the communications sector, including on the Internet. 
In fact, reliance on self-regulation, rather than on legislation, in order to protect children's safety 
and privacy online in Europe can be traced back to the mid-1990s (European Commission 
1996). Since then, policies aiming to create a safer - in more recent policy documents framed 
as "better" (European Commission 2012) - Internet for children place significant emphasis on 
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alternative regulatory initiatives, like self- and co-regulation (Lievens 2010). Preference for 
self-regulatory rule-making in relation to the online environment has been repeatedly 
confirmed in the main strategic EU policy documents, such as the Digital Agenda for Europe 
(COM/2010/0245 final), and the Agenda for Children's Rights (COM/2011/0060 final). 
References to sectorial industry codes of conduct were incorporated into the EU Data 
Protection Directive (95/46/EC), the EU Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC) 
and, most recently, the General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679). All of these acts 
encourage self-regulation by the industry in general and, in the latter case, codes of conduct to 
protect the privacy and personal data of minors in particular. 
There are various reasons why the EU considers industry self-regulation as the preferred option 
in the area of online child safety and privacy protection. More generally, a tendency to relate 
voluntary rule making rather than hard law with cyberspace regulation has been clearly 
expressed since the infancy of the Internet and grounded in cyber-libertarian ideas about an 
independent and unregulated cyberspace (Barlow 1996, Weber 2002). In fact, the Internet 
being global creates worldwide problems, such as safety and privacy risks for the users, which 
go beyond the capacity of individual states to solve, and thus requires global solutions. Self-
regulation allows for detaching these solutions from the complex hard law Internet-related 
dilemmas of jurisdiction, applicable law and effective cross-border enforcement of legislation. 
It therefore also allows for softly reducing regulatory fragmentation on both sides of the 
Atlantic, getting US-based companies providing services to the EU citizens on board and 
imposing voluntary rules on them. 
Other reasons that have driven the rise of self-regulation include the rapidly changing 
technological landscape and the difficulty of adjusting the national laws of the Member States 
to the new Internet-related developments (De Haan et al. 2013). Self-regulation was thus seen 
as able to address the emerging issues in a more time-saving and cost-efficient way. Also, 
multi-stakeholder involvement into the regulatory process and an informal-law-making 
environment seemed to promise more expertise and innovation than the traditional law making 
process and as a collective effort permitted reconciliation of conflicting interests - to preserve 
fundamental human values in the face of economic and technological pressures. In this respect, 
self-regulation was seen as able "to operationalize vague and general policy objectives" and 
provide practical guidance to the relevant parties on how to carry out their activities, in such a 
way "moving discussions from high-level policy rhetoric and slogans to more mundane, nitty-
gritty action" (Webb 2004, pp.14-15). This evidenced a way to depoliticize important public 
issues, replacing them with technical solutions, procedures, and formalities driven by industry 
(Webb 2004). For instance, reliance on practical instruments such as parental control software, 
reporting mechanisms, content rating, and filtering systems introduced by self-regulation has 
allowed the EU to respect both freedom of expression and internal market and competition 
rules (Lievens 2010). 
Finally, protection of online privacy in particular requires achieving a careful balance between 
ensuring the free flow of information and safeguarding the rights of users. Balancing these and 
similar competing interests can be complicated in legislative instruments not only due to their 
typical features such as rigidity or central implementation, but also the sensitivities involved. 
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For example, as regards Internet content regulation, there is a propensity for state censorship, 
and therefore regulation in this area can be intentionally left to private parties (Lievens 2010). 
 
2. Self-regulatory initiatives addressing online child privacy 
This section introduces the four EU self-regulatory initiatives adopted to mitigate online 
privacy risks for children, with the focus on their main characteristics (the year of the adoption, 
actors involved, nature and scope of the initiatives and the privacy-related provisions). All 
child-related provisions of the four initiatives are summarized and compared in Table 1 below. 
 
2.1. Safer Social Networking Principles 
The Safer Social Networking Principles for the EU (the SNS Principles) (European 
Commission 2009) is an early example of self-regulation in the area of online safety of minors. 
Initiated and supported by the European Commission, this self-regulatory initiative was 
adopted in 2009 and brings together approximately 20 social networking service (SNS) 
companies. The common goal of the participants, as claimed in the introductory part of the 
Principles, is "to maximise the benefits of the Internet while managing the potential risks to 
children and young people". To reach this goal, the providers have to assess the risk of potential 
harm that their service may cause to children, and consider the application of the specific seven 
overarching principles-guidelines. Two principles in particular encourage a safe approach 
towards personal information and privacy by having adequate safety tools and policies 
implemented in online social networking services. The third Principle requires empowering 
children through tools and technology and providing them with assistance with regard to 
inappropriate or unwanted content or conduct through special measures and technological 
tools. Concrete measures and tools that service providers should offer include, for example, 
non-searchable private profiles, profiles set to 'private' by default, ability to control who can 
access full profiles and post comments, 'easy-to-use' report tools. The sixth Principle asks 
service providers to enable and encourage their users to employ a safe approach to personal 
information and privacy through privacy settings and supporting information. Providers should 
offer user-friendly and accessible privacy options that enable users to make informed decisions 
about personal information that they publish and allow for privacy status and setting to be 
visible all the time. The remaining principles focus on awareness raising about online safety, 
age-appropriate services for the intended audience (e.g. indication of the minimum registration 
age, deletion of under-aged user accounts), and effective mechanisms to report inappropriate 
content and behaviour. 
In essence, the SNS Principles provide only guidance for the providers of SNS and, thus, are 
merely aspirational in their nature. They are in no way prescriptive or legally binding. 
Participating SNS providers are left with a wide discretionary power while judging whether to 
respect certain principles and to what extent, considering the particular nature of their services. 
This leads to inconsistent and hardly measurable enforcement of the Principles, one of the 




2.2. Coalition to make a better and safer internet for children 
In contrast to the SNS Principles, an initiative which aims to shape the behavior of private 
actors in a technology-specific domain, the Coalition to Make a Better and Safer Internet for 
Children (CEO Coalition), has been designed to gather a broad range of private companies 
working in various sectors of the ICT industry, such as operating system providers, handset 
manufacturers, Internet Service Providers, broadcasters, social networks and mobile operators. 
Launched in December 2011 on a high political level - personally by the Vice-President of the 
European Commission responsible for the Digital Agenda for Europe N. Kroes - the CEO 
Coalition aims to propose and develop, first of all, technical solutions and measures to protect 
children online. It was hoped that later these solutions proposed by the Coalition members can 
also be embraced by other market players. This initiative spans traditional technological or 
sectorial boundaries, and is defined by the practice in which companies are engaged - providing 
ICT services or products directed at or used by minors rather than by specific technology, like 
the SNS Principles. 
Since its formation, around 31 companies have joined the CEO Coalition. According to the 
CEO Coalition's Statement of Purpose (CEO Coalition 2011), the five areas in which the 
companies agreed to take action and develop solutions include: tools for users to report harmful 
content and contact, age-appropriate privacy settings, content classification, parental controls, 
effective take down of child abuse material. The second area - age-appropriate privacy settings 
- is the most important reference to online privacy that can be found in the Coalition's Statement 
of Purpose. However, the intention of Coalition members in this area has been limited to 
pooling current practices and data together on a possible single appropriate level of privacy 
settings across services and related user information protocols. The mere compilation of a 
database on these issues seems to be a very modest aim, acknowledging privacy as a human 
right and the influence of default-settings on the online behavior and practices of children. The 
lack of ambitious and clear goals has characterized this initiative since its inception and 
consequently attracted criticism from various actors within civil society (EDRi 2013). 
Despite the initial enthusiasm, especially on the political level, currently the CEO Coalition is 
not very active in practice. After the first year of functioning the progress has been suspended, 
although publicly the Coalition members and the European Commission affirmed their 
commitments to collaborate. Apart from a few spin-offs from the Coalition in the area of 
content classification, future collaboration (if it happens at all) appears to be essentially limited 
to awareness raising and the sharing of best practices and educational materials among the 
Coalition members. 
2.3. ICT coalition for children online 
Another self-regulatory initiative that is similar to the CEO Coalition in terms of content, 
membership and timing is the ICT Coalition for Children Online (ICT Coalition). The main 
difference between the two initiatives lies in their formation process. The ICT Coalition was 
formed by the industry without any involvement of the European Commission. In its own 
capacity, it elaborated a set of principles - Principles for the Safer Use of Connected Devices 
and Online Services by Children and Young People in the EU (ICT Coalition 2012). Although 
adopted a month after the CEO Coalition's Statement of Purpose, in January 2012, the ICT 
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Principles actually preceded the CEO Coalition in terms of negotiations and drafting by one 
year. Almost identically to the CEO Coalition, the ICT Coalition Principles pursues the aim 
"to help younger Internet users across Europe to make the most of the online world and deal 
with any potential challenges and risks" [4]. Given the overlap in focus and members, it is not 
entirely clear why the CEO Coalition was initiated in the first place, creating a parallel initiative 
to the already ongoing industry effort. 
The ICT Coalition is made up of 23 different companies from across the ICT sector, and just 
as the CEO Coalition can be considered a functional initiative in its nature. In terms of scope, 
the ICT Coalition Principles focus on six key areas: harmful content, parental controls, 
abuse/misuse of technology, sexual abuse content/illegal contact, digital literacy and 
awareness, and privacy. The privacy area is defined by Principle 5, according to which 
companies promise to manage and provide options for privacy settings in a user friendly way 
(easy to understand, prominently placed, user friendly and accessible) and enable children and 
parents to make informed decisions, as well as to raise awareness among all relevant parties. 
This commitment, if still limited in its aim, provides much more clear and ambitious goal than 
the action of the CEO Coalition on the same matter. 
In practice, the ICT Principles oblige each company (or group of companies) to present a 
document, which states objectives to be attained and benchmarks as far as applicable to its 
specific services and products, which would allow proper monitoring of further implementation 
in the six areas mentioned above. Companies that are signatories to this initiative are expected 
to report on their progress after the adoption of the Principles. More than half of the companies 
have published their progress reports on the Coalition's websites, based on which an 
independent review of the achievements took place. 
 
2.4. European code of practice for the use of personal data in direct marketing 
A very different initiative in its nature compared to the three online child safety initiatives is 
the European Code of Practice for the Use of Personal Data in Direct Marketing (the Code) 
(FEDMA 2003), a self-regulatory initiative adopted in the advertising sector to regulate data 
collection for marketing purposes. The aim of the Code is, in part, to protect minors from 
commercial risks inherent to the online world. The Code is based on more detailed and 
thorough analysis of how industry collects and processes personal information rather than 
broad commitments and statements. 
The Code was adopted in 2003 by the Federation for European Direct and Interactive 
Marketing (FEDMA), a sectorial organization widely representing the direct and online 
marketing industry on the European level through promotion and protection of its interests, 
lobbying for a favorable legislative environment and education and training. Currently 
FEDMA reports to have around 400 direct members in more than 30 countries, and nearly 
10,000 companies are represented indirectly through their membership in national Direct 




The Code is European in character, as the Article 29 Working Party, a European body 
representing the national data protection authorities, has approved it in accordance with 
Directive 95/46/EC as providing sufficient added value by addressing data protection problems 
in the direct marketing sector (A29WP 2003). By approving the Code, the Article 29 Working 
Party also underlined that the general provisions of the Code cannot solve all specific issues 
related to online direct marketing, and asked FEDMA to draft an annex to the Code applicable 
to the online environment and in particular addressing the protection of children. As a result, 
in 2010 following an extensive and long consultation process with the Article 29 Working 
Party, the Code has been supplemented with an Annex applicable to online marketing (FEDMA 
2010), which was also approved by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (A29 WP 
2010). Section 6 of the Annex deals with the protection of children and, among other things, 
establishes the responsibility of the data controller for setting up the procedures to guarantee 
verification of the age of the minor and the authenticity of the parental consent. However, it 
acknowledges that there is no easily accessible, universally accepted age verification system 
available on the Internet. The Code also obliges data controllers to provide child-appropriate 
information about data processing, prohibits family data collection from children, limits 
collection of sensitive data, and forbids incentives to provide personal data for marketing 
purposes or in exchange for a reward, including games of chance, tombola or lotteries. 
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3. Comparative assessment of the self-regulatory initiatives 
The comparative assessment in this section is based on the main evaluation criteria that, 
according to scholars in the areas of electronic communication and technology regulation and 
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governance, must be present in self-regulatory regimes to consider them as effective and 
legitimate. 
Although in the electronic communications sector conceptual frameworks for evaluation of 
self- and co- regulatory initiatives are still in the initial stage of their development (Latzer et 
al. 2013), several efforts to propose a set of criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of voluntary 
rules have been made by academics (Schulz and Held, 2002; Latzer et al. 2007; 2013). On a 
policy level, the European Commission has also recently looked for criteria to define 
accountable and efficient self-regulation which could deliver on its societal goals (CoP 2013). 
These contributions highlight the need for clearly formulated rules and requirements, effective 
monitoring and oversight, enforcement mechanisms and sanctions, including independent 
complaint assessment procedure. Writings on self-regulation in industries other than ICT have 
similar requirements for effective industry self-regulatory arrangements (Bowman & Hodge 
2009; Sethi and Emelianova 2006; Gunningham & Rees 1997; Doing & Wilson 1998; Jenkins 
2001). 
In addition, interdisciplinary literature on governance and self-regulation underlines the 
importance of a background presence of public actors (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992, Gunningham 
& Grabosky 1998, Rees 1997) and the existence of recognized industry organizations (Latzer et 
al. 2007) in enhancing the adoption and enforcement capacity of self-regulatory rules. The 
latter refers to acknowledged and structured industry bodies, such as the associations of specific 
industry segments, which have experience and administrative capacity in dealing with self-
regulation. 
Taking into account the contributions mentioned above, the paper uses two sets of criteria to 
evaluate the self-regulatory process related to the initiatives described earlier: procedural (rule 
formulation, monitoring, enforcement) and organizational (organizational structures, role of 
public actors). These criteria and their precise indicators are applied to the four initiatives in 
Table 2. 
 
3.1. Content of the rules 
Clearly defined objectives and measurable standards set forth by self-regulation that are able 
to add additional value to the existing legislative provisions can enhance potential advantages 
and reduce failures of self-regulation. As noted by Latzer et al. (2007), the way the self- and 
co-regulatory initiatives are designed may constitute an important enabling 
institutional/organizational factor. Ideally, a self-regulatory initiative should specify a mission 
statement with a reference to a public policy objective, define clear, measurable goals and 
intended outcomes. Additionally, it should clarify the regulatory added value in relation to the 
existing state regulation (Latzer et al. 2007). 
When comparing the four initiatives, one of the most striking differences lies in the formulation 
of the rules embodied in the self-regulatory texts under analysis. All the initiatives adopted in 
the online child safety domain set only general targets and aims, which can be denoted more 
as intentions or statements of commitments rather than as rules. Consequently, they add little 
203 
 
to the existing legislative framework. The CEO Coalition's Statement of Purpose and reports 
provide the clearest illustration of broad objectives from all three safety-related initiatives (e.g. 
"to take positive action to make the Internet a better place for kids"; to "continue to work with 
wider stakeholders to raise awareness on parental controls"). These statements also almost 
entirely repeat the legislative requirements ("to offer clear and understandable information" in 
privacy policies). In contrast, the sectorial code in the online advertising area provides much 
more precise rules and obligations for its members. [5] It is thus a much more measurable self-
regulatory text which builds upon the general data protection standards that are not tailored to 
children, an additional level of specific protection adding value to the existing data protection 
law. For example, the FEDMA members are required to obtain prior consent before collecting 
sensitive data or are prohibited from processing certain types of data. 
Lack of clear, prescriptive rules and measurable standards in the policy area of child online 
safety leads to several shortcomings. First, companies adhere to the same initiative in very 
different ways. Some of the companies commit to do very little, some take obligations seriously 
within the scope of the same principles and others even claim that certain obligations are not 
applicable to their services or products. Second, due to imprecise goals it is difficult to measure 
and compare compliance among the members and to evaluate the level of fulfillment of the 
agreed objectives. The latter problem will be discussed in more detail below. 
Notwithstanding this, one should note that broad and vague objectives do not automatically 
lead to the failure of a self-regulatory initiative. Vague prescriptions and high-level statements 
of intent not only allow for adapting the requirements to specific services and products, but 
also leave companies room for innovative solutions. In addition, the inclusion of more 
prescriptive rules may be premature in the beginning of the self-regulatory process, especially 
in the areas where technological solutions are still scarce, like in relation to age verification 
technologies. This, however, does not preclude the possibility of developing quantifiable and 
enforceable standards over time. 
In addition, from a policy making perspective it may be questioned whether companies would 
be at all willing to commit themselves to something more than broad statements and intentions. 
Even if the state of the art of technological developments and expertise of the industry may 
theoretically allow for prescriptive provisions, the motivation to have detailed self-regulatory 
rules can still depend on various other factors. These factors, for instance, can be pressure on 
corporate image (Gunningham 1995) or peer pressure and mutual benefits, the perception of 
the importance of avoiding hard regulation, the willingness to forestall or shape future laws, 
and the existence of distrustful public attitudes towards their services or technology (Webb & 
Morrison 2004, Bowman & Hodge 2009). Moreover, the motivation of companies also can be 
largely profit-oriented in nature, such as increasing or maintaining customers, decreasing risk, 
or decreasing the likelihood of a legal violation and liability (Webb 2004). As direct economic 
benefit for the industry in the policy area of online child protection is clearly not a driving force 






3.2. Monitoring and oversight 
There is wide support for the view that effective self-regulation requires independent or third-
party monitoring and oversight (Schulz and Held 2002; CoP 2013, Latzer et al. 2007; 2013). 
Drawing upon the experiences of self-regulation in industries other than ICT, independent 
monitoring and compliance verification appears to be an important precondition for any 
effective industry self-regulatory arrangement (Bowman & Hodge 2009; Sethi and Emelianova 
2006). No less important is the "willingness to make the findings of the independent external 
audit available to the public without prior censorship" (Sethi and Emelianova 2006, p. 230-
231). Other scholars have similarly claimed that monitoring and disclosure clearly matters 
(Gunningham & Rees 1997; Doing & Wilson 1998; Jenkins 2001). Jenkins (2001, p. iv), in an 
analysis of corporate codes of conduct, recognized that it is essential to include provisions on 
effective monitoring into them in order to see an impact and, in addition, claimed that "the 
reluctance of many firms to include independent monitoring as an integral part of their code 
gives rise to some suspicion that they may be used as a public relations exercise rather than a 
genuine attempt at improving conditions and performance" (Jenkins 2001, p. 27). 
Different oversight and monitoring mechanisms are used by each of the initiatives, ranging 
from external oversight to a pure information disclosure practice and self-reporting. Two of the 
initiatives, the SNS Principles and the ICT Principles, enjoy the strongest evaluation 
procedures carried out by independent third parties. Compliance with the SNS Principles is 
periodically measured through the evaluations carried out by external experts. However, their 
final reports are approved and published by the European Commission, causing doubts about 
the total independence of the conclusions. Since the adoption of the initiatives, two such 
evaluations have taken place (Staksrud & Lobe 2010; Donoso 2011). The evaluations were 
carried out in two steps: assessment of individual self-declarations of the participating SNS and 
practical testing of their websites. Overall, according to the latest assessment in 2011, only 3 
from 14 self-declarations were assessed as "very satisfactory", while the remaining 9 were only 
"rather satisfactory" and 2 "unsatisfactory" (Donoso 2011). Self-declarations were better 
evaluated than their real implementation on the concrete websites, underlining the problem of 
objectiveness among participating SNS. Although the evaluation of other principles showed 
some signs of success, privacy was shown to be the area where the majority of the SNS failed 
to meet their commitments. Only 3 SNS from 14 providers were evaluated as very satisfactory. 
The main weakness noted by the assessor related to the lack of explicit information regarding 
the characteristics (e.g. age-appropriateness, availability, user- friendliness, etc.) of the privacy 
settings on the services and the lack of information regarding whether these services provide 
users with supporting information to help them make informed decisions about their privacy 
settings. 
Yet, even positive evaluation does not necessarily reflect the practical impact that self-
regulation has on Internet users. Although the majority of the tested SNS demonstrated some 
positive progress, tangible results, especially in the area of privacy protection, remain limited. 
As indicated by empirical evidence-based research, which compared SNS Principles with 9-
16-year-old children's experiences and skills on the social networks, many industry players do 
not meet their commitments (e.g. in guaranteeing effective age-restriction or setting children's 
profiles to 'private') (Livingstone et al. 2013). 
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Similarly to the SNS Principles, the ICT Coalition has lately introduced an independent 
monitoring mechanism to evaluate how the Coalition members implement the ICT Principles. 
It established a position of an independent assessor who carried out his first assessment in 2014 
(O'Neill 2014). The evaluation was based on the statements of the ICT Coalition members, 
without actual testing of their services and products. Although individual commitments and 
best practices in the six broad areas related to online safety are to be applauded, the concrete 
implementation and measurement of compliance may be questioned. Given the above-
mentioned trend among the SNS providers to self-declare more than is actually implemented, 
only formal evaluation of declarations without comparing them with the actual achievements 
may have an impact on objective assessment results. Moreover, due to the broad, and 
sometimes ambiguous, targets, it is not clear from the assessment to what extent (and if at all) 
all the members of the ICT Coalition achieved the agreed goals. The report, therefore, looks 
more like a summary of best practices rather than an assessment indicating the actual level of 
compliance. 
Contrary to the external evaluation schemes mentioned above, which admittedly have their 
shortcomings, it is much more difficult to establish compliance in the case of the CEO 
Coalition. It does not undergo any formal monitoring process, despite its own evaluation of the 
work in progress. Such self-assessment took place after the first year of functioning of the CEO 
Coalition and was rather broad, recognizing that progress had been made in all the working 
areas but more effort was needed to achieve the agreed goals (CEO Coalition 2012). In 
February 2013, the CEO Coalition published its final report containing recommendations and 
best practice description (CEO Coalition 2013). In addition, in January 2014 individual 
companies produced separate reports on how they have implemented or will implement the 
recommendations of the Coalition (CEO Coalition 2014). Such a self-evaluation mechanism 
appears to be very subjective and limited. 
In contrast, the FEDMA Code sets forth a well-defined and institutionalized monitoring 
mechanism. According to the Code, the burden of monitoring has been primarily shifted to the 
national direct marketing associations (DMAs). It is not surprising, as advertising, even if it is 
a cross-border phenomenon, is also "very often nationally distinctive, using the local language, 
characters, and humor familiar to the target audience" (Verbruggen 2013, p. 515). Therefore, a 
national rather than European system of adoption, review and enforcement seem to better serve 
the goal of voluntary governance. In practice, several of the DMAs have a compliance tool in 
place and carry out compliance monitoring, either when a company becomes a new member of 
the national association with subsequently action only on complaints, or involving monitoring 
the compliance with the Code on a more regular basis (Fiquet M 2015, personal 
communication). For example, some of the DMAs have a certification program every year or 
every two years (Fiquet M 2015, personal communication). In addition, the Code encourages 
the companies themselves to regularly monitor how they conform to the provisions of the Code 
(for example, via self-audits), but this is more a piece of advice rather than a strict obligation. 
In addition to the main enforcement efforts on the national level, a "Data Protection 
Committee" has been established on the European level at FEDMA to monitor the application 
of the Code, to consider annually if a revision of the Code is necessary and to provide the 
Article 29 Working Party with an annual report on the functioning of the code at national level 
and in cross-border activities. However, despite the established internal structures and the 
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formal obligation to report to the national data protection authorities, the European 
Commission and the European Data Protection Supervisor (via the Article 29 Working Party 
meetings), FEDMA does not officially assess the extent to which its members comply with the 
code. Only some informal discussions on the functioning of the Code took place with the 
European Commission after the Code and the Annex were adopted (Fiquet M 2015, personal 
communication). 
Lack of an independent monitoring scheme in the activities of the CEO Coalition can be seen 
as a very serious shortcoming. However, even if the remaining online safety initiatives are 
monitored and evaluated by independent experts, there are significant pitfalls: the final reports 
published by the European Commission may not be entirely independent, evaluation results 
may greatly depend on the methodology and sources used (actual testing of the services or 
evolution of self-declarations), and due to vague targets lack of a clear indication of the level 
of compliance. Also, the positive evaluation does not necessarily reflect the practical impact of 
self-regulation as, from the perspective of Internet users, empirical evidence may suggest that 
in reality companies fail to meet their commitments. 
 
3.3. Enforcement 
Enforcement of self-regulatory rules depends on the existence of and access to the procedures 
to handle possible complaints in relation to the infringement of the self-regulatory rules and 
the sanctioning of the members for established violations. Latzer et al. (2007, p. 21) identified 
the following elements of an adequate enforcement mechanism in relation to disputes and 
complaints: existence of a relevant enforcement organizational structure such as a unit to 
handle complaints, a defined enforcement and complaint handling procedure, a visible and 
well-known contact point to which to report potential infringements, an appropriate appeals 
mechanism. They claim that the level of enforcement can be measured based on the amount of 
complaints filed and disputes registered or any other modes of industry notice to members. 
Once a violation is found, a test of self-regulation effectiveness is "whether it has 'shown its 
teeth' to a member through some type of sanction" (Cave et al. 2008, p. 23), such as withdrawal 
of membership, or censure for non-compliance. The two elements of enforcement (i.e. 
complaint handling procedures and sanctioning mechanisms) will be analysed below. 
Complaint handling procedures are not present in the majority of initiatives (the SNS 
Principles, the CEO and ICT Coalitions), with the exception of the FEDMA Code. The latter, 
being a European initiative, dedicates the establishment of procedures to solve any complaints 
that may arise from the application of the Code to the national DMAs. According to the 
information provided by FEDMA, the Code enforcement mechanisms have been put into 
practice and national DMAs have received and solved several complaints in cases of 
malpractice (Fiquet M 2015, personal communication). As set out in the officially established 
mechanisms, the complaints are normally handled by special compliance boards, ethic 
committees or similar commissions formed at the DMA level. Only if the DMAs appear to be 
unable to solve complaints due to their cross-border aspects, FEDMA could take up and 
investigate the dispute itself. The Code establishes a mechanism for that by stating that the 
investigation on the FEDMA level should be carried out by the Data Protection Committee, an 
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internal body composed of representatives from national direct marketing associations, 
FEDMA and companies that are direct FEDMA members according to its internal rules of 
procedure. In practice, however, up to now FEDMA has not yet received or handled any cross-
border complaints (Fiquet M 2015, personal communication). The small number of actual 
complaints may well be related not so much to procedural enforcement issues, but to practical 
difficulties for individuals in complaining about online behavioral advertising. Online 
advertising substantially differs from traditional print, broadcast or outdoor advertising 
(Verbruggen 2014). As "advertisements may appear only to individual consumers and perhaps 
only once, it can be difficult to prove that the ad was served and that it violated the applicable 
code(s) of conduct" (Verbruggen 2014, p. 97). 
Neither the SNS Principles nor the CEO Coalition self-regulatory initiatives include any 
reference to sanctions. As a result, only symbolic sanctioning mechanisms relating to 
companies' reputation can be used in order to improve compliance. In cases of poor 
performance, the European Commission in practice tends to put pressure on companies through 
"naming and shaming" in public press releases. [6] In contrast, an explicit reference to sanctions 
is present in the FEDMA code and shortly mentioned in the ICT Principles. Pursuant to the 
Code, as national DMAs are responsible for the application of the Code, they have to apply the 
same sanctions stipulated in their countries for the breaching of their national codes. Most of 
the time the sanctions applied by the DMAs on the national level include "naming and 
shaming", DMA membership removal or passing the complaint to the national regulators, such 
as the national data protection supervisory authorities (Fiquet M 2015, personal 
communication). Moreover, depending on the type of violation, if the FEDMA Data Protection 
Committee gets to handle the complaint - which, as mentioned earlier, has not been the case 
until now - it can equally recommend the FEDMA Board to expel a member or apply other 
sanctions (e.g. “to initiate legal action against a member or a non-member in order to safeguard 
the ethics of the profession”) (FEDMA 2003, p. 18). However, FEDMA is not able to enforce 
fines or apply other monetary sanctions due to the fact that it is a voluntary, fee-based 
membership organization and fines would diminish incentives for membership. To a lesser 
extent, a similar sanctioning possibility is present in the ICT Principles. The text of the 
Principles establishes a possibility to exclude a member, if it does not seek to apply the 
Principles. However, given the embryonic nature of the initiative, it is still not possible to know 
the extent to which the ICT Coalition will take this possibility seriously. In addition, contrary 
to the whole package of benefits that industry associations provide to its members (e.g. 
lobbying, good practice developments), exclusion from a Coalition does not seem to promise 
the same loss for companies and therefore calls into question the extent of the threatening 
power it may carry. 
The absence of enforcement mechanisms and dissuasive sanctions in case of malpractice, and 
the lack of specific bodies to enforce them in the majority of the online child safety initiatives, 
present significant limitations. Reliance on symbolic sanctioning through public 'naming and 
shaming' does not help much to deal with violators or free riders. Sectorial industry 
associations, in contrast, tend to operate within a well-defined set of regulatory institutions and 
rules, which in turn provide for cohesive and appropriate organizational and sanctioning 
mechanisms for the implementation of self-regulatory rules. In addition, due to additional 
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benefits besides being part of the voluntary rule-making process, industry associations have a 
much wider impact on their members if they impose exclusions as a sanctioning mechanism. 
 
3.4. Organizational structure of the industry 
The availability of recognized organizations and their internal structures, such as secretariats 
and special committees, for regulatory tasks in the existing market environment may help to 
achieve a greater level of adoption and more effective implementation of self-regulatory rules. 
If a well-established organization in a particular segment can perform regulatory tasks and 
provide necessary organizational assistance, i.e. backup the initiatives, the practicability of 
adoption and compliance with voluntary schemes is much higher (Latzer et al. 2007). A 
significant difference exists between the FEDMA as a representative of a direct marketing 
industry and the other remaining multi-stakeholder dominated institutions in terms of their 
organization. FEDMA and the DMAs already have refined institutions, have experience with 
codes of conduct, and have necessary personnel and organizational structures that can monitor 
implementation, handle complaints, and impose fines. The need for a particular organizational 
structure seems to be increasingly recognized, but still under development, in the ICT 
Coalition, which has appointed an independent evaluator, hired an external consultant, and 
sought transparent and open functioning processes (creating a website, providing information 
to relevant stakeholders, etc.). The remaining online child safety initiatives are characterized 
by loose bonds among their members, and operate more as cooperative and consensual 
technical networks rather than structured organizations. Such open governing structures, what 
regulatory scholars (Kohler-Koch 2002; Kooiman 2003; March 1998, and Rhodes 1997) would 
call governance networks, are issue-specific constituencies build by a public authority as an 
activator, which interact though multilateral negotiations in order to upgrade common interests 
while pursuing the individual benefit (Kohler-Koch 2002). This model brings its own 
disadvantages of loss of oversight and steering and fragmented coordination. 
The absence of the proper organizational structures in the online child safety initiatives, and 
reliance on the European Commission in terms of organizational matters, may be seen as 
negatively influencing their performance. Yet, as Weber (2012, p. 3) reminds us, "cyberspace 
is not regulated or supervised by any of the existing bodies" and "there is a certain lack of 
sufficiently involved international organisations". Apart from industrial associations for 
specific sectors, there are no stable organizational structures for ICT policy domains where 
multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder action to protect vulnerable users is required. When the 
focus of regulation is child safety and privacy risks in conjunction, only a combination of 
different stakeholders representing a wide range of online technologies, services, platforms and 
business models can propose solutions. 
 
3.5. Role of public actors 
Potential intervention via hard-law by national or European authorities is considered to be an 
additional incentive for companies to adopt and enforce self-regulatory rules. The ability to 
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pose a real regulatory threat of intervention by public bodies can enable better adoption and 
enforcement of self-regulation (Latzer et al. 2007). In addition to providing the shadow of 
hierarchy, i.e. threatening to adopt legislation unless private actors accommodate the 
legislators' demands in self-regulatory rules, public bodies can actually be involved in the 
adoption and implementation of self-regulation. Although self-regulatory rules related to 
public interest could hardly be adopted without any kind of involvement from public 
institutions, possible forms of such involvement greatly differ. The possible levels of 
institutional involvement range from encouragement (provision of carrots, inspiration) and 
appreciation on a political level to financial and personnel support, collaboration on an 
institutional level, or even co-regulation (direct control in a legal sense), periodic reviews 
performed by public officials, establishment of alternative scenarios in case of failure (sticks), 
and a clear definition of responsibility among industry and public authorities (Latzer et 
al. 2007). 
The EU institutions have never publicly threatened the industry with real and immediate legal 
provisions on child safety if self-regulation fails to deliver expected results. Several areas, 
however, like personal data protection and behavioral advertising, have been touched upon or 
are under consideration by the European Commission. The recent revision of the European 
Data Protection Directive (96/46/EC) has given a possibility to address protection of children's 
privacy online. The newly adopted General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679) has, for the 
first time, explicitly recognized that children deserve specific protection of their personal data, 
as "they may be less aware of risks, consequences, safeguards and their rights in relation to the 
processing of personal data" (Recital 38). The Regulation has introduced far-reaching changes 
in relation to the processing of children's personal data: it requires verifiable parental consent 
before processing personal data of children under the age of 16 (unless the Member States 
choose another age limit between 13 and 16), obliges companies to give information to children 
in a clear, audience-appropriate language, and foresees other additional rights and safeguards, 
such as the right to be forgotten. These legislative developments happened despite the fact that 
public consultation revealed the willingness of companies to develop codes of conduct together 
with the Article 29 Working Party and to ensure their proper enforcement rather than to have 
legislative provisions on child-related data protection matters (European Commission 2010). 
The actual influence of these new legislative provisions will, however, depend on how much 
practical guidance and specification the European Commission and data protection authorities 
will provide to companies implementing the General Data Protection Regulation. 
Regarding the advertising sector, the "regulatory gorilla in the closet" (Verbruggen 2013) has 
been present for longer and felt more clearly. Children have been protected from Internet-based 
audiovisual services, programmes and advertisements as vulnerable consumers in the Directive 
2010/13/EU on Audiovisual Media Services. Also, the European Commission is currently 
gathering evidence to explore whether the existing regulation is effective and adequate to 
protect children from online marketing in social media, online games and mobile applications, 
or whether changes are necessary in regulatory approach, including the initiatives taken by the 
industry (European Commission 2015). Based on the outcome of the exploration, potential 
amendments can be expected in relation to children as vulnerable consumers protected in the 
Guidance document to the Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices (SEC(2009) 
1666) and to the upcoming review of the Directive on Audiovisual Media Services. It is 
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difficult to establish any connection between the legislative initiatives mentioned above and 
the better performance of the self-regulation under analysis. 
As mentioned above, an adequate level of support from the public institutions is considered to 
significantly enhance the performance of self-regulatory initiatives. In fact, it is often claimed 
that co-regulation is the most successful form of self-regulation. In the area under analysis, the 
EU is the most intensively involved in the SNS Principles and the CEO Coalition, but mainly 
in the form of inspiration and financial and personnel support. The SNS Principles are financed 
under the EU Safer Internet Programme and the European Commission provides supporting 
activities, hosts industry and stakeholder meetings, hires independent experts for periodic 
assessments, publishes assessment results on its website and evaluates the compliance via press 
releases. Similarly, the CEO Coalition has been initiated by the Commissioner N. Kroes in 
person, inviting specific companies to participate in the initiative. In addition, the EU supports 
the work of the CEO Coalition on financial, know-how (Commission representatives 
participate in Coalition meetings) and organizational levels (hosts stakeholder meetings, 
publishes information on its website). Yet, as emphasized earlier, the rules of both initiatives 
are broad and rely more on good-will commitments rather than enforceable obligations 
resulting in limited added value to actual protection. 
It therefore seems that content approval is more important for initiatives than procedural and 
political support, which may guarantee that industry takes on board all the most relevant public 
policy issues and challenges - in other words avoiding pick and choose tactics - as well as 
formulating clear and enforceable rules. In this respect, contrary to the SNS Principles and the 
CEO Coalition, the FEDMA code seems to experience a more balanced support from the public 
authorities. Although initiated entirely by the direct and online marketing industry, the 
European Commission together with the Article 29 Working Party has been closely involved 
in the drafting procedure of the Code. The rules on the protection of children are the direct 
result of such involvement as the Annex had been approved as compliant with and adding value 
to the EU data protection rules only after the provisions of child protection had been introduced. 
As a result, the approval of self-regulatory rules as a procedural step in order to adopt a 
European code of conduct is not only a desired "political backing" of the self-regulatory rules 
for the industry but also a guarantee for those to be protected that their interests and societal 










Table 2. Assessment of the four initiatives 
 
 
4. The way forward 
This analysis showed significant limitations of self-regulation in the online child safety area, 
characterized by broadly formulated statements and unmeasurable commitments, limited 
monitoring mechanisms and often inexistent sanctions compared to a sector specific, 
institutionalized European code of conduct in the area of advertising. 
Drawing on the differences in the online child safety and advertising domains, it seems that the 
policy goal of protecting children's privacy online can be approached from two different angles. 
Privacy can be viewed from a social or informational lens. The online child safety initiatives 
are mainly concerned with social privacy, a concept often used by the American scholars to 
note "the ability to control the social situation by navigating complex contextual cues, technical 
affordances, and social dynamics" (boyd 2014, p. 60) in the networked publics. It refers more 
to the negotiation of social boundaries, in particular to the management of diverse audiences 
through privacy settings and controls, and is entangled with online safety. The concept of social 
privacy and the risks to it relate to various values to be protected that are at stake, such as 
seclusion, intimacy, identity, reserve, self-determination and autonomy. Social privacy, being 








Content of the 
rules 
Prescriptive, measurable rules - - - P 
Broad statements of intent  P P P - 
Monitoring & 
oversight 
Internal self-assessment P P P P 
External assessment by an independent 
party 




Existence of a body to handle 
complaints  
- - - P 
Defined complaint handling procedure - - - P 
Reputational sanctions  P P P P 
Organizational sanctions (expulsion, 
membership suspension) 
- - P P 
Organisational                                  
structure  
Industry association  - - - P 
Ad-hoc network/coalition P P P - 
Role of public 
actors  
Initiator  P P - - 
Approver  - - - P 
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about control of social situation and context (e.g. hiding from public environments), is a broad 
concept and significantly differs from informational privacy, which refers just to the control of 
the flow of personal data (Westin 1967). Informational privacy, a more European concept, and 
even more precisely protection of personal data from illegal and illegitimate collection and use, 
instead, is the focus of the sectoral - and not surprisingly European in its nature - FEDMA 
Code. While dealing with informational privacy in terms of personal data protection, a single 
risk and one well-defined facet of privacy, the rules and requirements for legitimate data 
processing are very clearly set in a legislative framework and, therefore, can be easily 
implemented also on a voluntary level. As a result, while addressing social privacy, with its 
inherently different safety and privacy risks on the Internet, in one initiative, the multi-scope 
online child safety initiatives unavoidably use deliberately vague language, leaving the 
companies to decide for themselves how they will respect each of the agreed requirements. It 
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to address all the aspects of social privacy in a 
uniform and measurable way. Consequently, clear and detailed rule-making is only possible 
when the rules aim to mitigate a single informational privacy risk, such as personal data misuse, 
in the sectorial code of the advertising industry. As a result, without denying the need for 
general rules to protect other aspects of privacy, it would be more beneficial to self-regulate 
online child privacy issues separately from safety initiatives and use sectorial industry 
associations for such self-regulatory tasks. 
Such a human rights-based approach, instead of a safety-based approach, would consequently 
require the EU to take a stronger and better defined self-regulatory strategy. The conditions for 
that seem to be envisioned in the General Data Protection Regulation. It encourages 
associations and other bodies to prepare codes of conduct for the purpose of specifying the 
application of data protection provisions when the personal information is collected from 
children. The Regulation also requires an independent body which has an appropriate level of 
expertise and is accredited by the competent supervisory authority, to monitor compliance with 
codes of conduct. More reliance on sectorial codes would not only bring online privacy 
protection mechanisms more in line with the human rights perspective, but also possibly lead 
to clear rules given the possibility for public authorities to approve their content and the 
similarity of the industry players. As noted by Bennet (2004, p. 232), the main defining feature 
of the industry associations and their codes is "a broad consonance of economic interest and 
function, and by extension a similarity in the kinds of personal information collected and 
processed", and "sectoral codes permit, therefore, a more refined set of rules tailored to the 
issues within each industry". 
The aim of the online child safety initiatives to empower the users through technological 
solutions to manage their social privacy could, instead, be partially realized by putting more 
pressure on the industry providing online services for children to implement the privacy by 
design and privacy by default principles. Special privacy protection tools should be 
implemented at the early design stage of online services and products offered to children and 
enabled by default. For example, services and applications could be designed in a way that only 
the minimum amount of personal data necessary to deliver the services are collected from 
children, and children are not subject to online behavioural targeting, including profiling. 
Privacy settings and reporting tools could be prominently placed, easily accessible across all 





Achieving effective industry self-regulation is never easy, especially in a rapidly changing, 
multi-jurisdictional, multi-stakeholder dominated online environment. 
This article analyzed four specific self-regulatory initiatives aiming to protect online child 
privacy. A formal self-regulatory process analysis focused on the procedural (rule formulation, 
monitoring, enforcement) and organizational (organizational structures, role of public actors) 
aspects of the initiatives, and demonstrated significant limitations of self-regulation in the area 
of online child safety compared to the area of online advertising. The former suffers from 
limitations due to broadly formulated statements and unmeasurable commitments, limited 
monitoring mechanisms and often inexistent sanctions. The comparison provides an 
opportunity to distinguish several features that can possibly contribute to greater effectiveness 
of the self-regulatory schemes to protect the online privacy of children. 
First, clearly defined voluntary rules and measurable standards, rather than a broad statement 
of objectives, can enable better adoption and action of the voluntary initiatives in practice. In 
addition, formal approval of the industry formulated rules by public authorities can help to take 
into account public interests. However, it has been recognized that refined and detailed rule-
making is possible when the rules aim to mitigate a single privacy risk, such as personal data 
misuse. Online child safety initiatives, where different risks and various aspects of social 
privacy are at stake, require multi-stakeholder dominated platforms which manage to agree 
only on broad statements and principles. They can hardly be prescriptive and provide technical 
implementations, as they inherently focus on desired outcomes, leaving a large margin of 
maneuver for implementation to individual companies. As a result, their adoption and 
implementation is inevitably more complicated and less measurable. 
Second, lack of independent monitoring schemes and the absence of enforcement mechanisms 
and dissuasive sanctions in cases of malpractice in the majority of the online child safety 
initiatives could be mitigated by the availability of organizational structures for self-regulatory 
tasks. An industry association of a particular sector, through "institutionalization" of self-
regulation, would not only provide the necessary personnel and organizational structures to 
enforce self-regulatory rules and impose fines for non-compliance, but also due to the 
additional benefit provided to its members, such as lobbying, education and training, could 
exercise a threatening power in case of exclusion. However, such stable structures do not exist 
yet in cases where multi-sectoral action to mitigate online privacy and safety risks is necessary. 
Therefore, it has been argued that it would be more beneficial to tackle online child privacy 
issues separately from safety initiatives and use sectorial industry associations for the self-
regulatory task. This would not only bring online privacy protection mechanisms more in line 
with the human rights perspective, but also lead to clear and more enforceable rules given the 




Such a human rights-based approach, instead of a safety-based approach, would consequently 
require the EU to take a stronger and better defined co-regulatory strategy. The new General 
Data Protection Regulation envisions a similar future and encourages associations to adopt 
approved and monitored codes of conduct for the purpose of specifying the application of data 
protection provisions when processing children's personal data. 
The aim of the online child safety initiatives to empower the users through technological 
solutions to manage their social privacy, instead, could be partially realized by putting more 
pressure on the industry to implement the privacy by design and privacy by default principles, 
also present in the Regulation. 
Although the existing self-regulatory initiatives in the area of online child safety may be 
criticized, the broader potential of private governance networks in this domain should not be 
denied. Self-regulation "has advantages over no regulation at all" as even if doubtful in 
effectiveness it can overcome market failures and prevent violations of economic and privacy 
interests of the users (De Haan et al., 2013, p. 112). Apart from effective or ineffective 
regulatory outcomes, the process of self-regulation alone may create innovation, permit mutual 
learning, awareness raising, sharing of resources among industry and other stakeholders. Due 
to the fact that the industry takes up the regulatory responsibility, some industry players may 
propose new technical solutions to protect children from online privacy risks (e.g. age-
verification mechanisms, privacy by default measures, parental controls). From a user 
perspective, any improvement of privacy features and policies in online services and mutual 
change can be considered a sign of success of a regulatory process. The question is whether 
the initiatives that aim to bring industry together into networks for sharing knowledge and 
experience without adequate rules, monitoring and enforcement procedures should be called 
'self-regulation' or this term should only be allowed "when it was surrounded by heavy 
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label them self-regulation or co-regulation. Given the existing rich typology of Internet co-regulation and the 
difficulty of clearly separating self-and co-regulation both as concepts and as practices, this paper refers to the 
initiatives under analysis as self-regulatory initiatives. It uses the term 'self-regulation' in a broad sense, 
encompassing a process of rule setting wherein the industry alone or together with other stakeholders formulates 
the rules, enforces and adjudicates them. In this sense, it follows the definition of self-regulation provided by the 
EU itself in point 22 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law Making (OJ EU 321/1, 31.12.2003), 
denoting "the possibility for economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental organizations or 
associations to adopt amongst themselves and for themselves common guidelines at European level (particularly 
codes of practice or sectoral agreements)". 
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http://www.gsma.com/gsmaeurope/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/saferchildren.pdf [Last accessed 20 December 
2014]. This initiative is excluded from the analysis in this paper because it focuses merely on online child safety, 
excluding online privacy from its content. 
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Behavioural Advertising ([Last accessed 20 July 2015] Available from 
URL: http://www.iabeurope.eu/files/5013/8487/2916/2013-11-11_IAB_Europe_OBA_Framework.pdf ) and the 
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the paper. 
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The overall ambition of this PhD dissertation was to contribute to a better understanding 
and justification of the necessity of specific regulatory privacy protection (through legal and 
soft-law tools) for children on the internet, to identify the exising gaps and unclarities, and 
consequently to consider how to improve existing regulation. In doing so, the research for this 
dissertation was guided by the following central research question: how can the EU law and 
self-regulatory initiatives protect children from online privacy risks while accounting for the 
particular characteristics of children. This concluding chapter summarises the arguments made 
in the previous chapters by outlining the main findings and grouping them according to the 
research sub-questions.  
 
 
1. Beyond the obvious and explicit: a multitude of raisons d'être for a child-specific 
privacy protection regime 
 
The first research sub-question, implied by the main research question, was: What are 
the characteristics that make the (online) position of children special and require a specific 
regime to protect them from privacy risks online in the EU?  
This dissertation identified explicit and implicit types of justifications for specific 
protection going beyond data protection law and drawing attention to children not only as data 
subjects but also as consumers and as young, still developing, individuals. The analysis 
suggested that in addition to the lack of knowledge and implications of personal data collection 
practises (the GDPR lack of knowledge yardstick), children merit enhanced protection due to 
their different online behaviour, needs and privacy perceptions, their potential vulnerability as 




1.1. The lack of knowledge yardstick  
 
The GDPR refers to the lower awareness as a yardstick to normatively justify  
establishing its specific child’s data protection regime. 
Lack of knowledge and the absence of a full understanding of complex personal data 
collection practices, along with their implications, especially online, is an undeniable problem 
not only for children and young people, but for many adults too. Empirical research shows that 
some more advanced data collection and tracking techniques and their possible impact, are 
hardly understandable even for sophisticated users. Websites that are popular among children 
employ increasingly sophisticated methods to gather children’s data as they play, communicate 
or browse online, resulting in their constant surveillance.  Privacy policies are long, complex, 
difficult to find and often age-inappropriate.947 The privacy policies of the most widely used 
                                                
947 Micheti A Burkell J and Steeves V (2010) Fixing Broken Doors: Strategies for Drafting Privacy Policies 
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221 
 
social networking sites, are framed in language which valorises ‘sharing’ and ‘control’, despite 
the ongoing ubiquitous collection, use and disclosure of their data.948 Even though some 
children might be tech-savvy and informed internet users, a stance which has been widely 
debated in the academic literature949, this does not necessarily render them capable of fully 
realising the consequences of pervasive online data collection practices.  
 
 
1.2. Different online behaviour, needs, and privacy perceptions  
 
The GDPR refers only to the (lack of) certain capacities pertaining to children rather 
than to the specific features characterizing children and, especially, teenagers as individuals. 
Development psychology provides evidence that adolescents have particular needs and 
interests, such as identity formation, developing their agency and establishing autonomy, 
creating peer relations.950  
Relationship development is an important need during adolescence. Making friends and 
forming peer relations become increasingly important with growth and can even affect the 
psychological, social and academic development of the adolescents.951 Adolescents are eager 
to make new friends952 and often establish more friendships than adults.953 These assumptions 
are confirmed in the social media context: younger social media users tend to create new 
relationships more often, while older users often strengthen ties with the existing friends.954  
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During adolescence identity creation and self-representation in from of friends is a key 
need.955 Social media has become a new arena for adolescents to present and experiment with 
their identities.956 Identity development and creation of relations as developmental needs are 
potentially connected with user online behaviour, such as adding contacts on their social 
networks and disclosure of personal information.957 
Academics have established the link between developmental phases and online 
behaviour in relation to adolescents.958 Empirical research also hase elucidated that privacy 
perceptions and concerns are different between children, adolescents and adults and the 
developmental perspective can help to understand, and thus justify, the different privacy 
concerns and behaviour between individuals of different age on social media.959  
Yet, the key features of social networks that strongly meet adolescent needs and 
manipulative and unfair techniques to satisfy those needs often used online960 have raised 
concerns among academics and policy makers. As a result, questions have emerged as to 
whether certain data collection and use practices directed to children, such as intrusive and 
negative-impact having profiling or emotional manipulation, should be considered unfair 
commercial practices in terms of consumer law and should be added to a blacklist of the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive.   
 
 
1.3. Particular vulnerabilities and immaturities  
 
 
The reliance on neurotechnology, in particular magnetic resonance imaging, in the last 
decade has provided neurological evidence to compare the different structures and functioning 
of adolescent and adult brains. Scientists have demonstrated that there are structural and 
functional immaturities in the brain of adolescents. Since the part of the brain controlling 
inhibitions fully matures only in early adulthood, adolescents can be less capable of evaluating 
risky situations and can be more easily misled.961  They are less likely to consider the long-
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term consequences of their actions, and are more likely to be risk-prone.962 As summarised by 
Preston and Crowther, “(N)otwithstanding growing research on the capabilities of teenagers 
and their need for respect and autonomy, the developmental science shows that, alongside these 
positive qualities, minors are nonetheless still impulsive, take more risks than adults, and are 
less capable of controlling their emotions”963. They continue: “(t)hese behavioral immaturities 
suggest that minors are not in the same position as adults when making long-term decisions, 
especially when surrounded by their peers” and note further that “in the Internet age, they are 
always surrounded by their peers, using social media to bounce every decision off a host of 
other teenagers”964. This has resulted in the questioning of Jean Piaget’s previously dominant 
claim that by the age of 15, adolescents’ cognitive capability to understand, appreciate, and 
articulate decisions are on par with those of an adult.965 It has been instead acknowledged that 
“teenagers may have the ability to reason like adults, but do so with vexing inconsistency”966 
due to, among others, their emotional volatility, impulsiveness, lower ability to deflect the 
pressure of peers.   
It should be pointed out that the research results on adolescents’ brain have not been 
free of criticism. Bessant, for example, criticised this research as “it begins with a prejudice 
(‘they’ are ‘different’ ‘irrational’ and ‘deficient’) and then threatens to expand the civil and 
social disadvantages that already severely affect too many of our young people”. 967 By 
contrast, she claimed that “some young people are sometimes at risk not because their brains 
are different, but because they have not had the experience or opportunity to develop the skills 
and judgment that engagement in those activities and experiences supply”.968  
Nevertheless, the specific developmental features might influence adolescents’ online 
behaviour and increase the possibility of online victimisation among peers, as well as the 
possibility of commercial personal data exploitation to a level higher than that of cases 
involving younger children or adults. In the commercial context, such exploitation can be seen 
when online marketers employ special strategies to take advantage of the adolescent’s 
vulnerabilities, knowing that ‘(b)ecause of adolescents’ emotional volatility and their tendency 
to act impulsively, they are also more vulnerable than adults to such techniques as real-time 
bidding, geolocation targeting (especially when an individual is near a point of purchase), and 
‘dynamic creative’ ads tailored to their individual profiles and behavior patterns’.969 Data 
protection and its justification could be significantly strengthened  or even refined  if the law 
were informed by or even incorporate some of the main finding on minors from developmental 
psychology and neurosciences. As claimed by Preston and Crowther, “(w)hen approached 
carefully and consistently, scientific research can be successfully integrated into our legal 
structure, infusing it with greater understanding and ability to meet the needs and realities of 
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adolescents rather than the panic of older generations or the self-interested demands of 
corporate and governmental pressure”970. 
EU consumer law, in contrast to the data protection law, has clearly distinguished a 
special category of ‘vulnerable consumers’ and provided justification for their protection.971 
Such justification is partially based on the insights from social sciences. Vulnerability in 
consumer law can be both “a permanent or long-term condition, often related to factors internal 
to the consumer, such as age, inexperience or a disability” and “dynamic and relative” in its 
nature arising in interaction with markets and services. Thus, any consumer can become 
vulnerable at times depending on his personal situation and characteristics as well as products 
or services and marketing used.972 According to the recent interpretation of the vulnerability 
concept in the EU “(V)ulnerability is not a static condition. Consumers may move in and out 
of states of vulnerability and they may be vulnerable in respect of some categories of 
transaction but not others. In addition, vulnerability is best viewed as a spectrum rather than a 
binary state”973.  
Children and teenagers may be more vulnerable as consumers not only because they 
lack knowledge and skills, but also because (partially due of this lack) they can be more easily 
influenced by others (susceptibility).974 Research on consumer socialisation deals with the 
development of consumer skills, knowledge and attitudes of children and adolescents.975 It 
indicates that the ability to act as consumers is increasingly acquired with growth. Research on 
the ability to understand advertising demonstrates that younger children are not able to 
critically assess and understand persuasive aim of advertising.976 From 7-8 years old children 
start to distinguish the persuasive intent and realise that advertisements can be deceptive or 
bias.977 From 11 years old children become more sceptical in relation to advertisement and 
their intent and tactics.978 However, these age thresholds of recognising and understanding 
advertisements are not absolute or certain. Oath et al. claim that not all children being 10 years 
old can understand the persuasive aim of advertisers.979 Livingstone and Helsper show a more 
complex picture on the relationship between influence and age: “different processes of 
persuasion operate at different ages, precisely because literacy levels vary by age”.980 Also, the 
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findings on age ranges often reflect the research outcomes in the context of traditional 
advertising, such as on television or in newspapers, but are not to be directly transferred into 
the online context. Recognition of sophisticated advertising techniques in new media among 
children is much less explored than in traditional media. Yet, a recent EU study showed that 
although the most popular online games provide embedded or contextual advertisements, 
children have difficulty in recognizing marketing intend of the content, in shielding themselves 
from it and in taking decisions.981 The impact of imbedded advertising is considerable on 
children from subliminally changing their behaviour and purchasing.982 
It therefore could be claimed that children can be considered more vulnerable than 
many other types of consumers. While many other groups of consumers would change the 
states of vulnerability by acquiring and losing external vulnerability factors, children would 
often fall under both groups of internal and external vulnerability factors. They would be 
permanently vulnerable depending on their personal situation and most of the times depending 
on characteristics of products, services and marketing techniques. 
 
 
1.4. Specific privacy-related interests 
 
Besides the general privacy-related interests (personal autonomy, dignity, intimacy and 
self-determination), there are some privacy-specific interests of children that data protection 
law can promote. It can allow for harmonious development and growth, and facilitate the 
unconstrained creation of a child’s - still-developing - personality. Academic literature 
elucidates that privacy afforded to adolescents can enforce their developing attitudes and 
identities and be instrumental for their dynamic self-determination and participation.983 
What has been explicitly underlined in case law relating to children’s privacy by several 
national courts is the importance of privacy for persons who have not yet reached physical, 
psychological and intellectual maturity. In Germany, the Constitutional court explicitly 
recognised that children are ‘persons-in-the-making’ and they have a ‘right to become [i.e., to 
freely develop into] a [full] person’. As a consequence, children deserve extra protection in so 
far as the collection and disclosure of their personal data must be more rigorously justified than 
for adults whose personality is already-developed. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada 
also underlined the ‘undoubted constitutional significance’ of children’s privacy and the special 
necessity to protect it. In its case law, the Court has recognised the ‘inherent vulnerability of 
children’ and their ‘diminished moral culpability’.  It has  held that the privacy of children 
should be equally, if not more strongly protected, than that of adults, not only to avoid concrete 
harms, such as labelling and stigmatization, but, fundamentally, to guarantee the physical and 
moral autonomy and the well-being of the individual.  
The French data protection authority (CNIL) has equally described a child as lacking 
psychological, intellectual and physical maturity and as going through the process of 
constructing their personality ‘through a series of metamorphoses’984. Due to their personality 
being in development, law considers children to be in need of special protection against 
themselves (negative decisions that they themselves may take) and third parties.  
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It should be acknowledged that the courts and the CNIL mentioned-above have to a 
large extent followed the ‘deficit theory of the child’, perceiving children as inherently 
vulnerable and in need of protection. This view has been the subject of academic debate.985 
Scholars following the new sociological perspective of childhood (discussed in the introduction 
of this dissertation), have, in contrast, viewed children as beings rather than beings in the 
making, and refused biological reductionism and age-based determinism. However, the latter 
perspective although largely absent in court decision has been acknowledged by the Article 29 
Working Party incorporated both views expressing them through the static and the dynamic 
perspective.986 From the static point of view, it views the child as a person “who has not yet 
achieved physical and psychological maturity” and from the dynamic point of view as a person 
“in the process of developing physically and mentally to become an adult”987. The Working 
Party clearly recognised that the rights of the child to privacy and data protection, including 
their exercise, should be ensured in such a way that both of these perspectives are respected. 
 
 
2. The EU child-tailored privacy protection regime 
 
Building on the analysis justifying the need for a specific regime to protect children 
from privacy risks online, the research turned to examine the following two research sub-
questions:  
• How has the child-specific online privacy protection regime thusfar been constructed, 
i.e. what are the different levels, rules and tools employed in the EU?  
• What are the dilemmas and unresolved challenges in terms of particular characteristics 
and rights of children when implementing child-specific online privacy protection 
mechanisms in practice?  
The dissertation portrayed protection of children’s privacy in the EU as a multifaceted regime 
composed of the GDPR (age generic and age specific provisions), self-regulatory initiatives 
and enforced self-regulatory tools (DPIAs). 
 
 
2.1. The GDPR 
 
The newly adopted GDPR emphasises the need to better safeguard children online and 
expressly addresses conditions and requirements for lawful processing of children’s personal 
data in relation to online services offered directly to them. To achieve this, the GDPR constructs 
a child-specific privacy protection regime consisting a two-tier system of protections. 
 
2.1.1. The first tier – age generic GDPR provisions 
 
The first tier of the regime is composed of general, age-generic GDPR provisions. 
Although these provisions apply equally to both adults and children, they have been framed by 
the EU legislator as specifically relevant to children and their online activities. 
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First, the most prominent provision is the right to erasure (right be forgotten), allowing 
children to remove content that may be damaging to their reputation and personality. 
Essentially, this right is not a novelty, but an updated and clarified version of the right of access, 
already present in Article 12 of the Directive 95/46/EC. As Recital 65 explains, this right is 
particularly relevant in cases where children’s data is collected online based on their consent, 
when they are not fully aware of the risks arising from the processing of this data, and later 
want to remove such personal data. The right to erasure can be exercised notwithstanding the 
fact that an individual is no longer a child. Although the right to erasure (right to be forgotten) 
is particularly relevant with respect to children’s data, the application of this right to children 
may be more problematic and complex than it is for adults. When deciding whether to delete 
children’s data, a dynamic perspective should be taken into account. With time, a child may 
become a public figure, and his data may therefore change status from private (worth deleting) 
to public interest-related (worth preserving) data.988 
The second age-generic but child-relevant GDPR provision refers to the right to data 
portability, potentially allowing internet users to shift from one service provider to another by 
moving their personal data. In fact, an easier exit from ‘walled gardens’, such as Facebook, can 
reinforce the ongoing trend of social media platform diversification989 among children, and 
consequently empower children to choose more privacy-friendly online services. 
  Third, the provisions on data protection by design and by default, contribute to the 
empowerment of adults, but in particular children and hence their protection through 
technology in the online setting. These principles require data protection safeguards to be built 
into products and services from the initial stage of their development. Privacy-friendly default 
settings are expected to be the norm on social networks and mobile apps.990  
Fourth, the Regulation also aims to protect data subjects though awareness raising and 
the provision of transparent information. It obliges data controllers to give information to all 
data subjects in a clear, audience-appropriate language at the time that their personal data is 
collected. Recital 58 frames this requirement in relation to children as giving information ‘in 
such a clear and plain language that the child can easily understand’. The challenge that will 
be faced by data controllers in practice, however, is how to implement the transparency 
requirement in a meaningful way in the case of children.991 Drawing on consumer protection 
law and practices, Chapter 4 propose several ways to reach child-tailored transparency 
(personalised information, participatory transparency and information in symbols). 
Fifth, the GDPR relies on the data protection impact assessments for data controllers to 
evaluate risks when data processing is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms 
of natural persons. In the DPIA data controllers need to evaluate, “the origin, nature, 
particularity and severity of that risk” and mitigate the risk by appropriate measures or consult 
the supervisory authority prior to the processing (Recital 84 of the GDPR). 
                                                
988 Blume P (2015) The Data Subject. European Data Protection Law Review 1(4): 258 – 264. 
989 Cortesi S (2013) Youth Online: Diversifying Social Media Platforms and Practices. In: Gasser U, Faris R and 
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990 European Commission (note 11). 
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Although neither the GDPR in Article 35(3)992 nor the Article 29 Working Party in its 
recent guidelines993 explicitly ask for a mandatory DPIA for all the systems involving personal 
data about children, it acknowledges that the processing of vulnerable data subjects’ data could 
require a DPIA. Also, given the fact that the GDPR establishes a non-exhaustive list of “high 
risk” data processing operations that are subject to the DPIA requirement, national data 
protection authorities might include children’s data into their lists of data processing operations 
under the DPIA obligation (Article 35.4). Thus, as in many cases, the DPIA will need to be 
conducted when personal data about children is collected, especially before the creation and 
deployment of a new product or service. Chapter 6 proposed a way to approach the specific 
DPIAs for children and outlined the main component and their attributes that data controllers 
providing information society services to children should consider.  
Last, the GDPR encourages associations to adopt approved and monitored codes of 
conduct for the purpose of specifying the application of data protection provisions when 
processing children's personal data. However, codes of conduct should achieve clear 
formulation, adoption and enforcement of voluntary rules. Chapter 7 analysed four existing 
self-regulatory and reflected on the strengths and shortcomings of the self-regulatory process 
in the area of online child privacy. 
 
2.1.2. The second tier – child specific GDPR provisions  
 
Along with the first, general tier GDPR provisions, the Regulation introduces two 
provisions specifically for children as data subjects. They impose obligations on external 
parties, i.e. negative obligations for data controllers to abstain from certain data collection 
practises, and positive obligations for parents to engage in activities to secure the effective 
enjoyment of their child’s fundamental rights. 
First, the GDPR prohibits certain potentially harmful data collection practices through 
restrictions on the profiling and marketing activities of data controllers. Recital 38 generally 
emphasises that specific protection should be afforded to children against marketing or 
profiling. Under Article 4(4), ‘profiling’ means any automated data processing activity that 
involves (a) automated processing of personal data; and (b) using that personal data to evaluate 
certain personal aspects relating to a natural person. Specific examples include analyzing or 
predicting aspects concerning a person's economic situation, personal preferences, interests, 
behaviour, and location. Recital 71 refers to automated decision making based on profiling and 
states that such a measure should not concern children. This seems to lead to the conclusion 
that the profiling of children should not be carried out and that automated decisions based on 
profiling that produce legal effects or similarly significantly affect the child are prohibited. 
Given that the articles of the GDPR do not explicitly exclude children from profiling 
and the recitals are not legally binding, debates are still taking place about the extent to which 
automated decisions based on profiling of children are allowed. Many unclear questions 
remain. If profiling measures in relation to children are allowed by the GDPR, how strictly 
should Article 22 of the GDPR be interpreted? When do decisions have a significant effect on 
children and what is the effect? Should this effect be negative? Should measures involving 
automated decisions based on profiling that aim to benefit children and enhance their rights, 
                                                
992 The initial GDPR proposal published by the European Commission on 25 January 2012 included children’s 
data among the data categories for which the DPIA was required. Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) COM(2012) 11 final, 25 
January 2012. 
993 Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is “likely to 
result in a high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, WP 248, 4 April 2017. 
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i.e. have positive effect, be allowed and under what legal ground for the related data 
processing? Would children be asked for an explicit consent to be profiled, can such consent 
be informed and if yes, at what age? What additional safeguards are necessary to prevent major 
problems associated with (commercial) profiling, such as the lack of control over the profile, 
its possible use and abuse, or opaque steering of consumer choices?  
Second, the Regulation requires a prior parental consent or authorisation before the 
processing of the personal data of children when they are directly offered ‘information society 
services’ (Article 8). It is the most controversial and complicated GDPR provision in relation 
to children. As a general rule, protection through the parental consent mechanism is applicable 
to children under the age of 16. However, 16 is not an absolute threshold, as Member States 
are allowed to apply a lower age limit, which nevertheless cannot be lower than 13 years. The 
parental consent requirements is applicable online, excluding offline data processing practises, 
such as those in the context of school or leisure activities.  
The analysis of the legislative history of Article 8 in the GDPR provided in Chapter 3 
revealed the lack of well-reasoned justifications and evidence in terms of the substantive 
requirements adopted in the final GDPR version. With most of the GDPR debate being focused 
around articles with a direct economic impact on data controllers’ activities and the Digital 
Single Market rather than the protection of vulnerable data subjects, Article 8 witnessed only 
sporadic renewals of interest during the debates in the EU institutions. 
The European Commission almost literally copied the parental consent requirement 
from COPPA in its proposal for the GDPR, without taking into account the criticisms related 
to ineffective parental consent and age verification mechanisms or considering any alternatives 
of a more nuanced approach to child protection. COPPA has been heavily criticised due to its 
limited scope (i.e. its applicability only to children below the age of 13), the ineffectiveness 
and burden of parental consent mechanisms for service operators, the possible impact on online 
anonymity, and the balance between parental and service provider responsibility. 
Despite many valuable amendments being registered, the discussions at the European 
Parliament did not lead to major substantive changes in Article 8 of the GDPR either. The 
Council has only substantially deviated from the original GDPR proposal on the age of consent. 
It initially increased the age limit of consent to 16 years and in the last minute of negotiations 
took a flexible approach leaving the decision partially to the Member states. As a consequence, 
this left the EU without coherent and uniform age threshold in the European Digital Market 
and undermined the much-anticipated harmonisation effect of the GDPR. In summary, the EU 
institutions failed to employ an up-to-date means of assessment, question the age limit for 
consent, assess the impact on children’s rights and the effectiveness of a particular formulation 




2.2. Dilemmas and tension with child rights in the GDPR 
 
Chapter 2 examined two dilemmas that the introduction of the child-specific rules into 
the GDPR has created: the ‘empowerment vs protection’ and the ‘individualized vs average 
child’ dilemma. 
The GDPR in relation to children essentially entails empowering provisions (the right 
to erasure, the right to data portability, data protection by design and by default, transparency 
and awareness) and protective provisions (the prohibition of profiling, parental consent). 
Ideally, data protection law should protect children from privacy risks, such as commercial 
data exploitation and misuse, reputational damage and harm to one’s identity, dignity and 
personal integrity, while also enhancing online opportunities and accounting for the growing 
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maturity of children. This requires a policy framework that not only imposes legal compliance 
requirements on data controllers, but that also adequately balances online risks and 
opportunities, e.g. empowers children while also addressing the needs of those who require 
greater protection.  
The consent requirement formulated in Article 8 of the GDPR seems to place children 
under the strict over-protection of their parents and to distort the balance between 
empowerment and protection towards the latter. The consent requirement is fully applicable in 
all cases except for the preventive or counselling services offered directly to a child and the 
GDPR does not foresee consent exceptions for less risky data collection practices; the consent 
rule is very broad in scope and applies to all types of online services in different sectors; it does 
not formally require the involvement of children or give due weight to children’s opinions. The 
GDPR makes no effort to adopt a sliding scale approach and increasingly recognise child’s 
agency, foster children’s participation in their own protection, as well as support coping and 
resilience through learning by doing. The adoption of broad parental oversight through the 
consent mechanism also raises questions as to whether and to what extent children will be able 
to enjoy the empowering rights, such as the right to erasure  and data portability, without 
parental involvement.  
Although there is a clear lack of rules on children’s ability to exercise their data subject 
rights994, it seems to be recognised that the age for consent and the age at which a child might 
exercise his data subject’s rights (e.g. to access or rectify personal data) should not necessarily 
coincide. Children as data subjects should be able to exercise their rights as soon as they can 
demonstrate the capacity to do so. This view is supported by several data protection 
authorities.995 The ICO in the UK provides the following criteria to be used when considering 
borderline cases: the level of maturity of the child, the nature of the personal data, any court 
orders on parental responsibility, duty of confidence, any consequences or detrimental effect 
to the child and any views of the child.996 However, the Article 29 Working Party has stated 
that the right of access should normally be exercised by the child’s legal representative in the 
interest of the child with children who are mature enough permitted to act jointly with their 
representatives and only in limited cases alone, such as in relation to the health data.997 
There is seemingly more flexible approach to the exercise of data subject rights in 
contrast with the strict requirements in the case of consent in practice. For example, the data 
protection authority in Italy has suggested the age threshold for consent according to the GDPR 
                                                
994  See Annex 1, which demonstrates that no clear provisions or guidance exist in the EU Member States regulating 
children’s as data subjects rights. 
995 ICO states: “Even if a child is very young, data about them is still their personal data and does not belong to 
anyone else. It is the child who has a right of access to the information held about them. Before responding to 
a request for information held about a child, organisations should consider whether the child is mature 
enough to understand their rights. If the organisation is confident that the child can understand their rights, 
then it will respond to the child rather than the parent. What matters is that the child is able to understand (in 
broad terms) what it means to make a subject access request and how to interpret the information they 
receive as a result of doing so.” (see  ICO, Information for the public, at: https://ico.org.uk/for-the-
public/personal-information/). The Irish Data Protection Commissioner states: “Legal guardians can make an 
access request on behalf of a child. However, once a child is capable of understanding their rights to privacy 
and data protection, the child should normally decide for themselves whether to request access to data and 
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of understanding their own rights to privacy and data protection, the organisation must take account of the 
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guide for Individuals and Organisations, at: https://www.dataprotection.ie/documents/AccessGuidance.pdf) 
996 ICO, Subject access code of practice: Dealing with requests from individuals for personal information, 9 June 
2017, at: https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2014223/subject-access-code-of-practice.pdf 
997 Article 29 Working Party (A29WP), ‘Opinion 2/2009 on the protection of children’s personal data (general 
guidelines and the special case of schools) WP 160’, 11 February 2009 
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at 16 years.998 The new Anti-cyberbullying Law999, which allows the lodging of a complaint 
for the removal, blocking or takedown of personal data for underage victims of cyberbullying, 
sets instead the age limit of 14. A huge amount of confusion, however, surrounding a uniform 
interpretation of the positioning of age in relation to data subjects rights and its relationship 
with consent remains. The UK Government has recently expressed a view that children should 
be able to ask for posts to be deleted at the age of 18.1000 The logic appears to target the removal 
of past posts when a child reaches 18. There is no good reason, however, why a child should 
not be able to ask for blog posts to be removed at 16 or 17, or even younger.  Children aged 16 
or 17 are very likely to have the capacity to understand the issue and the process of asking for 
the deletion of information posted by others. The prohibition to exercise the data subjects rights 
until one reaches the legal majority would seem illogical and would undermine the very essence 
of the right to data protection. In theory, there also seems to be a recognition that an indication 
of the degree of maturity and autonomy, and thus the ability to exercise the rights of the data 
subject, is an analysis of the factual circumstances and thus  whether the data concerned were 
provided by the parents or by the child. In other words, the exercise of data subject rights relies 
on the capacity to consent. 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that there is a difference between accessing 
one’s data (ex post control), and taking an active decision to authorize certain usage or 
disclosure of personal data that may have long-term consequences (ex ante control). John 
Eekelaar emphasises that “information sharing is a more complex issue than subject 
access”,1001 while Joan Loughrey has opined that:  
 
‘(c)hoosing to have your confidentiality breached is much more of an autonomy 
right. You need to have the capacity to make an autonomous decision regarding 
the release of information.’1002 
 
In sum, the highly protective consent provision seems to distort the balance between 
empowerment and protection towards the latter, especially for teens, and there is a risk that the 
same protective stance can be followed when interpreting the age threshold for data subjects’ 
rights. 
Although the maturity of the child (physical, emotional, cognitive and social 
development) should guide the balancing of the protection and empowerment elements, it is 
difficult to assess when an individual child is competent to take responsibility for a decision 
affecting him or her. This is the second ‘individualized versus average child’ dilemma 
discussed in this dissertation. This dilemma refers to the difficulty of determining the age at 
which specific protection for children should be lowered, taking into account the individual 
understanding and maturity of each child. Strict age thresholds or bright-line rules are absolute 
                                                
998  Guida all'applicazione del Regolamento europeo in materia di protezione dei dati personali, 28 April 2017, at: 
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1001 Cited in Dowty, T. / Korff, D. (2009), Protecting the virtual child – the law and children’s consent to sharing 
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blanket norms, they do not allow for the examining of the best interests of each child on a case-
by-case basis, or for the taking into account of individual ability and development. They are 
based on a generalized age limit that is used as a proxy for maturity and judgement, and thus 
may easily exclude children capable of maturely engaging in certain activities. Yet, the 
capacities of a child are personal, context-dependent and constantly evolving. An assessment 
in each individual case would show widely differing capacities among children of the same age 
and could, thereby, reflect the best interests of the child. In addition, the same child may need 
protection for one data processing purpose, and autonomy or self-determination for another, 
depending on the potential privacy risks and harm that are at stake. The imposition of legal age 
limits may disproportionally restrict the rights of other children and data subjects, irrespective 
of a child’s own levels of competence. 
 
 
2.3. Lack of legal certainty and effectiveness 
 
Chapter 3 showed that the GDPR parental consent requirement lacks legal certainty and 
faces many practical challenges related to its implementation. First, the parental consent 
requirement is applicable to information society services offered directly to a child. As 
information society services are normally provided for remuneration, this causes uncertainty 
as to the particular material scope of Article 8, especially its applicability to free services. 
Second, the requirement concerns online services offered directly to children, but it is 
complicated to draw the exact distinction between services to which the protection should 
apply. The extent to which the GDPR parental consent requirement will cover general-audience 
or mixed-audience services and sites remains unclear. The FTC solution of subjecting different 
services to a parental consent requirement through the ‘totality of the circumstances test’ and 
‘actual knowledge test’ is useful, despite its flaws. Third, as the GDPR allows consent 
authorisation by the parents or the holders of parental responsibility over the child, it remains 
unclear if the reference to consent authorisation can be understood as allowing a joint consent 
and if the circle of holders of parental responsibility can include individuals other than parents 
and legal guardians. Fourth, to comply with the GDPR it suffices to make reasonable efforts to 
obtain verifiable parental consent rather than guarantee verified consent as a final outcome. It 
is not clear how much effort and proof in relation to obtaining consent can be requested from 
the controllers in order to sufficiently demonstrate compliance nor how reasonable efforts 
should be documented and proven. Fifth, specific parental consent mechanisms that can be 
used by data controllers to be compliant with the GDPR require further clarification and the 
guidance of the FTC on COPPA can be informative in specifying adequate and GDPR-
compliant consent verification methods. Finally, the GDPR does not explicitly require the 
verification of a child’s age, and thus more specification is needed on the relationship between 
consent and age verification, and the need for concrete proportionate and reliable age 
verification solutions. 
Chapter 5 explored the concept and the role of risk, as well as associated risk regulation 
mechanisms in the GDPR through a two-fold shift. It showed that the GDPR is based on an 
undefined and multidimensional risk notion, which is not only a potential obstacle to 
successfully asses and measure risks, but also might lower the protection level for individuals. 
In data security, risk is an objective phenomenon, which can be expressed and quantified 
through feared events and threats. Privacy risks are more subjective and ‘individualised’, and 
thus hard to establish, evaluate, and quantify. No uniform understanding of the privacy harms 
and negative impacts on individuals exists, and privacy risk are too complex to be fully caught 






3. Towards the future protection regime 
 
Given the limitations of the child-specific privacy protection regime identified earlier, 
this section pulls together the recommendations made in different chapters of the dissertation 
showing how the regime can be improved. In doing so, this section answers the last research 
sub-question: What are ways to improve the child-specific online privacy protection regime? 
 
 
3.1. Improvement of the GDPR consent mechanism 
 
Given the weaknesses of consent in general and parental consent in particular (Chapter 
3), the GDPR places an excessive burden on parents and children to make informed decisions 
about their personal data processing in the complex technology and data-driven environment. 
Instead of or in addition to asking parents to control children’s data collection through consent, 
restrictions on the most undesirable data processing practices in relation to children should be 
enforced. Effective GDPR restrictions on children’s data collection such as prohibition of 
profiling, marketing, the use of legitimate interest as a ground to process children’s data, may 
provide an alternative to the parental consent requirement as a protection model. Purpose 
dependent restrictions on the collection of children’s data would be better suited to diminishing 
its commercial exploitation in complex marketing, tracking and targeting systems, than 
parental consent. 
Given that consent has been assigned a prominent role in the GDPR, when data 
processing is based on the parental consent it could be fine-tuned as a protection mechanism. 
As regards the age threshold for consent, it might be worth adopting different age limits for 
different data collection areas and practices in the 13–16 year age span. Specific consent age 
limits could be determined in national laws as Member States can depart from the GDPR 
default age of 16 or in codes of conduct at the European level. The latter could help to create 
standards that account for children’s vulnerabilities in a specific activity or sector. If the 
Member States chose to lower the age threshold to 13, the industry codes of conduct could still 
go beyond this age requirement and guarantee stringent protection in specific data collection 
scenarios offering more protection for children’s personal data depending on the context. In 
any case, the choice of the most appropriate age limit between 13 and 16, be it in national law 
or in self-regulatory initiatives, should be based on extensive empirical evidence and 
consultations with children.  
The implementation of Article 8 of the GDPR provides an opportunity for the EU to 
address the different challenges and opportunities in adopting innovative online methods of 
age verification. Instead, of purely relying on the internet users’ self-assertion of their age, as 
provided in the COPPA regime in the US, the EU should explore innovative, effective and 
privacy-friendly age verification mechanisms, aligning them with the advancements in online 
authentication, attribute-based ecosystems and public e-ID schemes. The use of attribute-based 
credentials in implementing Article 8 of the GDPR looks particularly promising, allowing for 
pseudonymous and reliable age checks online. In line with the risk-based approach embodied 
into the GDPR, methods of age verification that afford lower levels of assurance might be 
adequate in online services posing lower risks to the rights and freedoms of children, leaving 
high assurance options for high risk information society services, such as services involving 
profiling, marketing and other practises from which the GDPR considers that children merit 
specific enhanced protection. 
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When determining acceptable parental consent verification methods, the EU could 
follow the US example and encourage industry to propose effective, acceptable (from an 
industry perspective) and sector-tailored solutions for approval. Codes of conduct could be one 
possible way to create standards for effective consent verification and the further specification 
of Article 8 of the GDPR. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that self-regulation is accountable, 
efficient and able to deliver on its societal goals, the EU should actively participate in the 
formulation of self-regulatory rules, and their effective monitoring and enforcement. 
 
 
3.2. Child-tailored risk assessments: taking children’s interest, needs vulnerabilities into 
account 
 
In order to take into account the specific catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms 
(i.e. the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) and the earlier identified reasons to protect 
children (special needs and vulnerabilities), Chapter 6 proposed to conduct the child-specific 
DPIAs. It first discussed the general criteria of DPIAs established in Article 35 of the GDPR: 
the envisaged processing operations and their purposes of the processing, the necessity and 
proportionality of the processing, the impact on the rights and freedoms of data subjects. As a 
case study, it focused on the PRIAM methodology and showed how its components, categories 
and attributes can be specialized in the context of a child-specific DPIA assessing risks for 
children in the information society context (online privacy risks). 
 
 
3.3. Holistic understanding of the GDPR concepts and principles: lessons from consumer 
law 
 
Chapter 4 explored the extent to which EU consumer law, which takes account of 
children as a particularly vulnerable group of consumers, can inform the GDPR and reduce the 
clarity gap in relation to some GDPR concepts and principles, principles of fairness, 
transparency, and conceptual questions of an average child and services directed to children. 
Bearing in mind consumer law and the requirement to provide clear and comprehensive 
pre-contractual information to consumers, icons and symbols, personalized information and 
participatory transparency have been considered as the ways to implement child-adapted 
transparency in data protection law. It has become clear that the proposal of personalized 
information, although promising and interesting from a consumer law perspective, as a 
transparency mechanism cannot be easily aligned with the core data protection requirements 
as its implementation requires the profiling of children. It is also questionable if and to which 
extent icons, pictograms and other non-verbal ways of transmitting information can be effective 
and feasible for the implementation of the GDPR in relation to children. 
Relying on consumer protection, the GDPR could be interpreted as forbidding a priori 
some unfair and undesirable data collection and use (e.g. personalisation) practices. Consumer 
law would also allow to establish violation of fairness even in cases where the child or his 
representative has consented to the processing. In addition, the blacklist contained in Annex 1 
in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive could be updated to include a list of unfair 
commercial data-processing practices in order to ban them as misleading or aggressive. 
Consumer law can provide guidance on how to interpret definition of information 
society services offered directly to a child allowing to include services not only directly 
targeting children but also those that are likely to appeal to children due to their content, style 
and presentation. Finally, following the logic of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, 
the GDPR could rely on an average data subject, define an average child in different data 
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collection scenarios and explore the correlation between the characteristics of certain age 




3.4. Improved self-regulation  
 
In line with the broad definition of regulation employed in this dissertation, Chapter 7 
looked beyond hard law and included into the regulatory regime the current self-regulatory 
rules for the online privacy protection of children. It drew on two different areas: online child 
safety and online advertising and analysed four self-regulatory initiatives: the Safer Social 
Networking Principles, the CEO Coalition's Statement of Purpose, the ICT Coalition's 
Principles, and the FEDMA code. At the time of writing, these were the only existing self-
regulatory initiatives dealing with online child privacy as a substantial part of their content.1003  
The chapter focused on the procedural (rule formulation, monitoring, enforcement) and 
organizational (organizational structures, role of public actors) aspects of the initiatives, and 
demonstrated significant limitations of self-regulation in the area of online child safety 
compared to the area of online advertising. The former suffers from limitations due to broadly 
formulated statements and unmeasurable commitments, limited monitoring mechanisms and 
often non-existent sanctions. The comparison provides an opportunity to distinguish several 
features that can possibly contribute to greater effectiveness of the self-regulatory schemes to 
protect the online privacy of children. 
First, clearly defined voluntary rules and measurable standards, rather than a broad 
statement of objectives, can enable better adoption and action of the voluntary initiatives in 
practice. In addition, formal approval of the industry formulated rules by public authorities can 
help to take into account public interests. However, it has been recognized that refined and 
detailed rule-making is possible when the rules aim to mitigate a single privacy risk, such as 
personal data misuse. Online child safety initiatives, where different risks and various aspects 
of social privacy are at stake, require multi-stakeholder dominated platforms which manage to 
agree only on broad statements and principles. They can hardly be prescriptive and provide 
technical implementations, as they inherently focus on desired outcomes, leaving a large 
margin of maneuver for implementation to individual companies. As a result, their adoption 
and implementation is inevitably more complicated and less measurable. 
Second, the lack of independent monitoring schemes and the absence of enforcement 
mechanisms and dissuasive sanctions in cases of malpractice in the majority of the online child 
safety initiatives could be mitigated by the availability of organizational structures for self-
regulatory tasks. An industry association of a particular sector, through "institutionalization" 
of self-regulation, would not only provide the necessary personnel and organizational 
structures to enforce self-regulatory rules and impose fines for non-compliance, but also due 
to the additional benefit provided to its members, such as lobbying, education and training, 
could exercise a threatening power in case of exclusion. However, such stable structures do not 
exist yet in cases where multi-sectoral action to mitigate online privacy and safety risks is 
necessary. 
                                                
1003 Since the article has been published, one of the self-regulatory initiatives (the CEO Coalition) ceased to exist 
and a new initiative (the Alliance to better protect minors online) has been launched. In the Statement of 
Purpose, adopted on 7 February 2017, the Alliance members agreed to curb harmful content, conduct and 
contact, through three strands of action: user-empowerment to promote enhanced use of online safety tools, 
cooperation and sharing of best practices, awareness raising and access to positive, educational and 




Therefore, it has been argued that it would be more beneficial to tackle online child 
privacy issues separately from safety initiatives and use sectorial industry associations for the 
self-regulatory task. This would not only bring online privacy protection mechanisms more in 
line with the human rights perspective, but also lead to clear and more enforceable rules given 
the possibility for public authorities to approve their content and the similarity of the industry 
players. Such a human rights-based approach, instead of a safety-based approach, would 
consequently require the EU to take a stronger and better defined co-regulatory strategy. The 
new General Data Protection Regulation envisions a similar future and encourages associations 
to adopt approved and monitored codes of conduct for the purpose of specifying the application 
of data protection provisions when processing children’s personal data. 
 
 
4. Future research directions  
 
This dissertation aimed at researching how the EU law and self-regulatory initiatives 
can protect children from online privacy risks while accounting for the particular characteristics 
of children. At the moment of completion of this dissertation, which was written in the middle 
of academic debates of theoretical and practical justifications as well as policy developments 
in the area of children‘s online protection, a number of issues have been identified for future 
research and will be presented in this section with the hope that they will be the starting point 
for fruitful academic debates and inspiration for further research. 
In answering its main research question, the dissertation takes a child rights-based 
theoretical approach. It sheds light on some of the tensions and complexities that arise when 
this approach in applied in an attempt to ensure online privacy for children. Recent 
developments in online privacy protection for children in the European Union and in particular 
the specific provisions of the GDPR, as discussed in this disseration, create a new level-playing 
field in Europe. Future research is needed to assess in detail how the child rights-based 
approach and the lenses of protection, participation and provision it promotes, could still 
contribute towards the safeguarding the online privacy of children and help to interact in 
harmony with other child rights foreseen in the UN CRC. Future research is also necessary in 
order to examine how certain concrete data-driven daily practices impact the rights of children. 
For example, as noted by Lupton and Williamson,1004 big data may potentially lead to direct 
contravention of Article 12 UN CRC, and instead of engaging children to express their views 
and perpectives, actually silence their voices. 
The research identified the need for more empirical data on children and privacy online, 
including privacy related harms stemming not only from the interactions between individuals 
but also, increasingly importantly, from commercial data collection and use, should be 
gathered. In the context of privacy and data protection, such information is indispensable for 
instance in the context of data protection impact assessments. Despite the methodological and 
ethical challenges that the research will have to overcome,, the empirical research on harms is 
a stepping stone for policy making. As acknowledged by Slavtcheva-Petkova et al. “a focus on 
risk, or the risks of risk to the exclusion of harm is ultimately self-defeating, for without 
research into the types of harm experienced, we cannot know who is at risk, or why that should 
matter, and may fail to notice certain new or emerging sources of concern”1005.  
                                                
1004 Deborah Lupton and Ben Williamson, The datafied child: The dataveillance of children and implications for 
their rights , New Media & Society Vol 19, Issue 5, pp. 780 - 794 
1005 Vera Slavtcheva-Petkova, Victoria Jane Nash & Monica Bulger, Evidence on the extent of harms 
experienced by children as a result of online risks: implications for policy and research, Information, 
Communication & Society Vol. 18 , Iss. 1,2015, 60. 
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There is a need for future research on children’s privacy online and related harms to 
pay more attention to specific age groups, instead of relying on the general distinction between 
children and adults. As discussed in Chapter 4, policy makers should explore different sectors, 
data collection practices and age groups, for example by looking into the correlation between 
the characteristics of certain age groups of children and the likelihood of being vulnerable for 
specific commercial data collection practices. In line with the ‘evolving capacities’ of the child, 
identified in Article 5 of the UN CRC and the recent General Comment No. 20 on the 
Implementation of the Rights of the Child in Adolescence adopted by the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child,1006 approaches in data protection law in relation to adolescents should 
differ from approaches to younger children in order to realise their rights and recognise their 
development,  increasing capacity and agency and the implications for consent.1007  
Finally, an underdeveloped field that would reguire further exploration is the 
involvement of children in regulation and policy making. It is well established that the views 
of children themselves should be considered in policymaking and the preparation of national 
laws related to the use of children’s personal data, as well as in their evaluation.1008 As noted 
by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘including children should not only be a 
momentary act, but the starting point for an intense exchange between children and adults on 
the development of policies, programmes and measures in all relevant contexts of children’s 
lives’.1009 However, currenlty children do not have a voice on the regulation of issues that relate 
to them and no public consultation has taken place to incorporate their voice, even if the GDPR 























                                                
1006 General comment No. 20 (2016) on the implementation of the rights of the child during adolescence 
CRC/C/GC/20, 6 December 2016. 
1007 Berman, G. and Albright, K. (2017). Children and the Data Cycle: Rights and Ethics in a Big Data World, 
Innocenti Working Paper 2017-05, UNICEF Office of Research, Florence. 
1008  Committee on the Rights of the Child, The right of the child to be heard (General Comment No. 12) (2009)  
CRC/C/GC/12. 









The dissertation examined EU data protection law and self-regulation initiatives and questioned 
how they can be protect children from online privacy risks while accounting for the particular 
characteristics of children. It proposed to include the specific catalogue of fundamental rights 
and freedoms (i.e. the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) and account for special needs 
and vulnerabilities of children in the child-specific data protection impact assessments. Also, 
it showed that the child-specific data protection regime can benefit from more legal certainty 
if consent, as a protection mechanism, is fine-tuned drawing on the US COPPA’s experience, 
and the GDPR concepts and principles, (principles of fairness, transparency, and conceptual 
questions of an average child and services directed to children) are interpreted holistically with 
the EU consumer law. Finally, it claimed that the regime could become more effective and 
bring online privacy protection mechanisms more in line with the human rights perspective if 
online child privacy risks were addressed separately from safety risks, preferably in the self-
regulatory codes of sectorial industry associations. This could lead to clearer and more 
enforceable rules given the possibility for public authorities to approve the content of such 






Annex 1: Overview of the survey results  
               










SOFT LAW AND 
OTHER INITIATIVES 
Other initiatives (until 
2014) 
1. Does your country 
have specific legal 
provisions regulating 
the protection of 
children’s (age below 
18) personal data 
online? If yes, please 
specify and provide 
references to the 
relevant legal acts. 
2. How many complaints 
related to the 
infringement of 
children’s privacy/data 
protection rights online 
did your data protection 
authority (DPA) receive 
in the last 5 years 
(please, if possible, 
specify the amount of 
complaints per year 
since 2009)? How many 
of the received 
complaints resulted in an 
action of your DPA? 
What were the reasons 
for complaints and the 
adopted decision of the 
DPA? Please provide 
reference to the relevant 
texts. 
3. Are there any 
court decisions 







to the relevant 
court decisions. 
4. To your knowledge, are 
there any soft law 
instruments (codes of 
conduct, guidelines, 
principles, etc.) adopted 
on the national level 
aiming to protect 
children’s personal data 
online? Please provide a 
reference to the relevant 
texts. 
5. If possible, please 
provide any other relevant 
information (documents, 
reports, surveys, etc.) you 
are aware of in light of the 
research topic. 
 
1. Austria No specific legal 
provisions. 
 
No complaints received. No court 
decisions. 
No soft law and other 
initiatives. 
2. Belgium No specific legal 
provisions. 
 
Belgian DPA has 
issued an Opinion No. 
38/2002 on the 
protection of privacy 
of minors on the 
internet.1010 
Statistical information is 
not detailed enough to 
answer the question. 
The DPA has no 
information about 
such decisions.  
 
Initiatives of the DPA: 
Long-term awareness 
raising initiative “I 
decide” on modern 
technologies and their 
impact on privacy.1011 
The DPA aims to educate 
children and young people 
about the importance of 
privacy and responsible 
                                                
1010Opinion No. 38/2002 of 16 September 2002 concerning the protection of the private life of minors on the 




1011Website of “I decide” initiative is available in Dutch (http://www.lkbeslis.be) and French 
(http://www.Jedecide.be). The description of the initiative provided by the DPA: “The Belgian DPA has its 
own "I decide" project, for which its original ambition was to act as a knowledge centre, to make its know-
how, experience and services available to the world of education and other organisations working with and 
for young people. The objective of the DPA throughout the project has been to raise awareness on the 
importance of privacy for young people, because they do not always realize that rapid technological 
developments and the temptation to use technology intensively result in the dissemination of their personal 
data. However, the DPA did not want its message to be a "heads up" stressing dangers instead of possibilities: 
the Belgian DPA only aims at reconciling young people's privacy with the positive impact of modern 
technologies, in order for them to take their own well-informed decisions on whether or not they disclose 
their personal data. 'I decide - young and aware of my privacy' is a powerful statement, launched by the 
Belgian DPA approximately five years ago as the title of a long-term initiative aimed at awareness raising 
among young people on all possibilities of modern technologies and their impact on privacy.” 
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behaviour online without 
stressing dangers instead 
of possibilities.  
3. Bulgaria No specific legal 
provisions.  
No complaints received. 
 
In May 2011, the DPA 
was asked for an opinion 
by another public 
authority on whether the 
IP address is personal 
data in a case related to a 
website which 
disseminated erotic 
pictures of children.  
The DPA has no 
information about 
such decisions.  
 
Initiatives of the DPA:  
In 2012, the DPA 
organized the information 
campaign “Data 
Protection Week” (a site 
with information on 
important privacy and 
personal data protection 
issues and the leaflets 
were created).1012  
A competition “Me and 
the Internet” for drawings, 
essays or poems on the 
dangers of the internet and 
the importance of the 
personal data protection 
online. 60 children (4-17 
years of age) took part in 
the competition.  
 
Other initiatives:  





- State Agency for Child 
Protection publishes 
documents in the area of 






4. Croatia No specific legal 
provisions.  
The DPA received 55 
complaints on the misuse 
of children’s personal 
data. 4 complaints 
exclusively related to the 
personal data processing 
online, others to data 
processing by 
newspapers (including 
online versions), media 
and preschool public 
institutions. In each of 
the cases the DPA took 
measures to protect the 
child rights. 
The DPA has no 
information about 
such decisions.  
 
Initiatives of the DPA: 
Together with the Centre 
for Safer Internet 
(http://www.sigurnijiintern
et.hr/) the DPA promotes 




- Red Button Project by 
the Ministry of Interior: 
https://redbutton.mup.hr 
- Safety and Protection on 
the Internet project by 
the Polytechnic of 
                                                
1012The texts offering guidance for children and parents when providing personal data on the Internet can be 
found in English on the DPA’s website: 
http://www.cpdp.bg/en/index.php?p=element&aid=425 - guide for children 





5. Cyprus No specific legal 
provisions. 
No complaints received. 
 
The DPA has no 
information about 
such decisions. 
To the knowledge of the 




- - - -  
7. Denmark No specific legal 
provisions. 
  
Statistical information is 
not detailed enough to 
answer the question. 
The DPA has no 
information about 
such decisions.  
The DPA has no 
information about  
soft law instruments and 
other initiatives. 
8. Estonia  No specific legal 
provisions. 
 
Statistical information is 
not detailed enough to 




breaches online are rare 
and dealt with very fast. 









Other initiatives:  
Targaltinternetis.ee1013  is 
an Estonian website 
dedicated to teaching 
children about online 
dangers and behaviour. 
9. Finland No specific legal 
provisions.  
  
Statistical information is 
not detailed enough to 
answer the question. 
 
There have been few 
cases about pictures or 
names of minors on the 
Internet.  






An organization called 
“Mediakasvatus- ja 
kuvaohjelmakasvatuskesk
us” organizes events on 
media skills and how to 
use the Internet for school 
age children in schools1014  
10. France No specific legal 
provisions. 
 
The CNIL has not 
adopted any decisions 
regarding minors in 
particular, but 
published articles on 
how to protect 
information on social 
media1015 and photos 
online1016. In 2013, 
the CNIL proposed to 
amend the French 
Data Protection Act, 
and amongst others, 
to provide particular 
protection for minors 
Statistical information is 
not detailed enough to 
answer the question. 
 
In 2014, more 
complaints on behalf of 
minors than in previous 
years were received. The 
subject of most of the 
complaints was the right 









online data. Some 




Court of Nancy, 





Initiatives of the DPA: 
The CNIL puts much 
effort into a Digital 
Education programme 
which targets minors, e.g. 
the CNIL has a website 
dedicated to young people, 
parents, and educators1020. 
This website offers 
information for young 




In coalition with 
EDUCNUM, the CNIL 
has launched a 
competition regarding 
                                                
1013http://www.targaltinternetis.ee/?lang=en (in English)  
1014https://kavi.fi/fi/kansallinen-audiovisuaalinen-instituutti/mediakasvatus-ja-kuvaohjelmayksikko (in 
Finnish) 
1015CNIL, Maîtriser les informations publiées sur les réseaux sociaux, 10 janvier 2011, at: 
http://www.cnil.fr/linstitution/actualite/article/article/maitriser-les-informations-publiees-sur-les-reseaux-
sociaux/ 
1016CNIL, Les conseils de la CNIL pour mieux maîtriser la publication de photos, 13 octobre 2014, at: 
http://www.cnil.fr/nc/linstitution/actualite/article/article/les-conseils-de-la-cnil-pour-mieux-maitriser-la-
publication-de-photos/  
1019Appellate Court of Nancy, 10 février 2014, Poirot c. SA Banque CIC, arrêt n° 362/14, 13/01512 
1020http://www.jeunes.cnil.fr/  
1021Guidelines available at: http://www.jeunes.cnil.fr/espace-jeunes/mon-quotidien/;  
242 
 
online 1017 by 
enhancing children’s 
rights to effectively 




According to the CNIL: 
“the idea is to get students 
thinking about how to best 
transmit good reflexes and 
good practices regarding 
personal data online to 
children and young 
people1022. In other words, 
instead of a regulator 
deciding how to best 
inform the youth, it will be 
a “youth to youth” 
discussion model. Thus, 
the youth will come up 
with new and inspiring 
ideas on how to best 
educate the next 





The protection of 
children’s rights in 
Germany is regulated 
in the 
“Jugendschutzgesetz”
, a federal law, which 
does not contain any 
specific regulations 
on children’s personal 
data. Each of the 16 
federal-states has its 
own data-protection-
law. The data 
protection law of 
Rhineland-Palatinate 
does not contain any 
specific provisions on 




Statistical information is 







decisions in the 




No soft law instrument on 




An institution called 
“jugendschutz.net” 
focuses on protection 



















agte für den 
Datenschutz 




We are not aware of 
any separate rules for 
the protection of 
personal data of 
children in the online 
area. 
General rules for the 
data protection of 
children and 
adolescents can be 
3 concrete complaints 
regarding the handling of 
personal data of children 
and young people on the 
Internet have been 
received: 
2010 - Publication of 
student names on lists 
that document payment 
for a class trip; 
No court 
decisions in the 
area of DPA’s 
responsibility. 
 
Initiatives of the DPA: 
No concrete instructions 
on the subject have been 
issued by the DPA. 
However, the DPA carries 
out information and 
teaching events on data 
protection in schools for 
pupils and teachers. It has 
also conducted teaching 
                                                
1017CNIL, Présentation du 3’ème rapport d’activité 2013, Press Conference, 19 March 2014, at: 
http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/La_CNIL/publications/Dossier_de_presse_rapport_d_activite_2013.
pdf; p. 18 
1018The proposition of CNIL has resulted in an amendment of the French Data Protection Act of 1978 (Article 
40 establishes an "accelerated data erasure procedure", the condition of being a minor is sufficient to obtain 
the erasure of data "as soon as possible“; Article 58 foresees a possibility for the minor from 15 years old to 
exercise his/her rights of access, rectification and opposition and to refuse to allow his/her parents to be 
informed and have access to his/her personal data) 
1022More information available at: http://www.educnum.fr/  
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found in the School 
law of the state of 
Brandenburg as well 
as in the 
corresponding data 
protection regulation 
of the school system. 
   
 
Pictures published on the 
school's website. 
2011 - Publication of 
exam grades including 
the student names on the 
Internet. 
No regulatory measures 
were taken by the DPA 
in the aforementioned 
cases. The schools were 
informed about the 
violations and terminated 
them. 












While the State Data 
Protection Act of 
Baden-Württemberg 
(LDSG) regulates the 
processing of 
personal data 






(BDSG) applies to the 
processing of 
personal data 




the BDSG nor LDSG 
contain any specific 
provisions on minors. 
An exception is the 
provision on consent 
in § 4a (1) BDSG. 
Pursuant to § 4a (1) 
BDSG, consent is 
only valid if it is 




Minors can give 
consent in accordance 
with § 4a BDSG if 
they are able to 
foresee the 
consequences of 
using their data in the 
respective context and 
therefore make a 
binding statement 
(comprehension 
ability). This also 
applies if data is 
collected or 
transmitted online. 
Statistical information is 
not available to answer 
the question. 
 






In public schools in 
Baden-Württemberg, 
the use of social 
networks for 
communication, e.g. 
between teachers and 
students is prohibited 

































were mainly received by 
telephone and answered 
ad hoc.  
Statistical information is 
not detailed enough to 
answer the question. 
 
In 2013, there has been a 
written complaint from a 
divorced mother who 
saw the photo of her 
minor child (whom she 
has the sole custody) 
posted by the father on 
his Facebook page 
without her consent. The 
DPA sent a letter to the 
father informing him 
that, since access to the 
posted material is not 
confined to his “Friends” 
but can be seen by a 
large number of third 
party contacts or may be 
generally accessible to 
all users of the service, 
the processing falls 
within the scope of the 




Initiatives of the DPA: 
The DPA contributes to 
the protection of 
children’s privacy online 
with informative seminars 
at schools, webinars aimed 
at schools all over Greece, 











                                                
1023The Guide is available at: http://it.kultus-bw.de/,Le/Startseite/IT-Sicherheit/soziale+Netzwerke 
1025More information available at: 
http://www.dpa.gr/portal/page?_pageid=33,97846&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (in Greek) 
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Greek Privacy Law 
2472/1997. 1024 





- Act CVIII of 2001 
on Electronic 








- Hungarian Privacy 
Act: Act CXII of 
2011 on the Right of 
Informational Self-
Determination and 
on Freedom of 
Information (Section 
6, sub-section 3) 
 
19 cases related to the 
infringement of 
children’s online data 
protection rights.  
 
The reasons for the 
complaints: the grounds 
of infringement of 
privacy rights of 
children, an infringement 
relating to children’s 
personal data or 
concerning the exercise 
of the rights of access to 
public information or 
information of public 
interest, or if there is 
imminent danger of such 
infringement. Specific 
complaints related to 
issues like deletion of 
photos of children from 
social network sites, 
requirement for 
authorization of 
accessing website by 
children, conditions of 
publishing photos of 
children on internet, 
deletion of personal data 
of children from 
websites. 
In 9 out of 19 cases an 
administrative 
proceeding for data 
protection were 
launched1026 and 2 out of 
these 9 cases ended with 




/81028 against a 
dating site 
nolrandi.hu due to 
the fact that a 
large percentage 
of the subscribers 







and did not 
implemented 
technological 
code for setting an 
age limit when 
creating an 
account to prevent 
that children 
below the age of 
16 can subscribe.  
Initiatives of the DPA: 
A study published by the 
DPA, which promotes the 




- Media Literacy 
Education Centre Magic 
Valley: 
(http://magicvalley.hu/) 









- Safer Internet project: 
http://saferinternet.hu 
 
14. Ireland - - - - 
- 
                                                
1024The DPA also noted that the posting and publication of a photograph of a child on a website is a decision which 
must be taken jointly by the parents, who exercise parental authority over minor children (cf. decision no. 
34697/2010 of the Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki). 
1026The DPA is entitled to launch a procedure if it is presumed that the illegal processing of personal data 
concerns many individuals; concerns special data, or significantly harms interests or results in the risk of 
damages. (Section 60 of the Hungarian Privacy Act) 
1027The relevant texts related to the Authority’s decisions (in Hungarian language) are: Case No. NAIH-798-
40/2013/H (at:http://www.naih.hu/files/798_2013_hatarozat.pdf), Case No. NAIH-799-8/2013/H (at: 
http://www.naih.hu/files/799_2013_hatarozat_anonim.pdf), case No. NAIH-805-5/2013/H (at: 
http://www.naih.hu/files/805_2013_hatarozat.pdf). 
1028Court decision No. 11.K.33.918/2013/8, available at: http://www.naih.hu/files/798_2013_itelet.PDF  
1029Available at: http://naih.hu/files/projektfuzet-angol-web.pdf 





15. Italy No specific legal 





provisions relate to 




a) in respect 
of processing 
operations for 
purposes of justice, 
specific safeguards 
are provided against 
the dissemination, 
including online, of 
information related to 
children involved in 
judicial proceedings. 
(sec. 50 and 52.5 of 
the Data Protection 
Code)1031:  
b) the Code of 
Practice Concerning 
the Processing of 
Personal Data in the 
Exercise of 
Journalistic Activities 
which is attached to 
the Data Protection 
Code, sets forth 
specific provisions to 
protect children in the 
journalistic field 
(including with 
respect to online 
journalism). In 
particular, Section 7 
of the Code of 
practice gives a 
strengthened 
protection to the 
child's right to privacy 
which takes 
precedence over both 
freedom of expression 
and freedom of the 
press.1032 This code of 
conduct has a 
Statistical information 
cannot be provided. 
 
The greatest part of 
complaints/reports 
received by the DPA on 
processing of children's 
personal data concerns 
the publication 
(including online) of 
personal 
information/images 
related to minors by 
newspapers,1033 as well 
as by social networking 
users. 
For example, a complaint 
was lodged by a woman 
against the 
dissemination, by her 
husband on his personal 
blog, of personal data 
related to her and her 
daughters.  In order to 
reconcile freedom of 
expression with the right 
to privacy of the persons 
concerned the DPA 
ordered the 
anonymisation of the 
personal data related to 
the woman and her 
daughters.1034 Another 
complaint related to an 
unlawful publication of 
sensitive personal data of 
a minor (a video on 
Youtube where a face of 
seriously sick girl could 
be clearly seen).1035 
 
A ("Vividown" 
case) related to 
data processing 
on the Internet, 
i.e. the uploading 
on the Google 
video platform of 
a video in which a 
disabled minor 







reasoning for its 
verdict of 
acquittal for the 
three Google 
executives who 
were sentenced to 
six months in 








in cases of 
violation of 
privacy (Section 
167 of the Privacy 
Code) due to 
videos (in this 
case of a minor) 
posted on the 
web.  
Soft law instruments: 
- The Code of Practice 
Concerning the 
Processing of Personal 
Data in the Exercise of 
Journalistic Activities.  
- The "Treviso Charter", a 
set of principles 
specifically aimed at 
protecting children's 
privacy and dignity. 
Such Charter, in 
cooperation with the 
DPA, was updated in 
2006 in order to extend 
children' protection also 
to online journalism. 






1034Available at: http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/3117705 




value since the 
respect of its 
principles is a pre-
requisite for the 
processing to be 
lawful, as foreseen by 
Article 12 of the Data 
Protection Code. 
16. Latvia No specific legal 
provisions. 
Statistical information is 
not available. 
 
The DPA received 
several complaints 
related to children’s data 
published online (e.g., 
results of competitions 
indicating name, 
surname and other 
personal data of children; 
the height and weight of 
identifiable children 
published online by a 
Model school) or 
information provided to 
third parties without a 
legal ground (e.g., a 
characteristic of certain 
identifiable child 
provided to third 
persons).1036 






been challenged in 
court.  




Initiatives of the DPA: 
A recommendation issued 
by the DPA “Children’s 
Personal Data Protection 




regarding children’s rights 
online by the State 
Inspectorate for Protection 
Of Children's Rights1038  
17. Lithuania No specific legal 
provisions. 
No complaints received. 
The Office of the 
Inspector of Journalist 
Ethics examines 
complaints (applications) 
of interested persons 
with regard to personal 
data violations in the 
media and could have 
received relevant 
complaints. 




The DPA has no 
information about any 
relevant soft law 
instruments. 
 






14 complaints regarding 
specifically children’s 
privacy/data protection 
rights were received. 
Most of those complaints 
concerned 









secure.lu/) organises and 
promotes the secure use of 
                                                
1036According to the Children’s Protection Law in Latvia the cases concerning children should be considered 
as a priority by each state institution, thus also by the DPA. Therefore there has always been an action 
from the DPA, including fines applied for illegal data processing. 
1037The recommendation is available at: http://www.dvi.gov.lv/lv/jaunumi/publikacijas. 




ms of children published 
via various media on the 
internet (Facebook, 
internet sites and blogs, 
Youtube, etc.), some 
concerned requests for 
deletion of accounts 
created by minors 
(PayPal, Amazon, etc.) 
and identity theft cases. 
All of those cases were 
investigated and relevant 
action was taken 
accordingly.  
the internet and other 
media, especially for 
young people. 
 
19. Malta - - - - 
20. Netherlands The Dutch data 
protection act 
specifies in Article 
5(1) that children 
under 16 cannot give 
valid consent. This 
rule applies to all 
types of data 
processing for which 
consent is the 
legitimate ground, 
including online data 
processing.  
In 2007, the Dutch 
DPA has published 
Guidelines on the 
publication of 
personal data on the 




The Dutch DPA receives 
dozens of questions and 
signals per year related 
to children’s online 
privacy. These signals 
may be questions about 
relatively easy to answer 
data protection issues, or 
serious complaints from 
(legal representatives) of 
children about an alleged 
breach of their right to 
data protection. 
Compared with other 
data protection issues, 
the amount of signals 
and complaints the Dutch 
DPA receives about 
children’s online privacy 
is low. 
Other investigations 
relating to children’s 
online privacy: 
2009 - Investigation 
social networking site 
www.zikle.nl aimed at 
children 12-15 years old 
2009 - Investigation 
ranking & rating site 
beoordeelmijnleraar 
(school children rating 
their teachers) (many 




The DPA has no 
information about any 
relevant soft law 
instruments. 
 
Initiatives of the DPA:1041 
The DPA provides 
specific guidance for the 
general public regarding 
children and online 
privacy on its website. 
 
Other initiatives: 
Work of the organisations 
'Mijn Kind Online', 




                                                
10392007 - Richtsnoeren publicatie persoonsgegevens op internet (also available in English, Guidelines for the 
publication of personal data on the internet, with special attention for minors, see: 
http://www.dutchdpa.nl/downloads_overig/en_20071108_richtsnoeren_internet.pdf). 
1041The Dutch DPA has actively contributed to a number of opinions from the Article 29 Working Party and the 
Berlin group of data protection experts relating to internet issues. All of these opinions contain specific 
recommendations with regard to children’s online privacy. See specifically the opinions on Mobile apps 
(2013), Online behavioural advertising (2010), Online social networking (2009) and Search Engines (2008), 
Working Document 1/2008 on the protection of Children's Personal Data and the Report and Guidance on 





received in 2008) 
2009 - Investigation tell-
a-friend game website 
jiggy.nl aimed at 
children.1040  







- Initiatives of the DPA:  
A survey “The perception 
of issues related to data 
protection and privacy of 
children and young 
people" has been 
conducted. Together with 
the survey results the DPA 
published tips and 
recommendations on how 
to protect personal data 
and privacy while using 
the Internet.1042  
 
From 2009 the DPA 
conducts an educational 
programme “Your data –
your concern. Effective 
protection of personal 
data. Educational activity 
addressed to students and 
teachers”.1043 






Statistical information is 
not available. 
 
The reasons for 
complaints are related to 
the abusive disclosure of 
personal data (e.g. on 
school websites or 
photos in social media 
networks). The DPA has 
applied fines and ordered 
the erasure of the data. 
 
 
The DPA is not 
aware of such 
decisions.  
 
The DPA is not aware of 
any soft law. The DPA 
plans to develop specific 
guidelines for the data 
processing in the school 
context, including the 
online world. 
 
Initiatives of the DPA: 
The DPA developed an 
awareness raising project 
for children at school 
(DADUS Project) to 
provide information on 
data protection and 
privacy, safe ICT use, 
                                                
1040Other investigations conducted by the Dutch DPA relating to information society services are also likely to 
involve children, e.g. the investigation into the data processing by the app WhatsApp, or the investigation 
into data processing by Google after the change of its privacy policy in May 2012. 
1042These guidelines are addressed to parents and teachers. The main result of the research is that actions which 
aim is to raise awareness in the field of personal data and privacy protection among children and youth in the 
online environment are absolutely essential in order to protect them in the Internet and remind them about the 
need to protect privacy because they do not always remember about it, sharing carelessly their personal data 
while using the Internet. The survey is available at the DPA’s website 
http://www.giodo.gov.pl/1520124/id_art/6914/j/pl (in Polish). 
1043During the 4th edition of the programme, teachers from schools involved in the initiative developed lessons’ 
scenarios devoted to the education in the field of personal data and privacy protection also on the Internet. 
This material, written in Polish, is restricted to the participants of the programme. 
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online risks and ways to 
minimize them.1044  




personal data of 
minors aged between 






No complaints received. The DPA is not 




The Sigur.Info project 
(www.sigur.info) on the 
promotion of the use of 
the internet and of the new 
online technologies in the 
safest conditions, Safer 
Internet plus.  
Two brochures - “Practical 
Guide for Teenagers” and 
“Practical Guide for 
Parents” are also available 
in Romanian.1047 





No complaints received. The DPA is not 





companies have special 
departments or sections on 
their websites dealing with 
children’s protection. 
Several NGOs in Slovakia 
are working on this 
subject: (e.g. the website 
www.zodpovedne.sk on 
protection of children 
online, a civil association 
eSlovensko, the project 
“Ovce” (Sheeplive)).  
  
The DPA is of “the 
opinion that the parents 
and children in Slovakia 
have enough information 
on the issue of children’s 
protection in the net. 
Children have also subject 
of “information 
                                                
1044This Project was launched in 2008 with great adhesion from schools (teachers and pupils) and the support of 
the Ministry of Education, through a cooperation protocol. The Project worked based on a e-platform and all 
kind of materials were developed by the DPA. The DADUS Project is now under revision, evolving to a 
different role, as the Ministry of Education has officially inserted data protection and privacy issues in the 
curricular programmes of the ICT discipline, which is mandatory for all children for two years.  
1045The provisions of Law No. 677/2001 are applicable and the provisions of article 12 of Law no. 506/2004 on 
the processing of personal data and protection of private life within the electronic communication’s sector 
must be taken into account. As regards the operations of collection of minors’ personal data via the internet, 
these are susceptible to present special risks for their rights and liberties and for that reason data controllers 
must bear in mind ensuring an efficient protection for minors. One must also take note of the legal provision 
which guarantees children’s right in relation to protecting their public image, the intimate, family and private 
life, the protection against any forms of exploitation or abuse, etc.  
1046The legal system of Rumania recognizes a restrained capacity for the minors aged between 14 and 16. It is 
necessary to obtain minors’ agreement, as well as the consent of their legal representatives for personal data 
processing. Therefore, depending of the minor’s age, their legal representatives may be required to provide 
their contact data (phone number, e-mail, etc.) in order to allow for them to be contacted or, alternatively, the 
use of certain applications oor enrolment on various websites may be conditioned to only being done by the 
parents. In all situations, the fact that minor’s legal representatives have given their express and unequivocal 
consent must be provable.  
1047They aim to describe the types of situations which may catch children unprepared as well as the types of 
illegal or harmful content on the internet, which must be reported to the Safenet.ro hotline.  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technologies” at school 
when they receive 
information on protection 
necessity. In addition to 
help from state authorities 
the green line is operated 
to help children with any 
problem and many 
children have used this 
line”.  
25. Slovenia No specific legal 
provisions. 
Approximately 10 
complaints regarding on 
children’s data 
processing online were 
received. The majority of 
these complaints related 
to the publishing of 
children’s photos online 
(photos taken in 
kindergarten, school, 
etc.); one complaint 
related to the publishing 
of personal data of all 
children born in 2010 on 
a municipality’s 
webpage. In each case 
the DPA asked the data 
controller to demonstrate 
the legal basis for the 
processing of personal 
data. If the data 
controller was not able to 
provide a concrete 
consent of the parents, 
the Commissioner 
ordered for the 
data/photos to be 
removed. 
The DPA is not 
aware of such 
decisions.  
 
Soft law instruments:  
- Self-regulatory code of 
conduct of the public 
electronic 
communication services 
providers on the 
protection of users1048  
- Self-regulatory code of 
conduct of mobile 
operators of public 
electronic 
communication services 
on safer use of mobile 
phones by children and 
adolescents up to 18 
years 
- Code of conduct on hate 
speech:1049 
Initiatives of the DPA: 
Since there are no legal 
instrument regulating the 
protection of children's 
personal data online the 
DPA (alone and together 
with other organizations) 
performs many awareness 
raising activities: prepares 
and publishes leaflets and 
brochures on the subject, 
gives lectures to children 
and teachers, gives 
advices through its non-
binding opinions, etc. 
 
Soft law instruments 
prepared by the DPA:  
- guidelines Fighting cyber 
bullying1050  
- guidelines How to use 
Facebook and survive1051  









- several non-binding 
opinions. 
26. Spain One provision (Art. 
13 of the Regulation 
Implementing 
Organic Law 
15/1999, on the 
Protection of Personal 
Data, Approved by 
Royal Decree 
1720/2007) 
specifically refers to 
children. It sets 
special requisites in 
relation to consent for 
the processing of 
personal data of 
children.1052     
In connection with the 
protection of children 
in this matter, it 
would also be 
necessary to take into 
account the 










Statistical information is 
not detailed enough to 
answer the question. 
 
Based on the experience 
of staff dealing with 
complaints, only a very 
limited number of 
complaints have been 
lodged before the 
Spanish DPA involving 
children´s personal data 
online. The cases 
basically were related to 
the absence of parental 
consent (or of procedure 
to authenticate the 
consent), the unlawful 
use of personal data of 
third persons (minors and 
adults) by children on the 
Internet. In one case, for 
instance, the complaint 
was related to the 
recording and posting in 
YouTube of images of a 
handicapped minor.  
These few complaints 
seem to reflect the 
existing pattern with 
regard to children’s data 
processing on line. In 
most of the cases, and 
given that unlawful 
processing tends to be 
associated with criminal 
offences, the police and 
the courts are the 




Soft Law Instruments: 
The Spanish DPA is 
responsible for registering 
the codes of conduct on 
data protection. One of 
them, called “Confianza 
Online”, is aimed to the 
electronic commerce and 
the interactive advertising 
and includes special 
provisions for protection 
of children´s personal data 
online (arts. 34 – 37).1053  
 
Initiatives of the DPA: 
More information on 
protection of children´s 
personal data in the DPA 
website (Canal Joven) 





enterprises have made 
studies and surveys on this 
issue, including the 
Spanish Senate and the 
Spanish Congress. 
                                                
1052“Article 13 Consent for the Processing of Data of Minors 
1. Data pertaining to data subjects over fourteen years of age may be processed with their consent, except in 
those cases where the law requires the assistance of parents or guardians in the provision of such data. 
The consent of parents or guardians shall be required for children under fourteen years old. 
2. Under no circumstances may data be collected from the minor regarding information about any other 
member of the family unit, or about its characteristics, such as data relating to the professional activity of 
the parents, financial information, sociological or any other such data, without the consent of the persons 
to whom such data refer. The aforesaid notwithstanding, data regarding the identity and address of the 
father, mother or guardian may be collected for the sole purpose of obtaining the authorization set out in 
the previous subsection. 
3. When processing refers to the data of minors, the information aimed at them shall be expressed in easily 
understandable language, with express indication of the provisions of this Article. 
4. The data controller is responsible for setting up the procedures that guarantee that the age of the minor 
and authenticity of the consent given by the parents, guardians or legal representatives have been 
effectively checked.” 
1053http://www.agpd.es/portalwebAGPD/canaldocumentacion/codigos_tipo/common/pdfs/codigo_tipo_confianz
a_online_nov_2009.pdf (in Spanish) 
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institutions that currently 
dealt with the claims.  
27. Sweden  No specific legal 
provisions. 
 
Statistical information is 
not available. 
 
The DPA is not 
aware of such 
decisions.  
 
Other initiatives:  
Other relevant authorities 





the Ombudsman for 







The UK Data 
Protection Act 1998 
does not specify a 
particular age limit 
for any of its 
provisions with one 
exception. There is an 
exception for 
Scotland on the right 
for a data subject to 
access their personal 
data.  That person 





Statistical information is 
not detailed enough to 
answer the question. 
 
The ICO is not 














on whether the 
personal data 
being processed 
belongs to a child 
or not.1055 
 
Initiatives of the DPA: 
The ICO has a web page 
dedicated to young people 
(those under 18) which 
has some helpful guidance 
on data protection 
(http://ico.org.uk/youth). 
The ICO has also twice 
supported an initiative by 
the law firm Speechly 
Bircham with regard to 
children protecting 
themselves online.  This 
initiative is called “I in 
Online” and helps teach 
children about protecting 















                                                
1054Data subject’s rights - http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/part/II Exemption regarding rights in 
Scotland - http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/section/66  
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